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

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VOL. VI.

Godet on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans.

VOL. II.

EDINBURGH:
T. & T. CLARK, 38 GEORGE STREET.
1881.

PRINTED BY MORRISON AND GIBB,

FOR

T. & T. CLARK, EDINBURGH.

LONDON, ...	HAMILTON, ADAMS, AND CO.
DUBLIN, ...	ROBERTSON AND CO.
NEW YORK, ...	SCRIBNER AND WELFORD.

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ON

ST. PAUL'S

EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS.

BY

F. GODET, D.D.,
PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY, NEUCHATEL.

111692

Translated from the French

By Rev. A. CUSIN, M.A., Edinburgh.

VOLUME SECOND.

EDINBURGH:
T. & T. CLARK, 38 GEORGE STREET.
1881.

00111692

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THE PRINCIPLE OF SANCTIFICATION CONTAINED IN JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH.

(CONTINUED.)

FIFTEENTH PASSAGE (VII. 1–6).

The Believer is set free from the Law at the same Time as he is set free from Sin.

AGREEABLY to the proposition stated vi. 14: "Sin shall no more have dominion over you: for ye are under grace," the apostle had just expounded emancipation from sin by subjection to grace. But he had said: "For ye are *not under the law,* but under grace." And the words underlined required a special explanation. It is this demonstration which is furnished by the following passage. In his view the two emancipations, that from sin and that from the law, are two closely connected facts, so that the one is the complement of the other. Also between the descriptions of the two deliverances there is to be remarked a parallelism of figures which extends to the slightest details of the two descriptions. It is easy to see how exactly vii. 1–4 corresponds to vi. 16–19,

and vii. 5, 6, to vi. 21–23. Only the general figure in the two cases is borrowed from different domains of social life. The law being a nobler master than sin, the apostle in speaking of it substitutes for the degrading relation of *servitude*, the more exalted one of *marriage;* and hence also in vv. 5 and 6 for the figure of *fruits* (of labour) he puts that of *children* (the issue of marriage).

To prove the believer's emancipation from legal bondage, Paul supports his argument by an article of the law itself, which he applies spiritually, vv. 1–4; then he shows that the believer makes use of this right, not to yield himself more freely to sin, but to serve God better than he would have done under the law (vv. 5, 6). His emancipation in relation to the law is therefore legitimate,—more than that, it is morally beneficial and necessary.

The first three verses adduce the example cited from the law, and the fourth applies it.

Vv. 1, 2. "*Or know ye not, brethren* (*for I speak to them that know the law*), *how that the law hath dominion over a man as long as he liveth? For the woman which hath an husband is bound to her husband so long as he liveth; but if the husband be dead, she is loosed from the law*[1] *of her husband.*"—We are familiar with the meaning of Paul's question: *Or know ye not;* it explodes the negation of the expounded truth by an indisputable truth. The meaning here is therefore: Or, if ye are afraid, in the work of your sanctification, to yield yourselves solely to this new master, grace, and think that ye cannot dispense with an external rule like that of the law, know ye not that . . .? The form of address: *brethren,* had not occurred, as Hofmann observes, since i. 13. The apostle is about to have recourse to a more familiar mode of teaching than he had hitherto used in his Epistle; hence he approaches his readers addressing them by this title, which gives to what follows the character of a conversation.—In the parenthesis: *for I speak to those who . . .*, the *for* refers to the negative answer which is to be supplied after the question: *know ye not:* "No, ye cannot be ignorant of the legal prescription which I am about to quote" . . .—We must avoid translating as if the article τοῖς stood before the participle γινώσκουσι:

[1] T. R. omits the words του νομου without any authority; a simple oversight.

"*to those among you who know the law.*" The grammatical form proves that the apostle here, as well as by the word *brethren*, is addressing the whole of the church of Rome. This is one of the passages from which many conclude that this church was almost exclusively composed of Jews (Baur, Holtzmann), or at least of proselytes (de Wette, Beyschl.). Nevertheless, even Mangold allows (p. 73) that "this expression may apply also to Christians of Gentile origin, as the O. T. was received and read throughout the whole church as a document of revelation." One might even go farther, and maintain that it would be superfluous to remind those who had been Jews that they are such as *know the law*. Very early the reading of the O. T. passed from the worship of the synagogue to that of the church. The Epistles addressed to the churches of the Gentiles prove to what an extent the apostles assumed their readers to be acquainted with the history and oracles of the O. T. St. Paul thus interrogates the Galatians, who certainly were not of Jewish origin (iv. 21): "Tell me, ye that desire to be under the law, understand ye not the law?"—Now, here is one of the articles of that law, which, spiritually applied, solved the question of the relation between the Christian and the law. The code, in case of death, allowed the surviving spouse to re-marry. If, consequently, it is a fact that there was a death in the case of the believer, it follows, according to the law itself, that he is set free from the law, his former spouse. Such is the summary of the following verses.—So true is it that ver. 1 is still connected with ver. 14, and gives the development of the words of that verse: *not under the law*, that the term κυριεύειν, *to be master*, to have power over, is borrowed from that verse.—The term *man*, ἄνθρωπος, may designate either sex. In ver. 2, where the case of the female is specially in question, Paul uses another word (ἀνήρ) to denote the husband.—The subject of the verb ζῇ, *lives*, according to our translation, is, *the man*. The law bears rule over the individual man, so far as his civil relations are concerned, as long as he is in life. Some commentators (Or., Er., Beng.) understand as the subject of the verb *lives*, νόμος, *the law*. This would give the idea of the abolition of the law by the coming of Christ, in the sense of x. 4. But this sense is incompatible with the following

verse, where the word ζῶντι (to the *living* husband) reproduces the idea of ζῇ, *liveth*, from ver. 1, as well as with the antithesis: "but if *the husband be dead.*" Besides, the idea of the whole passage is not that of the objective abolition of the law by the coming of Christ; the point in question is the believer's subjective emancipation from this external standard through faith in Christ's death. Philippi agrees with us in making ὁ ἄνθρωπος, *man*, the subject of the verb ζῇ, *liveth*; but he applies the notion of *living* to life *in sin* (vi. 2), to which faith in Christ has put an end (vi. 2–11). The meaning of these last words of the verse would thus be: "The law has only power over the man as long as he continues in his own life, in his natural state of sin; from the time he renounces it to enter into union with Christ, he is set free from the law." Hence it would follow that ver. 1, instead of citing an *example* taken from the law, with the view of illustrating the thought of the passage, would itself express this thought. But it is impossible thus to separate ver. 1 from the sequel. The *for* of ver. 2 shows that the latter is only the explanation of the article of the law quoted in ver. 1. Besides, how could the reader have suspected this extraordinary meaning of the word *live*, which would here designate neither common life nor life in God? Finally, the words: "I speak to you as to those who know the law," forbid us to take the following maxim as anything else than an extract from the law. The first three verses form a whole: the example, namely, taken from the code relating to conjugal life. Ver. 4 will apply the general maxim contained in this example to the domain of religion.

Ver. 2. The maxim cited in ver. 1 is developed in ver. 2. The same law which renders the woman inseparable from the man as long as he lives, sets her free from this subjection as soon as he dies. In the first proposition the emphasis is on the word ζῶντι, *living*; in the second, on the words: *if he be dead.* The precept Deut. xxiv. 2 expressly authorized the marriage of a woman *put away* by her first husband with a second; and *a fortiori*, a new marriage after the first husband was *dead.* If, in the first proposition, the apostle does not speak of the case of divorce, it is because he is referring to the woman as the acting party, and because in any case it did

not belong to the woman to put away her husband. The husband alone had the right to give a letter of divorce, Deut. xxiv. 1. The expression κατήργηται, literally: *is annulled, has ceased to be,* and hence, naturally, *is freed from,* is chosen to extend in a sense to the woman herself the notion of *death,* which applies in strictness only to the husband. The conjugal bond being broken by the husband's death, the wife dies also *as a wife.* Thus the formula of ver. 1, which seemed to apply only to the deceased, is found to apply likewise to the widow. She is dead (to the conjugal bond) in her dead husband. Some take the expression: *the law of her husband,* as meaning the article of the code concerning marriage, *lex ad maritum pertinens.* But it is more natural to understand by this law *the legal power* with which the husband is invested in relation to his wife.—The difficult question in this verse is why Paul takes as an example a wife losing her husband and free to re-marry, rather than a husband losing his wife and enjoying the same right. For the two cases equally demonstrate the truth of the maxim of ver. 1. The fact that the law bound the woman more strictly than the husband, does not suffice to explain this preference. It is the application which Paul proposes to make of his example to the spiritual life which will give us the solution of the question. It shows, in point of fact, that Paul had in view not only the breaking of the believer's soul with the law (the first husband), but also its new union to the risen Christ (the second husband). Now in this figure of the second marriage, Christ could only represent the husband, and the believer, consequently, the wife. And this is what leads the apostle to take a step farther, and to attribute *death* to the wife herself. For Christ having died, the believing soul cannot espouse Him except as itself dead.

Ver. 3. "*So then if, while her husband liveth, she be married to another man, she shall be called an adulteress; but if her husband be dead, she is free from the law; so that she is no adulteress, though she be married to another man.*"—This verse is not a needless repetition of ver. 2. It serves to draw from the legal prescription explained in ver. 2 the conclusion which the apostle has to demonstrate,—the *legitimacy* of a second union in the case supposed. What would be a crime during the husband's lifetime, becomes legitimate when he is dead.—The

term χρηματίζειν strictly signifies *to do business*, and hence: to bear the name of the profession to which one is devoted. To this day a large number of our family names are names of some trade. Comp. also Acts xi. 26.—The expression: *freed from the law*, is defined by the context: it bears special reference to the law on the rule of marriage. But the expression is designedly kept up in all its generality to prepare for the absolute application of it to believers, which the apostle is about to make.—*That she may not be an adulteress* (if she marries again): the law was really intended to reserve for her such liberty.—Augustine, Beza, and Olshausen have attempted another explanation, according to which vv. 2 and 3 are not the development, but the *allegorical application* of the maxim of ver. 1. In its clearest form it is as follows, as it seems to me: The woman bound by the law to her living husband is the human soul subjected by the law to the dominion *of sin* (the first husband). The latter, sin, dying (through faith in Christ crucified), the soul is set free from his power, and enjoys the liberty of entering into union with Christ risen (the new husband). But this explanation would carry us back to the idea of the preceding passage (emancipation *from sin*), whereas ver. 6 shows clearly that Paul means to speak here of emancipation *from the law*. Then the relation between vv. 1 and 2 would require to be expressed, not by *for*, but by *so* (οὕτω), or *so that* (ὥστε). Finally, the ὥστε, *so that*, of ver. 4 shows it is not till then that the moral application begins.

Ver. 4. "*So that, my brethren, ye also are become dead to the law by the body of Christ; that ye should belong to another, even to Him who is raised from the dead, that we should bring forth fruit unto God.*"—Coming to the application, the apostle approaches his readers anew, and more closely, addressing them as: *my brethren*. It is as if he were to say to them familiarly: Let us see! Now, then, is it not clear to you all?—The conjunction ὥστε, *so that*, cannot be taken, as some have sought to do, in the sense of *likewise*, or *so then*. The natural sense: *so that*, is perfectly suitable, if only the force of this conjunction is made to bear not exclusively on the following verb: *Ye are dead to the law*, but on the verb with its entire regimen: *Ye are dead to the law; that ye should belong*

to another. It is not the death of believers in Christ crucified whose legitimacy the apostle wished to show by the preceding example taken from the law, but the new union of which this death is the condition.—The same need of drawing close to his readers which suggests the form of address: *my brethren,* leads him also to use the second person, which is more in keeping with the direct application to which he is now coming. —*Ye also:* quite like this wife who is dead (as a wife) through her husband's death, and who thus has the right to marry again.—*Ἐθανατώθητε, ye are dead,* or more literally: *Ye have been put to death in relation to the law.* The first aorist passive here expresses, as usual, the highest degree of passivity. Jesus draws believers as it were violently into communion with Him in His sufferings. This participation in His violent death is not exactly the same in this passage as that spoken of in ver. 6 of the preceding chapter. The latter referred to the believer's death *to sin,* whereas Paul says here: "Ye are dead *to the law.*" Christ on the cross died to the law, inasmuch as this punishment set Him free from the jurisdiction of the law, under which He had passed His life, and from the Jewish nationality which had determined the form of His earthly existence (Gal. iv. 4). The believer who appropriates this death appropriates also the glorious liberty which in the case of Christ was its consequence. Delivered in Him from the *law of ordinances* (Eph. ii. 15), he enters with Him into the higher life of communion with God. When Paul says: *by the body of Christ,* he reminds us that it was this body which formed the bond between Christ and the theocratic nation (i. 3); and that this bond once broken in His case by death, it is also broken in that of believers, who draw their life from Him. There is no reference in this context to the *gift* of His body as the *price* of our *redemption* (Gess).—The application of the idea of *death* to believers, in the words: *Ye are dead to the law,* agrees with the observation we have made on the expression *κατήργηται, she* (the wife) *is annulled, has ceased to be* (as a wife), at the end of ver. 2. As the new husband is a dead and risen Christ, the wife must necessarily be represented as dead (through the death of her first husband, the law), that she may be in a position to be united to Christ as one risen again. It is a marriage, as it

were, beyond the tomb. And hence it is that the apostle is not content with saying: "Ye have been put to death in relation to the law; *that ye should belong to another*," but adds immediately: "*to Him who is raised from the dead.*"—We can now understand perfectly how Paul, with this application in view from the beginning, extended the notion of *death*, which, strictly speaking, applied only to the husband, to the wife, by the term *κατήργηται, she is abolished, has ceased to be*, ver. 2. — It is easy to see that this figure of a *marriage* between the soul dead in Christ crucified and Christ risen expresses exactly the same idea as we have found already in vi. 5, and as was developed in the whole passage vi. 6–10; only this idea is resumed here to deduce from it the believer's enfranchisement in regard to the law. We may therefore thus sum up the contents of these four verses: As by His death Christ entered upon an existence set free from every legal statute and determined by the life of God alone, so we, when we have died to sin, enter with Him into this same life in which, like a re-married widow, we have no other master than this new Spouse and His Spirit.

The object of this new union, says Paul, concluding this development, ver. 4, is, *that we may bring forth fruit unto God.* By this expression he unmistakeably continues and completes the figure which he began, namely, that of marriage. The new issue which is to spring from this union between the Risen One and His church is an activity rich in holy works wrought in the service of God (*καρποφορῆσαι τῷ Θεῷ, to bear fruit unto God*). To reject this view of the figure is to show a prudery which is neither in harmony with the spirit of antiquity, nor with that of the gospel itself. It is, in fine, to put oneself in contradiction to the two following verses, which can leave no doubt as to the apostle's real meaning.—On what does the *that* depend? Hofmann and Schott hold that it must be connected solely with the last words: *to Him that is raised from the dead, that . . .*; Christ is *raised* to a celestial life *that* He might communicate it to us, and render us active in God's service. But the aim of the resurrection cannot be thus restricted, and the sequel proves that the *that* depends, as is natural, on the principal idea: *that ye should be married to another.* It is not the resurrection, it is

the union of the believer with the Risen One, which has for its end to give birth to a life of good works. This appears from the following verses, in which the apostle contrasts union with the law, which produced fruits of sin, with union with Christ, which results in the best fruits. What has led Hofmann to this false explanation is the desire to account for the transition from the second person plural: *ye have become dead . . . ye were married . . .*, to the first: *we should bring forth fruit*: "*He is raised* for us, *believers*, that *we* should bring forth" . . . Some commentators, indeed (Meyer, to a certain extent), suppose that the verb in the second person and the pronoun ὑμᾶς (*you*) were written from the viewpoint of Judeo-Christians; for, it is said, only people formerly subject to the law could *become dead in relation to it*. The last verb in the first person is, on the contrary, it is said, written from the standpoint of all Christians. But the author of these lines, being himself of Jewish origin, would require to say, and especially when speaking of Judeo-Christians, *we*, rather than *ye*. Comp. Gal. iii. 13, where, speaking in the name of believers of Jewish origin, he says *we*, to contrast with them afterwards, in ver. 14, *the Gentiles*, and in the end to combine both in a final *we*. The true explanation of the contrast between *ye* and *we* in our passage is simpler. At the beginning of this passage, Paul, to get near to his readers, had passed from the didactic tone to the direct address: *brethren!* It was a way of saying to them: "Understand thoroughly, brethren; it is your own history which was contained beforehand in this legal prescription." A new and still more urgent apostrophe had followed in ver. 4 (*my* brethren), at the point where from the explanation Paul was passing to the application. And now the application being made by the: *Ye became dead; that ye should be married*, the didactic tone of the treatise recommenced with the: *that we should bring forth fruit*, which is true not only of the Roman readers, but of the whole Church; and the first person continues (vv. 5, 6); comp. viii. 12, 13 (the inverse change). In ver. 6 he also affirms, as well as in ver. 4, things which at first sight can only suit believers of Jewish origin: "*that* (the law) *under the power of which we were held.*" This is because the apostle does not forget that the experiment of the effects of the law made by the Jews is to the benefit of

all mankind. For if the law had continued for the Jews, its maintenance must have issued in extending the reign of the law to the rest of the world; and so it was indeed that Paul's adversaries understood it (*the* Judaizing *false brethren*), so that it is when addressing all believers that he can say: "Ye became dead to the law by the body of Christ, that ye should be married to the Risen One." Calvin also says, speaking of every Christian: "From hand to hand, *passing from the power of the law*, we were given over to Christ." Apart from Christ, the Gentiles would have no other religious future than subjection to the Jewish law.—The apostle had just proved by the law itself that believers, in consequence of the death which they have undergone, may *without unfaithfulness* cast off the yoke of the law, and contract a new union with Christ. He now points out the grave reason which they have for using this right and preferring this new union to the previous one. The fruits which shall issue from it will be as excellent as those which proceeded from the former were detestable. This expression: *fruits*, recalls the conclusion of the preceding passage, vi. 20–23, where the moral result of the two *servitudes* was described. Here the subject is two *marriages*. The contents of the two verses 5 and 6 were announced in the last words of ver. 4. And first, ver. 5: the first marriage and its fruits.

Ver. 5. "*For when we were in the flesh, the affections of sins, excited by the law, did work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death.*"—The *for* evidently bears not on ver. 5 only, but on vv. 5 and 6 together.—The expression: *to be in the flesh*, is very far from being synonymous with *living in the body*; comp. Gal. ii. 20. The term *flesh*, denoting literally the soft parts of the body, which are the usual seat of agreeable or painful sensations, is applied in Biblical language to the whole natural man, in so far as he is yet under the dominion of the love of pleasure and the fear of pain, that is to say, of the tendency to self-satisfaction. The natural complacency of the ego with itself,—such is the idea of the word *flesh* in the moral sense in which it is so often used in Scripture. Now, what part does the law play in the moral development of man in this state? The *affections of sins*, παθήματα ἁμαρτιῶν, are, says Paul, *excited by it*. The Greek term, which

may be rendered by *affection* or *passion*, denotes an essentially passive state. And, indeed, the affections of sense, which correspond to certain external objects fitted to satisfy them, are less of the nature of spontaneous determinations of the will, than the effect of impressions received. As to the complement: *of sins*, it might be taken either as the genitive of *cause* (produced by sins), or of *quality* (which have the character of sins). But in both senses the singular: *of sin*, would have been more natural. This complement might also be explained as the genitive *of apposition:* the affections *in which* the varied inward forms of sin *consist*, such emotions as are intemperate or impure, interested or proud, selfish or violent. But is it not more natural to see in this complement: *of sins*, the genitive of *effect?* the affections which do not fail to produce every kind of sins, as soon as, being strongly excited, they seek their gratification.—The regimen: *by the law*, depends directly on the word παθήματα, *the affections;* it cannot signify: *produced* by the law, which would be to say too much; for they result from the natural state which Paul designated by the expression: *to be in the flesh.* We must therefore explain: *excited* by the law; this coming into collision with those instincts which were asleep, makes them pass into the active and violent state. Why as a fact do we find man degrading himself so often, by passing beyond the simple satisfaction of his wants, and plunging into excesses to which the brute does not descend? There is not in the latter case that arrest of law which seems so often nothing more to man than an incitement to evil-doing. —The term ἐνηργεῖτο, *acted, operated*, literally, *worked within*, denotes that sort of inward fermentation which is produced when the passions, excited by the resistance of the commandment, seek to master the body in order to their gratification. The verb ἐνεργεῖσθαι, *to act, operate*, is always taken by Paul in the middle sense, which we give to it here, never in the passive sense: *to be put in action;* comp. 1 Thess. ii. 13; 2 Thess. ii. 7; Gal. v. 6; 2 Cor. i. 6, iv. 12, etc. etc. The word: *the members*, corresponds to the expression: *of the sins.* Every evil instinct has, so to speak, an agent corresponding to it in one of the members of the body. The result of this impure working, caused by the shock of the

holy law against the carnal heart of the natural man, is an abundance of evil *fruits* which produce *death* in man; comp. Jas. i. 14, 15. The εἰς, *to, in order to,* contains, as it always does, the notion of *end,* and not only of effect. In the affections of the flesh, it is said, viii. 6, there is a secret aspiration after death. The man who acts without God tends to separate himself ever more profoundly from God.

Ver. 6. "*But now we are delivered from the law, being dead*[1] *to him under whom we were held; so that we serve in newness of spirit, and not in oldness of the letter.*"—The contrast between this *but now* and the *when we were* of ver. 5, corresponds exactly, both as to form and substance, with the contrast between the *when ye were* and the *but now,* vi. 20 and 22; only with an application to another domain (that of the law). In the κατηργήθημεν, literally, *we were annulled,* we again find the form already explained in ver. 2, where it was said of the woman deprived of her standing as a married wife by the death of her husband: κατήργηται, *she is abolished,* she *has ceased to be* (as a wife). Here, as in the former case, this verb, construed with the preposition ἀπό, *from,* contains the idea of the most complete deliverance. We have seen in ver. 4 that this deliverance resulted from the death undergone in Christ (*ye were put to death*). It is this last idea which is recalled by the *being dead,* ἀποθανόντες. The reading of the T. R.: ἀποθανόντος, *that* under which we were held (the law) *being dead,* arises, according to Tischendorf, from a mistake of Beza, who followed Erasmus in a false interpretation which he gives of a passage from Chrysostom. In point of fact, as we have seen, the idea of the abolition *of the law* is foreign to this passage. As to the reading τοῦ θανάτου of the Greco-Latins: "We are delivered from *the law of death* under which we were held," it has probably been occasioned by the expression: *to bring forth fruit unto death,* ver. 5; but this qualification of the law is equally foreign to the passage before us.—Could the master, under whom we were held, possibly be, as Hofmann would have it, *the flesh,* taking the ἐν ᾧ as a *neuter* pronoun? But the whole context, as well as the parallel passage, ver. 4, shows

[1] T. R., without any authority whatever, reads αποθανοντος; ℵ A B C K L P, Syr.: αποθανοντες; D E F G, It.: του θανατου.

clearly that the subject in question is *the law*. The antecedent of ἐν ᾧ is the demonstrative pronoun τουτῷ (*him*, that is to say, *the master*) understood. The last words: *under whom we were . . .*, appear superfluous at first sight; but they are intended to remind us of the example taken from the law, which was the starting-point of this demonstration (vv. 1–3).

But this liberation does not tend to licence. On the contrary, it is to issue in a δουλεύειν, a new *servitude* of the noblest and most glorious nature, which alone indeed deserves the name of liberty. This term δουλεύειν, *to serve*, is chosen as alone applicable to the two states about to be characterized. —*In newness of spirit*, says the apostle; he thus designates the *new* state into which the Holy Spirit introduces the believer, when He establishes a full harmony between the inclination of the heart and moral obligation; when to do good and renounce self for God has become a joy. With this state, of which he gives us a glimpse, and which he reserves for description (chap. viii.), the apostle in closing contrasts the former state. This he puts second, because it is the state which he proposes to describe immediately, vv. 7–25. He calls it *oldness of the letter:* there may be in this expression an allusion to the *old man*, παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος, vi. 6; but anyhow Paul wishes to designate this state as now past for the believer; it is from the viewpoint of his new state that he can characterize it thus. *The letter* is the moral obligation written in the code, imposing itself on man as a foreign law, and opposed to his inward dispositions. Is it not legitimate (vv. 1–4) and advantageous (vv. 5, 6) to break with such a state, and enter upon the other, as soon as this possibility is presented by God Himself?

The apostle has shown in the first section that the gospel has the power to sanctify, and thereby to put an end at once to the reign of sin and law, which are one and the same state. He proceeds to explain that the law need not be an object of regret, since it is powerless to sanctify. It has therefore no well-founded protest to raise against the judgment which falls on it. Such is the subject of the following section.

SECOND SECTION (VII. 7–25).

POWERLESSNESS OF THE LAW TO SANCTIFY MAN.

SIXTEENTH PASSAGE (VERS. 7-25).

The essential ideas of this passage are the following:— After having involved man in death (vv. 7–13), the law leaves him to struggle in this state which cleaves to his nature, and from which it has no power to extricate him (vv. 14–23). It cannot bring him farther than to sigh for deliverance (vv. 24, 25).

But in developing this theme of the powerlessness of the law, is not the apostle turning backward? Was not this subject treated already in chap. iii.? It seems so, and this is one of the reasons why Reuss thinks that our Epistle is deficient in systematic order. But what Paul proved in chap. iii. was the insufficiency of the law to *justify;* the demonstration to be given in the part relative to justification by faith. What he proves here is its powerlessness to *sanctify,* which is entirely different, at least in the eyes of the apostle, and of all those who do not confound justification and sanctification.

It is perfectly intelligible how, after displaying the sanctifying power of the gospel (vi.–vii. 6), the apostle should take a look backwards to consider the work of the law, and describe it from this point of view. This retrospective glance at the part played by an institution which he regards as divine, and which had ruled so important a part of his life, does not at all, as has been thought, assume Judaizing readers, or even such as were of Judeo-Christian origin. The question of the influence of the law was of general interest; for the new gospel revelation appeared everywhere as a competitor with the ancient revelation of the law, and it concerned all to know their respective value in the work of man's sanctification; some, on the one side, wishing to know if they should *remain* under the law; others, if they should *place themselves* under its discipline.

The following section consists of only one passage, divided

into two parts. In the first (vv. 7–13), the apostle proves from experience that the law can only *kill* man morally—that is to say, separate him from God; in the second, from ver. 14, he shows its powerlessness to extricate him from the sad state into which he is plunged. The passage has this peculiarity, that the theses demonstrated are not expounded in a general way, but in a purely personal form; ver. 7: "*I* had not known" . . .; ver. 8: "Sin wrought in *me*" . . .; ver. 9: "*I* was alive . . . *I* died" . . .; ver. 11: "Sin deceived *me;*" ver. 14: "*I* am carnal;" ver. 15: "What *I* would, that *I* do not;" ver. 22: "*I* delight in the law of God;" ver. 24: "Who shall deliver *me?*" ver. 25: "*I* thank God." This style continues even into the beginning of the following chapter, viii. 2: "The law of the spirit of life hath made *me* free." The question is, who is the personage denoted throughout this whole piece by the ἐγώ, *I?* Commentators have indulged in the most varied suppositions on this point.

1. Some Greek commentators (Theoph., Theod. of Mops.) have thought that Paul was here speaking of himself as representing the whole race of mankind from the beginning of its existence, and was thus relating the great moral experiences of the *human race* up to the time of its redemption.

2. Others (Chrys., Grot., Turret., Wetst., Fritzs.) apply this description to the *Jewish nation. Apostolus hic sub primâ personâ describit hebræum genus,* says Grotius. The experiences here described (see below) are referred to the different phases of their history.

3. A large number of commentators (most of the Fathers, Er., the Pietistic school, the rationalistic critics, Beng., Thol., Neand., Olsh., Baur, Mey., Th. Schott, Holst., Bonnet, etc.), consulting the context more strictly, think that the apostle, in virtue of his past history, is here introducing himself as the personification of the *legal Jew,* the man who, being neither hardened in self-righteousness, nor given over to a profane and carnal spirit, seeks sincerely to fulfil the law without ever being successful in satisfying his conscience.

4. After his dispute with Pelagius, Augustine, who had formerly adhered to the previous opinion, gave currency to

another explanation. He expounded the passage, especially from ver. 14, as referring to the *converted Christian;* for he only can be so profoundly in sympathy with the divine law as Paul describes himself in the passage, and on the other hand every believer in the course of his life has those profound experiences of his misery which are here described by the apostle. This opinion was followed by Jerome, then adopted by the Reformers, and defended in our time by Philippi, Delitzsch, Hodge, etc.

5. Only two commentators, so far as known to us, restrict the application of the passage to the apostle's own person. Hofmann, who, if we understand rightly, refers it to Paul as a Christian, but such as he finds himself when he abstracts for a moment from his faith, and Pearsall Smith,[1] who thinks that Paul is here relating a painful experience of his Christian life, in consequence of a relapse under the yoke of the law; after which chap. viii., he thinks, sets forth his return to the full light of grace.

We shall not pronounce on what we believe to be the true sense of the apostle till we have studied this controverted passage in all its details. The first part extends to the end of ver. 13. It explains the effects of the first living contact between the divine law and the carnal heart of man. Sin is unveiled, ver. 7, and in consequence of this discovery it gathers strength and grows (vv. 8, 9), so that man, instead of finding life in his relation to the law, finds death (vv. 10, 11). But this tragical result must be ascribed not to the law itself, but to sin, which uses the law to this end.

Vv. 7–13.

This whole exposition is introduced by the objection which consists in identifying the law with sin. But it must not be thought that the apostle's aim is really to exonerate the law from such a suspicion. Who, in the circle in which he taught, could have pronounced such a blasphemy against an institution recognised to be divine? What the apostle wishes to justify is not the law; it is his own teaching, from which it seemed to follow that the two things, law and sin, are

[1] *Bondage and Liberty*, by M. P. Smith, 1875.

inseparably united, or even identical. Had he not just proved that to be set free from sin is to be so also from the law? Does it not seem to follow that the law and sin are one and the same thing? It is this impious consequence from which he proceeds to clear his gospel. He shows that if the law plays so active a part in the history of sin, it is by no means because of its own nature, which would be wicked, but because of the exceedingly sinful nature of sin.

Ver. 7. "*What shall we say then? Is the law sin? Let it not be! Nay, I did not learn to know sin, but by the law; for I had not known lust, except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet.*"—Some commentators think that in the second question the word *sin* should be taken in the sense of *a cause* of sin. But Paul would easily have found a way of expressing this thought more precisely. The simple meaning of the terms which he uses is this: Is the law something bad in itself, contrary to the essence and will of God, and consequently malignant? And this meaning suits the context still better than the preceding one, which, however, does not imply that we should paraphrase *ἁμαρτία, sin,* by *ἁμαρτωλός, sinner,* (Mey., Philip.), a term which can only be applied to a personal agent. — While repelling with indignation the conclusion ascribed to him, the apostle nevertheless points out the measure of truth which it contains. The law does not produce sin, but it is the law which reveals it. There might be given to the word *ἀλλά, but,* which follows the: *Let it not be!* the meaning of a strong contrast: *Nay, but on the contrary.* To unveil sin is in reality, in some respects, the opposite of producing it. But the apostle has already in view what he proceeds to expound in ver. 8, the fact of the growth of sin as an effect of its detection by means of the law. And hence we think it better to give to the word *ἀλλά, but,* a *restrictive* sense, in relation to the strong negation which precedes. No, assuredly! *But at least* this cannot be denied. —It is unnecessary to give to *οὐκ ἔγνων,* literally: *I did not learn to know,* the meaning of the conditional (understanding *ἄν*): I should not have known. The indicative is perfectly suitable. It is a fact: "I did not learn to judge of sin otherwise than by the light of the law."—The notion of *knowledge,* contained in *ἔγνων,* has been here explained in many

ways. Fritzsche applies it to the *existence* of sin, as when it is said: I did not know pain; for I had not yet suffered. But this meaning would throw the responsibility of sin on the law, the very thing which Paul wishes to avoid. Meyer thinks that the law *made* sin *known* by calling forth its violence, and so rendering it more easily perceived. But in this sense the idea of ver. 7 would not differ from that of ver. 8; now this is precluded by the δέ, progressive or adversative, at the beginning of the verse (see the strait to which Meyer is reduced to explain this transition). Tholuck and Philippi give an entirely different sense to the word *know*. The point in question is not the proof of the fact of sin, but the understanding of its culpability: "It was by the law that I knew sin as an act contrary to the will of God." But why in this way force the application of the word *know*, when its simple meaning is perfectly sufficient: "I did not perceive in myself the presence of the evil instinct of sin, except by means of the law;" comp. the ἔγνων, Luke viii. 46: I became aware of; I became conscious. This sentence is absolutely parallel, whatever Meyer may say, to that in iii. 20: "By the law is the knowledge of sin."—And how was this discovery, made by means of the law, effected? This is what the apostle explains in the following proposition: "*For also I had not known lust except*" . . . He explains by a concrete fact what he has just stated more abstractly in the preceding proposition. If he discovered sin by the law, it was because one of the commandments made palpable to him the presence of lust, of whose abnormal existence in his inner man he would otherwise have remained for ever ignorant.—This τὲ γάρ, *for also, and in fact*, denotes two things: 1st, a *second* fact of the same kind as the preceding (τέ, *also*); and 2d, the second fact serving as a proof or explanation to the first (γάρ, *for*). Paul might have remained ignorant for ever of the state of sin in which his heart was sunk, if lust had not made it palpable to him. And the presence of lust would have for ever escaped him, if the tenth commandment had not made it known to him. Ἐπιθυμία, *lust*, denotes that involuntary motion of the soul (θυμός) toward (ἐπί) the external object which presents itself as corresponding to its desire. This motion of the soul toward the objects which can satisfy it is so natural to the

human heart, that it would be absolutely lost in the general current of life, and would not fall specially under the eye of conscience, unless the law said: *Thou shalt not covet.* This prohibition is needed to bring man to fix his attention on this spontaneous movement of the soul, and to discover in this fact the symptom of an inward revolt against the divine will.—The pluperfect ἤδειν has, strictly speaking, the meaning of an imperfect: *I had learned* to know, and hence: *I knew.* But in consequence of the *if* (if not = except) which follows, this verb can only be taken logically in the sense of a conditional (understanding, as is frequently done, the ἄν which indicates this mood): *I should know* (present), or: *I should have known* (past). It may therefore be translated in two ways: "I should not know lust (presently), except the law said to me (ἔλεγεν, imperfect)." Or: "I should not have known (I should not have been aware of) lust, except the law had said" (extending the ellipsis of the ἄν to the second verb). In the second case, Paul goes back in thought to the previous time denoted by ἔγνων: "I did not know except by . . .; and in fact I should not have been made aware of . . . except" . . . What seems to me to decide in favour of the latter sense, which places the action in the past, is the relation indicated between the two propositions, and expressed by the τὲ γάρ, *for also,* or *and in fact.* For the abstract terms: *sin* and *law* (in the first proposition), there are substituted in the second the two concrete terms: *lust* and *commandment.* Sin *appears* in lust, as law in the commandment. This is what is signified in reality by the τὲ γάρ, the τέ denoting the transition from the general to the particular, and the γάρ characterizing the particular fact as a *proof* or explanation in relation to the general: "I did not learn to know sin except by the law; for in fact I should not have been aware of lust (in which sin is revealed), had there not been a positive commandment saying to me: Lust not." With this sense also agrees the difference between the two verbs: ἔγνων, from γιγνώσκειν, *to learn to know,* and ἤδειν, from ἰδεῖν, *to perceive* (a fact). It was through the tenth commandment that Paul discovered lust, and it was by finding out this inward fact of lust that he became conscious of his state of sin.—In this picture of his inner life Paul gives us, without intending it, a very high

idea of the purity of his life as a child and a young man. He might, when confronted with the nine commandments, have to the letter claimed for himself the verdict, Not guilty, like the young man who said to Jesus: "All these have I kept from my youth up." But the tenth commandment cut short all this self-righteousness, and under this ray of the divine holiness, he was compelled to pass sentence of condemnation. Thus there was wrought in him, Pharisee though he was, without his suspecting it, a profound separation from ordinary Pharisaism, and a moral preparation which was to lead him to the arms of Christ and His righteousness. To this so mournful discovery there was added (δέ, ver. 8) by and by a second and still more painful experience.

Ver. 8. "*Then sin, taking occasion, wrought in me by the commandment all manner of concupiscence; for without the law sin is dead.*"—After revealing to him the presence of sin, the law itself intensified in him the force of this evil principle. This idea of progress is indicated by the δέ, *now, then*, which makes the fact described in ver. 8 a sequel to that of which we are reminded in ver. 7. The word ἀφορμή, which we translate by *occasion*, strictly signifies *the point of support* from which the spring or flight proceeds (ἀπό, ὁρμάω). Some critics make the words διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς, *by the commandment*, dependent on the participle λαβοῦσα, *having taken*. In this case we should not have to translate: "Taking occasion *from* the commandment," which would require one of the prepositions ἀπό or ἐκ usual in such a case. The meaning would be: "Taking occasion *by means of* the commandment." But it is more natural to make this clause depend on the principal verb *wrought*. For, in the other sense, there would have been no reason for inserting the subject between this regimen and the participle which depended on it. The analogous construction of ver. 11 also leads us to make the regimen: *by the commandment*, dependent on the principal verb *wrought*.—What is the *occasion* meant by the apostle? The usual answer is, the commandment itself: "*In lege* est occasio," says Calvin. This meaning is not inadmissible. Sin, finding a series of prohibitions enumerated in the commandment, made use of this means to enkindle desire for the forbidden objects. But is it not more probable that Paul finds *the occasion* of which

sin makes use, in those forbidden objects themselves, when they appear to the eye or imagination? "Sin finding an occasion, in the view of one of those objects in regard to which God says to me: Thou shalt not covet, took advantage of the circumstance to kindle in my heart, through this very prohibition, the manifold lusts which are related to those different objects." The point in question here is the well-known experience already remarked by the ancients, that man always inclines to forbidden fruit. Comp. Prov. ix. 17. The prohibition has for its effect to fix the object strongly on the imagination, and thereby to lend it a new charm. The heart is as it were fascinated by it, and the latent desire changes into intense aspiration. Thus every word of the commandment has, so to speak, the property of awakening in the heart a new lust. But it must be constantly borne in mind that this is only so because sin, the egoistic instinct, already exists in the heart. The commandment of itself does not produce this result; it is sin which, so to speak, trades upon the commandment for its own profit. On a sound nature, the commandment would not have acted thus; witness the first temptation in which a foreign agent required to play the part here ascribed to sin.—Calvin, in his eagerness to exculpate the apostle completely from the charge of ascribing to the law the aggravation of sin, gives this verse a purely logical meaning. Paul means, according to him, that the law *manifested* the various lusts already present. *Detexit in me omnem concupiscentiam.* This is evidently to distort the meaning of the apostle's words.

And in what state, then, was sin before the law had thus made it abound in all manner of particular lusts? *It was dead,* says Paul. This expression, far from signifying that it did not *exist,* proves, on the contrary, its presence, but, virtually, like the germ of a disease still slumbering, which the least circumstance may cause to break out so as to bring the malady to the acute state. And it is this malignant principle, already in existence, which bears all the responsibility of the disagreeable effects of the law. The literal translation would be: *Without law sin is dead.* It is not as Mosaic law, but as *law,* that is to say, as an external letter, that the code produces this pernicious effect on the sinful soul. And this is what warrants us in applying this description to the law of

nature, and what explains how the *nitimur in vetitum* may also be a confession of the heathen conscience.—We must beware of understanding with Beza the verb ἦν, *was:* "Without law sin *was* dead." The very ellipsis of the verb proves that we have here a general proposition.—The verses which follow initiate us more deeply still into the apostle's moral experiences, when he was *under the law.*

Vv. 9, 10*a*. "*And I was alive when I was formerly without law; but when the commandment came, sin revived, and I died;*"—Calvin well expresses the rhythm of these verses: "The death of sin is the life of man; and, on the contrary, the life of sin is the death of man."—The *Vatic.* reads ἔζην instead of ἔζων: both forms are classical. What is this *life* which the apostle enjoyed when he was yet *without law?* Augustine, the Reformers, and some modern commentators (Bengel, Bonnet) think that the time in question is when, sunk in his Pharisaical delusions, filled with self-righteousness, Paul *thought himself* in possession of the life of God, of true righteousness. They understand the: *I was alive,* in the sense of: *I thought myself alive.* This interpretation is in itself forced; but there is more against it. Could Paul really say of himself that, as a Pharisee, *he was without law?* It was, on the contrary, the time when he was absolutely *under the law,* ὑπὸ νόμον, according to 1 Cor. ix. 20, kept under the charge of the schoolmaster, who was to bring him to Christ, according to Gal. iii. 24. Then if it was his Pharisee life which he wished to characterize in the words: *when I was formerly without law,* what would be the time denoted by the following words: *when the commandment came?* Will it be said: the time of his conversion, when the law took its inmost meaning for him, *in Christ,* its full spiritual bearing? "Though before his eyes," says Calvin, when speaking of his life as a Pharisee, "the law did not seriously affect his heart with the conviction of the judgment of God." It was only by the Spirit of Christ that his eyes were opened, and that the commandment truly humbled and condemned him. But where, then, is this idea of the interposition of Christ, and of the profound crisis of which he speaks elsewhere as a *new creation?* And was the understanding of the commandment then the sole or even the principal character of this transformation? Certainly, if these

words refer to his conversion, some indication or other would not be wanting to designate this transition to a new faith. To discover a period in Paul's life to which the words: *formerly when I was under the law,* really apply, we must go back to the days which preceded the awakening of his moral consciousness under the operation of the law. We are thereby led to the period of his childhood, before he was subjected to the Pharisaic ordinances and the exact discipline of the law. From the age of twelve, young Israelites were subjected to the legal institutes, and became, as was said, *sons of the law, bené hattorah.* This stage of his outward life was undoubtedly for the young Saul the signal of the inward crisis described from ver. 7 onwards. From the moment he found himself called to apply the prescriptions of the law seriously to his conduct, he was not slow to discover sin within him; for in the depths of his heart he found lust; and not only did the law unveil this evil principle to him, but it intensified its power. The torrent bubbled and boiled on meeting with the obstacle which came in its way. Till then Saul *was alive,* morally and religiously, which does not mean merely that he thought himself alive; nor does it denote merely the innocent and pure sprightliness of childhood, yet untroubled by any remorse. The word *live,* when used by Paul, always includes something more profound. It refers here to the state of a young and pious Israelitish child, trained in the knowledge and love of Jehovah, tasting by faith in the promises of His word the blessings of the covenant, awaking and going to sleep in the arms of the God of his fathers, and seeking not to displease Him in his conduct. There was here a real beginning of *life in God,* a pure flame, which was extinguished no doubt afterwards by self-righteousness and by the inward strife inseparable from it, but which burst forth at last magnificently at the breath of faith in Jesus Christ.

The words: *when the commandment came,* after what precedes, refer simply to the appearance of the commandment, with its holy majesty, in the conscience of young Saul. Then began in him the serious attempt to put it fully into practice. The term *commandment* is used instead of *law,* because, as ver. 7 shows, it is specially the tenth commandment which is in question. It is by it above all that the work here described

is effected in him. This work was, as Paul tells us, to make sin *live* or *revive*. The term *live* forms an antithesis to the other: *sin is dead* (ver. 8). It is a somewhat difficult question which of its two meanings is to be attached to the preposition *ἀνά* in the composition of the verb *ἀναζῆν*, that of *anew* (like our *re* in revive): *recovered life;* or whether, according to its strict signification, *above*, it merely denotes here the transition from the passive to the active state: *took life*. Meyer, in favour of the first sense, insists on the fact that it is impossible to quote, either in the N. T. or in the classics, a single case in which this verb or its analogues (*ἀναβιόω, ἀναβιώσκομαι*) signifies anything else than *revive* (Luke xv. 24, for example). This cannot be denied. Nevertheless it is true that many verbs compounded with *ἀνά* do not at all include the idea of a *return* to a previous state; thus *ἀνατέλλω, to spring* (speaking of plants), and *to rise* (speaking of the stars); *ἀναβοάω, to raise the voice, to cry; ἀναζέω, to bubble up*. The verb *ἀναβλέπω* is taken in both senses: *to look above* (Matt. xiv. 19; Mark vii. 34; Luke xix. 5), and *to see anew* (Acts ix. 12, 17, 18). In John ix. 11, the meaning is doubtful. If we translate: "*recovered* life," what is the previous life of sin present to the mind of the apostle? Origen discovers here his system of the pre-existence of souls, and of a fall anterior to this present life. Hilgenfeld also ascribes this idea to the apostle. But how obscurely would it be expressed, and how would it come about that no other trace of it is *found* in his writings? Rom. v. 12 is anything but favourable to this theory. Augustine and Bengel think of the first appearance of sin in paradise; but this fact is too remote to furnish us with the explanation of the word *revive* here. It would be better to hold that Paul was thinking of sin as it had lived in his parents before *reviving* in him. But what is simpler still is to abandon this idea of the renewal of the life of sin, and to explain *ἀναζῆν* in the sense of: to awake to active life.—The commentators who have applied the preceding words to the Pharisaic epoch of the apostle's life, are embarrassed by the declaration: *Sin revived, and I died* (10*a*). Would such be the terms in which he would characterize his new birth? Impossible! But they apply, it will be said, to the most advanced stage of his Pharisaism.

M. Bonnet says in this direction: "Sin, pursued to its last entrenchments, manifested its power by a desperate resistance . . .; and, on the other hand, the man saw the nothingness of his moral life, and succumbed to the sentence of death executed by the law within the depths of his consciousness." But where in Paul's Epistles do we find the evidences of such a crisis? It seems to me more natural to carry it back to the time when his moral consciousness was first developed, and to hold that this state was gradually increasing during the whole time of his Pharisaism.

Ver. 10*a*. The transition of sin from its latent state to that of an active force was to Saul a mortal stroke. The internal divorce between God and him was consummated: to infantine liberty there succeeded fear, to filial feeling the revolt of the heart and servile obedience, two equally sure symptoms of death. A weight henceforth repressed the impulse of his soul Godwards.

The words which follow serve to bring out the unforeseen character of this effect (ver. 10*b*), and give the true explanation of it (ver. 11).

Vv. 10*b*, 11. "*And the commandment, which was ordained to guide me to life, I found, turned me to death; for sin, taking occasion, deceived me by the commandment, and by it slew me.*" — This coming into activity on the part of sin, which Paul felt as if he were the object of a spiritual murder, was occasioned by a gift of God, the commandment; for this was the instrument of it, the commandment which God had given to the faithful Israelite with the words: "This do and *thou shalt live*" (Lev. xviii. 5)! Instead of guiding him to holiness and peace, or *giving life*, it did the opposite, by revealing sin to him and increasing its power, it raised a thick wall between God and him, and involved him in death! The feeling of *surprise* which so unexpected a result produced is expressed by the word εὑρέθη, *was found*.—Meyer understands the term *death* (end of the verse) of *eternal death*, in the sense that the man who passes through such experiences is doomed to final perdition (apart, of course, from redemption). But Paul is speaking of a more immediate result, a separation from God, that spiritual death which he describes himself, Eph. ii. 1 et seq.

Undoubtedly this description of the effects of the law

exhibits only one aspect of the truth, that which had been particularly experienced by Saul the Pharisee. For he then regarded the law as the means of *establishing his own righteousness* (x. 3), and not as the pathway opened to divine grace. The psalmists frequently describe the effects of the law in a wholly different light (Ps. xix., cxix., etc.), and we cannot doubt that Jesus Himself, during the period of His development up to His baptism, found in it the fulness of what God had promised: *Doing these things, thou shalt live by them,* or what is expressed by the words of Paul: "The commandment which was given me *to guide me to life.*" Only, if it is to display this beneficent effect, the law must be received either by a heart free from sin, or otherwise by a heart which does not separate the commandment from the grace accompanying the law, a heart which seeks in it not the means of acquiring self-merit and gratifying its pride, but the way of union to the God of the covenant by sacrifice and prayer: as an illustration, let the parable of the Pharisee and the publican serve!

Ver. 11 is intended to explain what *really* took place. It throws back the blame of the sad experience related, on its true author, *sin,* as was already done in ver. 8, while reproducing this explanation more forcibly after the fuller development of the experience itself in vv. 9 and 10. The word ἡ ἁμαρτία, *sin,* is placed foremost; for it is the true culprit, not the law; it is this depraved instinct which the commandment encountered, and which caused the latter to produce a result diametrically opposed to that for which it was given.—The words *taking occasion* refer, as in ver. 8, to the external objects corresponding to our various lusts. The commandment, by raising a barrier between these objects and us, makes them appear so much the more desirable; we cannot get rid of the impression that a jealous God takes pleasure in refusing them to us, for the very reason that they would promote our happiness. Such is the mirage which sin produces in us *by the commandment* itself. The words: *deceived me by the commandment,* certainly contain an allusion to the part played by the serpent in Gen. iii., where, as we have said, it fills the office here ascribed to sin in relation to man in innocence. It deceives and seduces Eve by ascribing hatred to God, love

to itself; and hence murder, separation from God, either by internal revolt or external disobedience. — The repetition of the regimen: *by the commandment . . . by it*, with each of the two verbs, expresses forcibly how contrary to the nature of the commandment is the part which sin makes it play.—The verb ἐξαπατᾶν includes the two ideas of *deceiving*, and of thus causing *to deviate* from the right road (ἐκ, *out of*). Deception causes to deviate, and deviation leads to *death: by it slew me.* It is incomprehensible how Calvin should take the liberty of giving a purely logical sense to the terms *deceived* and *slew*: "Sin was unveiled by the law as a seducer and murderer (*Ergo verbum* ἐξεπάτησεν non de *re ipsâ*, sed de *notitiâ* exponi debet)."

It remained to conclude by finally formulating the result of this profound psychological analysis contained in the passage vv. 7–11. This is what is done in vv. 12 and 13. The ὥστε, *so that*, ver. 12, announces a conclusion.

Vv. 12, 13. "*So that the law assuredly is holy, and the commandment holy, just, and good. Was then that which is good made*[1] *death unto me? Let it not be so! But sin, that it might appear sin, wrought death in me by that which is good; that sin by the commandment might become exceeding sinful.*"— The result formulated in these two verses is this: The holier the law is, the more does sin, which has used it to produce evil, appear thereby in the blackness of its nature.—The apostle begins, in view of the result indicated, by removing from the law all suspicion of blame. The μέν, *undoubtedly*, has no corresponding δέ, *but*. So far as the sense goes, the δέ is found in ver. 13*b*. This μέν is intended to guard beforehand the unassailable character of the law. Whatever may be said afterwards, nothing shall invalidate the character of *holiness* belonging to the law. *The law*, ὁ νόμος, here denotes the Mosaic system in its entirety, and the commandment ἡ ἐντολή, each article of the code in particular. The term ἅγιος, *holy*, is the word which in Scripture denotes *the perfect love of good*; when it is applied to God, it is the identity of His will with goodness; when it is applied to the creature, it is his voluntary consecration to God, the one Being essentially good.

[1] T. R. reads γέγονεν, with K L, instead of ἐγένετο, which is read by ℵ A B C D E P.

The law is *holy*, precisely because it demands this consecration, and the commandment also, because each commandment only demands this consecration in a particular relation. The two characteristics *just* and *good* flow from and are included in that of holiness. The commandment is *just* (δικαία), because it regulates in a normal way the relations between different beings. It is *good* (ἀγαθή), in the sense of *beneficent;* this epithet is explained by the preceding words: *fitted to give life* (ver. 10).

Ver. 13. Here was the place strictly speaking for the *but* (δέ), answering to the *μέν, assuredly,* of ver. 12. But Paul interrupts himself; he feels the need of yet again stating the problem in all its difficulty. This is what he does in the question beginning ver. 13. The difference between the reading of the majority of the Mjj., ἐγένετο (aorist), and that of the T. R., γέγονε (perfect), is this: The first expresses the act by which this whole internal history was brought about; the second, the permanent state which resulted from that act. The first is therefore rather connected with what precedes, the second with what follows. From the internal point of view both may consequently be defended; but the authorities are rather in favour of the first.—The problem being thus put afresh in all its rigour, the second part of ver. 13 gives its solution precisely as the *μέν* of ver. 12 leads us to expect, and as we have stated it at the beginning of that verse.—The second part of the verse has been construed in many ways. And first, what is the verb of the subject ἡ ἁμαρτία, *sin,* which begins the sentence? Either it is derived from the preceding sentence, by understanding ἐγένετο θάνατος: "But sin (not the law) *became my death,*" or "turned me to death." But is not this ellipsis somewhat serious? Or the verb is found in the following participle κατεργαζομένη, by making it a finite verb: "But sin, that it may appear sin, *works my death* (Calvin: *operatur* mihi mortem) by that which is good." To this meaning there has been objected the form of the participle. But if the apostle means to denote rather a quality than an act of the subject, the participle may be suitable: "Sin (*is*) *working* death," that is to say, *is capable of working,* or *wicked enough to* work it. But this return to the *present* tense would be singular after the past ἐγένετο; then it would require rather

the present φαινῇ, *may appear*, than the aorist φανῇ, *might appear*. Paul is not speaking of what *is*, he is reflecting on what has *taken place*. The first of the two constructions would therefore be preferable; but there is still room for hesitation between two alternatives: (*a*) Either the participle κατεργαζομένη is taken as in explanatory apposition to the principal subject ἡ ἁμαρτία, *sin*, by making the three words ἵνα φανῇ ἁμαρτία a short parenthetical proposition: "But sin, that it might appear sin, *turned me to death, working* my death by what was good." The participle κατεργαζομένη would have the force of the Latin gerund. Only the general sense suffers from an awkward tautology: to turn to death by working death! (*b*) Or the participle κατεργαζομένη is joined to the proposition ἵνα φανῇ ἁμαρτία: "But sin (turned me to death), that *it might appear sin by working* my death by that which is good." This second sense is evidently preferable. As to making the second ἁμαρτία the subject of this dependent proposition: "But sin turned me to death that *sin might appear* (to all eyes) *working* my death by what is good," it cannot be thought of; this construction would require the article ἡ before the second ἁμαρτία. We should therefore range ourselves without hesitation on the side of construction No. 1*b*, were it not for two grave difficulties, the one arising from the thought itself, the other from the connection between the two ἵνα, *in order that*, which follow one another in this verse. Could Paul say: Sin turned me to death, that it might appear sin slaying me by a good thing? The idea is rather this: Sin *caused my death by a good thing*, that it might appear so much the more sin. Then what relation are we to establish in this sense between the two *thats?* Are they parallel as two distinct and simultaneous ends: Sin turned me to death, 1st, that it *might appear* sin; 2d, that it *might become* exceeding sinful? But the fact of *becoming* is not parallel to that of *appearing;* the latter is rather the result of the former. Or should we give to γένηται, *become*, a purely *logical* sense, as is done by many commentators: that it might appear exceedingly sinful *in the view of my conscience?* But this verb would only serve in this sense to repeat the idea of the verb φανῇ, *might appear;* and then why change the term? Or should we see in the second *that* a more

remote end in relation to which the first *that* would only be the means? But *appearing* is not the means of *becoming;* on the contrary, *appearing* is the result of becoming. It is clear that none of those constructions is wholly satisfactory.

It seems to me that to obtain a result in harmony both with the requirements of language and of logic, it is enough to modify construction No. 1, and combine it so modified with No. 2. We need to understand not ἐγένετο θάνατος, but merely the verb ἐγένετο, then to make of this finite verb the point of support for the participle κατεργαζομένη: "But sin, that it might appear sin, *turned to* [became] *working* (ἐγένετο κατεργαζομένη) my death by what was good." We have thus a simple ellipsis, a meaning exact, clear, and in keeping with the context; we keep up the *past* tense (ἐγένετο), which suits the aorist φανῇ; we get an analytic form (ἐγένετο κατεργαζομένη) which, while leaving the fact in the past, serves to bring out (by the *present* participle) the permanent *attribute,* and not merely the initial *act,* as the aorist κατειργάσατο (ver. 8) would have done. Finally, in this way we get without difficulty at the explanation of the two *thats.* The verb ἐγένετο κατεργαζομένη, *became working,* becomes the point of support for the second *that,* which gives a clear meaning: sin wrought death by goodness, that it *might become* as sinful as possible. God *willed* that sin, by *killing* by means of that which was ordained to give *life,* should commit a true masterpiece of perversity. Hence the second *that:* it applies to the fact in itself (γένηται, *might become*). And why did God will that it should be so? This is what we are told *in the outset* by the first *that: that sin* might appear fully what it is, *sin* (ἵνα φανῇ ἁμαρτία). These three words form a parenthetical proposition put at the beginning to indicate from the first the *final* aim of this whole unexpected dispensation. It was necessary that *to manifest* completely its evil nature (the first *that*), sin should inflict death on me, not by something evil (which would throw part of the odium of this murder on the means employed), but by something good (the commandment), that the crime *might be* completely the work of sin (the second *that*).

Thus we have three ideas—(1) sin slays by that which is good; (2) *that* thereby it *may accomplish* an act worthy of its

nature; (3) *and that* thereby (final end) this nature *may be manifested* clearly. It is obvious from this progression that we must beware of taking *γένηται, might become,* in the logical sense, and of identifying as far as the sense goes the two *thats,* as Meyer does.

On vv. 7–13.—The commentators who apply the moral experiences described by the apostle in this passage (p. 15) *to mankind* in general, apply the words *I was alive* (ver. 9) to the period of paradise; those which follow: *when the commandment came,* to the prohibition to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and the rest of the passage, extending to the end of the chapter, to the fall and its consequences. By the question: *What shall we say then* (ver. 7)? Paul would thus invite his readers to a general contemplation of the history of our race from the beginning, to justify what he has been expounding in regard to emancipation from the law (vv. 1–6). But this interpretation is excluded first by the words *ἁμαρτία νεκρά, sin is dead* (ver. 8). In paradise, according to St. Paul, sin was not *dead;* it did not exist (ch. v. 12). Then neither would the term *ἀνέζησεν,* as understood, be suitable to designate the first appearance of sin. Finally, the commandment expressly quoted (ver. 7) belongs to the code of Sinai, and thus brings us face to face with the *Jewish* law.

Those who, from Chrysostom to our day (p. 15), apply this passage to the *Jewish people,* find in the words *I was alive* an indication of the patriarchal period when the promise was the bond between God and man, and in *the coming of the commandment,* the epoch of Moses, when the law broke this relation, and produced the great national revolts. This interpretation connects itself more easily with the context than the preceding. But neither is it tenable. When we think of the shameful sins of the patriarchal period, can we apply to that time the descriptions of *sin being dead,* and *I was alive?* Then is it historically demonstrable that through the giving of the law, the state of the nation was made sensibly worse, and that its relation to Jehovah was broken? Do not the words of Paul apply to an inward event (*covetousness,* revelation of sin), rather than to a great national experience? Finally, what subtleties are we led into by this explanation, when we

attempt to apply it in a consequent way to the end of the section! When we come to the passage 14–25, we must then, with Reiche, apply the first of the two *I's* which are in conflict, to the ideal Jew, the Jew such as he ought to be, and the other, to the real Jew, such as he shows himself in practice! We do not deny that the human conscience in general, and the Jewish conscience in particular, may recognise their experiences in those which are here described. But that is natural; is not Paul a man and a Jew? The truth is, the whole is narrated about *himself*, but with the conviction that his experience will infallibly be that of every Israelite, and of every man who will seriously use the moral or Mosaic law as a means of sanctification.

The point in question now is to trace this experience to its profound cause. Such is the study to which the following section (vv. 14–25) is devoted (*for*, ver. 14).

Vv. 14–25.

It is from this ver. 14 especially that the difference between the two explanations of the passage comes out: that which applies it to the state of man regenerate, and that which regards it as depicting the impotent struggles of a sincere and serious man, but one still under the yoke of the law, and ignorant of deliverance by the Holy Spirit.

The principal reasons advanced in favour of the first opinion are the following (best developed perhaps by Hodge): 1. The transition from the *past* tense in the preceding passage to the *present* in this; 2. The impossibility of ascribing to unregenerate man sentiments so elevated in their nature as those which are here professed: cordial assent to the law, vv. 16 and 22, and profound hatred of evil, vv. 15, 19, etc.; 3. Ver. 25, where the apostle seems expressly to appropriate to himself at the present time the entire description which he has just traced: thus far the objections whose validity or groundlessness it belongs to exegesis alone to determine. The only side of the question which we can exhaust here is that of the connection of this passage with the preceding, and with the section to which it belongs taken as a whole.

1. Paul has just delineated, vv. 7–13, the deadly action of

the law upon him, from the time it established its supremacy in his inmost soul, and from that period during the whole time of his Pharisaism. How should he now pass all at once from this description, to that of his inward struggles as a *regenerate* man? Hodge and Philippi explain this transition by an *a fortiori*. The law is powerless to regenerate the natural man, it only serves to increase the power of sin, vv. 7–13. And the proof is, that it does not act otherwise, even on the believer's heart, when, forgetting his faith for the time, he finds himself as a naturally carnal man face to face with the law. Even with the profound sympathy which his renewed heart feels for the law, he cannot find in it the means of sanctification which he needs; how much less can it deliver from sin a heart still unregenerate? This attempt to construe the passage in keeping with what precedes is ingenious, but inadmissible. Exactly what it was most essential to say in this case, to make the argument intelligible, would be understood: "Even since I have become a new creature in Christ, I cannot find any assistance in the law; on the contrary, when I put myself under its yoke, it renders me worse." This must have been said in order to be clear. Paul says nothing of the kind between vv. 13 and 14.

2. Another omission, not less inexplicable, would be his passing over the profound change which was effected in him by regeneration. He would pass from the period of his Pharisaism (vv. 7–13) to his Christian state, as it were on the same level, and without making the least allusion to the profound crisis which made all things, and the law in particular, *new* to him (2 Cor. v. 17). And it would not be till chap. viii., and by an afterthought, that he would come to his experiences as a Christian. The author of the Epistle to the Romans has not accustomed us hitherto to a style of writing so far from clear. Hodge says no doubt that the apostle is here speaking of the believer from the viewpoint of his relations to the law, abstracting from his faith. But a believer, apart from his faith . . ., that surely resembles a non-believer. So understood, the description of the miserable state, vv. 14–25, would be the demonstration not of the impotence of the law, but of that of the gospel.

3. How explain the contrast between the delineation of

chap. vii. and that of chap. viii., a contrast infinitely *sharper* than we find between the section vv. 7–13 (description of Saul as a Pharisee) and vv. 14–25, a passage which they would refer to Paul the Christian? Is there, then, a greater difference between Christian and Christian, than between Pharisee and Christian? Philippi alleges that the apostle describes successively in the two passages, vv. 14–25 and viii. 1 et seq., the two *opposite aspects of the Christian life*, the believer *without* and the believer *with* the breath of the Spirit. But once again the great crisis would require to be put in this case, not in vv. 24 and 25, between the *two aspects* of the *same state*, but between vv. 13 and 14, where the new state is contrasted with the old, *newness of spirit* with *oldness of the letter*, to use Paul's own words.—The direction of the apostle's thought is clearly marked out by the section as a whole; it may serve as a guiding thread in all that follows. After showing that there is in faith a new principle of sanctification (vi. 1–14), which is a sufficiently firm standard for moral life (vv. 15–23), and which renders emancipation from the law possible and desirable (vii. 1–6), he explains what the intervention of the law produced in his own life (vv. 7–13), and the state in which, despite his sincere and persevering efforts, it left him (vv. 14–23), to issue in that desperate cry of distress in which this state of continual defeats finally expresses itself: *Who shall deliver me?* Of this liberator he does not know the name at the time when he utters the cry (a fact which proves that he is not yet in the faith); but he anticipates, he hopes for, he appeals to him without knowing him. And heaven gives him the answer. Chap. viii. contains this answer: *The Spirit of Christ hath set me free*, ver. 2; He it is who works in me all that the law demanded, without giving me power to do it (ver. 4).—This series of ideas is unimpeachable; it only remains to see whether in this way we shall account for all the details of the following passage, and succeed in overcoming the objections mentioned above, which have been raised in opposition to this view.

This passage seems to me to fall into three cycles, each of which closes with a sort of refrain. It is like a dirge; the most sorrowful elegy which ever proceeded from a human heart.

The first cycle embraces vv. 14–17. The second, which begins and ends almost in the same way as the first, is contained in vv. 18–20. The third differs from the first two in form, but is identical with them in substance; it is contained in vv. 21–23, and its conclusion, vv. 24 and 25, is at the same time that of the whole passage.

It has been sought to find a gradation between these three cycles. Lange thinks that the first refers rather to the *understanding*, the second to the *feelings*, the third to the *conscience*. But this distinction is artificial, and useless as well. For the power of this passage lies in its very monotony. The repetition of the same thoughts and expressions is, as it were, the echo of the desperate repetition of the same experiences, in that legal state wherein man can only shake his chains without succeeding in breaking them. Powerless he writhes to and fro in the prison in which sin and the law have confined him, and in the end of the day can only utter that cry of distress whereby, having exhausted his force for the struggle, he appeals, without knowing him, to the deliverer.

First Cycle: Vv. 14–17.

Ver. 14. "*For*[1] *we know that the law is spiritual; but I am carnal,*[2] *sold under the power of sin.*"—We have in this cycle, ver. 14, an affirmation: "I acknowledge that the law . . . but I am captive;" then the demonstration of this fact (vv. 15 and 16); finally, ver. 17, the conclusion, which is merely the reaffirmation of the thesis now demonstrated.

The reading of some MSS. *οἴδαμεν δέ, then,* or *but we know,* has no meaning. We must read *γάρ, for,* with the majority of the Mjj. and versions. This *for* might signify: The case was really so; for witness my state as it *resulted* from this fatal crisis. The law slew me, and what proves it is the state of death in which I found myself involved from that time. But it is more natural to understand the transition from the preceding passage to this somewhat differently. Holsten

[1] A D E L read *οἴδαμεν δὲ* instead of *οἴδαμεν γαρ*, which T. R. reads with all the other Mjj., It., Syr.

[2] ℵ A B C D E F G read *σαρκινος* instead of *σαρκικος*, which T. R. reads with K L P.

seems to me to put it well when he says: From the historical phenomenon, described vv. 7–13, Paul now ascends to its real moral nature, which explains it: "The law produced on me the effect which I have just described, because there is an opposition between its nature which is holy, and mine which is corrupt." This transition includes what we have presented in the first place, for the state in which the law involves us is only the continuation of that in which it had found us. It finds us diseased, and leaves us so. If this is the explanation of the *for*, we need not be surprised at the use of the *present* in the verbs which follow. We do not certainly say with Hodge: Paul speaks of the regenerate man abstractly from his faith for the time; but we say: Paul speaks of the unregenerate man without concerning himself with the question how far the unregenerate heart still remains in the regenerate believer. He describes man *as he is* by nature, man as he knew him, and still finds him in himself, every time that his natural character shows itself. Here is *the permanent essence* of human nature since the fall outside the action of faith. Thus is explained the use of the *present*, without our saying that Paul describes his present state.—Some commentators, such as Jerome, Hofm., Schott, write οἶδα μέν: *I know undoubtedly.* But after that should we not have had simply εἰμι δέ, *but I am*, instead of ἐγὼ δὲ . . . εἰμι: "but *as for me*, I am" . . .? In point of fact, this form implies a very marked contrast between the *I* thus emphasized, and some other subject in the preceding context. And this subject to which the *I*, ἐγώ, forms an antithesis, can only be the subject of the preceding verb *we*. We are thus led to regard the ordinary reading as necessary: οἴδαμεν, *we know.* In this *we*, Paul no doubt includes with himself all believers who have passed through the same experiences, and even the Jews who are at one with Christians regarding the truth affirmed by him.—The *knowing*, of which he here speaks, is more than a matter of understanding; the sequel shows that it implies a cordial adhesion to that truth (comp. the verbs σύμφημι, συνήδομαι, vv. 16 and 22): "We know and heartily own that the law is excellent."—The epithet *spiritual*, applied to the law, has been understood by many, Beza for example, in this sense, that the law is suited to the spiritual

nature of man (the πνεῦμα, *the spirit*, in man); whence it follows that it demands not only external observance, but also the obedience of the heart. But the term πνευματικός, *spiritual*, is usually connected with the idea of the Divine Spirit; and as in chap. viii. 4 Paul says himself that what is demanded by the law is wrought in them who walk *after the Spirit* (evidently God's Spirit), it is more exact to understand here by *spiritual:* agreeable to the impulse or tendency of the Divine Spirit. What the law commands is nothing else than what the Holy Spirit works in the heart where He dwells. There is a complete identity between the external precept of the law and the internal working of the Spirit. The idea found here by Calvin, that the law *cannot* be fulfilled *except* through the Spirit, follows indeed from the expression used by Paul, but does not express its meaning.

But, says Paul, returning upon himself, of what avail practically is this knowledge which we all have of the holy spirituality of the law? By the use of the pronoun *I*, he here contrasts with this collective acknowledgment (*we know*) the wholly individual experience of his carnal state; and in this latter he finds the invincible obstacle to the fulfilment of the law, however it may be recognised as perfect in theory. The reading of the T. R. and of the Byzs., σαρκικός, and that of the Mjj. of the two other families, σαρκινός, have almost the same meaning: *carnal.* But the first adjective denotes carnal *activity*, the second the carnal *substance*, and by metonymy the carnal *nature.* As the apostle in this passage is contrasting with the *essentially* good law not only his own sinful *action*, but his corrupt *nature*, the form σαρκινός is certainly preferable.—The notion *flesh* is here taken in its moral sense, and embraces, as it does in all cases where *the flesh* is opposed to *God*, or to what is divine, the whole *human person.* Paul feels his natural self controlled by the flesh, that is to say, by self-complacency, the inclination to seek self-satisfaction in everything. This tendency is what determines his natural will. And hence the incompatibility between his nature and that of the law, which demands absolute self-consecration.—He adds in explanation of the term *carnal*, the words: *sold to sin*, literally: "*under* sin." Thereby he compares himself to a slave bought for money. The seller is the flesh, and the

buyer, who has become his master, *sin*. In fact, a fatal contract, as it were, has taken effect on us, whereby the violence of the flesh has given over our will to the power of sin. The expression *sold under* is stronger than the usual form *sold to;* it includes the idea of the shameful state of *servitude* which has followed the act of sale.

Ver. 15. "*Indeed what I do I know not: for what I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that do I.*"—This verse contains the proof from fact of the state of slavery which Paul has just affirmed. The slave knows not what he does, for he does the will of another. So Paul complains that his work is not the result of a distinct view in which he has, as it were, intellectually possessed himself beforehand of what he was going to do; it is the result of blind instinct, which drags him along as if without his knowledge, so that when he sees it realized, it is not what he wished; it is, on the contrary, what he detests. The expression: *I know not*, should not be taken in the sense: "I do not own *as good*," a forced sense, and one which is not necessary.—The *θέλειν, will*, which Paul does not execute, is of course the willing of good, and what he *hates* and yet executes is certainly evil. The moral tendency of his will to purpose good and hate evil, is connected with the acknowledgment of the perfection of the law of which he spoke in ver. 14. But this will which puts itself on the side of the law is nothing more than a desire, a wish, a simple *I should like*, which gives way in practice. Such, indeed, is the frequent meaning of *θέλειν, to will*, in Paul (1 Cor. vii. 7; 2 Cor. v. 4, xii. 20; Col. ii. 18).—The term *πράσσειν, to do*, has the meaning of *working at*, and expresses the idea that his practical activity does not follow the direction of his will.—*Μισεῖν, to hate*, here denotes moral reprobation; and *ποιεῖν, to do*, which has the sense of *accomplishing*, realizing, refers not to activity in exercise (*πράσσειν*), but to the *product* of the activity, so that the exact paraphrase of the two last propositions would be this: "At the time when I act, I am not working in the direction of my desire to fulfil the law; and when I have acted, I find myself face to face with a result which my moral instinct condemns."—It is asked how Paul could ascribe to himself this desire of good and hatred of evil, while speaking of the time when he was

yet under the law? but we ask in turn of those who refer this verse to Paul in his regenerate state, how he could in this state ascribe to himself the powerlessness with which he charges himself, especially if we compare the contrast he brings out between the state described here and the delineation of the Christian he draws in chap. viii.? In fact, what this verse expresses is nothing else than what is contained in the words of Jesus, John iii. 24: "He that *doeth truth* cometh to the light." To do the truth certainly denotes the loyal desire of goodness; and this disposition *precedes* faith in the case of the men of whom Jesus is speaking, since the latter is its consequence: *cometh to the light.* We meet with the same thought in the parable of the sower, Luke viii. 15, when Jesus speaks of the *honest and good heart* in which the gospel seed produces its fruit; comp. also Rom. ii. 7 and Acts x. 34, 35. It is understood, of course, that such a disposition only exists as the work of Him who is *alone good.* But there is a way of regarding the corruption of human nature contrary to the gospel, and which when thoroughly weighed is self-destructive.

Vv. 16, 17. "*If then I do that which I would not, I assent with the law that it is good. And now it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth*[1] *in me.*"—These two verses draw the conclusion from the fact mentioned ver. 15, a conclusion which is the reaffirmation of the thesis laid down in ver. 14. —The reprobation with which Paul's conscience visits his own work, is a solemn homage rendered by him to the law, for thereby he takes part with the law against himself. The preposition *σύν, with,* in the verb *σύμφημι, I give testimony,* I applaud *with,* can only bear on the regimen *τῷ νομῷ, the law:* "I declare, *in concert with the law,* that the contents of the law are good." It is the reproduction of the assertion: "We know that the law is spiritual."

Ver. 16 likewise reproduces the second part of ver. 14; it is, so to speak, the paraphrase of the words: *sold to sin.* It is not to be thought that Paul wishes to exculpate himself in the least when he says: "It is not I who do it, but sin." On the contrary, he wishes to make the miserable state of bondage to which he is reduced the more palpable; he is not

[1] ℵ B read *οἰκουσα* instead of *ἐναικουσα*, which all the others read.

master even in his own house; there he finds a tyrant who forces him to act in opposition to his better wishes. What humiliation! What misery! It is the state of sin regarded from its painful rather than its culpable point of view.—The adverbs *now*, *νυνί*, and *no more*, *οὐκέτι*, cannot have a temporal meaning here; Paul states the moral *conclusion* drawn from the facts which he has just recorded. Their meaning is therefore logical. *Now* means: "Things being so;" *no more:* "not as if the normal state, that of full moral liberty, *still* existed in me."

Second Cycle: Vv. 18–20.

The first verse again contains a thesis parallel to that of ver. 14. This thesis is demonstrated by experience in the second part of the verse and in ver. 19, which thus correspond to vv. 15 and 16 of the first cycle. Finally, in ver. 20 we find as a conclusion the reaffirmation of the thesis; it is the parallel of ver. 17.

Ver. 18*a*. "*For I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing.*"—This thesis, reproducing that of ver. 14: *I am carnal*, connects itself, by terms used, with the last words of ver. 17; comp. the two expressions: "Sin dwelling in me," and "in me dwelleth no good thing." The *γάρ*, *for*, is explanatory rather than demonstrative. It is the same experience which is again expounded more precisely; comp. the similar *for*, ver. 10. It might seem, when Paul said, ver. 14: *I am carnal*, that he left nothing subsisting in the *ego* which was not flesh. The contrary appeared, however, from the *we know* preceding; for he who recognises that the law is spiritual, must possess in himself something spiritual. This distinction between the *ego*, the *I*, and the *flesh*, is emphasized still more fully in ver. 18. For it is obvious that the phrase *that is* has a restrictive sense, and that Paul means: in me, so far at least as my person is carnal. He therefore gives it to be understood that there is something more in him besides the flesh. This something is precisely that in him which recognises the spirituality of the law, and pays it homage. We thereby understand what *the flesh* is in his eyes, the complacent care of his person, in the form of pride or sensuality.

Now this is precisely the active power which in practice determines the activity of the unregenerate man. The flesh thus understood does not exclude the knowledge, and even the admiration of goodness; but it renders this noble faculty fruitless in ordinary life, by enslaving to itself the active principle, the will. There is therefore really, as Paul gives it to be understood, good in the *ego*, but in the understanding only, the contemplative faculty, not in the flesh which gives the active impulse. See this contrast exactly stated in ver. 25.—The proof from fact follows.

Vv. 18*b*, 19. "*For to will is present with me; but how to perform that which is good I find*[1] *not. For the good that I would I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do.*"— In what precedes, Paul had already claimed a certain will in relation to good; he here affirms the same thing more expressly. This will *is present*; παράκειται, to be *beside*, and as it were within reach. The verb θέλειν, *to wish*, denotes, as in vv. 15 and 16, a simple desire, an intention, rather than a fixed and deliberate decision; comp. the passages quoted. Paul means: as to good intentions, *they are present* and in abundance; but the execution . . . that is what I find not. *Not finding* is the opposite of *being within reach*. Instead of οὐχ εὑρίσκω, *I find not*, read by the Byzs. and the Greco-Lats., there is found in the four Alex. a simple οὐ, *not*: "But the doing of good, not!" (οὐ παράκειται). This reading has something harsh and abrupt which renders it suspicious. Whence could this word εὑρίσκω, *I find*, have come into the text, corresponding so well with the term παράκειται, *to be present?* Has not Meyer ground for suspecting a copyist of having passed carelessly from the οὐχ, ver. 18, to the following οὐ, ver. 19?

Ver. 19. The *I find not* was the proof that no good whatever dwelt in the flesh; it is demonstrated in turn by the two facts stated in ver. 19. The only difference between this verse and ver. 15*b*, is that here the verb ποιεῖν, *to do*, accomplish, is applied to good, while the verb πράσσειν, *to work at*, is applied to evil; which leads to this sense: "I do not succeed in *realizing* the good which I would, while I find myself

[1] ℵ A B C read ου instead of ουχ ευρισκω, which T. R. reads with all the others, Syr., Vulg.

working at the evil which I would not."—The two notions of good and evil must of course be taken in their deepest sense, embracing the inward disposition as well as the external act. Even in doing the external task, one may himself, and in the eyes of God, find that he is doing *evil*.—The conclusion is expressed in ver. 20.

Ver. 20. "*Now if I do that I would not, I myself,*[1] *it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me.*"—A conclusion uniform with that before enunciated, vv. 16 and 17: "I am not master of myself; a stranger has forced his way into my house and holds me captive."—This is really the proof of the *sold unto sin*, ver. 14. Paul does not say so by way of excuse, but to describe a state of the profoundest misery. And every time he repeats this confession, it is as if he felt himself seized with a stronger conviction of its truth. The ἐγώ, *I* (after *that I would not*), is rejected by important authorities, and condemned by Meyer. But Tischendorf seems to me to be right in preserving it. It stands in a moral relation to the ἐγώ, *I*, which follows: "What I would not, *I myself*, it is not really I who do it."

Third Cycle: Vv. 21–25.

This cycle, while repeating the same experiences, stamps them as the abiding and definitive *result* of the state of things described throughout the whole passage (ἄρα, *consequently*). The following cycle really contains the full picture of man's state under the law. Like the others, it first expresses the general thesis, ver. 21, parallel to vv. 18 and 14; then the proof from fact, vv. 22 and 23, as above; and finally, the conclusion, vv. 24 and 25, which, while reproducing that of the other cycles, goes beyond it and forms the transition to the description of the new state which has replaced the former in the regenerate (chap. viii.).

Ver. 21. "*I find then this law, that, when I would do good, evil is present with me.*"—Always the same two characteristics of his moral state: will for good, but powerless; evil carrying him away in practice.—We have frequently seen the term νόμος, *law*, taking the general sense of a *governing principle of*

[1] B C D E F G, It. Syr. here omit ἐγω.

life; any rule whatever imposing itself authoritatively on the will (*νόμος πίστεως*, the law of faith; *νόμος ἔργων*, the law of works, iii. 27; *νόμος πνεύματος, τῆς ἁμαρτίας*, the law of the spirit, of sin, viii. 2, etc.). Such, undoubtedly, is the meaning of the word here. Paul is summing up *the mode of his existence* since the time when the law came in to affect his inward life, and from which the law gives him no means of escape. This is what he calls *τὸν νόμον, this law.* This general and abstract meaning of the term *law* follows first from the expression: the law *of God,* ver. 22, where by this complement *of God* the law of which he speaks here is contrasted with the moral and Mosaic law; and next from ver. 23, where Paul again applies the general idea of *law,* speaking, in contrast to the law of God, of *another law.*—This mode of existence appears with two opposite characteristics; the will for good: *to me who would do good,* and the doing of evil: *evil cleaves to me.* The dative *τῷ θέλοντι, to me who would,* is the regimen of *τὸν νόμον, the law;* for this word has here a very active sense: "The law which imposes itself on me who would do" ... We have taken the liberty of translating the words thus: *with me, when I would do.* The *ὅτι, that,* depends also on *τὸν νόμον, the law:* this law which I find in me *consisting in the fact that ....*—The verb *παράκειμαι, to be present with,* is taken here in the same sense as in ver. 18: to be within reach, to present itself at once: "As to me, when I wish to do good, evil is present first."—The two *ἐμοί, to me,* serve to bring out strongly the *unity* of the subject who has the misfortune to wish one thing and to do its opposite.

The numerous critics who have begun with taking the term *law* in this verse in the sense of the *Mosaic law,* have thereby involved themselves in inextricable difficulties. Witness the following:—1. Knapp and Olshausen take *τὸ καλόν, good,* as in apposition to *τὸν νόμον, the law;* then *ὅτι, that,* as the object of *I find:* "As to me who would perform the law, that is, good, I find that evil is present with me." But this apposition is very strange, and the participle *τῷ θέλοντι* would require to be placed before *τὸν νόμον.*—2. Chrysostom and the Peschito take the words *τῷ θέλοντι, to me wishing,* as the dative of favour, and the conjunction *ὅτι* in the sense of *because:* "I find the law coming to my aid, to mine who

would do good, and that because evil is present with me." The law coming to Paul's help in the struggle against evil! The idea is the antipodes of what Paul teaches throughout this whole chapter.—3. Ewald obtains a directly opposite sense, by taking *τὸ κακόν, evil,* as the apposition to *τὸν νόμον, the law:* "I find the law, that is, evil, present with me when I would do good."—Not only is this construction forced grammatically, but above all this identification of the law and of evil would be an evident exaggeration (comp. vii. 7). Only Marcion could have expressed himself thus.—4. Meyer gives as the object of the participle *θέλοντι, wishing,* the substantive *law,* and takes *ποιεῖν, to do,* as the infinitive of aim: "I find that with me when I wish the law with the view of doing good, evil is present." But the object *τὸν νόμον* would require to be placed between *τῷ* and *θέλοντι*; and the term *wishing the law* is unsupported by example. Finally, it is far from natural to take the infinitive *ποιεῖν, to do,* as the infinitive of aim; it is evidently the object of *θέλοντι, wishing.*—5. The masterpiece of all these explanations is that of Hofmann; according to him the verb *ποιεῖν, to do,* has no object; it must be taken in the sense of *acting; τὸ καλόν, good,* is an attribute of *τὸν νόμον, the law,* and *ὅτι* signifies *because:* "I discover that the law is goodness for me when I would act, because evil is present with me;" meaning: that evil, by arresting me in my eagerness to act when good is before me, serves to prove to me by this resistance that it is really the law which I intend to realize. Is it possible to imagine a more tortuous thought and a more artificial construction? The active verb *ποιεῖν, to do,* without an object; the attribute separated from its substantive, etc.!—The true meaning of the word *νόμος, law,* which we have established, delivers this poor verse from all those tortures to which it has been subjected. Our meaning is found in a goodly number of commentators (Calvin, Tholuck, Philippi, etc.). If after that confirmation were needed, it would be found in the two following verses, the one of which demonstrates the: *in me when I would do good* (ver. 21*a*), the other the: *evil is present with me* (ver. 21*b*).

Vv. 22, 23. "*For I delight in the law of God after the inward man: but I see another law in my members, warring*

against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to[1] *the law of sin which is in my members.*"—The verb συνήδομαι strictly signifies: *I rejoice with.* Does it mean, as van Hengel thinks: with *other persons*, who like me take pleasure in the law? Or as Meyer understands it, with *the law itself*, which as well as myself takes pleasure in the good it prescribes? The first idea is not supported by the context, and the second is unnatural; for the law is not the subject, but *the object* of συνήδεσθαι, of the feeling of joy spoken of by the apostle. We must therefore apply the σύν, *with*, to *the inwardness* of the feeling experienced: I rejoice *in* and *with myself*, that is to say, in the inmost chamber of my being. This term is still stronger than the σύμφημι, *to agree with*, of ver. 16. The latter merely signified: "What the law declares good, I declare good along with it," while here we have an eager and even delighted adherence.—The complement *of God*, added to *the law*, brings out the moral elevation of the rule, and so justifies the assent indicated by the verb συνήδομαι, *I applaud.* —The last words: *after the inward man*, expressly remind us that it is only to a part of his being that we must apply what Paul here says of himself. We must beware of confounding *the inward man* with the *new man* (καινὸς ἄνθρωπος). Paul means to speak only of that which he calls, vv. 23 and 25, *the understanding*, the νοῦς, the organ with which the human soul is endowed to perceive the true and good, and to distinguish them from the bad and false. Here especially is the action of the moral consciousness, that faculty which has little more than a theoretic character, and which in practice exercises no control over the will sufficient to constrain it to do what it approves. The *outward* man, the acting phenomenal personality, remains under the dominion of another power which draws it on the other side (ver. 23). Again, in 2 Cor. iv. 16 we come upon the contrast between the *inward* and the *outward* man, but modified by the context. The first in this passage denotes the whole man morally regarded, the will as well as the understanding, and the second, physical man only. —We have already shown, on occasion of the expressions used, ver. 16, that nothing affirmed by Paul here passes in the

[1] ℵ B D E F G K P, It. read ιν before τω νομω; this ιν is omitted by T. R. with A C L, Syr.

least beyond what Jesus Christ Himself ascribes to man unconverted, but desirous of goodness and placed under the influence of the divine law and of the prevenient grace which always accompanies it; comp. John iii. 21. St. Paul in chap. ii. had already recognised not only the existence of moral conscience in the Gentiles, but the comparative rightness with which they often apply this divine rule in the practice of life.

Ver. 23. This verse is the development of 21*b*: *Evil is present with me.* All the expressions of this verse refer to the same figure and form a picture. At the moment when the speaker starts to follow the law of God which attracts him, he beholds (*βλέπω, I see*) an armed adversary advancing against him to bar his passage; such is the literal meaning of the term *ἀντιστρατεύεσθαι, to set oneself in battle against.* This enemy is *a law* opposed to that *of God* dwelling in *his* own *members.* Thereby Paul denotes the egoistical instincts attached to the members of the body, and which seek their gratification through them, in spite of the assent the understanding gives to the law which labours to repress them. Thus two adversaries find themselves as it were face to face, the law of the mind and that which dwells in the members. The prize of the contest is the *I*, the *ego* which both seek; and its ordinary result, the taking of the *ego* by the second. —The words: *bringing me into captivity to the law of sin,* represent the *ego* at the moment when it is dragged captive (*αἰχμαλωτίζειν, to make prisoner*) by the law of the members, and so given over to the power of sin. St. Paul calls this master *the law of sin which is in my members.* These last words appear at first sight like a repetition. But they are added to show in these members, which strive so faithfully against the law of the mind to wrest the *ego* from it, the army equipped as it were by sin to fight in its service and pay.

In the two verses, 22 and 23, we thus find four particular laws mentioned, in which there is summed up the general law, or the entire mode of living belonging to the natural man. Two of these laws are *objective,* and are imposed on the will as it were from without. The one is the *law of God,* the moral law written or unwritten; the other is the *law of sin,* that egoistical instinct which hereditarily reigns over mankind

since the fall. To these two objective laws there correspond two *subjective* ones, which are, so to speak, the representatives of the two former in the individual: *the law of the mind*, which is nothing else than the moral sense in man, appropriating the law of God, and making it the rule of the individual; and *the law of the members*, which is, on the other hand, the subjective organ by which the individual falls under the law of sin. And the four laws combined, the habitual fact being added of the victory which the latter two gained over the former two, constitute the general law of our existence before regeneration, that order of life which Paul recognises within him when he examines himself, the νόμος of ver. 21.—If the apostle were merely a cold moralist, dissecting our state of moral misery with the scalpel of psychological analysis, he would have passed directly from ver. 23 to the second part of ver. 25, where in a precise antithesis he sums up once more the result of this whole investigation. But he writes as an apostle, not as a philosopher. In drawing the picture of this state, the question he feels weighing on his heart is one of salvation. Anguish seizes him as if he were still in the heat of this struggle. He utters the cry of distress (ver. 24), then immediately that of thanksgiving, because now when he is writing he knows of deliverance (ver. 25*a*); after which he resumes the course of exposition in the second part of ver. 25.

Vv. 24, 25. "*O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death? I thank God*[1] *through Jesus Christ our Lord! So then with the mind*[2] *I myself serve the law of God; but with the flesh the law of sin.*"—The figure of the preceding verse continues in this; these two exclamations are those of the inward man, who, feeling himself led captive to the law of sin, utters a groan and then cries for help. The term ἄνθρωπος, *man*, is fitted to remind *every* reader that the state described is really *his own*, so long as the deliverer has not appeared for him.—Why does Paul here call himself *wretched*, rather than guilty? Because the point in question is not the condemnation resulting from guilt; this subject was treated in the first part, chaps. i.–v. The innate power

[1] Three readings: T. R. with ℵ A K L P, Syr.: ευχαριστω τω θεω; B. Or.: χαρις τω θεω (ℵ[a] χαρις δε . . .); D E F G: η χαρις του θεου (F G: του κυριου).

[2] ℵ F G, It. omit μεν between τω and νοι.

of evil, against which that of the law is shattered, is a hereditary disease, a misfortune which only becomes a fault in proportion as we consent to it personally by not struggling against it with the aids appropriate to the economy in which we live. Thus undoubtedly is explained the cry of the apostle: ταλαίπωρος, *wretched!*—The term ῥύεσθαι, *to deliver*, is used to denote the act of the soldier who runs at his comrade's cry to rescue him from the hands of the enemy. It too belongs to the same order of figures as the two verbs ἀντιστρατεύεσθαι and αἰχμαλωτίζειν in the preceding verse.—The enemy who keeps the prisoner bound is here called *the body of this death.* The term *body* has sometimes been taken as a figurative expression, signifying merely *mass, load.* Thus Calvin says: *Corpus mortis vocat massam peccati vel congeriem, ex quâ totus homo conflatus est.* But there occurs the mention in ver. 23 of the μέλη, *members*, of the body in the strict sense; and such a figure is far from natural. Chrysostom, followed by several, takes *the body* in the strict sense; but in the cry he finds a call for death, also in the strict sense: How long shall I be obliged to live in this miserable body? Calvin's explanation of the apostle's cry amounts to the same thing: "He teaches us to ask for death as the only remedy of evil; and such indeed is the only end which can make the desire of death lawful." It is impossible to mistake the meaning of this saying more completely. Does not the apostle give thanks in the following sentence for the deliverance obtained? And is this deliverance then death? Assuredly not; it is the spiritual emancipation described in chap. viii. It is then *the body* strictly so called which is in question, but the body in a sense analogous to that in which it was called, vi. 6, *the body of sin.* It is the body regarded as the principal instrument of which sin makes use to enslave the soul and involve it in spiritual death, estrangement from God, the life of sin (ver. 5: *to bring forth fruit unto death*). The body continues with the Christian, but to be to his soul an instrument of righteousness, *to bring forth fruit unto God* (ver. 4); comp. vi. 12, 13. Those who applied the whole passage, vii. 14–23, to the regenerate believer, were of course led to the explanation either of Chrysostom or Calvin.—Should the adjective τούτου be connected with σώματος, *the body* (*this* body of

death), or with *θανάτου, death* (the body of *this* death)? The Greek phrase would give rise to an almost inevitable misunderstanding, if the first construction were the true one; and Meyer rightly observes that the sigh for deliverance does not arise from the fact that the body is *this* earthly body, but from the fact that the body is the instrument of *this* state of death in which the soul is sunk (ver. 11). This observation seems to us to decide the question.

. There are two things in the form of the second question of ver. 24 which do not harmonize well with the supposition that Paul is here speaking as the representative of *regenerate* humanity. There is the indefinite pronoun *τίς, who.* A Christian may find himself in distress; but he knows at least the name of his deliverer. Then there is the future: *will deliver me.* In speaking as a Christian, Paul says, viii. 2: *hath made me free;* for to the believer there is a deliverance accomplished once for all, as the basis of all the particular deliverances which he may yet ask. He does not pray, therefore, like the man who utters the cry of our verse, and who evidently does not yet know this great fundamental fact. Finally, let us reflect on the opposite exclamation in the following words: *I thank God through Jesus Christ.* If, as is manifest, we have here the regenerate believer's cry of deliverance, corresponding to the cry of distress uttered in ver. 24, it follows as a matter of course that the latter cannot be the apostle's, except in so far as he throws himself back in thought into a state anterior to the present time.

Ver. 25. Of the three readings presented by the documents in the first part of this verse, we must first set aside the Greco-Latin: *ἡ χάρις τοῦ Θεοῦ, the grace of God.* This would be the answer to the *τίς* in the preceding question: "Who shall deliver me?" Answer: "The grace of God." This reading evidently arises from the desire to find an immediate answer to the question in the words which followed it. According to the reading of the Vatic. and Origen: *χάρις τῷ Θεῷ, thanks to God!* the exclamation would be a triumphant one, corresponding to the previous cry of pain. The copyists might easily yield to the temptation of thus contrasting cry with cry; but would not this change of mood be somewhat abrupt? Is it not probable that the analogous passage, 1 Cor. xv. 57, has

exercised some influence on the form thus given to our text? We therefore hold to the received reading, notwithstanding the authority of Tischendorf: εὐχαριστῶ τῷ Θεῷ, *I thank God*, not only because it has representatives in the three families of documents, but also because, having a more peaceful character, it contrasts better both in form and matter with the agonizing agitation which characterizes the two preceding questions.—Is the mediation of Jesus Christ, referred to in the following words, to be applied to *the giving of thanks* itself, of which He is the mediator and instrument in the presence of God, or to *the deliverance*, which is the understood ground of the giving of thanks, and of which Jesus Christ was the instrument? The first meaning is defended by Hofmann; but it is not supported by the general idea, while the second is demanded by the context; comp. 1 Cor. xv. 57.—The special feature in the deliverance, of which the apostle is here thinking, is not the pardon of sins through the blood of Christ, but victory over sin through Christ crucified and risen, communicated to faith by the Holy Spirit; comp. the contrast established by Paul himself between these two means of grace contained in Christ, chap. v. 1, 2.—If Paul does not develop the mode of deliverance, it is because every reader can and should supply it on the instant from the preceding passage, vi. 1–vii. 6. The apostle indeed may satisfy himself at this point with few words, because, as Schott well says, he is merely recalling what he has been expounding at great length; we shall add: and announcing what he is about fully to develop, viii. 1 et seq.

After this interruption in the description of his state of misery previously to faith, Paul returns to his subject in the second part of ver. 25, which is a sort of summary of the whole passage, vv. 14–23. It seems to me that the ἄρα οὖν, *so then*, has the double office of taking up the broken thread (ἄρα) and of marking that there is here a conclusion (οὖν). This conclusion might be regarded as the consequence of the: *I thank through Jesus Christ*, in this sense, that without Christ Paul's state would still be that which is about to be expressed in the two following propositions; so Meyer thinks. But this connection has the awkwardness of making an idea, which has only been expressed in passing, control the general thought of

the whole piece. I am therefore more inclined to agree with Rückert, in connecting the *then* with the entire piece, which is about to be recapitulated in two striking sentences. We have already found more than once, at the close of a development, a pointed antithesis intended to sum it up by recalling the two sides of the question; comp. chap. v. 21 and vi. 23.—The two particles μέν and δέ, the first of which is not often used in the N. T., forcibly bring out the contrast. The rejection of the μέν in the *Sinaït.* and two Greco-Latins is a pure negligence. This form (μέν and δέ) shows that the first of the two thoughts is mentioned only in passing and with the view of *reserving* a side of the truth which is not to be forgotten, but that the mind should dwell especially on the second.—The pronoun αὐτὸς ἐγώ, *I, myself*, has been variously understood. Some (Beza, Er.) have taken it in the sense of *I, the same* man, *ego idem:* "I, one and the same man, am therefore torn in two." This meaning, whatever Meyer may say, would suit the context perfectly; but it would rather require the form ἐγὼ ὁ αὐτός. The examples quoted to justify it are taken wholly from the language of poetry. Others (Grot., Thol., Philip.) understand it: *I, I myself, ipse ego:* "I, *that same man* who have thus been deploring my misery." But this meaning would only be suitable if what Paul proceeds to say of himself formed a contrast (or at least a gradation) to the preceding description. Now, as we shall immediately see, far from saying anything new or different, he simply sums up in order to conclude. This pronoun has also been explained in the sense of *I alone, ego solus*, that is, isolating my person from every other. This sense would be the true one if it had not the awkwardness of substituting a numerical notion (*one* only) for the purely *qualitative* idea of the pronoun. As Hofmann says, "the αὐτός, *self*, serves to restrict the *I* to himself;" that is, to what Paul is in and by himself. The undoubted antithesis is: I in what I am *through Christ* (ver. 24) or *in Christ* (viii. 1). By this statement of his case he replaces himself in the position described from ver. 14. The instant he abstracts from the interposition of Christ the deliverer in his moral life, he sees only two things in himself, those mentioned in the immediate sequel. On the one hand, a man who *with the mind serves the law of*

God. The term *νοῦς, the mind,* is strangely tortured by Hodge, who paraphrases it thus: "the heart so far as regenerated;" and by Calvin and Olshausen, the one of whom takes it as: "the rational element of the soul enlightened by God's Spirit;" the other: "the understanding set free [by regeneration] to fulfil the law." But where is there a word of God's Spirit in the passage? Do we not again meet here with the same expression as in ver. 23: *the law of my mind,* equivalent to the term: *the inward man,* ver. 22? True, Calvin makes bold to say that "it is *the Spirit* which is there called the inward man!" Paul's language is more strict, and it is enough to prove that this specially Christian sense, which is sought to be given to the term *mind,* is false; that, as Meyer observes, if it were the regenerate man who is here in question, the order of the two propositions would necessarily require to be inverted. Paul would have required to say: "With the flesh no doubt I serve the law of sin, but with the mind the law of God;" for it is on the latter side that victory remains in the Christian life. The mind here therefore simply denotes, as in ver. 22, that natural organ of the human soul whereby it contemplates and discerns good and gives to it its assent. If this organ did not exist in the natural man, he would no longer be morally responsible, and his very condemnation would thus fall to the ground.—The expression seems extraordinarily strong: "*serve* the law of God!" But comp. vii. 6: "*serve* in oldness of the letter," and Phil. iii. 6: "as to the righteousness of the law blameless." It is impossible to overlook a gradation from the *we know,* or *we acknowledge,* ver. 14, to the *I agree with* (*σύμφημι*), ver. 16; from this term to the *I rejoice in* (*συνήδομαι*), ver. 22; and finally from this last to the *I serve,* ver. 25; Paul thus passes from knowledge to assent, from that to joyful approbation, and from this, finally, to the sincere effort to put it in practice. He therefore emphasizes more and more the sympathetic relation between his inmost being and the divine law.

As the first of the two antithetical propositions sums up the one aspect of his relation to the law, vv. 14–23 (the goodwill of the mind), the second sums up the opposite aspect, the victory gained by the flesh in the practice of life. And this is the point at which human life would remain indefinitely, if

man received no answer to the cry of distress uttered, ver. 24. Olshausen and Schott have thought right to begin the new section (the description of the state of the regenerate man) at ver. 25. But this obliges us either to admit an immediate interruption from the second part of this verse onwards, or to give to the term *νοῦς, the mind,* the forced meaning given to it by Olshausen. Hofmann succeeds no better in his attempt to begin the new section with the *ἄρα οὖν, so then* (25*b*). How would a second *ἄρα, then,* viii. 1, immediately follow the first? And, besides, the contrast which must be admitted between 25*b* and viii. 1 would require an adversative particle (*δέ, but*), much more than a *then.*

Conclusion regarding the passage vv. 14–25.—Before entering on the study of this passage, we had concluded from the context, and from the section taken as a whole, that this part could only refer to Paul's state as a *Pharisee.* It was the natural consequence of the identity of the subject of the passage vv. 7–13 (on which all, or nearly all, are agreed) with that of the section vv. 14–25. This view seems to us to have been confirmed by the detailed study of the whole passage. Paul has avoided, with evident design, every expression specially belonging to the Christian sphere, and the term *πνεῦμα, the Spirit,* in particular, to make use only of terms denoting the natural faculties of the human soul, like that of *νοῦς, the mind.* The contrast in this respect with viii. 1–11 is striking. We can thus understand why this is the passage in all Paul's Epistles which presents the most points of contact with profane literature.[1] The state of the pious Jew under the law does

[1] . . . Aliudque cupido
Mens aliud suadet.
(*Desire counsels me in one direction, reason in another.*)—OVID.
. . . Video meliora proboque
Deteriora sequor.
(*I see the better part, and approve it; but I follow the worse.*)—OVID.
Scibam ut esse me deceret, facere non quibam, miser.
(*I knew what I ought to be, but, unhappy that I am, I could not do it.*)
—PLAUTUS.
Quid est quod nos aliò tendentes aliò trahit?
(*What then is it that, when we would go in one direction, drags us in the other?*)
—SENECA.
Ὁ ἁμαρτάνων ἃ μὲν θέλει, οὐ ποιεῖ, καὶ ἃ μὴ θέλει, ποιεῖ.
(*He who sins does not what he would, and does what he would not.*)
—EPICTETUS.
We need scarcely add the well-known comparison of Plato, which represents the human soul as like a chariot drawn by two horses, the one of which draws it upwards, the other downwards.

not differ essentially from that of the sincere heathen seeking to practise goodness as it is revealed to him by conscience (ii. 14, 15).—Neither has it seemed to us that the verbs in the present offer an insurmountable obstacle to this explanation. Not only did ver. 24 prove with what liveliness Paul in writing this passage recalled his impressions of former days. But it must also be remembered, and Paul cannot forget it, that what for him is a past, is a present for all his sincere fellow-countrymen of whom he is himself the normal representative. Finally, does he not feel profoundly, that as soon as he abstracts from Christ and his union with Him, he himself becomes the natural man, and consequently also the legal Jew, struggling with sin in his own strength, without other aid than the law, and consequently overcome by the evil instinct, the flesh? What he describes then is the law grappling with the evil nature, *where these two adversaries encounter one another* without the grace of the gospel interposing between them. No doubt this is what explains the analogy between this picture and so many Christian experiences, and which has misled so many excellent commentators. How often does it happen that the believer finds nothing more in the gospel than a law, and a law more burdensome still than that of Sinai! For the demands of the cross go infinitely deeper than those of the Israelitish law. They penetrate, as a sacred writer says, "even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and of the joints and marrow, and discerning even the thoughts and intents of the heart" (Heb. iv. 12). Now as soon as the Christian has allowed the bond between Christ and his heart to be relaxed, however little, he finds himself face to face with the gospel, exactly like the Jew face to face with the law. Obliged to carry into effect the injunctions of Jesus and the apostles in his own strength, since Christ no longer lives in him, is it surprising that he should make the same, and even more bitter experiences, than the Jew under the yoke of the Decalogue? Faith in Christ is usually supposed to be a fact accomplished once for all, and which should necessarily and naturally display its consequences, as a tree produces its fruits. It is forgotten that in the spiritual domain nothing *is done* which does not require to be continually *done again*, and that what is not done again to-day, will to-morrow begin to be undone. Thus it is that the bond of the soul to Christ, whereby we have become *His branches*, relaxes the instant we do not re-form it with new active force and begins to break with every unpardoned act of infidelity. The branch becomes barren, and yet Christ's law demanding its fruitfulness remains (John xv.). Thus, then, he recommences the experience of the Jew. And this state is the more frequent

and natural, because we Christians of the present day have not passed, like Paul, from the law to faith through that profound and radical crisis which had made the one dispensation in him *succeed* to the other. From the fact of our Christian education, it happens rather that we learn to know the gospel at once as law and grace, and that we make, so to speak, the experiences of Jew and Christian simultaneously, and that very often (when there has been no marked conversion) to the end of our life. But we must beware of concluding therefrom that this state of half Jew half Christian is normal, and may be justified by the passage, Rom. vii. It is against this enervating view, resting on a false interpretation of our chapter, that the most recent religious movement has justly sought to protest. It has brought out forcibly the difference between the spiritual state described in chap. vii. and that which chap. viii. describes, and claimed for the latter only the name of Christian. Is not the one in fact what Paul calls *oldness of the letter*, the other, *newness of Spirit* (vii. 6)? These cannot be, as Philippi would have it, the two aspects of one and the same state; they are two opposite states. We ought to humble ourselves because of the last traces of the former, when we find them in ourselves, as for something abnormal, and aspire after the complete possession of the glorious privileges which constitute the second.

Of the various explanations mentioned above (pp. 15, 16), we therefore set aside the application of this passage: 1. *To mankind* in general; 2. To the *Jewish people*, considered in their external and national history; 3. To Paul, as the representative of *regenerate* Christians; 4. Neither can we share Hofmann's opinion, who finds here only the entirely *personal* experiences of Paul. How would those experiences interest the Church, and deserve a place in the description of the *method of salvation*, given in the Epistle to the Romans, if they had not something of a prototypical character? Paul himself ascribes to them this character, Eph. iii. 8–10, and 1 Tim. i. 12–16. He regards himself as the normal example of what must happen to every man who, in ignorance of Christ, or thinking to dispense with Him, will yet take the law in earnest. It is only as such that he can think of presenting himself prominently in the pronoun *I*, in a work of supreme importance like our Epistle.—As little can we accept the explanation proposed in the treatise of Pearsall Smith: *Bondage and Liberty*. According to this writer, as we have said, the apostle is here giving the account of a sad experience through which he passed, some time after his conversion, by yielding to the attempt to "render himself perfect by his own efforts," so that in consequence of this aberration sin recovered life in him; he saw himself deprived of his

intimate communion with Christ, and consequently also of victory over sin (see p. 14). This idea assuredly does not merit refutation, especially when this example of the apostle's alleged aberration is contrasted with that of an American preacher, who for forty years had known only the experience of chaps. vi. and viii. of the Romans, those of triumph, and never the experience of chap. vii., that of defeat (p. 28)! We cannot express our conclusion better than in these words of M. Bonnet (*Comment.* p. 85): "The apostle is speaking here neither *of the natural man* in his state of voluntary ignorance and sin, nor *of the child of God,* born anew, set free by grace, and animated by the Spirit of Christ; but of the man whose conscience, awakened by the law, has entered sincerely, with fear and trembling, but still *in his own strength,* into the desperate struggle against evil;" —merely adding that in our actual circumstances the law which thus awakens the conscience and summons it to the struggle against sin, is the law in the form of the Gospel, and of the example of Jesus Christ, taken apart from justification in Him and sanctification by Him.

THIRD SECTION (VIII. 1–39).

THE WORK OF THE HOLY SPIRIT IN THE JUSTIFIED BELIEVER.

At the close of the preceding section, the apostle had contrasted *oldness of the letter,* a term by which he denotes the state of the sincere Jew under the law, with *newness of Spirit,* by which he understands the state of the regenerate Christian. He has just described from his own experience the former of these two states, in order to show how little reason the Christian has to regret the passing away of subjection to a principle of morality so external and inefficacious as the law. He now turns the page of his spiritual life, and describes the latter of these two states, the work of the Holy Spirit. This divine principle does not impose good from without; He inspires it; He causes it to penetrate into the very will, by radically transforming its direction. The consequences of this life of the Spirit are displayed from this time onwards from stage to stage, till the perfect accomplishment of God's plan in behalf of redeemed humanity. Such is the subject developed in this admirable chapter, which has been called: "The chapter beginning with *no condemnation,* and ending

with *no separation!*" Spener is reported to have said that if holy Scripture was a ring, and the Epistle to the Romans its precious stone, chap. viii. would be the sparkling point of the jewel.

This chapter may be divided into four sections:

In the first, vv. 1–11, the Holy Spirit is represented as the principle of the *moral and bodily resurrection* of believers.

In the second, vv. 12–17, the new state into which the Holy Spirit has brought the believer, is represented as the state of *adoption*, which confers on him the dignity of an *heir*.

The third, vv. 18–30, contrasts with the misery still attaching to the present state of things the assured realization of *glory*, to which believers have been *eternally destined*.

Finally, in the fourth section, vv. 31–39, the hymn of the *assurance of salvation* crowns this exposition of sanctification, adoption, and glorification by the Spirit.

Before beginning the study of this incomparable chapter, we must again take account of its connection with chap. vi. In the latter, the apostle had showed how *the object* of justifying faith, Christ justified and risen, becomes to the believer, who appropriates it, a principle of death to sin and life to God. But there it was yet nothing more than a state of *the will*, contained implicitly in the act of faith. That this new will may have the power of realizing itself in the life, there is needed a *force from above* to communicate to the human will creative efficacy, and overturn the internal and external obstacles which oppose its realization. This force, as the apostle now unfolds, is the Holy Spirit, by whom Christ crucified and risen reproduces Himself in the believer (Phil. iii. 10).

SEVENTEENTH PASSAGE (VIII. 1–11).

The Victory of the Holy Spirit over Sin and Death.

Vv. 1–4 describe the restoration of *holiness* by the Holy Spirit; and vv. 5–11 show how from this destruction of *sin* there follows that of *death*. Thus are destroyed the two last enemies of salvation.

Vv. 1, 2. "*There is therefore now no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus.*[1] *For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me*[2] *free from the law of sin and death.*" —The word *now* has here its temporal, and not its logical sense, as Philippi would have it (to be in keeping with the application which he makes of vii. 7–25 to the regenerate). By this word Paul contrasts the new state with the old, which has passed away.—The *therefore* is not merely connected, as Meyer thinks, with the preceding verse: "As I am no more in myself, but in Christ, there is no" . . .; for then *but* would have been required rather than *therefore*. This *therefore* takes up the thread, which had been for the moment broken, of the exposition of Christian sanctification; for the passage vii. 7–25 was, as we have seen, a retrospective glance at the moral effects of the law in fallen man, and consequently a sort of parenthesis. Now Paul resumes at the point where he had interrupted himself, that is, at vii. 6, and raises the superstructure, the foundation of which he had laid in the section vi. 1–vii. 6. Hence the *therefore:* "Since ye are dead to sin and alive to God, and so subject to grace, and made free from the law, all condemnation has disappeared." The expression: *no condemnation,* does not apply to any one form of condemnation, and, indeed, Paul takes into view first that which has been lifted off by the grace of justification, chaps. i.–v.: the abolition of *guilt;* and next, that which is made to disappear by the destruction of *sin* itself (chaps. vi. 1–vii. 6). After *therefore* the believer has found reconciliation with God, and thereby death to sin, he can really exclaim: "There is now *no* condemnation." Only sin must not recover its dominion; otherwise condemnation would infallibly revive. For we have seen at the close of chap. vi. that sin entails death on the justified, in whom it regains the upper hand, as well as on the unjustified (viii. 12, 13). There is therefore only one way of preventing sin from causing us to perish, that is, that it perish itself. Grace does not save by patronizing sin, but by destroying it. And hence the apostle can draw

[1] T. R. adds here, with E K L P: μη κατα σαρκα περιπατουσιν, αλλα κατα πνευμα; A, Syr^{sch} add only the words: μη κατα σαρκα περιπατουσιν; the reading followed in the translation is found in ℵ B C D F G.

[2] ℵ B F G, Syr^{sch} read σε (*thee*) instead of με (*me*).

from what has been proved in chap. vi. the conclusion: that there is no condemnation. It ought to be so after sin is pardoned as guilt and destroyed as a power, if always this power remains broken. The view of Paul extends even it would seem to a third condemnation, of which he has not yet spoken, that which has overtaken the body, *death*, the abolition of which he proceeds also to explain, ver. 11.—The words: *them which are in Christ Jesus*, form a contrast to the expression *αὐτὸς ἐγώ*, *I, as I am in myself*, vii. 25.—Our translations, following the received text, give us at the end of the verse this addition: *who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit*. These words are, according to numerous authorities, and according to the context itself, an interpolation borrowed by anticipation from ver. 4: "A precautionary gloss against the freeness of salvation," says M. Bonnet very happily. It was needful to proclaim deliverance before explaining it.—*How* has it been effected? This is what is expounded vv. 2–4.

Ver. 2. It is strange that Paul should speak of the *law of the Spirit*. Are these two expressions not contradictory? We shall not understand the phrase unless we bear in mind what has been said (iii. 27, vii. 21, etc.) of the general sense which the word *law* often takes in Paul's writings: a controlling power imposing itself on the will, or, as in the case before us, appropriating the very will. The complement *τῆς ζωῆς*, *of life*, may be understood as the genitive of *cause*: "The Spirit which proceeds from the life (that of Jesus Himself);" or as the gen. of *effect*: "The Spirit which produces life (in the believer)." But is it possible wholly to sever these two relations? If the Spirit produces spiritual life in the believer's heart, is it not because He is the breath of the living and glorified Christ? He *takes of that which belongs to Jesus*, John xvi. 15, and communicates it to us.—The regimen: *in Jesus Christ*, is connected by several commentators with the verb *hath made free*: "The Spirit of life made us free as soon as we entered into communion with Jesus Christ." But in this sense would not Paul rather have said in Him, *ἐν αὐτῷ*, simply referring to the *in Christ Jesus* of the previous verse? It is therefore more natural to make the regimen dependent on the immediately preceding phrase: the law of the Spirit of

life. The only question is what article is to be understood, to serve as the link of this regimen. Should it be ὁ, relating to νόμος, *the law*, or τοῦ, referring to πνεύματος, *the Spirit*, or finally τῆς, referring to ζωῆς, *life?* The first connection, that adopted by Calvin, seems to us the preferable one. The apostle has no special reason for recalling here that *life* or *the Spirit* are given *in Jesus Christ*, which is understood otherwise of itself. But it is important for him to remind us that, in opposition to the reign of the letter, which made us slaves, the *reign* of the Spirit of life, which sets us free, was inaugurated in Jesus Christ. The absence of the article ὁ before the regimen ἐν *X.* *I.* arises from the fact that the latter is regarded as forming only one and the same idea with the phrase on which it depends.—Instead of the pronoun μέ, *me*, read by the T. R. with the majority of the Mss., there is found in the *Sinaït.* and the *Vatic.*, as well as in two Greco-Latins, σέ, *thee:* "hath made *thee* free." This reading must be very ancient, for it is found so early as in the Peschito and Tertullian. It has been admitted by Tischendorf in his eighth edition. But it is nevertheless very improbable. Why the sudden appearance of the second person at the very close of this argument? This σέ has evidently arisen, as Meyer thinks, from the repetition of the last syllable of ἠλευθέρωσε. The μέ, *me*, is the continuation of the form of expression which the apostle had used throughout the whole of the second part of chap. vii. Indeed, the figure used by him in vv. 23 and 24, that of a prisoner calling for help, with the cry: "Who shall deliver me?" still continues and reaches its close in our verse, as is seen by the choice of the term ἠλευθέρωσε, *hath made free.* Our ver. 2 is the true answer to this cry of distress, ver. 23. It is *the breath of life* communicated in Jesus to the justified Christian which causes the chains of sin and death to fall from him.—We must beware of following several commentators in applying the phrase: *the law of sin and death*, to the law of Moses. Paul has just called the latter *the law of God*, and has declared that he *took pleasure in it after the inward man;* this would not be the time to abuse it in this fashion. The true explanation follows from ver. 23, where he has spoken of the *law which is in his members*, and which renders him the captive *of sin.* The word *law* is therefore still used here in

that general sense in which we have just seen it taken in the beginning of the verse. The apostle deliberately contrasts *law* with *law*, that is to say here: power with power.—The two combined terms, *sin* and *death*, form the antithesis to *life*; for the latter includes the notions of holiness and resurrection. *Death* is the state of separation from God in which sin involves us, but that while understanding physical as the transition to eternal death. The two words: *sin* and *death*, control the following development down to ver. 11. And first: deliverance from sin, vv. 3 and 4.

Vv. 3, 4. "*For—what the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh—God sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh, that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit.*"—The *fact* and *agent* of the deliverance had just been mentioned in ver. 2; vv. 3 and 4 describe its *mode*; ver. 3 its condition, ver. 4 its realization. The *for* of ver. 3 extends its force to the close of ver. 4.—Our translation shows to what construction we hold in explaining the words: *what the law could not do.* We make them, with Meyer, Philippi, and others, a nominative, in apposition to the divine act, to be enunciated immediately afterwards: "God condemned sin, a thing which the law was powerless to accomplish." This construction is to be preferred for its simplicity and clearness to all others: to that of Schott, who, by means of a harsh inversion, thus explains the words: "seeing that (ἐν ᾧ) the impotence of the law was weak through the flesh;" that is to say, the weakness of the law was still further increased through the influence of the flesh —the meaning is as forced as the construction;—or to that of Hofmann, who understands the verb ἦν, *was*, and makes the whole a principal proposition. "The weakness of the law *was* (consisted) in that it was weak through the flesh." But such an ellipsis is inadmissible, and the asyndeton between this and the following proposition is without explanation. It would be better to understand, with Luther (comp. the translations of Ostervald and Oltramare), the words ἐποίησε τοῦτο: "What the law could not do, God *did* by sending" . . . When Paul was about to write this verb, he is held to have substituted the mention of the act itself thus announced:

"What was impossible . . . God condemned." But does not that bring us back to Meyer's construction, which reaches the goal by a shorter course? Comp. Heb. viii. 1.—The powerlessness of the law to accomplish this work did not come from any intrinsic imperfection, but from the fact that it found resistance in man's sinful nature: *διὰ τῆς σαρκός, by reason of the flesh.* The law could certainly condemn sin in writing, by engraving its condemnation on stone; but not by displaying this condemnation in a real human life. And yet this was the necessary condition of the destruction of the sinful tendency in mankind, and in order to the restoration of holiness. The expression: *the powerlessness* or *impossibility of the law,* is easily understood, notwithstanding Hofmann's objection, in the sense of: "What it is impossible for the law to realize." Meyer quotes the expression of Xenophon: *τὸ δύνατον τῆς πόλεως, what the city can make* or *give.*—The words *ἐν ᾧ, in this that,* evidently open up the explanation of this weakness. The depraved instinct which the law encounters in man, *the flesh,* prevents it from obtaining the cordial obedience which the law demands from him. *The flesh* here as so frequently, in the moral sense which rests on the physical: self-complacency. The participle *πέμψας, sending,* though an aorist, nevertheless expresses an act simultaneous with that of the finite verb *condemned* (see Meyer): "condemned by sending." The term *sending* by itself would not necessarily imply the pre-existence of Christ; for it may apply to the appearance of a mere man charged with a divine mission; comp. John i. 6. But the notion of pre-existence necessarily follows from the relation of this verb to the expression: *His own Son,* especially if we take account of the regimen: *in the likeness of sinful flesh.* It is evident that, in the view of one who speaks thus, the existence of this Son preceded His human existence (comp. the more emphatic term *ἐξαπέστειλεν,* Gal. iv. 4).—The expression: *His own Son,* literally, *the Son of Himself,* forbids us to give to the title *Son,* either the meaning of *eminent man,* or *theocratic king,* or even *Messiah.* It necessarily refers to this Son's *personal* relation to God, and indicates that Him whom God sends, He takes from *His own bosom;* comp. John i. 18. Paul marks the contrast between the *nature* of the envoy (*the* true *Son* of God) and the manner of

His appearing here below: *in the likeness of sinful flesh.*—This expression: *sinful flesh* (strictly, *flesh of sin*), has been understood by many, especially most recently by Holsten, as implying the idea that sin is inherent in the flesh, that is to say, in the bodily nature. It would follow therefrom—and this critic accepts the consequence—that Jesus Himself, according to Paul, was not exempt from the natural sin inseparable from the substance of the body. Only Holsten adds that this *objective* sin never controlled the will of Jesus, nor led him to a positive *transgression* (παράβασις): the pre-existing divine Spirit of Christ constantly kept the flesh in obedience. We have already seen, vi. 6, that if the body is to the soul a cause of its fall, it is only so because the will itself is no longer in its normal state. If by union with God it were inwardly upright and firm, it would control the body completely; but being itself since the fall controlled by selfishness, it seeks a means of satisfaction in the body, and the latter takes advantage therefrom to usurp a malignant dominion over it. Thus, and thus only, can Paul connect the notion of sin so closely with that of *body* or *flesh.* Otherwise he would be obliged to make God Himself, as the creator of the body, the author of sin. What proves in our very passage that he is not at all regarding sin as an attribute inseparable from the flesh, is the expression he uses in speaking of Jesus: *in the likeness of a flesh of sin.* Had he meant to express the idea ascribed to him by Holsten, why speak of likeness? Why not say simply: *in a flesh of sin,* that is to say, sinful like ours? While affirming similarity of *substance* between the flesh of Jesus and ours, the very thing the apostle wishes here is to set aside the idea of likeness in *quality* (in respect of *sin*). This is done clearly by the expression which he has chosen. It will be asked, might he not have said more briefly: *in the likeness of flesh,* or *of our flesh* (ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκός)? But by expressing himself thus, he would have favoured the idea that the body of Jesus was a mere *appearance.* And this is the very consequence which Marcion has sought to draw from our passage. One cannot help admiring the nicety of the phrase formed by the apostle, and the pliability of the language which lent itself so readily to the analysis and expression of such delicate shades.—Wendt, while rightly criticizing Holsten's

opinion, escapes it only by another inadmissible explanation. He understands the word *flesh* in the sense in which it is taken in that frequent expression: *all flesh*, that is to say, every man, every creature. Paul means here, he thinks, that Jesus appeared on the earth in the likeness *of the sinful creature*.[1] But should we then require to take the word *flesh* in the preceding proposition: "The law was weak *through the flesh*," in the sense of creature? It seems to us that M. Sabatier is right in saying:[2] "No doubt the word *flesh* sometimes denotes man taken in his entirety. But even then it never absolutely loses its original signification; the notion of the material organism always remains the fundamental notion." We have no need of Wendt's expedient to account for the phrase of the apostle. Here is its meaning, as it seems to us: God, by sending His Son, meant to provide a human life in that same flesh, under the influence of which we sin so habitually, such that it might complete this dangerous career without sin (χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας, Heb. iv. 15); comp. 2 Cor. v. 21: "He who knew no sin" . . .—What then was the reason why God sent His Son in this form? Jesus, Paul tells us in Philippians, might in virtue of His *God-form*, of His *divine state* in the presence of God, have appeared here below as the equal of God. The reason it was not so is explained by the words καὶ περὶ ἁμαρτίας, *and for sin*. If man had still been in his normal state, the appearance of the Son would also have had a normal character. But there was an extraordinary thing to be destroyed, sin. And hence the necessity for the coming of the Son in a flesh like our sinful flesh. As the expression: *for sin*, is sometimes taken in the O. T. (LXX. version) as a substantive, in the sense of *sacrifice for sin* (Ps. xl. 6, *e.g.*), and has passed thence into the N. T. (Heb. x. 6–18), some commentators have thought that Paul was here appropriating this Alexandrine form. But there are two reasons opposed to this idea: 1. This very special sense, which might present itself naturally to the mind of the readers of such a book as the Epistle to the Hebrews, filled throughout with allusions to the ceremonies of the Levitical worship, could hardly have been understood, without explanation, by the Christians

[1] *Die Begriffe Fleisch und Geist*, p. 190 et seq.
[2] *L'Apôtre Paul*, p. 252.

of Rome, who were for the most part Gentiles. 2. The context does not require the idea of *sacrifice*, because the matter in question is not *guilt* to be expiated, but solely the evil tendency to be uprooted. Not that the notion of expiation should be wholly excluded from the contents of so general an expression as *for sin*. It is undoubtedly contained in it, but it is not here the leading idea. Paul means in a wide sense, that it is the fact of *sin*, and especially the intention to *destroy* it (by every means, *expiation* and *sanctification*), which have caused the coming of Christ here below, in this form so unlike His glorious nature.

This coming is only the means of the means; the latter is the decisive act expressed by the words: *He condemned sin.* To condemn, is to declare evil, and devote to destruction; and we see no occasion to depart from this simple and usual meaning. Most commentators have thought it inapplicable, and have substituted for it the meaning of *conquering, overwhelming, destroying,* Chrys.: ἐνίκησεν ἁμαρτίαν; Theod.: κατέλυσεν; Beza: *abolevit;* Calvin: *abrogavit regnum;* Grot.: *interfecit;* Beng.: *virtute privavit;* so also Thol., Fritzs., de Wette, Mey., etc. But Paul has a word consecrated to this idea; it is the term καταργεῖν, *to abolish, annul;* comp. vi. 6; 1 Cor. xv. 24, etc. There is in the word κατακρίνειν, *to condemn,* the notion of a judicial sentence which is not contained in the sense indicated by these authors. Other commentators have felt this, and have again found here the idea of *expiation,* developed in chap. iii.: God condemned sin in Christ crucified, as its representative, on the cross (Rück., Olsh., Philip., Hofm., Gess); to this idea many add that of the *destruction* of sin, evidently demanded by the context; so Philippi: "*to destroy by expiating;*" Gess: "a destruction of the power of sin founded on a judicial sentence," which is included in "Christ's expiatory death." But that powerlessness of the law in consequence of the flesh, of which Paul was speaking, did not consist in not being able to condemn sin; for it did condemn and even punish it; but it was powerless to destroy it, to render man victorious over its power. Besides, would it not be surprising to find Paul, after developing the subject of expiation in its place in chap. iii., returning to it here, in very unlike terms! We are therefore led to a wholly different

explanation. Paul has in view neither the *destruction* of sin by the Holy Spirit (ver. 4), nor its *condemnation* on the cross; he is regarding *Christ's holy life* as a living condemnation of sin. The flesh in Him was like a door constantly open to the temptations both of pleasure and pain; and yet He constantly refused sin any entrance into His will and action. By this persevering and absolute exclusion He declared it evil and unworthy of existing in humanity. This is what the law, *because of the flesh*, which naturally sways every human will, could not realize in any man. This meaning, with an important shade of difference, was that to which Menken was led; it is that of Wendt; it was certainly the idea of Theophylact when he said: He sanctified the flesh, and crowned it by condemning sin in the flesh which He had appropriated, and by showing that the flesh is not sinful in its nature" (see the passage in de Wette). Perhaps Irenæus even had the same thought when he thus expressed himself: *Condemnavit peccatum* (in the inner chamber of His heart) *et jam quasi condemnatum ejecit extra carnem.*—It is evident that if this meaning corresponds exactly to the thought of the apostle, the question whether we should connect the following regimen: ἐν τῇ σάρκι, *in the flesh*, with the substantive τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, *sin* ("sin *which is* in the flesh"), or with the verb κατέκρινε, *condemned* ("He *condemned in* the flesh"), is decided. Not only, indeed, in the former case would the article τήν be necessary after ἁμαρτίαν; but still more this regimen: *in the flesh*, would be superfluous, when connected with the word *sin;* now it becomes very significant if it refers to the verb. It might even be said that the whole pith of the thought centres in the regimen thus understood. In fact, the law could undoubtedly overwhelm sin with its sentences, and, so to speak, *on paper*. But Christ accomplished what it could not do, by condemning sin *in the flesh*, in a real, living, human nature, in a humanity subject to those same conditions of bodily existence under which we all are. Hence the reason why He must appear here below *in flesh*. For it was in the very fortress where sin had established its seat, that it behoved to be attacked and conquered. We must beware of translating with several: "in *His* flesh," as if there were the pronoun αὐτοῦ, *of Him*. In this case the pronoun could not be want-

ing; and the thought itself would be misrepresented. For the expression: in *His* flesh, would only denote the particular historical fact, whereas the latter: in *the* flesh, while reminding us of the particular fact, expresses the general notion which brings out its necessity. Like the hero spoken of in the fable, He required, if one may venture so to speak, Himself to descend into the infected place which He was commissioned to cleanse.—Thus from the perfectly holy life of Jesus there proceeds a conspicuous condemnation of sin; and it is this moral fact, the greatest of the miracles that distinguished this life, which the Holy Spirit goes on reproducing in the life of every believer, and propagating throughout the entire race. This will be the victory gained over the law *of sin* (ver. 2). Thus we understand the connection between the *condemned* of ver. 3, and the *no condemnation*, ver. 1. In His life He condemned that sin, which by remaining master of ours, would have brought into it condemnation. The relation between vv. 3 and 4 becomes also very simple: The condemnation of sin in Christ's life is the *means* appointed by God to effect its destruction in ours.[1]

Ver. 4. The relation we have just indicated between vv. 3 and 4 forbids us to give here to δικαίωμα, *what the law lays down as just*, the meaning of: *sentence of absolution*, which some, and Philippi most recently, have given to it. The matter in question here is not *guilt* to be removed; and to say that the law itself can henceforth declare us just, the term πληρωθῆναι, *to be fulfilled*, would not be very suitable. The matter in question, according to the context and the terms employed, is *what the law demands* of man. All the postulates contained in the righteousness demanded by the law (comp. the Sermon on the Mount, for example) are *fulfilled in us*, as soon as we

[1] Menken and Wendt, as well as Theophylact, think that, according to Paul, Christ's holy life in the flesh was intended to *justify* the flesh, and thereby humanity itself, from the reproach of having sin inherent in its essence. But this pretended justification is not directly enough connected with the context, and it would prove at most the *possibility* of sanctification; the apostle evidently goes further.—Menken and others seem to have concluded from this passage, like Holsten, that sin, in so far as it is a fact of *nature*, must have belonged in some way to Christ's flesh, that so it might be vanquished by our Lord. But to secure the reality of victory it was enough that He should endure *temptation*. It is possible to conquer sin, not only by forcing it to quit, but also by preventing it from entering.

walk, no more *after the flesh*, but *after the Spirit*. For, as we have seen, the law being *spiritual*, must coincide at all points in its statutes with the impulses of the Spirit. The participle *περιπατοῦσιν, who walk*, expresses the condition on which Paul can affirm of believers what he has just said (comp. the *τοῖς πιστεύουσιν*, John i. 12).—Commentators differ as to the meaning of the word *πνεῦμα, spirit*. Does it denote, as Lange thinks, the *spiritual life* in believers? But would this be a very sure standard, and does ver. 2 admit of this subjective sense? Most, therefore, understand by the expression: *the Holy Spirit*. This meaning does not seem to us open to question (comp. also vv. 9 and 11). Only from the use of the word *spirit* in the sequel (vv. 5–8), it follows that the apostle is not speaking of the Holy Spirit, independently of His union with the human *πνεῦμα*, but of the former as dwelling in the latter, or of the latter as wholly directed by the former. And hence the reason why the one and the other idea becomes alternately the dominant one in the following passage.

But the most important word in this verse is the conjunction *that*. In this word is contained Paul's real notion of sanctification. How does the fulfilment of the law in believers follow from the fact expounded in ver. 3: the condemnation of sin wrought in the person of Christ? The strangest answer to this question is that of Holsten: "The power of the flesh in humanity was destroyed by the death-blow which slew the flesh of Christ on the cross." But how could sin of nature, *objective* sin, in humanity, be destroyed by the fact of Christ's death? If sin is inherent in *the flesh*, the flesh which needs to be destroyed is not only Christ's, but that of the entire human race. As Wendt rightly observes, nothing but *the death of all men* could secure the desired result.—Gess thinks that the part played by Christ's death in sanctification was to render possible the gift of the Spirit, who alone has power to sanctify (comp. Gal. iii. 13, 14). But Paul does not say in ver. 4: "that the Spirit might be given" (as he does Gal. iii. 14: *that we might receive the Spirit*). He passes directly from the condemnation of sin in Christ (ver. 3) to the fulfilment of the law in believers (ver. 4). This mode of expression supposes another relation. And this relation is

easy to comprehend if the right meaning of ver. 3 has been taken. The believer's holiness is nothing else than that which Jesus Himself realized during His earthly existence. "For their sakes I sanctify myself," says Jesus, John xvii. 19, "that they also might be sanctified through the truth." Here, as in other respects, the Spirit only *takes what is His*, to communicate it to us (John xvi. 14). Our Lord's holy life on the earth is the type which the Holy Spirit is commissioned to reproduce in us, the treasure from which He draws the renewing of our life (Col. iii. 10; 2 Cor. iii. 17, 18). The holiness of all of us is only this one holiness which the Spirit makes ours: *He is our sanctification* as well as *our righteousness*, the latter by His death (which faith makes our death), the former by *His* holy *life* (which the Spirit makes our life). Witness the two διά, *through, by*, of v. 1, 2; and the mysterious *by His life*, ἐν τῇ ζωῇ αὐτοῦ, of v. 10. Such is the rich and profound sense of the *that*, ver. 4.—The expression ἐν ἡμῖν, *in us*, perfectly suits this meaning. It says first, that therein we are receptive; then it contains also the *by us*.—The term περιπατεῖν, *to walk*, is Paul's usual figure for moral conduct. —The subjective negation μή is used because Paul is speaking not of the fact in itself, but of the fact as being the *assumed condition* of the preceding affirmation.

Thus the first idea of this passage has been developed: emancipation from the *law of sin*. What the law condemns was condemned in Christ, that henceforth through His Spirit the law might be fully carried out in us. No doubt the power of sin is not annihilated within, but it cannot control the active part of our being and determine the περιπατεῖν (*the walk*). There remains the second idea: deliverance from the last condemnation, that of *death:* death *spiritual*, vv. 5–10, and finally also from *bodily* death, ver. 11.

Vv. 5, 6. "*For they that are after the flesh aspire after the things of the flesh; but they that are after the Spirit aspire after the things of the Spirit. For the aspiration of the flesh is death; but the aspiration of the Spirit is life and peace.*"—To understand the *for* which connects this verse with the preceding, we must begin with paraphrasing the first clause by adding: "For, *while* they that are after the flesh," . . . then complete the second clause by adding to the words: "aspire

after the things of the Spirit," the following: "and consequently *walk after the Spirit*, with the view of obtaining those spiritual blessings."—*To be after the flesh*, is to be inwardly governed by it, as the natural man always is. The part here referred to is the deepest source of the moral life, whence the will is constantly drawing its impulses and direction. Hence the consequence: τὰ τῆς σαρκὸς φρονοῦσιν: they are preoccupied with the things of the flesh, aspire after them. The word φρονεῖν is one of those terms which it is difficult to render in English, because it includes at once *thinking* and *willing*. Comp. the well-known Greek expressions ὑψηλοφρονεῖν, μεγαφρονεῖν, *to aim high, to have a high self-regard*. The φρονεῖν, *the aspiration*, of which our verse speaks, proceeds from the εἶναι, *being*, and produces the περιπατεῖν, *the walking*, of ver. 4, the moral necessity of which Paul wishes to demonstrate, whether it be on the side of the flesh or on that of the Spirit.—The *I*, *ego*, is distinct from both tendencies; but it yields itself without fail to the one or the other—to the former, as the *I* of the natural man; to the latter, as the *I* of the regenerate man. As its state, so is its tendency; as its tendency, so is its conduct.

Ver. 6 explains (γάρ, *for*) the moral necessity with which this motion constantly proceeds, from the inward moral state to aspiration, and from aspiration to action. There is on both sides, as it were, a fated end to be reached, which acts at a distance on the will by an attraction like that which is exercised by a precipice on the current of a river as it approaches it. No doubt one might take the words *death* and *life* as characterizing the two tendencies themselves. But the argument does not find so natural an explanation thus, as if we take the two words to express the inevitable *goal* to which man is inwardly impelled in both ways. This goal is *death* on the one hand, *life* on the other. The *flesh* tends to the former; for to gain the complete liberty after which it aspires, it needs a more and more complete separation from God; and this is death. The spirit, on the contrary, thirsts for life in God, which is its element, and sacrifices everything to succeed in enjoying it perfectly. Neither of these two powers leaves a man at rest till it has brought him to its goal, whether to that state of death in which not a spark of life remains, or to

that perfect life from which the last vestige of death has disappeared.—*Death* is here, as in ver. 2, separation from God, which by a course of daily development at length terminates through physical death in eternal perdition (vi. 23). *Life*, in Scripture, denotes a fully satisfied existence, in which all the faculties find their full exercise and their true occupation. Man's spirit, become the abode and organ of the Divine Spirit, realizes this life with a growing perfection to eternal life. *Peace* is the inward feeling of tranquillity which accompanies such an existence; it shows itself particularly in the absence of all fear in regard to death and judgment (v. 1). There is no changing the *nature* of these two states and walks (ver. 5), and no arresting the latter in its onward march (ver. 6). The way of salvation is to pass from the first to the second, and not to relapse thereafter from the second to the first.

The two theses of ver. 6 are justified in the following verses, the former in vv. 7 and 8, the latter in vv. 9 to 11.

Vv. 7, 8. "*Because the aspiration of the flesh is enmity against God: for it is not subject to the law of God, neither can it be. And they that are in the flesh cannot please God.*"—The flesh tends to death (ver. 6); for it is in its essence *hatred of God.* The conjunction διότι, literally, *because of the fact that,* announces an explanation which indeed follows. The flesh, the life of the *I* for itself, must be hostile to God; for it feels that all it gives its idol it takes from God, and all it would bestow on God it would take away from its idol. Enmity to God is therefore only the reverse side of its attachment to itself, that is to say, it belongs to its essence. This enmity is proved by two facts, the one belonging to man as related to God (ver. 7*b*), the other to God as related to man (ver. 8). The first is the revolt of the flesh against the divine will; this feeling is mentioned first as a simple fact. The flesh wishes to satisfy itself: most frequently the law withstands it; hence inward revolt always, and often external revolt. And this fact need not surprise us. The flesh is what it is; it cannot change its nature, any more than God can change the nature of His law. Hence an inevitable and perpetual conflict, which can only come to an end with the dominion of the flesh over the will. Now this conflict is the way of death; comp. Gal. vi. 8.

Ver. 8. On the other hand, God is no more the friend of the flesh than the flesh is of Him. The δέ has been understood in all sorts of ways, from Meyer, who understands it in the sense of *now then*, to Calvin and Flatt, who give it the sense of *therefore* (*ergo*)! It is a simple adversative: *and on the other hand.* The enmity is as it were natural. For the abstract principle, *the flesh*, Paul here substitutes the carnal individuals; he thus approaches the direct application to his readers which follows in ver. 9.—*To be in the flesh* is a still stronger expression than *to be after the flesh*, ver. 5. According to this latter, the flesh is the *standard* of moral existence; according to the former, it is its *principle* or source. Now, how could God take pleasure in beings who have as the principle of their life the pursuit of self? Is this not the principle opposed to His essence?—Thus, then, carnal beings, already involved in spiritual death, plunge themselves in it ever deeper and deeper; and consequently for them condemnation remains, and is all that remains; while spiritual men rise on the ladder of life to that perfect existence wherein the last trace of condemnation, physical *death* itself, will disappear (vv. 9 to 11).

Ver. 9. "*But as for you, ye are not under the dominion of the flesh, but under that of the Spirit, if the Spirit of God really dwell in you. But if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His.*"—In thus apostrophising his readers directly, the apostle wishes to bring them to examine themselves, in order to know which of these two currents they are obeying; for we easily apprehend these truths with the understanding, but we are slow to apply them to ourselves personally. He begins with expressing a feeling of confidence in regard to their state; but he adds a restriction fitted to excite their vigilance: εἴπερ, *if really.* This word does not positively express a doubt, as εἴγε would do, *if at least* (Col. i. 23). Paul proceeds on their Christian profession to draw from it a sure consequence in the supposed case of their profession being serious. To them it belongs to verify the truth of the supposition. The expression: *to dwell in you*, denotes a permanent fact; it is not enough to have some seasons of impulse, some outbursts of enthusiasm, mingled with practical infidelities.—This first proposition of ver. 9 is

the foundation of an argument which will be prolonged to the close of ver. 11. Before continuing it the apostle throws in by the way the serious warning contained in ver. 9*b*, which rises the supposition contrary to that of the εἴπερ, *if really*, and shows also the consequence which would flow from it. It is remarkable that *the Spirit of Christ* is here used as the equivalent of *the Spirit of God* in the preceding proposition. The Spirit of Jesus is that of God Himself, whom He has converted by appropriating Him perfectly here below into His personal life, so that He can communicate Him to His own. It is in this form that the Holy Spirit henceforth acts in the Church. Where this vital bond does not exist between a soul and Christ, it remains a stranger to Him and His salvation. After this observation, which every one is expected to apply to himself, the argument recommences, connecting itself with the favourable supposition enunciated ver. 9*a*.

Ver. 10. "*Now if Christ be in you, the body is dead because of sin; but the spirit is life because of righteousness.*"—As the apostle had substituted *the Spirit of Christ* for the Spirit *of God*, he now substitutes for the Spirit of Christ His person: *Now if Christ be in you.* "Where the Spirit of Christ is," says Hofmann, "there He is also Himself." In fact, as the Spirit proceeds from Christ, His action tends to make Christ live in us. "I shall come again to you," said Jesus (John xiv. 17, 18), when He was describing the work of the Spirit. This new expression brings out more forcibly than the preceding the solidarity between the *person* of Jesus and *ours*, and so prepares for ver. 11, in which the resurrection of Jesus is set forth as the pledge of ours.—This hope of sharing His resurrection rests on the fact that even now His life has penetrated the spiritual part of our being (ver. 10*b*). No doubt this spiritual life will not prevent the body from dying; but it is the earnest of its participation in the resurrection of Christ. From chap. v. 12, 15, and 17, we know the apostle's view respecting the cause of death: "Through one man's offence *many* are dead." The fact of universal death does not therefore arise from the sins of individuals, but from the original transgression. The meaning of these words: *because of sin*, is thus fixed; they refer to Adam's sin. It is some-

times asked why believers still die if Christ really died for them; and an argument is drawn hence against the doctrine of expiation. But it is forgotten that, death not being an individual punishment, there is no connection between this fact and the pardon of sins granted to believing individuals. Death, as a judgment on humanity, bearing on the *species* as such, remains till the general consummation of Christ's work; comp. 1 Cor. xv. 26.—The term *dead* here signifies: irrevocably smitten with death. The human body bears within itself from its formation the germ of death; it begins to die the instant it begins to live. Commentators who, like Chrys., Er., Grot., explain this term *dead*, as *dead unto sin* (in a good sense), evidently do not understand the course of thought in these verses, 9–11.—But if the believer's death cannot be prevented, there is a domain in him where life has already established its reign, *the spirit* in which Christ dwells. Hofmann insists strongly that the term *spirit* should here be applied to the Spirit of God. In that case the words: *the spirit is life*, must be understood in the sense: the spirit produces and sustains life in the soul. But this sense is unnatural, and the contrast between *spirit* and *body* leads us rather to apply the former term to the spiritual element in the believer. In the passage, 1 Thess. v. 23, Paul distinguishes these three elements in man: *body, soul*, and *spirit*. By the third term he denotes the organ with which the soul of man, and of man alone of all animated beings, is endowed, whereby he perceives and appropriates the divine; by this spiritual faculty it is that the Spirit of God can penetrate into the soul, and by it rule the body. Hence arises the sanctification of the body (vi. 11–13), not its deliverance from death. But Paul can already say, nevertheless, that in consequence of its union with the Spirit of God the spirit of the believer *is life*. This expression no doubt sounds somewhat strong; why not say simply: *living?* This peculiarity seems to have been observed very early; it is certainly the origin of the reading ζῇ, *lives*, instead of ζωή, *life*, in two Greco-Latin MSS.; but Paul's thought went further. The life of God does not become merely an *attribute* of the spirit in man through the Holy Spirit; it becomes his *nature*, so that it can pass from the spirit to his whole person, psychical and

bodily (ver. 11). — The last words: *because of righteousness*, cannot refer to the restoration of *holiness* in the believer; not that the word *righteousness* cannot have this meaning in Paul's writings (comp. vi. 13 and 19), but because it is impossible to say life exists because of holiness; for in reality the one is identical with the other. We must therefore take the word *righteousness* in the sense of *justification*, as in chaps. i.–v. To this meaning we are also led by the meaning of the clause which forms an antithesis to this in the first proposition: *because of sin*. As the body dies because of a sin which is not ours individually, so the spirit lives in consequence of a righteousness which is not ours.—But will this body, given over to death, be abandoned to it for ever? No; the last trace of condemnation behoves to be effaced.

Ver. 11. "*Now, if the Spirit of Him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, He that raised up Christ Jesus*[1] *from the dead shall also*[2] *quicken your mortal bodies, because of His Spirit that dwelleth*[3] *in you.*"—The δέ, *now*, denotes the progress of the life which, after penetrating the spirit, takes hold even of the body. That body in which, as well as in Jesus, the Spirit of God has dwelt, will be judged worthy of the same honour as the body of Jesus Himself.—In the first proposition the apostle uses the name *Jesus*, because the reference is to His *person* merely; in the second he says *Christ*, or *Christ Jesus*, because the subject in question is the office He fills as *Mediator* between God and us. As Hofmann remarks, the personal resurrection of Jesus merely assures us that God *can* raise us; but His resurrection, regarded as that *of the Christ*, assures us that He *will do* so actually. Once again we see how carefully Paul weighs every term he uses. We have a new proof of the same in the use of the two expressions ἐγείρειν, *to awake* (applied to Jesus), and ζωοποιεῖν, *to quicken* (applied to believers). The death of Jesus was a sleep, unaccompanied with any dissolution of the body . . .; it was therefore enough to *awake* Him. In our case, the body, being

[1] Three principal readings: T. R., with K L P: τον Χριστον; B E F G: Χριστος; ℵ A D: Χριστον Ιησουν (C, Syr[sch]: Ιησουν Χριστον).

[2] ℵ B omit και.

[3] The 3d ed. of Stephens, with B D E F G K L P, 10 Mnn. It. Syr[sch] Ir. Or., reads: δια το ενοικουν αυτου πνευμα; T. R., with ℵ A C, many Mnn. Cop. Clem. Athan. Epiph. etc., read: δια του ενοικουντος αυτου πνευματος.

given over to destruction, must be entirely reconstituted; this is well expressed by the word *quicken.*—The word *καί, also,* omitted by the *Sinaït.* and the *Vatic.*, suits the context well: the spirit is already quickened; the body must be so *also.*—The apostle had said of the body in ver. 10, it is *dead, νεκρόν.* Why does he here substitute the term *mortal, θνητόν*? It has been thought that he used this word, which has a wider meaning, to embrace those who *shall be alive* at the Lord's coming, and whose bodies shall be not raised, but transformed. Hofmann takes the term *mortal,* of ver. 10, as referring to the *future* state of the body, the state of death to which it is still only destined, and from which the resurrection will rescue it. The true explanation of the term seems to me simpler: In ver. 10, Paul means to speak of the *fact* (death); in ver. 11, of the *quality* (mortal). For the resurrection will not only change the *fact* of death into that of life, but it will transform the *nature* of the body, which from being mortal will become incorruptible (1 Cor. xv. 43, 44).

The last words of this verse played a somewhat important part dogmatically in the first ages of the church. Those who maintained the divinity and personality of the Holy Spirit were more inclined to read, as is done by some ancient Alex. Mjj., *διὰ τοῦ ἐνοικοῦντος αὐτοῦ πνεύματος . . .*, "*by* the Holy Spirit who dwelleth in you."—In fact, by this mode of expression the apostle would ascribe the *divine* operation of raising from the dead (John v. 21) to the Holy Spirit, which would imply His power of free causation as well as divinity. The opponents of this doctrine alleged the other reading, which is that of Stephens, and which differs here from the received reading: *διὰ τὸ ἐνοικοῦν αὐτοῦ πνεῦμα,* "*because of the Spirit that dwelleth in you.*" This reading is found in authorities of the three families in the oldest versions, the *Itala* and the *Peschito,* and in some very ancient Fathers, such as Irenæus and Origen. Such being the case, we can only ascribe it to Tischendorf's provoking predilection for the *Sinaït.*, that he adopts the first reading in his eighth edition. Indeed, so far as external authorities are concerned, the decisive fact is the well-attested existence of a reading in the documents of the various countries of the church; now in this case we find the reading *διὰ τὸ . . .*, *because of,* in Egypt (Vatic.), in the West

(It. Fathers), in Syria (Peschito), and in the Byzantine Church (K L P, Mnn.), while the received reading is represented by little more than three Alexandrines and a Father of the same country (Clement). The meaning also decides in favour of the best supported reading. The διά with the accusative, *because of*, follows quite naturally the two similar διά of ver. 10: "because of sin, death; because of righteousness, the life of the Spirit;" and because of the life of the Spirit, the resurrection of the body. The entire course of thought is summed up in this thrice repeated *because of*. Besides, Paul is not concerned to explain here by what agent the resurrection is effected. What is of importance in the line of the ideas presented from ver. 5 onwards, is to indicate the *moral state* in consequence of which the granting of resurrection will be possible. That to which God will have respect, is the dwelling of His own Spirit in the believer; the holy use which he shall have made of his body to glorify Him; the dignity to which the Spirit shall have raised the body by making it a *temple of God* (1 Cor. vi. 19). Such a body He will treat as He has treated that of His own Son. This is the glorious thought with which the apostle closes this passage and completes the development of the word: *no condemnation*.—This difference of reading is the only one in the whole Epistle to the Romans which is fitted to exercise any influence on Christian doctrine. And yet we do not think that the question whether the resurrection of the body takes place *by* the operation of the Holy Spirit, or *because of* His dwelling in us, has been very often discussed in our Dogmatics or treated in our Catechisms.

The apostle does not speak of the lot reserved for the bodies of unbelievers, or of unsanctified believers. The same is the case in the passage 1 Cor. xv. 20–28. But the word of ver. 13: "If ye live after the flesh, ye shall die," should suffice. That is not, especially after all that precedes, a word of salvation. Besides, what would be meant by the sharp contrast between the two propositions of vv. 5 and 6? We have to explain his silence by his aim, which was to expound the work *of salvation* to its completion. It is the same with 1 Cor. xv. 20–28.—We believe, finally, that after that it is quite unnecessary to refute the opinion of those who, like de

Wette, Philippi, Holsten, think the expression: *to quicken the body*, ver. 11, should be applied in whole or in part to the *sanctification* of the Christian's body; Paul does not mix up questions so; he spoke, in ver. 2, of two laws to be destroyed, that of *sin* and that of *death*. And he has rigorously followed the order which he traced for himself.

EIGHTEENTH PASSAGE (Vv. 12–17).

Freed from Sin and Death, the Christian becomes Son and Heir.

Victory over sin and death once decided by the reign of the Holy Spirit, condemnation is not only taken away, it is replaced by the benediction which is given to us in all its degrees: in the present, the filial state, adoption; in the future, the divine inheritance.

Vv. 12 and 13 form the transition from the preceding passage to this. The life of the Spirit is not realized in the believer without his concurrence merely from the fact that the Spirit has once been communicated to him. There is needed on man's part a persevering decision, an active docility in giving himself over to the guidance of the Spirit. For the guidance of the Spirit tends constantly to the sacrifice of the flesh; and if the believer refuses to follow it on this path, he renounces the life of the Spirit and its glorious privileges.

Vv. 12, 13. "*Thus then, brethren, we are under obligation, not to the flesh to live after the flesh; for if ye live after the flesh, ye shall die; but if ye through the Spirit do mortify the deeds of the body,*[1] *ye shall live.*"—It is not enough to have received the Spirit; it is also necessary to walk according to Him. The *thus then* refers to the thought of the preceding passage: "Since the Spirit has set you free from the law of sin and death, do not replace yourselves under this curse." The address: *brethren*, reappears every time the apostle wishes to bring home to his readers a practical and personal warning. —When saying: *we are under obligation*, literally, *debtors*, Paul meant to continue in the words: to the Spirit, to live according to Him. As soon as the Spirit comes to dwell in

[1] D E F G, It. Ir. Or. read τῆς σαρκὸς instead of τοῦ σώματος.

our heart, we are under debt to Him for ourselves and for a life wholly conformed to His wishes. But the apostle breaks off his sentence to set aside the opposite supposition, one unfortunately which cannot be passed over in silence, and he makes haste to add: *not to the flesh.* "The natural man," Hofmann observes, "imagines that he owes it to his flesh to satisfy it." The care of his person, from the most earthly point of view, appears to him the first and most important of his obligations. Now it is this tendency which is combated by the Spirit as soon as He takes possession of us (Gal. v. 17). This is the debt which should neither be acknowledged nor paid. The apostle says why in the following verse.

Ver. 13. In this way the regenerate man himself would go on to death. So the flesh will reward us for our fidelity in discharging our debt to it.—Μέλλετε: "there is nothing for you but to die; such is the only future which awaits you." Now was the time to resume the sentence which had been begun: "Ye are under obligation . . . *to the Spirit.*" But the apostle supposes this idea to come out clearly enough from the expressed contrast: *not to the flesh,* and continues as if he had expressed it: "*But if through the Spirit,*" etc. Whither does this principle, whose impelling power takes the place of the flesh, lead us? To death also; to the death of the flesh, and thereby *to life: ye shall live.* The rhythm of this verse is quite similar to that observed by Calvin in vii. 9, 10; 13*a*, the life of the flesh is the death of man; 13*b*, the death of the flesh is the life of man. Why does the apostle say: *the works of the body,* and not *of the flesh?* This difference already struck certain Greco-Latin copyists, who have sought to correct the text in this direction. But it is unnecessary. The complement: *of the body,* is not here the genitive of *the instrument,* but that of *the author.* The acts of which the body is the simple *instrument* are not its own. Paul would suppress those of which it is the independent author, and wherein, consequently, it withdraws from the dominion of the Spirit. These should come to an end, because in the Christian the Spirit should direct and penetrate *all,* even *his eating and drinking,* according to the example quoted by the apostle, 1 Cor. x. 31. In all these acts of life the body should not guide, but be guided. Every act of sacrifice whereby the

independence of the body is denied, and its submission to the Spirit forcibly asserted, secures a growth of spiritual life in man. It is only as a void is cleared in the domain of the flesh, that the efficacy of the Spirit shows itself with new force. Thus is explained the *ye shall live,* which applies to every moment of the believer's existence on to the state of perfection.—This last word: *ye shall live,* becomes the theme of the following passage. For the two attributes *son* and *heir* of God, which are about to be developed, the one in vv. 14–16, the other in ver. 17, exhaust the notion of *life.*

Vv. 14, 15. "*For all they who are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God. For ye have not received a spirit of bondage again to fear; but ye have received a Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry: Abba, Father!*"—"Οσοι, literally: "*as many as there are of them who are led . . . they are*" . . . The *for* refers to the promise: *ye shall live.* It is impossible for one who is a Son of God, the source of life, not to live. Now he who gives himself to be guided by the Spirit of God, is certainly a son of God. The thought expressed in this verse may be understood in two ways. Does Paul mean that living according to the Spirit is the *proof* that one possesses the rank of a child of God? In that case this would follow from the grace of justification; and the gift of the Spirit would be a subsequent gift coming to seal this glorious acquired position. In favour of this view there might be quoted Gal. iv. 6: "*Because* ye are sons, God hath sent forth the Spirit of His Son into your hearts." But it must not be forgotten that Paul is not here speaking of the *gift* of the Spirit, but of the believer's *surrender* to His influences. The reference therefore is to a more advanced stage of the Christian life. The other possible meaning is this: "Ye have a right to the title of *sons* as soon as ye let yourselves be led by the Spirit." And this meaning evidently suits the context better. Though one becomes a *son* by justification, he does not possess the filial *state,* he does not really enjoy *adoption* until he has become loyally submissive to the operation of the Spirit. The meaning is therefore this: "If ye let yourselves be led by the Spirit, ye are *ipso facto sons of God.*"—Meyer gives the pronoun οὗτοι, *they,* an exclusive sense: "they *only.*" But we are no longer at the warning; the apostle is now proving the:

ye shall live (*for*). The restrictive intention is therefore foreign to his thought, he is making a strong affirmation.—In the term ἄγονται, *are led*, there is something like a notion of holy violence; the Spirit drags the man where the flesh would fain not go. The verb may be taken in the passive: *are driven*, or in the middle: *let themselves be driven*.—The intentional repetition of the word *God* establishes a close connection between the two ideas: obeying the Spirit and being sons. A son obeys his father. The term υἱός, *son*, implies community of nature and all the privileges which flow from it; consequently, when God is the father, participation in *life*.—The apostle gives in what follows two proofs of the reality of this state of sonship: the one, partly subjective, the filial feeling toward God experienced by the believer, ver. 15; the other, objective, the testimony of the Divine Spirit proclaiming the divine fatherhood within his heart, ver. 16.

Ver. 15. The ancients were much perplexed to explain this expression: *Ye have not received a spirit of bondage*. It seemed to them to imply the idea, that a servile spirit had been given to the readers previously by God Himself. Hence the explanation of Chrysostom, who applied the spirit of bondage to the *law*. This meaning is inadmissible. It would be preferable to understand it of the mercenary and timid spirit which accompanied legal obedience. But could Paul possibly ascribe this to a divine communication? If we connect the adverb πάλιν, *again*, as we should do, not with the verb ἐλάβετε, *ye received*, but only with the regimen εἰς φόβον, *to fear*, there is nothing in the expression obliging us to hold that Paul has in view an anterior divine communication; for the meaning is this: "The Spirit which ye have received of God is not a servile spirit throwing you back into the fear in which ye formerly lived." Comp. 2 Tim. i. 7. The character of heathen religions is in fact the sentiment of fear (δεισιδαιμονία, Acts xvii. 22). And was it not in some respects the same among the Jews, though with them the fear of Jehovah took a more elevated character than the fear of the gods among the Gentiles? The feeling with which the Spirit of God fills the believer's heart is not fear, suited to the condition of a slave, but the confidence and liberty which become a son.—The word *spirit* might here be regarded as

denoting simply a subjective disposition; as in that word of the Lord in reference to Sennacherib (Isa. xxxvii. 7): "I will put *such a spirit* in him, that he will return to his own land;" comp. 1 Cor. iv. 21: a *spirit of meekness;* Rom. xi. 8: a *spirit of slumber.* Here it would be the *filial sentiment* in relation to God. What might support this subjective meaning of the word *spirit,* is the strongly emphasized contrast between this verse and the following, where the objective meaning is evident: "The *Spirit Himself* beareth witness" . . . Nevertheless it is impossible, if we consider the connection between ver. 15 and the preceding verse, not to see in *the Spirit of adoption,* of which Paul here speaks, the Spirit of God Himself; comp. especially Gal. iv. 6, a passage so like ours, and where there is no room for uncertainty. The difference between vv. 15 and 16, so far as the meaning of the word *spirit* is concerned, is not the difference between an inward disposition and the Spirit of God, but rather that which distinguishes two different modes of acting, followed by one and the same Holy Spirit. In the former case, the operation of the Spirit makes itself felt by means of a personal disposition which He produces in us; in the second case it is still more direct (see on ver. 16).—The *Spirit of adoption* is the Spirit of God, in so far as producing the spiritual state corresponding to sonship; He may even be called: the Spirit of the Son Himself, Gal. iv. 6. He puts us relatively to God in the same position as Jesus, when He said: Father! The term *υἱοθεσία, adoption,* reminds us of the fact that Jesus alone is *Son* in essence (*υἱὸς μονογενής, only son*). To become sons, we must be incorporated into Him by faith (Eph. i. 5). —The pronoun *ἐν ᾧ, in whom,* shows that it is *under the inspiration* of the filial sentiment produced in us by this Spirit that we thus pray, and the term *cry* expresses the profound emotion with which this cry of adoration goes forth from the believing heart.—*Abba* is the form which the Hebrew word *ab, father,* had taken in the Aramaic language, commonly spoken in Palestine in the time of Jesus. It was thus Jesus spoke to God when He called Him *Father;* comp. Mark xiv. 36. It has been thought Paul employed the form here, because he made use of it habitually in his own prayers, and that he added the Greek translation: *ὁ πατήρ, father,* in writing

to the Romans and to the Galatians, because the Aramaic was unintelligible to them as former Gentiles. But the employment of the expression (which occurs in three writings of the N. T.) must rest on a more general usage. Like the terms *Amen*, *Hosanna*, *Hallelujah*, this word *Abba* had no doubt passed from the liturgical language of the primitive Judeo-Christian church into general ecclesiastical language. By adapting this sacred form of address, which had passed through the mouth of Jesus Himself, to the worship of Christians, not only was there a compliance with the command: "When ye pray, say: *Our Abba* (*our Father*), who art in heaven," but the feeling of the whole church seemed to blend with that of its High Priest, who had prayed, using the same term for Himself and His brethren. From regard to Greek-speaking Christians, and neophytes in particular, the custom was probably followed of adding the Greek translation: ὁ πατήρ, *father*, as is done by Mark. Augustine and Calvin suppose that it was meant, by using these two forms in juxtaposition, to express the union of Jewish and Gentile-Christians in one spiritual body. This hypothesis has no great probability.

Vv. 16, 17. "*The Spirit itself beareth witness to our spirit, that we are the children of God. Now if children, then heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Christ; if so be that we suffer with Him, that we may be also glorified together with Him.*"—The asyndeton form (the absence of a connecting particle) between vv. 15 and 16 indicates here, as always, profound emotion; it announces the more forcible reaffirmation of the same fact, but presented in a new aspect. The expression αὐτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα does not signify *the same Spirit* (τὸ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα), but *the Spirit Himself*, as the immediate organ of God. All who are not strangers to the experience of divine things, know that there is a difference between a state formed in us by the Divine Spirit, and expressing itself in the form of prayer (ver. 15), and the language in which God answers us directly by means of the Spirit. This difference comes out in the following passage, when the apostle expressly distinguishes the groaning of the Spirit Himself in those who have received the first-fruits of the Spirit (ver. 26), from their own groaning (ver. 23). We observe a similar difference in the life of Jesus Himself when it is He who says: *my Father* (Luke ii.

49, *et al.*), or when it is God who says to Him: *Thou art my Son* (Luke iii. 12). So, in this case the apostle means that we are *sons of God*, not only because our heart cherishes a filial disposition toward God, and inspires us with the cry of love: *my Father;* but—and this is still more sublime—because from the heart of God Himself there comes down the answer by the voice of the Holy Spirit: *my child.* It is not only our arms which are stretched out to take hold of God who gives Himself to us in Christ, but His at the same time which embrace us and draw us to His bosom.—The *σύν, with,* in the verb *συμμαρτυρεῖν, to bear witness with,* should evidently preserve its natural meaning: "bears witness conjointly with our spirit," the feeling of which was expressed in ver. 15. But the dative: *τῷ πνεύματι ἡμῶν, to our spirit,* is not to be regarded as the regimen. of *σύν, with* ("bears witness *with our spirit*"); it is our spirit which here receives the divine testimony. The term *τέκνου, child,* differs from *υἱός, son,* ver. 14, in this, that the latter expresses rather the personal dignity and independence, the official character of the representative of a family, while the second has a more inward sense, and indicates rather community of life. In the one what is expressed is the position of honour, in the other the relation of nature.

Ver. 17. The apostle has proved the fact of our being sons or children, first by the filial feeling produced in us by the Spirit, and then by the direct witness of the Spirit Himself. He can now conclude his argument; for even in expressing the most exalted sentiments, his exposition always assumes a logical form. He had said, vv. 13 and 14: "Ye shall live, for ye are sons;" then he demonstrated the reality of this title *son;* and he now infers from it the condition of *heirship.* Thus the reasoning is concluded; for to be an heir of God is identical with being a possessor of life.—No doubt God does not die, like those who leave an inheritance; it is from the heart of His glory that He enriches his sons by communicating it to them, that is, by imparting Himself to them. For, rightly taken, His heritage is Himself. The best He can give His children is to dwell in them. St. Paul expresses it when he describes the perfect state in the words (1 Cor. xv. 28): *God all in all.*—But he here adds an expression particularly

fitted to impress us with the sublimity of such a state: *co-heirs with Christ.* The loftiness of the title *heir of God* might easily be lost in vagueness, unless the apostle, with the view of making this abstract idea palpable, added a concrete fact. To be an heir with Christ is not to inherit in the second instance, to inherit from Him; it is to be put in the same rank as Himself; it is to share the divine possession *with* Him. To get a glimpse of what is meant by the title *heirs of God,* let us contemplate the relation between Christ and God, and we shall have an idea of what we are led to hope from our title *sons of God;* comp. ver. 29.—Only to reach the possession of the inheritance, there is yet one condition to be satisfied: *if we suffer with Him.* Paul knows well that, ambitious as we are of glory, we are equally ready to recoil from the necessary suffering. Now it is precisely in suffering that the bond between Christ and us, in virtue of which we shall be able to become His co-heirs, is closely drawn. We only enter into possession of the common heritage of glory, by accepting our part in the common inheritance of suffering; εἴπερ: "*if so be,* as we are called to it, we have the courage to" . . . These last words are evidently the transition to the passage immediately following, in which are expounded, first the miserable state of the world in its present condition, but afterwards the certainty of the glorious state which awaits us.

NINETEENTH PASSAGE (Vv. 18–30).

Completion of the Plan of Salvation, notwithstanding the Miseries of our present Condition.

In speaking of the full victory gained by the Spirit of Christ over the last remains of condemnation, Paul seemed to assume that the work had already reached its goal, and that nothing remained but to pass into glory. But in the words: "If so be we suffer with Him," he had already given it to be understood that there remained to the children of God a career of suffering to be gone through in communion with Christ, and that the era of glory would only open to them after this painful interval. These two thoughts: the present state of suffering, and the certain glory in which it is to issue, are the theme of

the following passage. This piece, as it appears to me, is one of those, the tenor of which has been most misunderstood even in the latest commentaries. It has been regarded as a series of consolatory themes, presented by the apostle to suffering believers. They are the following three, according to Meyer: 1. The preponderance of future glory over present sufferings (vv. 18–25); 2. the aid of the Holy Spirit (vv. 26 and 27); 3. the working together of all things for the good of those who love God (vv. 28–30). M. Reuss says on reaching ver. 28: After *hope* (vv. 18–25) and the *Spirit* (vv. 26 and 27), the apostle mentions yet a *third* fact which is of a nature to support us, namely, "that everything contributes to the good of them that love God." A little further on he adds: "To this end Paul recapitulates the series of acts whereby God interposes in the salvation of the individual." *A third fact . . ., to this end!* Such expressions hardly suit our apostle's style; and when one is obliged to have recourse to them, it simply proves that he has not grasped the course of his thoughts. The same is the case with the division recently offered by Holsten, who here finds the hope of the Christian founded: 1. on the state of creation; 2. on the groaning of believers; 3. on the groaning of the Spirit; 4. on the consciousness of believers that their very sufferings must turn to their good. How can one imagine that he has understood St. Paul, when he lacerates his thoughts in this fashion?

The following passage developes two ideas: the world's state of misery in its present condition, a state demonstrated by the groaning of the whole creation, by that of believers themselves, and finally by that of the Holy Spirit; then in contrast, the certainty, notwithstanding all, of the perfect accomplishment of the glorious plan eternally conceived by God for our glory. The transition from the first idea to the second is found in the οἴδαμεν δέ, *but we know*, of ver. 28, where the adversative particle δέ, *but*, expressly establishes the contrast between the second idea and the first.

And first of all, the general theme, ver. 18, enunciating the two ideas to be developed: 1. *The sufferings of the present time* (the συμπάσχειν, *to suffer with*, ver. 17), and 2. *The glory yet to be revealed in us* (the συνδοξασθῆναι, *being glorified together with*, ver. 17).

Ver. 18. "*For I reckon that the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed in us.*" — The term λογίζομαι, *I reckon*, here signifies: "I judge after calculation made." The expressions which follow imply, indeed, the idea of a calculation. The adjective ἄξιος, *worthy*, comes, as the old lexicographers say, from the verb ἄγω, *to drive, to cause to move*, and denotes strictly a thing which is heavy enough to produce motion in the scale of the balance. The preposition πρός is used here, as frequently, to denote proportion. Consequently, the apostle means that when he compares the miseries imposed on him by the present state of things with the glory awaiting him in the future, he does not find that the former can be of any weight whatever in the balance of his resolutions. Why does he use the first person singular, *I reckon*, instead of speaking in the name of all Christians? No doubt because he would have them verify his calculation themselves, each making it over again for himself. And he has good right to take the initiative in comparison with them, as evidently suffering more than all of them. — This *present time* denotes the actual conditions of our earthly life in contrast with those of the new world which succeeds it. These are, on the one hand, the miseries arising from bodily infirmities and the necessities of life; on the other, those caused by the enmity of man and the sins of believers themselves. Paul, who endured more than any other of these two kinds of sufferings, yet calls them, 2 Cor. iv. 17: *the light affliction of the present moment*, in opposition to the *eternal weight of glory* which he sees before him.—This *glory* is to be revealed; it *is* therefore already; and indeed it exists not only in the plan of God decreeing it to us, but also in the person of Christ glorified, with whose appearing it will be visibly displayed. The apostle adds εἰς ἡμᾶς, *in* and *for us*. He might have written ἐν ἡμῖν, *in us*; but this expression would have been insufficient. For the glory will not consist only in *our* own transformation, but also in the coming of the Lord Himself, and the transformation of the universe. Thus it will be displayed at once *for* us and *in* us; this is expressed by the εἰς ἡμᾶς. Being unable to render the two relations into English by a single

preposition, we have preferred to express the second, which is the most comprehensive.

Ver. 19 begins the development of this general state of misery and waiting in which the church still participates, and which was denoted by the term: *the sufferings of this present time* (ver. 18).

Ver. 19. "*For the earnest expectation of the creation longeth for the manifestation of the sons of God.*"—The *for* is usually made to refer to the idea of *the glory yet to be revealed*, ver. 18. And this view is supported either by the *greatness* of this glory (de W., Hofmann), or by its *certainty* (Meyer), or by its *futurity* (Philip.), or by the imminence of its manifestation (Reiche). But not one of these affirmations is really *proved* in what follows. What Paul demonstrates is simply the fact, that if we are already saved spiritually, we are far from being so also outwardly. In Biblical language: As to the spirit, we are in the *age to come;* as to the body, in the *present age.* The *for* therefore refers to *the sufferings of this present time.* This strange discord forms the basis of our present condition; and this is what ver. 19 demonstrates by the waiting attitude which all nature betrays. Holsten, ever preoccupied with the alleged application of our Epistle to the Judeo-Christians of Rome, thus introduces the subject: "The Judeo-Christians ask: But, if all wrath is taken away, why so much suffering still?" We in turn ask: Is it only Judeo-Christians, is it not every Christian conscience which asks the question?

The Greek term which we have translated by the word *expectation,* is one of those admirable words which the Greek language easily forms. It is composed of three elements: *κάρα, the head;* δοκέω, δοκάω, δοκεύω, *to wait for, espy;* and *ἀπό, from, from afar;* so: "to wait with the head raised, and the eye fixed on that point of the horizon from which the expected object is to come." What a plastic representation! An artist might make a statue of hope out of this Greek term. The verb *ἀπεκδέχεται,* which we have translated by *longeth for,* is not less remarkable; it is composed of the simple verb δέχομαι, *to receive,* and two prepositions: *ἐκ, out of the hands of,* and *ἀπό, from, from afar;* so: "to receive something from the hands of one who extends it to you from

afar." This substantive and verb together vividly describe the attitude of the suffering creation, which in its entirety turns as it were an impatient look to the expected future.—What is to be understood here by *the creation* (Eng. version, *the creature*)? There is an astonishing variety of answers given to this question by commentators. The word ἡ κτίσις itself denotes either the creative act, or its result, the totality of created things. But very often it takes a more restricted meaning, which is indicated by the sense of the whole passage. Thus in this context we must begin with excluding *believers* from the creation. For in ver. 23 they are mentioned as forming a class by themselves. We must likewise cut off from it *unbelieving men*, whether Jews or Gentiles. For of two things one or other must happen: either they will be converted before the expected time, and in that case they will themselves be found among the children of God, and will not form part of the *creation* (end of the ver. and ver. 21). Or if they are not then converted, they will not participate (even indirectly) in the glorious condition of the children of God. Consequently, since there can be no question in this context either of good angels or devils, it only remains to us to restrict the application of the word *the creation* to all the unintelligent beings which we usually comprise in the expression *nature* (in opposition to *mankind*). Thus are excluded the explanation of St. Augustine, who understood by it *unconverted men*, and that of Locke and others, who applied it to unconverted *Jews;* that of Böhme, who applied it to the *heathen;* the Arminian explanation, which took the word *the creation* in the sense of *the new creation*, and applied this term to *Christians* only; that of Luther, who in some passages seems to have restricted it to *inanimate* nature; that of Zyro, who sees in this term a designation *of the flesh* in the regenerate, etc. The explanation we have given is that most generally adopted (Er., Calv., Grot., Thol., de Wette, Philip., Hofm., etc.). It is confirmed by the following parallels: Matt. xix. 28, where Jesus speaks of the *palingenesia*, or universal renovation which is to take place; Acts iii. 21, where Peter announces the restoration of all things; and Rev. xxi. 1, where this event is described as the substitution of a new heaven and a new earth for the present heaven and earth.

The same perspective of an universal renovation in the last times is already opened up in the O. T. (Isa. xi. 1 et seq., lxv. 17; Ps. cii. 26, 27, civ. 34); it follows from the fact of the fall of man in which nature was involved. Solidarity in the matter of restoration is naturally associated with solidarity in the fall.—In this prophetico-poetical passage the destination of nature is represented as its own expectation. This figurative expression becomes a truth in proportion as the beings themselves suffer from the general disorder.—The hour of transformation is called the time of *the manifestation of the sons of God.* This expression is explained by Col. iii. 4: "When Christ, our life, shall be manifested, then ye also shall be manifested with Him in glory." The appearing of the sons of God in their true sanctified nature, will break the bonds of the curse which still to this hour hold the creation in fetters; comp. Matt. xiii. 43; 1 John iii. 2. And Nature herself is impatient to see those new guests arrive, because she knows that to receive them she will don her fairest apparel.—In the following verses, Paul developes more fully that abnormal character of the present creation which he has just declared in ver. 19.

Vv. 20–22. "*For the creation was made subject to vanity, not willingly, but by reason of him who hath subjected the same in hope, because*[1] *the creation itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God. For we know that the whole creation groaneth together and travaileth as it were until now.*"—The *vanity* to which nature is now subject, is the state of frailty to which all earthly beings are subjected. "Everywhere," says M. Reuss, "our eyes meet images of death and decay; the scourge of barrenness, the fury of the elements, the destructive instincts of beasts, the very laws which govern vegetation, everything gives nature a sombre hue" ... This reign of death which prevails over all that is born cannot be the normal state of a world created by God. Nature suffers from a curse which it cannot have brought upon itself, as it is not morally free. It is not *with its goodwill,* says the apostle, that it appears in this condition, but *because of him who hath subjected it to such*

[1] ℵ D F G read διότι instead of ὅτι, which is read by T. R. with all the other Mjj.

a state.—Whom does he mean? According to most modern commentators: God. Was it not He who pronounced the sentence of doom: "Cursed is the ground for thy sake" (Gen. iii. 17)? Yet if this were the apostle's meaning, it would be strange that he should use the expression: *by reason of* (διά with the accusative); for God is not the moral cause, but the efficient author of the curse on nature. Then if the expression: *not with its goodwill,* signifies: not by its own fault, it is natural to seek in the contrasted term a designation of the person on whom the moral responsibility for this catastrophe rests; and we cannot be surprised at the explanation given by Chrysostom, Schneckenburger, Tholuck, who apply the term ὁ ὑποτάξας, *he who subjected,* to the *first man;* comp. the expression, Gen. iii. 17: "Cursed is the ground *for thy sake.*" It cannot be denied, however, that there is something strangely mysterious in the apostle's language, which he might easily have avoided by saying: by reason of the man, or by reason of us; then does the term: *he who subjected,* apply well to man, who in this event, so far as nature is concerned, played a purely passive part? This consideration has led one critic, Hammond, to apply the term to *Satan,* the prince of this world (as Jesus calls him), who, either by his own fall or by that of man, dragged the creation into the miserable state here described. The only room for hesitation, as it appears to me, is between the two latter meanings.—The regimen: *in hope,* can only refer to the term: *who hath subjected,* if we apply it to God, which, as we have seen, is unnatural. It depends therefore on the principal verb: *was made subject to vanity,* and signifies that from the first, when this chastisement was inflicted, it was so only with a future restoration in view. This hope, precisely like *the expectation,* ver. 19, is attributed to nature herself; she possesses in the feeling of her unmerited suffering a sort of presentiment of her future deliverance.

Ver. 21. The conjunction ὅτι (*that,* or *because*) may be made directly dependent on the words *in hope:* "in hope *that.*" Ver. 21 would then state wherein the hope itself consists. But we may also take it in the sense of *because,* and find in ver. 21 the *reason* of the hope; "I say: with hope, *because*" . . . This indeed would be the only possible meaning if, with

Tischendorf, we adopted the reading of the Sinait. and the Greco-Latins: διότι, *seeing that.* In any case it is the natural sense; for why otherwise would the apostle repeat *in extenso* the subject of the sentence: αὐτὴ ἡ κτίσις, *the creation itself?* No writer will say: nature was made subject in the hope that Nature herself would be delivered.—The pronoun *itself* glances at a natural objection: one would not have expected such a fact in a being like Nature. The καί, *also, even,* refers to the same thought: the unintelligent creation *no less than men.*— In the expression: *the bondage of corruption,* the complement may signify: "the bondage *which consists* of corruption." But this complement may also be taken as the genitive of the object, subjection *to* corruption, *as a law.* This second meaning is undoubtedly better; for the idea of enslavement is thus rendered more emphatic, in opposition to the idea of liberty in what follows.—The term φθορά, *corruption, putrescence,* is more forcible than the word vanity, and serves to define it more exactly.—Paul does not say that nature will participate in *the glory,* but only in *the liberty* of the glory of the children of God. Liberty is one of the elements of their glorious state, and it is the only one to which nature can lay claim. It expresses the unchecked development of the free expansion of all the powers of life, beauty, and perfection, wherewith this new nature will be endowed. There is nothing to show that the apostle has in view the return to life of the individual beings composing the present system of nature. In the domains inferior to man, the individual is merely the temporary manifestation of the species. We have therefore to think here only of a new nature in its totality, differing from the old system in its constitution and laws.

Ver. 22. The hope expressed in ver. 21 is *justified* in ver. 22. By the word *we know,* Paul appeals, not as Ewald supposes, to an old book that has been lost, but to a book always open to those who have eyes to read it, nature itself, the daily sight of which proclaims loudly enough all the apostle here says. Is there not a cry of universal suffering, a woful sigh perpetually ascending from the whole life of nature? Have not poets caught this vast groaning in every age? has not their voice become its organ? As Schelling said: On the loveliest spring day, while Nature is displaying all her charms,

does not the heart, when drinking in admiration, imbibe a poison of gnawing melancholy? The preposition *σύν, with,* which enters into the composition of the two verbs, can only refer to the *concurrence* of all the beings of nature in this common groaning. But there is more than groaning in the case; there is effort, travail. This is forcibly expressed by the second verb *συνωδίνει,* literally, *to travail in birth.* It seems as if old Nature bore in her bosom the germ of a more perfect nature, and, as the poet says, "*sente bondir en elle un nouvel univers*" (feels in her womb the leaping of a new universe).—We should beware of giving to the expression *until now* the meaning assigned to it by de Wette and Meyer: *from the first of time,* or *without interruption.* This would be a superfluous observation. The context shows what Paul means: Until now, *even after redemption is already accomplished.* The renovating principle has transformed the domain of the Spirit; for it became penetrated therewith at Pentecost. But the domain of nature has remained till now outside of its action. Comp. the *ἕως ἄρτι,* 1 Cor. iv. 13. It is in this respect with the whole as with the individual; comp. ver. 10.

On the passage viii. 18–22.—In following the exposition of the work of salvation, the apostle touches a domain, that, namely, of *nature,* where he comes into contact with the labours of science. Is there harmony or variance between his teaching and the results of scientific study? There is a first point on which the harmony is complete. For a century past the study of our globe has proved that the present condition of the earth is only the result of a series of profound and gradual transformations; which leads us naturally to the conclusion that this state is not final, and should only be regarded as a temporary phase destined to pave the way for some other new transformation. So it is precisely that our earth appears to the view of the apostle enlightened by the Holy Spirit. But there is a second point on which the harmony does not seem so complete. The apostle traces the present state of suffering and death to a catastrophe which has intervened, first in the moral world, and which has reacted on external nature. Now modern science seems to prove that the present condition of the earth is a natural result of its whole previous development, and that the miseries belonging to it are rather remains of the primitive imperfection of matter than the effects of a fall which intervened at a given moment. Is death, for example, which reigns

over mankind, anything else than the continuation of that to which the animal world was subject in the epochs anterior to man? This is a serious objection. Putting ourselves at the apostle's point of view, we may answer it in two ways. If we apply to man the expression ὁ ὑποτάξας, *he who subjected* (nature to vanity), it must be held that man placed in a privileged position, exempt from miseries in general and from death, with a body which life in God could raise above the law of dissolution, was called as the king of nature to free this magnificent domain from all the imperfections and miseries which it had inherited from previous ages. After developing all his faculties of knowledge and power in the favoured place where he had been put for this purpose, man should have extended this prosperous condition to the whole earth, and changed it into a paradise. Natural history proves that a beneficial influence even on the animal world is not an impossibility. But in proportion as man failed in his civilising mission to nature, if one may so speak, it fell back under that law of vanity from which it should have been freed by him, and which weighed on it only the more heavily in consequence of man's corruption. Thus the apostle's view may be justified on this explanation. But if the term ὁ ὑποτάξας, *he who subjected*, refers to Satan, there opens up to our mind a still vaster survey over the development of nature. Satan is called—and Jesus Himself gives him the title—*the prince of this world.* He who believes in the personal existence of Satan may therefore also hold that this earth belonged originally to his domain. Has it not been from the first steps of its development the theatre of the struggle between this revolted vassal and his divine liege-lord? The history of humanity is constantly showing us, both in great things and small, God taking the initiative and laying down some good, but that good hasting to alter its character by a progressive deviation, which leads slowly to the most enormous monstrosities. Might not primitive nature have been subject to a similar law, and the crisis of its development have resulted also from conflict between a beneficent force laying down a normal state, and that power of deviation which immediately takes hold of the divine product to guide it to the most abnormal result, till the salutary principle again interpose to establish a new point of departure superior to the former, and which the malignant spirit will corrupt anew? From this unceasing struggle proceeded the constant progress which terminated in man, and in the relatively perfect condition in which he originally appeared. But the power of deviation showed itself immediately anew on the very theatre of paradise, and in the domain of liberty produced *sin*, which involved all again under

the law of death, which is not yet finally vanquished. It belongs to Christ, to the children of God, *the seed of the woman*, man victorious over the serpent, his temporary victor, to work out a deliverance which would have been the work of the race of mankind had it remained united to God.[1] Perhaps this second point of view explains more fully the thought of the apostle expressed in this passage.—There is a third point on which science seems to us to harmonize readily with St. Paul's view; I mean the close solidarity which exists between man and the whole of nature. The physiologist is forced to see in the human body the intended goal and masterpiece of animal organization which appears as nothing else than a long effort to reach this consummation. As the breaking of the bud renders sterile the branch which bore it, so the fall of man involved that of the world. As Schelling said in one of his admirable lectures on the philosophy of revelation: "Nature, with its melancholy charm, resembles a bride who, at the very moment when she was fully attired for marriage, saw the bridegroom to whom she was to be united die on the very day fixed for the marriage. She still stands with her fresh crown and in her bridal dress, but her eyes are full of tears."[2] The soul of the poet-philosopher here meets that of the apostle. The ancient thinkers spoke much of a soul of the world. The idea was not a vain dream. The soul of the world is man. The whole Bible, and this important passage in particular, rest on this profound idea.

The groaning of nature, of which the apostle has just spoken, is the expression and proof of the abnormal state to which it is subjected, with all the beings belonging to it. But it is not the only sufferer from this state of imperfection. Other beings of a higher order, and which have already been restored to their normal state, also suffer from the same, and mingle their groaning with that of nature. This is the truth developed in vv. 23–25.

Ver. 23. "*And not only so, but we also,*[3] *which have the first-fruits of the Spirit, we ourselves also*[4] *groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption,*[5] *the redemption of our body.*"—The connection between this passage and the preceding one is

[1] This was the view-point of Steffens in his lectures on "Anthropology."

[2] We quote from memory.

[3] D E F G, It. read αλλα και ημεις αυτοι instead of και αυτοι.

[4] Three principal readings: 1. T. R., with K L P and Mnn.: εχοντες και ημεις αυτοι.—2. ℵ A C: εχοντες ημεις και αυτοι.—3. D F G: εχοντες αυτοι; B: εχοντες και αυτοι.

[5] D F G, It. omit υιοθεσιαν.

obvious at a glance; it is found in the idea of *groaning*. The groaning of believers themselves, men already animated with the breath of God, rises as it were on that of nature. Of the three or even four readings presented by the documents, we must first, whatever Volkmar may say to the contrary, set aside that of the *Vatic.*, which rejects the ἡμεῖς, *we*, in the middle of the verse; this pronoun is indispensable to emphasize the contrast between believers and nature. And whence could it have come into all the other texts? We may also set aside the Greco-Latin reading (D F G). By putting the pronoun: *we ourselves also*, at the beginning of the sentence, after the words: *not only but*, it obliterates the forcible re-affirmation which these words contain when placed in the middle of the sentence: "*We also . . . we ourselves also*" . . . The two other readings differ only in this, that the Alexandrine (א A C) places the ἡμεῖς, *we*, before καὶ αὐτοί, while the Byzs. place it between the two words: *and we ourselves*. The difference of meaning is almost imperceptible (*we ourselves also; also we ourselves*). It is probable that the Alexs. have displaced the ἡμεῖς, *we*, to bring it next the participle ἔχοντες. This is the reason why we have translated according to the received reading. — Several commentators have thought that in saying first *we*, then adding *we ourselves also*, the apostle meant to speak of two different subjects, for example, *Christians* and *apostles* (Mel.), or *Christians* and *Paul* himself (Reiche). But in this case the article οἱ before the participle ἔχοντες would be indispensable; and what object could there be in such a distinction in the context?—The logical connection between the participle ἔχοντες, *having, possessing*, and the verb στενάζομεν, *we groan*, should be rendered by the conjunction *though*: "Though already possessing, we still groan (*ipsi nos habentes*)." — The expression: *the first-fruits of the Spirit*, is so clear that it is difficult to understand how it should have given rise to dispute. How has it occurred to commentators like de Wette, Olshausen, Meyer, to apply it specially to the Spirit bestowed on the *apostles* and *first* believers, to distinguish it from the Spirit afterwards bestowed on other believers? What importance can this difference have for the spiritual life, and where is a trace of such a distinction to be found in the N. T.? It would be preferable to regard

the word *first-fruits* (with Chrys., Calv., Thol., Philip., Bonnet) as referring to the fact that Christians here below receive only a beginning, while there will be given to them above the entire fulness of the Spirit. In this sense the genitive would be the complement of the object: *The first-fruits of that gift which is the Spirit.* But the apostle is not here contrasting an imperfect with a more perfect spiritual state; he is contrasting an *inward* state already relatively perfect, with an *outward* state which has not yet participated in the spiritual renewal; this appears clearly from the last words: *waiting for the redemption of our body.* The genitive is therefore the complement of quality or apposition: "The first-fruits *which consist of* the Spirit Himself." This meaning is proved, besides, by the attentive comparison of 2 Cor. i. 22 and Eph. i. 14. The apostle means: "We ourselves, who by the possession of the Spirit have already entered inwardly into the new world, still groan, because there is a part of our being, the outer man, which does not yet enjoy this privilege."—Hofmann joins the regimen: *within ourselves*, to the participle ἔχοντες: *we who have within ourselves.* But is it not superfluous to say that the Holy Spirit is possessed inwardly? This regimen is very significant, on the contrary, if we connect it, as is grammatically natural, with the verb *we groan:* "We groan often inwardly, even when others do not suspect it, and when they hear us proclaiming salvation as a fact already accomplished." The disharmony between *the child of God* and the child of the dust therefore still remains; and hence we wait for something.—This something St. Paul calls *adoption*, and he explains it by the apposition: *the redemption of our body.* No doubt our adoption is in point of right an acquired fact (Gal. iv. 6). It is so in reality on its spiritual side, for we already possess the *Spirit of our Father*, as Paul has developed it, vv. 14-16. But the state of sons of God will not be fully realized in us until to the holiness of the Spirit there be added the glory and perfection of the body. It needs hardly be said that the expression: *the redemption of our body*, is not to be interpreted in the sense: that we are to be delivered *from* our body (Oltram.). For this idea, applied to the body itself, would be anti-biblical; faith waits for a new body; and if it applied to the body only as the body *of our humiliation*, as

Paul says, Phil. iii. 21, this specification would require to be added, or at least Paul would require to say τοῦ σώματος τούτου, *of this present body.* The complement *of the body* is therefore evidently the genitive, not of the object, but of the subject: it is the body itself which is to be delivered from the miseries of its present corruption. We see from 2 Cor. v. 4 that Paul desired not to be *unclothed,* but *to be clothed upon:* that is, to receive his glorified body, by the power of which his mortal body was to be as it were swallowed up. It is by the transformation of the body only that we shall become completely *sons of God.* Comp. the affirmation, which is not identical, but analogous, made in reference to Christ Himself, i. 3, 4.

Vv. 24, 25: "*For we are saved by hope; but hope that is seen is not hope; for what a man seeth, why would he yet*[1] *hope for? Now if we hope for that we see not, then do we with patience wait for it.*"—Ver. 24 uses one of the three constituent elements of the Christian life, namely *hope* (1 Cor. xiii. 13), to demonstrate the reality of that state of groaning and expectation which has just been ascribed to believers. On the one hand, undoubtedly salvation is a thing finished; this is indicated by the aorist ἐσώθημεν, *we were saved.* But, on the other hand, this salvation having as yet penetrated only to the spiritual part of our being, is not fully realized, and leaves room for awaiting a more complete realization. Hence the restrictive specification τῇ ἐλπίδι, *by hope.* This word, from its position at the beginning of the sentence, evidently has the emphasis. This dative is, as Bengel says, a *dativus modi,* signifying: "*in the way of hope.*" The meaning therefore is: "If we are saved, which is certain, this holds true only when we take account of the element of hope which continues always in our present state." We must not, like Chrys., de Wette, Rück., identify hope with faith, and find here the idea of salvation by faith. The whole context shows that it is really of *hope* in the strict and special meaning of the word that Paul is speaking. Already in the apostolic age we find persons who, intoxicated with a feeling of false spiritualism,

[1] T. R., with A C K L P, reads τι καὶ before ἐλπιζει; D F G, It. Syr.: τι (without καὶ); ℵ: καὶ (without τι); B omits τι καὶ; ℵ A read ὑπομενει instead of ἐλπιζει.

gave out that salvation concerned only man's higher nature, and who abandoned the body to everlasting destruction; so those Christians of Corinth who denied the resurrection of the body (1 Cor. xv.), and those heretics of Asia Minor who alleged that *the resurrection was already past* (2 Tim. ii. 18), probably because they confounded it with moral regeneration. Were there such men at Rome? Paul must have had some reason for insisting, as he does here, on the outward and future consummation of the edifice of salvation. The meaning of the last two propositions of ver. 24 is clear: "Now, hope implies non-possession." In the words: *hope that is seen*, the term *hope* is taken for *the object hoped for*, as is often the case, Col. i. 5 for example. In the words following, the term resumes its subjective meaning. The last proposition has been amended by the copyists in all sorts of ways. In our translation we have rendered the T. R. The Greco-Latin text, rejecting the καί, *yet*, signifies: "For what one sees, why would he hope for?" The *Sinaït.*: "What one sees, he also hopes for," or "does he also hope for?"—a reading which in the context has no meaning. The *Vatic.*: "What one sees, does he hope for?" This is the reading which Volkmar prefers; for in regard to the *Vatic.* he gives himself up to the same predilection with which he rightly charges Tischendorf in regard to the *Sinaït.* This reading is impossible. It would require *when* instead of *what*: "*When* one sees, does he hope?"—The καί, *yet*, is by no means superfluous: *yet*, after sight has begun, along with sight, hope has no more place.

Ver. 25. This verse is not, as Meyer thinks, a deduction fitted to close the first reason of encouragement. In this case an οὖν, *therefore*, would have been necessary rather than δέ, *now*, or *but*. The meaning *but* (Osterv., Oltram.) well suits the contrast between the ideas of *hoping* (ver. 25) and *seeing* (ver. 24). Yet it seems to me that the meaning *now* is preferable. It is not a conclusion; it is a step in the argument intended to prove the painful state of waiting attaching even to believers. The emphasis is on the words δι' ὑπομονῆς, *with patience*, and the general meaning is this: "Now, obliged as we yet are to hope without seeing, waiting necessarily takes the character of *patience*." To understand this thought, it

is enough to recall the etymological meaning of the word *ὑπομένειν*: to hold out under a burden. *We wait with patience* amounts therefore to saying: "It is only by holding out under the burden of present sufferings that we can expect with certainty the hoped-for future." The conclusion is this: We are not therefore yet in our normal condition; otherwise why *endurance?*

Vv. 26, 27. "*And likewise the Spirit also helpeth our infirmity;*[1] *for we know not what we should ask*[2] *in order to pray as we ought, but the Spirit itself maketh intercession*[3] *with groanings which cannot be uttered. But He that searcheth the hearts knoweth what is the aspiration of the Spirit, because He maketh intercession for the saints according to God.*"—As the apostle had passed from the groaning of universal nature to that of the children of God, he now rises from the latter to that of the Holy Spirit Himself. This gradation is so evident that one is astonished it could have remained unobserved by so many commentators (see for example Meyer). But we must remark the significant difference between this second transition and the former. In passing from the groaning of nature to that of believers, he said: *not only . . . but also.* Now he simply says: *and likewise also.* There is no contrast indicated here; for the groaning of the Spirit is homogeneous with that of believers (*likewise*), though distinct from it notwithstanding (*also*), and though there is a gradation from the one to the other (δέ, *now*, which we have rendered by *and*). —If, with the Byzs., we read the plural *ταῖς ἀσθενείαις, our infirmities,* the word would denote the moral infirmities of believers. But so general an idea is out of place in the context. We must therefore prefer the Alex. reading: *τῇ ἀσθενείᾳ, our infirmity.* This expression refers to a special infirmity, the fainting condition with which the believer is sometimes overtaken under the weight of present suffering; it is the want which makes itself felt in his *ὑπομονή*, that *constancy,* the necessity of which had been affirmed in the pre-

[1] T. R. reads, with K L P: *ταις ασθενειαις*; ℵ A B C D F G, Syr^{sch} read *τη ασθενεια*, a word to which F G add: *της δεησεως.*

[2] T. R. reads, with ℵ A B C: *προσευξωμεθα*; D K L P read *προσευξομεθα* and F G: *προσευχομεθα.*

[3] ℵ A B D F G omit the words: *υπερ ημων* (*for us*).

vious verse. The reading of F G: *our weakness in prayer*, would refer to our ignorance as to what should be asked (the proposition following). But this so weakly supported reading is certainly a gloss. Infirmity in prayer enters into the weakness of which the apostle speaks, but does not constitute the whole of it. The verb συναντιλαμβάνεσθαι, *to support, come to the help of*, is one of those admirable words easily formed by the Greek language; λαμβάνεσθαι (the middle), *to take a burden on oneself*; σύν, *with* some one; ἀντί, *in his place*; so: to share a burden with one with the view of easing him; comp. Luke x. 40. This verb is usually followed by a personal regimen, which leads us to take the abstract substantive here: *our weakness*, for: *us weak ones* (ἡμῖν ἀσθένεσιν). The Spirit supports us in the hour when we are ready to faint. The end of the verse will explain wherein this aid consists.—Before describing it the apostle yet further examines the notion: *our infirmity*. The case in question belongs to those times in which our tribulation is such that in praying we cannot express to God what the blessing is which would allay the distress of our heart. We ourselves have no remedy to propose. The article τό defines the whole following proposition taken as a substantive: "The: *what we should ask*." This is what we know not ourselves. The words *as we ought* do not refer to the *manner* of prayer (this would require καθώς), but to its *object*. Jesus Himself was once in the perplexity of which the apostle here speaks. "Now is my soul troubled," says He, John xii. 27, "and what shall I say? Father, save me from this hour: but for this cause came I unto this hour." After this moment of trouble and hesitation, His mind became fixed, and His prayer takes form: "Father, glorify Thy name." In our case the struggle usually lasts longer. Comp. a similar situation in the experience of Paul, 2 Cor. xii. 7–9.—In these extreme situations help is suddenly presented to us, a divine agent who raises us as it were above ourselves, *the Spirit*. The verb ὑπερεντυγχάνειν is again a term compounded of three words: τυγχάνειν, *to find oneself, to meet* with some one; ἐν, *in* a place agreed on; ὑπέρ, *in* one's *favour*; hence: *to intercede in favour of*. It would seem that the regimen ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, *for us*, in the Byz. text, should be rejected according to the two other families.—How are we to conceive of this *interces-*

sion of the Spirit? It does not take place in the heavenly sanctuary, like that of the glorified Christ (Heb. vii. 25). It has for its theatre the believer's own heart. The very term *groaning* implies this, and ver. 27, by speaking of God *who searches the hearts*, confirms it.—The epithet ἀλάλητος, which we have translated *unutterable*, may be explained in three ways. 1. Beza and Grotius have given it the meaning of *mute*, that is to say, purely inward and spiritual. But what end would such a qualification serve here? 2. Others understand *inexpressible;* such is the meaning of our translation; that is to say, that the understanding cannot fully grasp its object, nor consequently express it in distinct terms. Only, 3, we should have preferred to translate, had the language permitted it, by the word *unformulated* or *unexpressed*. In every particular case, he who is the object of this assistance feels that no distinct words fully express to God the infinite good after which he sighs. The fact proves that the aspiration is not his own, but that it is produced in his heart by the Spirit of Him of whom John said, "that He is greater than our heart" (1 John iii. 20). We here find ourselves in a domain analogous to that of the γλώσσαις λαλεῖν, *speaking in tongues*, to which 1 Cor. xiv. refers; comp. vv. 14 and 15, where Paul says: "When I pray in a tongue, my spirit (πνεῦμα) prayeth indeed, but my understanding (νοῦς) is unfruitful." The understanding cannot control, nor even follow the movement of the spirit, which, exalted by the Spirit of God, plunges into the depths of the divine. Thus, at the moment when the believer already feels the impulse of hope failing within him, a groan more elevated, holy, and intense than anything which can go forth even from his renewed heart is uttered within him, coming from God and going to God, like a pure breath, and relieves the poor downcast heart.[1]

Ver. 27. The δέ, *but*, contrasts the knowledge of God, which thoroughly understands the object of this groaning, with the

[1] M. Renan (*St. Paul*, p. 469) thus interprets the words of Paul: "those indistinct and inarticulate groanings," as if the word ἀλαλήτοις referred to some physical stuttering like that of a child. Think what would be meant in this case by the phrase *praying as we ought*, and *knowing*, applied to God, ver. 27! It is to this also that many expositors bring down the *speaking with tongues* of 1 Cor. xiv.; a miserable degradation of one of the most glorious phenomena.

ignorance of the heart from which it proceeds. God is often called in the O. T. the καρδιογνώστης, the *searcher of hearts*. As to the blessing to which the aspiration of the Spirit goes forth in the believer's heart, he knows its nature, he discerns its sublime reality. Why? This is what is told us in the second part of the verse: Because this supreme object of the Spirit's aspiration is what God Himself has prepared for us. The groaning of the Spirit is κατὰ Θεόν, *according to God*. The preposition κατά, *according to*, denotes the standard; God does not require the man who prays to express to Him the things he needs, since the groaning of the Spirit is in conformity with the plan of God which is to be realized. If it is so, how should not God understand such a groan? For the Spirit fathoms the divine plans to the bottom, 1 Cor. ii. 10. It is obvious how far Meyer and Hofmann are mistaken in alleging that ὅτι should signify *that* and not *because*. They have not apprehended the bearing of the κατὰ Θεόν, *according to God*; Paul has a reason for making this word the opening one of the proposition. What is according to Him cannot remain unintelligible to Him. It is impossible to conceive a more superfluous thought than the one here substituted by the two commentators referred to: "God knows that the Spirit intercedes, and that He does so according to Him for the saints." Did this *knowing* require to be affirmed? The last words, ὑπὲρ ἁγίων, literally, "*for* saints," are very weighty. These *saints* are beings in whom the Spirit already dwells. After what He has already done in them, is it not natural for Him to interest Himself in the completion of their salvation?—In the words: *according to God* and *for saints*, there is already enunciated a thought which is now to become that of the following passage, the thought of a *divine plan* conceived from all eternity in favour of the *elect*. It is to the accomplishment of this plan that the operation of the Spirit tends.

What a demonstration of the unutterable disorder which reigns throughout creation, and consequently of the state of imperfection in which it still is, notwithstanding the redemption which has been accomplished! Nature throughout all her bounds has a confused feeling of it, and from her bosom there rises a continual lament claiming a renovation from heaven. The redeemed themselves are not exempt from this

groaning, and wait for their own renewal which shall be the signal of universal restoration; and finally, the Spirit, who is intimate with the plans of God *for our glory* (1 Cor. ii. 7), and who distinctly beholds the ideal of which we have but glimpses, pursues its realization with ardour. Thus is exhausted the first of the two leading ideas of this passage, that of the *συμπάσχειν, suffering with Christ.* The apostle now passes to the second, that of the *συνδοξασθῆναι, being glorified with Him.* The first was the condition (*εἴπερ, if so be,* ver. 17); the second is the final aim.

Ver. 28. "*But we know that all things work together*[1] *for good to them that love God, to them who are the called according to His purpose.*"—We have shown how mistaken those expositors are who take the δέ as a simple particle of transition: *then,* and say: third or fourth ground of encouragement. The δέ is adversative: *but.* With this universal groaning which he has just described, and the source of which is in *the sufferings of the present time,* the apostle contrasts the full certainty already possessed by believers of the *glorious goal* marked out beforehand by the plan of God. This result, which they await with assurance, is the luminous point on which their eye is already fixed, and the brilliance of which is reflected on the obscurities of the way which they have yet to traverse: "We groan, no doubt; we know not how to pray . . ., *but we know*" . . . The regimen: *to them that love God,* is placed at the beginning, as expressing the condition under which the prerogative about to be enunciated is realized in man. This characteristic of love to God is associated with the attribute of *saints* which he ascribed to believers, ver. 27, and more particularly with the cry: *Abba, Father,* the expression of their filial feeling, ver. 15. Those who belong to this class will never fail to be strengthened, and even to gain progress, by everything which can happen them; for in this normal path obstacles even become means of help. The end of the verse will explain why.—The term *πάντα, all things,* includes all that comes on us, especially everything painful in consequence of the miseries of the present time and of the sins of our neighbours. But it would be wrong to embrace under it what we may do ourselves in opposition to God's will, since

[1] A B read *ὁ θεὸς* after *συνεργεῖ.*

that would contradict the idea: *them that love God.*—The σύν, *with,* in the verb συνεργεῖν, *to work together with,* has been variously explained. According to some, it means that all things work *in concert* (comp. the σύν, ver. 22); according to others, All things work *in common with God* under His direction. Others, finally: All things work in common with the believer who is their object, and who himself aspires after the good. This last sense, which is well developed by Philippi, is undoubtedly the most natural. The *Alex.* and the *Vatic.* have added ὁ Θεός, *God,* as the subject of the verb. In that case we must give to συνεργεῖν a causative sense: "God *makes* all things *work together.*" But this meaning is foreign to the N. T., and probably to classic Greek; Passow does not quote a single example of it.—The regimen: εἰς ἀγαθόν, *for good,* has a more precise meaning in the apostle's language than that usually given to it. It means not only any good result whatever in which everything issues for the believer, but that constant progress to the final goal to which the plan of God leads us, and which constitutes our real destination. Everything is fitted to hasten our progress in this direction, when the heart has once been subjected to God. The last words of the verse give the reason. Those who have come to take God as the object of their life and activity, and to live for Him like Jesus Himself (vi. 10), are exactly those in whose favour God has formed the universal plan. All therefore which happens according to this plan must turn out in their favour. Two reasons explain the co-operation of all things for the believer's good: a subjective reason—he has entered into the true current (*loving God*); and an objective reason—all things are ordered in his favour in the plan of God; this is indicated by the second regimen.—The notion of the divine plan is expressed by the term πρόθεσις, *the design fixed beforehand.* Paul often uses this expression in a more or less extended sense; thus, 2 Tim. i. 9, he applies it specially to salvation *by grace* without works; Eph. i. 11, this term is applied to the *election* of the people of Israel; Rom. iii. 24, the design of God has for its object Christ's expiatory sacrifice. The classic passages, as they may be called, where this term is taken in its most general signification, are found in the Epistle to the Ephesians: i. 3–10 and

iii. 11. We see here that the design of God is eternal (*before the ages*), for it rests on Christ (*in Jesus Christ*), and that it was conceived freely, solely on account of the divine love (the decree *of His will, according to His good pleasure*).—In this plan of salvation there were comprehended at the same time the individuals in whom it was to be realized; hence they are designated here as *the called according to His purpose.* The *call* is the invitation addressed by God to man, when by the preaching of His gospel He offers him salvation in Christ. This call by the Word is always accompanied with an inward operation of the Spirit which tends to render the preaching effectual. Those theologians who hold absolute predestination have no doubt denied the generality of this internal operation of grace; they have alleged that it does not accompany the outward call except in the case of the elect. Some have even gone the length of distinguishing between a *serious* and consequently effectual calling, and a *non-serious* and consequently ineffectual calling. But it will be asked, What could God have in view with a non-serious call, that is to say, one which He did not Himself seek to render effectual? It has been answered, that its object was to render those to whom it was addressed inexcusable. But if God Himself refuses to give the grace necessary for its acceptance, how is he who refuses thereby rendered more inexcusable? It must then be held that when the apostle in his Epistle speaks of the divine call, he always embraces under the term the two notions of an outward call by the Word and an inward call by grace, and that the apostle's expression: *the called according to His purpose,* is not at all intended to distinguish two classes of called persons, those who are so according to His purpose, and those who are not. All are alike seriously called. Only it happens that some consent to yield to the call and others refuse. This distinction is indicated by Jesus in the saying: "Many are called, but few are chosen," Matt. xx. 16. The *chosen* in this passage are those who accept the call, and who are thereby rescued from the midst of this perishing world; the *called* are those who, not accepting the call, remain *called* and nothing more, and that to their condemnation. In the Epistles, the apostles, addressing Christians, do not require to make this distinction, since the individuals whom they

address are assumed to have *accepted* the call, from the very fact that they have voluntarily entered the church. The case is like that of a man who should say to his guests when assembled in his house: "Use everything that is here, for you are *my invited guests.*" It is obvious that by expressing himself thus, he would not be distinguishing invitation from acceptance, the latter being implied in the very fact of their presence; comp. 1 Cor. i. 23, 24. What the apostle means to say then is this: There is something prior to the present sufferings of believers; that is the eternal purpose in virtue of which their calling took place. It is not possible therefore but that all things should turn to their good.—The relation between the two regimens: *them that love God,* and *them that are the called according to His purpose,* reminds us of John's words: "We love Him because He first loved us" (1 John iv. 19).—The participle τοῖς οὖσι, *who are,* strongly expresses *the present reality* of this condition described by the word *called,* in opposition to the ideal nature of the decree, previously to its realization in time.—The Greek Fathers, Pelagius and others, in their desire to escape from the idea of an absolute predestination, applied the act indicated by the word πρόθεσις, *purpose,* to man, and understood thereby his *good will* to believe, as in Acts xi. 23. But in the context it is the *divine* side of salvation only which is meant to be emphasized, as it is the only side which is expounded in the two following verses. The ground of the calling could not really be the believer's disposition to accept it.

The idea of God's *purpose* is developed in the two verses, 29 and 30. Ver. 29 indicates its final aim; ver. 30 marks off, as it were, the path along which it reaches its realization.

Ver. 29. "*For whom He did foreknow, He also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of His Son, that He might be a first-born among many brethren.*"—The *for* bears on the principal idea of ver. 28: All things must turn to the good of them that are called according to God's eternal plan. Why so? Because once individually foreknown, He has determined to bring them to the glorious consummation of perfect likeness to His Son. This is the end with a view to which He has ordered the plan of all things beforehand.—By the οὓς προέγνω, *whom He did foreknow,* Paul evidently

expresses the condition of the προώρισεν, *He predestinated.* The decree of *predestination* (προορισμός) is founded on the act of *foreknowledge* (πρόγνωσις). What does St. Paul understand by this last word? Some have given to the word *foreknow* the meaning of *elect, choose, destine, beforehand* (Mel., Calv., Rück., de Wette, etc.). Not only is this meaning arbitrary, as being without example in the N. T., and as even in profane Greek the word γινώσκειν, *to know,* has the meaning of *deciding* only when it applies to a *thing,* as when we say: *connaître d'une cause, to judge of a case,* and never when applied to a person; [in this case γινώσκειν περί would be absolutely necessary, *to decide regarding* (the person)]; but what is still more decidedly opposed to this meaning is what follows: *He also did predestinate;* for in that case the two verbs would be identical in meaning, and could not be connected by the particle of gradation καί, *also,* especially in view of ver. 30, where the successive degrees of divine action are strictly distinguished and graduated. Others give to the word *know* a sense borrowed from the shade of meaning which it sometimes has in the biblical style, that of *loving* (Er., Grot., Hofm.); comp. xi. 2; Jer. i. 5; Amos iii. 2; Hos. xiii. 5; Gal. iv. 9, etc. The meaning according to this view is: "whom He loved and privileged beforehand." With this class we may join those who, like Beza, give the word the meaning of *approving.* It is certain that with the idea of knowledge, Scripture readily joins that of approbation, intimate communion, and tender affection; for it is only through mutual love that intelligent beings really meet and know one another. Besides, no one can think of separating from the word *foreknow* here, any more than xi. 2, the notion of *love.* Only it is still less allowable to exclude from it the notion of *knowledge,* for this is the first and fundamental meaning; the other is only secondary. There is not a passage in the N. T. where the word *know* does not above all contain the notion of *knowledge,* properly so called. The same is the case with the word *foreknow;* comp. Acts xxvi. 5; 2 Pet. iii. 17. In the passage Acts ii. 23, foreknowledge is expressly distinguished from the *fixed decree,* and consequently can denote nothing but prescience; and as to xi. 2: "His people whom God foreknew," the idea of knowledge is the leading one in the

word *foreknew;* that of love is expressed in the pronoun *His.* The meaning then to which we are brought seems to me to be this: those on whom His eye fixed from all eternity with love; whom He eternally contemplated and discerned *as His.* In what respect did God thus *foreknow* them? Obviously it is not as being one day *to exist.* For the foreknowledge in that case would apply to all men, and the apostle would not say: "*whom* He foreknew." Neither is it as future saved and glorified ones that He foreknew them; for this is the object of the decree of *predestination* of which the apostle goes on to speak; and this object cannot at the same time be that of the *foreknowledge.* There is but one answer: foreknown as sure to fulfil the condition of salvation, viz. *faith;* so: foreknown as His *by faith.* Such is the meaning to which a host of commentators have been led, St. Augustine himself in early times, then the Lutheran expositors; Philippi explains: *præcognovit prævisione fidei.* Only Philippi, after frankly acknowledging this meaning, instantly adds, that the faith which God foresees He also creates; and so by this door a return is provided into the system of predestination which seemed to have been abandoned. But this view is not compatible with the true meaning of the word *know,* especially when this word is contrasted, as it is here, with the term *predestinate.* The act of *knowing,* exactly like that of seeing, supposes an object perceived by the person who knows or sees. It is not the act of seeing or knowing which creates this object; it is this object, on the contrary, which determines the act of knowing or seeing. And the same is the case with divine prevision or foreknowledge; for in the case of God who lives above time, foreseeing is seeing; knowing what shall be is knowing what to Him already is. And therefore it is the believer's faith which, as a future fact, but in His sight already existing, which determines His foreknowledge. This faith does not exist because God sees it; He sees it, on the contrary, because it will come into being at a given moment, in time. We thus get at the thought of the apostle: Whom God knew beforehand as certain to believe, whose faith He beheld eternally, He designated *predestined* (προώρισεν), as the objects of a grand decree, to wit, that He will not abandon them till He has brought them to the perfect likeness of His own Son.—It

is clear from the οὓς and the τούτους, *whom . . . them*, that it was those individuals personally who were present to His thought when pronouncing the decree. — As the first verb contained an act of knowledge, the second denotes one of free will and authority. But will in God is neither arbitrary nor blind; it is based on a principle of light, on knowledge. In relation to the man whose faith God *foresees, He decrees* salvation and glory. Reuss is certainly mistaken, therefore, in saying of these two verbs that substantially they denote "one and the same act." The object of the decree is not faith at all, as if God had said: As for thee, thou shalt believe; as for thee, thou shalt not believe. The object of predestination is glory: "I see thee believing . . ., I will therefore that thou be glorified like my Son." Such is the meaning of the *decree*. The predestination of which Paul speaks is not a predestination *to* faith, but a predestination to glory, founded *on* the prevision of faith. Faith is in a sense the work of God; but it contains a factor, in virtue of which it reacts on God, as an object reacts on the mind which takes cognizance of it; this is the free adherence of man to the solicitation of God. Here is the element which distinguishes the act of foreknowledge from that of predestination, and because of which the former logically precedes the latter.—It is hardly necessary to refute the opinion of Meyer, who gives the verb *foreknow* the same object as the verb *predestinate:* "Whom He foreknew as conformed to the image of His Son, He also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of His Son." Has this any meaning? It would be more intelligible if the order were reversed: "Whom He *predestinated to* . . ., He also *did foreknow as*" . . .

What the decree of predestination embraces is the *realization of the image of the Son* in all foreknown believers. The adj. σύμμορφοι, *conformed*, is directly connected with the verb *He predestinated;* the ellipsis of the verb *to be*, or *to become*, is obvious and common. Paul does not say: "conformed or like *to His Son*," but: "to *the image* of His Son." By using this form of expression, he undoubtedly means that Christ has realized in Himself a higher *type of existence* (εἰκών, *image*), which we are to realize after Him. This is the existence of the God-man, as we behold it in Christ; such is the glorious

vesture which God takes from the person of His Son, that therewith He may clothe believers. What, in point of fact, was the aim of God in the creation of man? He wished to have for Himself a family of sons; and therefore He determined in the first place to make His own Son our brother. Then in His person He raises our humanity to the divine state; and finally, He makes all believing men sharers in this glorious form of existence. Such are the contents of the decree. It is obvious that Christ Himself is its first object; and hence He is called *the Elect*, absolutely speaking, Isa. xlii. 1; Luke ix. 35 (most approved reading). His brethren are elect *in Him*, Eph. i. 4–6. The Father's intention in acting thus is to glorify the Son by causing His beauty to be reflected in a family of living likenesses.—The term πρωτότοκος, *first-born*, no doubt denotes primarily a relation of time: Jesus *preceded* all the others in glory, not only because of His eternal existence, but also as a man by His resurrection and ascension; comp. Col. i. 15 and 18. But the decree of predestination carries us into an eternal sphere, where the idea of priority has no more place, and is transformed into that of superiority. It will be vain for us to take on His likeness; we shall never be equal to Him; for the likeness which we shall bear will be *His*. Thus what comes out as the end of the divine decree is the creation of a great family of men made partakers of the divine existence and action, in the midst of which the glorified Jesus shines as the prototype.

But how are we, we sinful men, to be brought to this sublime state? Such a work could not be accomplished as it were by the wave of a magician's wand. A complete moral transformation required to be wrought in us, paving the way for our glorification. And hence God, after fixing the end, and pronouncing the decree in eternity, set His hand to the work in time to realize it. He beheld them at their haven, all these foreknown ones, before launching them on the sea; and once launched, *He acted;* such is the meaning of ver. 30.

Ver. 30. "*Moreover, whom He did predestinate, them He also called; and whom He called, them He also justified; and whom He justified, them He also glorified.*"—Here are the successive acts whereby the eternal decree is executed in time. They stand, as it were, between the eternity in which this decree is

pronounced, and the eternity in which it is finished. It is to be remarked that the apostle only points out in its accomplishment the acts pertaining to God: *calling, justification, glorification,* because he is only setting forth that side of the work of salvation which is contained in the decree of predestination, and which consequently depends solely on divine causation. If his intention had been to explain *the order of salvation* in all its elements divine *and human,* he would have put *faith* between calling and justification, and *holiness* between justification and glorification.

The δέ, *then, moreover,* at the beginning of the verse is progressive; it indicates the transition from the eternal decree to its realization in time. He who wishes the end must employ the means; the first mean which God puts in operation is His *call,* which, as we have seen, embraces the outward invitation by preaching, and the inward drawing by the Spirit of grace. Paul does not mean that God addresses this call only to those whom He has predestined to glory, but he affirms that none of those who are predestinated fail to be also called in their day and hour. Not one of those foreknown shall be forgotten. They form a totality, which, once introduced from eternity into time, is faithfully led by God from step to step to the goal fixed beforehand. God would be inconsequent if He acted otherwise.—The plural pronouns *whom . . . them,* imply knowledge of the individuals as such. All were present to the mind of God when He decreed the height to which He would raise them.—The call once accepted—and it could not fail to be so, since we have to do here only with those whose faith God foreknew—a second divine act followed: *justification.* The καί, *also,* indicates the continuity of the divine work, the different acts of which follow, and mutually involve one another. Each successive grace is as it were implied in the preceding. *Grace upon grace,* says John i. 16. On those who have been called and have become believers, there has been passed the sentence which declares man righteous, that is to say, put relatively to God in the position of one who has never done any evil nor omitted any good.—The third step, *glorification,* is no longer connected with the preceding by καί, *also,* but by δέ, *moreover.* This change indicates a shade of difference in the thought. The apostle

feels that he is nearing the goal, foreseen and announced in ver. 29; and this δέ consequently signifies: *and finally.* The feeling expressed is that of one who, after a painful and perilous journey, at length reaches the end.—We might be tempted to include holiness here in glorification; for, as has been said, holiness is only the inward side of glory, which is its outward manifestation. But when we remember chaps. vi.–viii., it seems to us more natural to make holiness the transition from justification to glory, and to regard it as implicitly contained in the former. Once justified, the believer receives the Spirit, who sanctifies him in the measure of his docility, and so prepares him for glory. — There is nothing surprising in the fact that verbs in the *past* are used to denote the first two divine acts, those of calling and justification; for at the time Paul wrote, these two acts were already realized in a multitude of individuals who were in a manner the representatives of all the rest. But how can he employ the same past tense to denote the act of glorification which is yet to come? Many expositors, Thol., Mey., Philip., think that this past expresses the absolute certainty of the event to come. Others, like Reiche, refer this past to the eternal fulfilment of the decree in the divine understanding. Or again, it is taken as an aorist of anticipation, like that of which we have a striking example, John xv. 6 and 8. Hodge seems to have sought to combine those different senses when he says: "Paul uses the past as speaking from God's point of view, who sees the end of things from their beginning." But if it is true that the use of the two preceding aorists was founded on an already accomplished fact, should it not be the same with this? If believers are not yet glorified, their Head already is, and they are virtually so *in Him.* This is the completed historical fact which suffices to justify the use of the past. Does not Paul say, Eph. ii. 6: "We have been raised up together with Him, and made to sit together with Him in heavenly places"? When the head of a body wears a crown, the whole body wears the same with it.

Paul has thus reached the goal he had set from the beginning, in the last words of the preceding passage (ver. 17): "that we may be glorified together with Him." For he had proposed to himself (ver. 1) to show the final abolition of *all*

condemnation, even of that of death, by the law of the Spirit of life which is in Jesus Christ; and he has fulfilled this task. It only remains for him to celebrate in a hymn this unparalleled victory gained in our behalf.

It is obviously too narrow an interpretation of the passage to apply it merely, as Calvin does, to the victory over the sufferings of this present time (ver. 18). We have here the consummation of that *salvation* in Christ, the foundation of which Paul had laid (chaps. i.–v.) in the demonstration of the *righteousness of faith*, and the superstructure of which he had raised in the exposition of *sanctification* (chaps. vi.–viii.). Hereafter it will only remain to follow this salvation, thus studied in its essence, as it is unfolded on the theatre of history.

On predestination as taught vv. 28–30. — Wherein consists the divine predestination undoubtedly taught by the apostle in this passage? Does it in his view exclude the free will of man; or, on the contrary, does it imply it? Two reasons seem to us to decide the question in favour of the second alternative:— 1. The act of *foreknowing*, which the apostle makes the basis of predestination, proves that the latter is determined by some fact or other, the object of this knowledge. It matters little that the knowledge is eternal, while the fact, which is its object, comes to pass only in time. It follows all the same from this relation, that the fact must be considered as due in some way to a factor distinct from divine causation, which can be nothing else than human liberty. 2. The apostle avoids making the act of *believing* the object of the decree of predestination. In the act of predestination faith is already assumed, and its sole object is, according to the apostle's words, the final participation of believers in *the glory of Christ*. Not only then does Paul's view imply that in the act of believing full human liberty is not excluded, but it is even implied. For it alone explains the distinction which he clearly establishes between the two divine acts of *foreknowledge* and *predestination*, both as to their *nature* (the one, an act of the understanding; the other, of the will) and as to their *object* (in the one case, faith; in the other, glory).

Human liberty in the acceptance of salvation being therefore admitted, in what will *predestination*, as understood by St. Paul, consist? It contains, we think, the three following elements:—

1. The *decree* (προορισμός) whereby God has determiued to bring to the perfect likeness of His Son every one who shall believe. What more in keeping with His grace and wisdom than such a decree: "Thou dost adhere by faith to Him whom I give thee

as thy Saviour; He will therefore belong to thee wholly, and I shall not leave thee till I have rendered thee perfectly like Him, the God-man"?

2. The *prevision* (πρόγνωσις), in consequence of the divine foreknowledge, of *all the individuals* who shall freely adhere to the divine invitation to participate in this salvation. What more necessary than this second element? Would not God's plan run the risk of coming to nought if He did not foresee both the perfect fidelity of the Elect One on whom its realization rests, and the faith of those who shall believe in Him? Without a Saviour and believers there would be no salvation. God's plan therefore assumes the assured foreknowledge of both.

3. The *arrangement* of all the laws and all the circumstances of *history* with a view to realizing the glorious plan conceived in favour of those foreknown. It is this arrangement which St. Paul describes in ver. 28, when he says that "*all things must work together for good* to them who are the called according to the eternal purpose." What more magnificent! Once believers, we may be tossed on the tempests of this present time; not only do we know that no wave can engulph us, but we are assured that every one of them has its place in the divine plan, and must hasten our course.

Thus we have three points: 1. The *end* indicated by the decree; 2. The personally known *individuals* who are to reach it; 3. The *way* by which they are to be led to it.

If any one does not find this predestination sufficient, he may make one to his taste; but, according to our conviction, it will not be that of the apostle.

TWENTIETH PASSAGE (VIII. 31-39).

Hymn of the Assurance of Salvation.

This passage is a conclusion. The *then* of ver. 31 indicates this. This conclusion is directly connected with the previous teaching on predestination (vv. 28–30); but as this passage only sums up all that the apostle had expounded before: 1st, on justification by faith (chaps. i.–v.), 2d, on sanctification by the Spirit of Christ (chaps. vi.–viii.), it follows that it is the conclusion of the entire portion of the Epistle now completed. It is presented in the form of questions which are, as it were, a challenge thrown out to all the adversaries of that salvation, the certainty of which Paul would here proclaim. This form has in it something of the nature of a triumph; it gives us

the idea of what was meant by him when he used the expression in the previous context: *ἐν Θεῷ καυχᾶσθαι, to glory in God.*

Vv. 31 and 32 contain a question of an entirely general character; vv. 33–37 enumerate the different kinds of adversaries; vv. 38 and 39 are as it were the shout of victory on the battle-field now abandoned by the enemy.

Vv. 31, 32. "*What shall we then say to these things? If God be for us, who can be against us? He that spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all, how shall He not with Him also freely give us all things?*"—The question: *What shall we then say?* does not introduce an objection, as in other passages; it invites the readers to take account of the position made theirs by the divine acts which have been thus far expounded, and to seek language adequate to such benefits (*οὖν, then*). It would be incorrect to give to the words *πρὸς ταῦτα, to these things,* the meaning of *besides,* as Bengel does; this would have required *πρὸς τούτοις. Πρός* here signifies *in regard to:* "What shall we say when we consider these things?" The apostle seeks to make himself and us thoroughly familiar with the nature of the new situation which is made ours. God has put Himself henceforth on our side . . .; for that reason alone all adversaries will be powerless. "Not that there are none," says Calvin, "but with such a defender none of them is to be dreaded: *Hic murus nobis est aheneus.*"

Ver. 32. This absolute assurance in God, Paul derives from the great act of mercy toward us which has been accomplished. The expression *ὅς γε,* literally, *who at least,* is undoubtedly used in Greek in the sense of *who assuredly.* It is allowable, however, to seek the more precise sense of this restrictive form, and we think it may be expressed by the paraphrase: "Who though he had done *nothing else than that.*" There is a striking contrast between the expression: *His own Son,* and the verb *spared* not (so to say, did not treat delicately).—It is very clear here that the meaning of the word *Son* cannot be identified with that of Messiah—King. What would be meant by the expression: His own Messiah? The being in question is evidently one who is united to Him personally and who shares His nature, whom He brings, as it were, from His own bowels (*ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίου*). The apostle's expressions certainly reproduce those

of the angel of the Lord to Abraham, after the sacrifice of Isaac: "Because thou hast not spared thy son, thine only son" (Gen. xxii. 12). Meyer denies this parallelism, but without sufficient reason. There was, as it were, a victory gained by God over Himself, when He gave up His well-beloved to that career of pain and shame, just as there was a victory gained by Abraham over himself when with Isaac he climbed the mount of sacrifice. The inward sacrifice consummated, God *gave Him up* for us.—*For us all*, says Paul. These words might here embrace the totality of human beings. But the *us* ought undoubtedly to have the same meaning as that of ver. 31, unless, indeed, the word *all*, which is added here, be meant to indicate an extension to be given to the circle denoted by the preceding *us*. But is it not more natural to hold that this *all* contrasts the totality of believers with the *one* being whom God has given to be their Saviour? "One for all" (2 Cor. v. 14).—As *all* were the object of this sacrifice, so *all things* were comprehended in this gift. The word τὰ πάντα, *all things*, with the article, denotes a definite totality. This means all the gifts of grace previously enumerated. If, with the Greco-Lats., we reject the article, it is *all things*, absolutely speaking; which in the application amounts to the same thing. There is a very marked shade of difference between the verb: *freely give* (χαρίζεσθαι), and the preceding verbs: *not sparing, giving up*. While the latter express something painful, the former denotes an act full of pleasure to the heart of him who does it. How, after carrying through the sacrifice, would He not do the pleasant part of a gracious giver? Thus it is that all possible gifts, however great or small they may be, whether for this life or the next, are virtually comprised in the gift of the Son, just as the gift of all Abraham's possessions and of his person even were implicitly contained in that of Isaac. To give *all things* is a small matter after the best has been given. This is precisely what was expressed beforehand by the γέ, *at least*, at the beginning of the verse, and what is confirmed by the καί, *also*, added to the verb *shall give*. This particle indeed is connected with the verb, and not with the regimen *with Him* (see Philippi, in opposition to Meyer). He being once given, God *will also bestow* on us, in the course of our life, all other blessings.

The three questions which follow are only various applications of the question in ver. 31: "Who can be against us?" The first two (vv. 33 and 34) refer to attacks of a judicial nature; they contemplate enemies who contest the believer's *right* to pardon and salvation. The third (vv. 35–37) refers to a violent attack in which the enemy has recourse to brute force, to break the bond between Christ and the believer. The whole passage vividly recalls the words of Isa. l. 7–9: "I know that I shall not be ashamed. He is near that justifieth me: who will contend with me? Let us stand together: who is mine adversary? Let him come near to me! Behold, the Lord God will help me; who is he that shall condemn me?"

Ver. 33. "*Who shall lay anything to the charge of God's elect? It is God that justifieth.*"—Paul is not ignorant how many accusers every believer has: conscience, the law, Satan, the accuser of the elect, the persons we have offended or scandalized by our faults: all so many voices rising against us. Did Paul himself, when writing these words, not think of the cries of pain uttered by the Christians whom he had cast into prison and scourged, and especially of the blood of Stephen, which, like that of Abel the righteous, called for vengeance against him? All these charges are only too real. But from the mouth of God there has gone forth a declaration which serves as a buckler to the believer, and against which those fiery darts are quenched, as soon as he takes shelter under the sentence: God *hath declared him just.* Here we clearly see the juridical meaning of the word *justify* as used by St. Paul. These words: *It is God that justifieth,* which paralyze every accusation uttered in His presence, are the summary of the whole first part of the Epistle (chaps. i.–v.). The expression: *the elect of God,* literally, *elect of God,* has an argumentative value; it serves to demonstrate beforehand the powerlessness of the accusation. This expression recalls what has just been said (vv. 28–30) of the eternal predestination of believers to salvation and glory; ἐκλεκτός, *elect,* from ἐκλέγεσθαι, *to draw out of.* Rescued by His own call from identification with a world plunged in evil, could God thrust them back into it?

From the time of St. Augustine several commentators (most

lately Olshausen, de Wette, Reuss) have taken the last proposition of the verse in an interrogative sense: "Who will accuse? Would it be God? How could He do so, *He who justifieth?*" The apostle would thus be using an argument *ad absurdum*. This meaning is ingenious, and seems at the first glance to be more forcible. But can the part of *accuser* be ascribed, even by supposition, to God? The function of God is more elevated. Besides, it is simpler, graver, and in reality more forcible to regard this proposition as a calm and decided affirmation. It is the rock against which every wave of accusation breaks; compare also the parallel Isa. l., which speaks decidedly in favour of the affirmative form (Philippi).

The accusers are reduced to silence . . . for the present; but will it also be so at the final moment when the tribunal will be set, in the day of the δικαιοκρισία, "of the just judgment of God," when sentence will be given without "acceptance of persons" and "according to every man's work" (ii. 5, 6, 11)? Will the absolution of believers then still hold good? Let it be remembered this was the question put at the close of the first part (vv. 9 and 10), and resolved in the second (vi.–viii.). St. Paul raises it again in this summary, but in a tone of triumph, because on this point also he knows that victory is won.

Ver. 34. "*Who is he that condemneth? It is Christ Jesus*[1] *that died, yea rather,*[2] *that is risen again,*[3] *who is also*[4] *at the right hand of God, who also*[5] *maketh intercession for us.*"—The form τίς ὁ κατακρίνων, literally, *who* will be *the condemning one?* supposes only one judge possible, while the form of the previous question, *Who will accuse?* admitted a plurality of accusers. Why this difference? When accusing is the matter in question, all creatures may raise their voice. But as to *judging?* One only is appointed for that office, He who is called (Acts x. 42) by St. Peter "the judge of quick and dead;" comp. also

[1] ℵ A C F G L read Ἰησοῦς (after Χριστός), which is omitted by T. R. with B D E K, Syr.

[2] ℵ A B C reject καί after μᾶλλον, which is read by T. R. with D E F G K L, It.

[3] ℵ A C add ἐκ νεκρῶν.

[4] ℵ A C omit καί between ὅς and ἐστιν.

[5] Καί is read in all the Mjj. and almost all the Mnn.

Acts xvii. 31 and Rom. xiv. 10; so that the question put amounts to this: Will Christ, at the day of judgment, condemn us? The verb understood must be *will be*, not *is*; comp. vv. 33 and 35. The negative answer arises from the following enumeration of the acts done by Christ in our behalf. There would be a contradiction between this series of merciful interpositions and a final condemnation. It has excited surprise that when saying *Christ died*, Paul did not add *for us*. But he is not speaking here of the death of Christ from the viewpoint of expiation; in this respect it was already implied in the answer to the previous question, "It is God that justifieth." The death of Christ is mentioned here from the same standpoint as in chap. vi., implying, for the man who appropriates it, death to sin. The article ὁ, literally, *the* (*one who died*), reminds us that *one only* could condemn us, but that it is *that very one* who died that we might not be obliged to do it. The *resurrection* is likewise mentioned from the same point of view as in chap. vi., as the principle whereby a new life is communicated to believers, even the life of Christ Himself, of which, when once justified, we are made partakers (Eph. ii. 5 and 6).—*His sitting at the right hand of God* naturally follows, first as the principle of the outpouring of the Holy Spirit, and then as having put into the hands of Christ the government of the world and the direction of all the events of our life.—Finally, by His *intercession* we are assured of His precious interposition at such moments of spiritual weakness, as that in reference to which He declared to Peter: "I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not." How, with such support, should the Christian not become the conqueror of the sin which still cleaves to him, and how should he not succeed in presenting himself before the judgment-seat in a state which will not dishonour his Lord? This is what the apostle had called (ver. 10), "being saved *by His life*," in contrast to "being reconciled by His death" (same verse).

After the example of Erasmus, Meyer divides the questions and answers contained in this passage quite differently. According to him, the words: *Who will be the condemner?* still form part of the answer to the question: *Who will accuse?* (ver. 33), as if it were: "Since God justifieth, who *then* will

condemn?" Then follows a second interrogation introduced by the affirmations: *Christ died*, etc., affirmations terminating in the conclusion expressed anew, ver. 35, in the interrogative form: *Who will separate?* that is to say: "who *then* will separate us?" But this grouping of questions and answers seems to me inadmissible, for the following reasons:—1. The question: *Who will condemn?* cannot be the reproduction (negatively) of the previous question: *Who will accuse?* For *accusing* and *condemning* are two entirely different functions; the one belongs to everybody, the other to one only. 2. A *then* would be indispensable in the two questions: *who shall condemn* (ver. 34)? and *who shall separate* (ver. 35)? intended, according to Meyer, to express the two conclusions. 3. The question: *Who shall separate* (ver. 35)? is so far from being intended to express the conclusion from what precedes, that it finds its answer in all that follows, and particularly in the words of ver. 39, which close the whole passage: *Nothing shall separate us.* 4. This same question: *Who shall separate?* is followed by a long enumeration of the sufferings calculated to separate the believer from his Saviour, which absolutely prevents us from taking this question as expressing a conclusion.

A more seducing proposition is that of the expositors who, after taking the words Θεὸς ὁ δικαιῶν interrogatively: *God who justifieth?* give the same turn to ver. 34: "Who is he that shall condemn? Will it be Christ, He who died, who" . . .? This form has something lively and piquant; and if it applied only to a single question, one might be tempted to hold by it. But the series of questions which would then succeed one another in the same interrogative, and almost ironical sense, does not seem to us to be compatible with the profound feeling of this whole passage.

The numerous variants (ver. 34) which we have indicated in the note have no importance. The name *Jesus*, added to the title *Christ* by several Mjj., is in thorough keeping with the context; for in what follows there are summed up the phases of His existence as a historical person. It is the same with the καί, *also*, in the second and third proposition. It may even be said that the καί of the third does not admit of any doubt.

The apostle has defied accusers; their voice is silenced by the sentence of justification which covers believers. He has asked if at the last day the judge will not condemn, and he has seen sin, the object of condemnation, disappear from the believer's life before the work of the crucified and glorified Christ. It remains to be known whether some hostile power will not succeed in violently breaking the bond which unites us to the Lord, and on which both our justification and sanctification rest. By this third question he reaches the subject treated in the last place, in this very chapter, from ver. 18: *τὰ παθήματα, the sufferings of this present time;* and thus it is that in the three questions of this passage the entire Epistle is really summed up. It is clearly seen how the logical form does not for an instant slip from the mind of Paul, even at the time when the most overflowing feeling charges his pen.

Vv. 35–37. "*Who shall separate us from the love of Christ?*[1] *shall tribulation, or distress, or persecution, or famine, or nakedness, or peril, or sword? As it is written, For Thy sake we are killed all the day long; we are accounted as sheep for the slaughter. But in all these things we are more than conquerors through Him that loved*[2] *us.*"—The pronoun *τίς, who,* refers properly to persons; here it is applied to all the sufferings about to be enumerated, as if Paul saw in each of them an enemy bearing a grudge at the bond uniting him to Christ.—*The love of Christ,* from which nothing will separate him, is not the love which we have to Him; for we are not separated from our own personal feeling. It is therefore the love which He has to us; and this is confirmed by the close of ver. 37: "through Him that loved us." We might, with Calv., Thol., Rück., understand: nothing will separate us *from the feeling we have* of the love of Jesus to us. But is not Paul rather representing this love itself as a force which takes hold of and possesses us? Comp. 2 Cor. v. 14: "The love of Christ constraineth us (holds us pressed)." Paul is thinking of the profound action which this love exercises through the Holy Spirit at once on our heart and will. Such is the mysterious power from the operation of which nothing will be able to withdraw us.—*Θλίψις, tribulation:* overwhelming

[1] ℵ B: *του θεου* instead of *του Χριστου.*

[2] D E F G, It.: *δια του αγαπησαντα* instead of *δια του αγαπησαντος.*

external circumstances; στενοχωρία, *anguish*, literally, compression of heart, the inward effect produced by tribulation; διωγμός, *legal persecution*. To understand the words: *famine, nakedness, peril*, it is enough to refer to the sketch of St. Paul's life, given in 2 Cor. xi. 23 et seq. The *sword:* the symbol of capital punishment. When Paul writes this word, he designates, as Bengel observes, his own future mode of death.

Ver. 36. The apostle here quotes the sorrowful lament put by a psalmist in the mouth of the faithful under the old covenant, during a time of cruel oppression, Ps. xliv. 22. The quotation follows the LXX. *All the day:* every hour of the day (Meyer). Any hour is serviceable for dragging them to slaughter. *For Thy love's sake:* Jehovah in the O. T. corresponds to Christ in the New. *We are accounted:* it is long since sentence has been pronounced by hatred, and has hung over their head, though it is not yet executed.

Ver. 37. Paul expresses his certainty that none of these efforts will avail to tear the believer from the encircling arms of Christ's love. There is in this love a power which will overcome all the weaknesses of despondency, all the sinkings of doubt, all the fears of the flesh, all the horrors of execution. Paul does not say merely νικῶμεν, *we are conquerors*, but ὑπερνικῶμεν, *we are more than conquerors;* there is a surplus of force; we might surmount still worse trials if the Lord permitted them. And in what strength? The apostle, instead of saying: through the love of the Lord, expresses himself thus: *through the Lord that loved us.* It is His living person that acts in us. For it is He Himself in His love who sustains us. This love is not a simple thought of our mind; it is a force emanating from Him. The Greco-Latin reading: διὰ τὸν ἀγ., *on account of Him* . . ., would make Jesus merely the moral cause of victory. This is evidently too weak.—It will perhaps be asked if a Christian has never been known to deny his faith in suffering and persecution. Yes, and it is not a mathematical certainty the apostle wishes to state here. It is a fact of the moral life which is in question, and in this life liberty has always its part to play, as it had from the first moment of faith. What Paul means is, that nothing will tear us from the arms of Christ against

our will, and so long as we shall not refuse to abide in them ourselves; comp. John x. 28–30.

Vv. 38, 39. "*For I am persuaded, that neither death, nor life, nor angels,*[1] *nor principalities,*[2] *nor things present, nor things to come, nor powers,*[3] *nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.*" — The challenge which the apostle had just thrown out to condemnation, and sin and suffering of every kind, he now extends to all the hostile powers of the universe which could threaten the bond of love whereby Christ, and God Himself, are united to the believer. The *for* expresses an argument *a fortiori:* "none of the enemies mentioned is to be feared, for not even throughout the whole universe is there a being to be dreaded."—Paul reverts to the form *I*, which he had dropped after ver. 18; the reason being that here, as well as in ver. 38, the matter in question is a personal conviction of a moral rather than a systematic nature. We must not forget the: "*if at least* you persevere," which Paul himself wrote, Col. i. 23, nor examples such as that of Demas, 2 Tim. iv. 10. It is by ὑπομονή (ver. 25), perseverance in believing in the love of Christ to us, that this love exercises its irresistible power over us. The conviction here expressed by Paul does not apply to himself only, but to all believers (*us*, ver. 39).

The adversaries who rise before his view seem to advance in pairs. The first pair is *death* and *life*. Death is put first, in connection no doubt with vv. 35 and 36. The inverse order which we find 1 Cor. iii. 22, is occasioned there by the difference of the context. *Death:* the apostle is thinking of martyrdom, the fear of which may lead to apostasy. With death and its agonies, he contrasts *life* with its distractions, its interests and seductions, which may lead to lukewarmness and unfaithfulness, as in the case of Demas.—The second pair: *angels* and *principalities*. Undoubtedly *principalities*, ἀρχαί, might be regarded as an order of angels superior to common angels—archangels. But in the other pairs there is always found a contrast of character: it is

[1] D E F G, It.: αγγιλος instead of αγγιλοι.

[2] T. R., with K L, Syr^sch, here puts ουτι δυναμεις (*powers*).

[3] ℵ A B C D E F G, It. here put ουτι δυναμεις.

therefore natural to apply these two terms to spirits of opposite kinds; the first to *good* angels (though this sense is not exclusively the meaning of ἄγγελοι, as Meyer alleges; comp. 1 Cor. iv. 9 and vi. 3); the second to malignant angels, as 1 Cor. xv. 24 and Eph. vi. 12 (Hofmann). It will be asked how good angels could labour to separate us from Christ; but this may only be a hypothesis like that of Gal. i. 8. And may not what is of itself good contribute to lead us astray, if our attachment or admiration stops short at the creature, instead of rising to God?—The Byzs. here read a third term almost synonymous: δυνάμεις, *powers*; and a Mj. (C) with some Mnn. even adds a fourth: ἐξουσίαι, *dominations*. This last term is evidently an interpolation to form a pair with the third. As to the latter, according to the Mjj. of the other two families, it has its place, if it is really authentic, after the following pair.—Third pair: *things present* and *things to come*. The first term embraces all earthly eventualities, death included; the second, all that await us in the future life. The word ἐνεστῶτα, which strictly signifies what is *imminent*, when contrasted with *things to come*, takes the meaning: all that is already *present*.—If the term *powers* is authentic, it must be taken as embracing in one idea the two terms of the following pair: *height* and *depth*. These are all the powers of the invisible world, whether those which exalt us to the third heaven (*height*), but which in an instant, by reason of pride or even violently excited sensuality, may occasion the most frightful falls to the poor human heart; or those which plunge us into the most mysterious and unspeakable agonies (*depth*), like that of Jesus at Gethsemane, when He exclaimed: "My soul is sorrowful even unto death;" comp. what He added soon after: "This is your hour and *the power of darkness*." It is scarcely necessary to refute the following interpretations which have been proposed: good fortune and bad; or honour and disgrace; the wisdom of heretics and vulgar prejudices (Mel.); the heights from which martyrs were precipitated, and the depths of the ocean where they were buried (Thomas Aquinas); or finally, the opposite dimensions of *space* (Meyer).—The last term, κτίσις ἑτέρα, is usually translated by the expression: *any other creature*, and made a sort of *et cætera*. This meaning would certainly be

rather poor after expressions of such ample comprehension as those which precede. But more than that, it hardly suits the word ἕτερα, which signifies *different*, and not merely *other*, as the word ἄλλη would do (for the distinction between these two adjectives, comp. 1 Cor. xv. 37–41). It seems, then, that the word κτίσις signifies here, not *creature*, as if the reference were to a particular being, to be put side by side with several others, but *creation*. Paul sees in thought this whole creation disappear, on the theatre of which there has been wrought the greatest wonder of divine love; and he asks whether, if a new creation arise, and more magnificent marvels are displayed before the eyes of man, the cross in those new ages will not run the risk of being eclipsed, and the love of God in Jesus Christ of being relegated to the oblivion of the past. And he boldly affirms that whatever new creations may succeed one another, the first place in the heart of believers will ever remain for the redeeming love of which they have been the object here below.—Paul here speaks of the love of Jesus as being the love of God Himself; for it is in the former that the latter is incarnated for us, and becomes the eternal anchor of which our faith lays hold for eternity; comp. v. 15 and Luke xv., where the compassion of God is completely identified with the work of Jesus on the earth.

Nowhere has the feeling of St. Paul been displayed in such overflowing measure, and yet the thread of logical deduction is not broken for an instant. This passage sums up, as we have seen, all that Paul has hitherto expounded in this Epistle. He leaves us at the end of this chapter face to face with this divinely wrought salvation, which is complete, and assured, and founded on faith alone, to be apprehended, and ever apprehended anew by the same means. Then, after a moment of contemplation and rest, he takes us again by the hand to guide us to the theatre of history, and show us this divine work unfolding itself on a great scale in the human race.

SECOND PART.—SUPPLEMENTARY.

CHAPS. IX.–XI.

THE REJECTION OF THE JEWS.

In stating the theme which he proposed to discuss (i. 16 and 17), the apostle had introduced an element of a historical nature which he could not fail to develope at some point or other of his treatise. It was this: "to the Jew *first*, and also to the Greek." In what relation did salvation, as set forth in his Gospel, stand to those two great sections of the human race looked at from the standpoint of its religious development? And particularly, how did it happen that the Jewish people, to whom salvation was destined in the first place, showed themselves the most rebellious to this final revelation of divine mercy? Did not the fact give rise to a grave objection to the truth of the gospel itself, and to the Messiahship ascribed to the person of Jesus by the new faith? A Jew might reason thus: Either the gospel is true and Jesus really the Messiah,—but in this case the divine promises formerly made to this Jewish people who reject the Messiah and His salvation are nullified;—or Israel is and remains for ever, as should be the case in virtue of its election, the people of God, and in this case the gospel must be false and Jesus an impostor. Thus the dilemma seemed to be: Either to affirm God's faithfulness to His own election and deny the gospel, or to affirm the gospel, but give the lie to the divine election and faithfulness.

The apostle must have found this problem in his way every time he bore testimony to the gospel of Christ; and his demonstration of salvation by faith without the law would have contained a grave omission, if it had not presented a solution suitable to the nature of God of the greatest enigma in history: the *rejection* of the *elect* people.

Generally, when a new doctrine presents itself, after demonstrating its intrinsic truth, it has a double task to discharge to mankind whom it professes to save—(1) to prove that it is capable of realizing what *ought to be*, moral good; this Paul

has done by showing, chaps. vi.–viii., that the doctrine of justification by faith (expounded chaps. i.–v.) was capable of producing holiness; (2) to demonstrate that it can account satisfactorily for *what has been*, for history; this the apostle proceeds to do, chaps. ix.–xi.

The domain upon which the apostle here enters is one of the most difficult and profound which can be presented to the mind of man. It is that of *theodicy*, or the justification of the divine government in the course of human affairs. But he does not enter on it as a philosopher, and in its totality; he treats it in relation to a special point, the problem of the lot of Israel, and he does so as a part of his apostolic task.

There are two ways in which mistakes have been committed in expounding the thought of Paul in this passage. Some have taken it as a dogmatic and general statement of the doctrine of *election*, as an element of Christian teaching. This view finds its refutation in the entire course of this great exposition, in which the apostle constantly reverts to the people of Israel, the antecedents of their history (ix. 6 et seq.), the prophecies concerning them (ix. 27–29 and x. 19–21), and their present and future destiny (see the whole of chap. xi., and particularly the conclusion, vv. 25–31). It is therefore a problem of history and not of doctrine, strictly speaking, which he proposes to treat. Calvin himself is perfectly aware of this. Here is the dilemma which, according to him, St. Paul resolved in these chapters: "Either God is unfaithful to His promises (in regard to the Jews), or Jesus whom Paul preaches is not the Lord's Christ particularly promised to that people."

The other erroneous point of view in regard to these chapters is to take them as intended to reconcile the Judeo-Christian majority of the church of Rome to the apostle's mission to the Gentiles (Baur, Mangold, Holsten, Lipsius, with various shades). Weizsäcker, in his excellent work on the primitive Roman church,[1] asks with reason why, if the apostle was addressing Judeo-Christians, he should designate the Jews, ix. 3, "as *his* brethren," and not rather "as *our* brethren;" and how it is that in xi. 1 he alleges as a proof of the fact that all Israel is not rejected, only his own conversion and not

[1] *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, 1876, p. 257 et seq.

that of his readers. He likewise demonstrates beyond dispute, in our opinion, that in the passage, xi. 13, the words: "I speak unto you, Gentiles," are necessarily addressed to the whole church, not merely to a portion of the Christians of Rome (see on this passage). If it is so, it is impossible to hold that, addressing himself to former Gentiles, Paul should think himself obliged to demonstrate in three long chapters the legitimacy of his mission among the Gentiles. No; it is not his mission, and still less his person, which Paul means to defend when he traces this vast scheme of the ways of God; it is God Himself and His work in mankind by the gospel. He labours to dissipate the shadow which might be thrown on the character of God or the truth of the gospel by the unbelief of the elect people. The Tübingen school commits the same mistake in regard to this part of our Epistle as in regard to the Book of the Acts. This latter writing it views in general as the product of an ecclesiastical piece of management, intended to accredit Paul's person and ministry among Christians of Jewish origin, while it is meant to demonstrate by a simple statement of facts the painstaking and faithful manner in which God has proceeded toward His ancient people in the foundation of the church. Comp. besides, that remarkable passage in the Gospel of John, xii. 37–43, in which this apostle takes a general survey of the fact of Jewish unbelief, immediately after describing its development, and seeks to fathom its causes. This, indeed, was one of the most important questions at the period of the foundation of the church. In this question there was concentrated the subject of the connection between the two revelations.

How, at a given point in time, can God reject those whom He has elected? Is the fact possible? The apostle resolves this problem by putting himself successively at three points of view—1. That of God's absolute *liberty* in regard to every alleged *acquired* right, upon Him, on man's part; this is the subject of chap. ix. 2. That of the legitimacy of the *use* which God has made of His liberty in the case in question; such is the subject of chap. x., where Paul shows that Israel by their want of understanding drew upon themselves the lot which has overtaken them. 3. That of the *utility* of this so unexpected measure; this forms the subject of chap. xi.,

where the beneficent consequences of Israel's rejection down to their glorious final result are unfolded.—This passage does not contain a complete philosophy of history; but it is the finest specimen, and, so to speak, the masterpiece of this science.

TWENTY-FIRST PASSAGE (IX. 1-29).

The Liberty of God in regard to the Election of Israel.

The apostle opens this passage with a preface expressing the profound grief he feels in view of the mysterious fact which is about to occupy him (vv. 1–5); then he shows how the liberty of God is set in its full light by the theocratical antecedents (vv. 6–13), and by the most unequivocal scriptural declarations (vv. 14–24); and finally, he calls to mind that the use which God is now making of this liberty in relation to the Jews, was clearly foretold (vv. 25–29). This last idea forms the transition to the following passage, which refers to the legitimacy of the application which God has made to the Jews of His sovereign right (chap. x.). Chap. x. ought strictly to begin at ver. 30 of chap. ix.

Vv. 1–5.

Paul expresses all the intensity of his grief on account of his people (vv. 1–3), and he justifies it by the magnificent prerogatives wherewith this unique people had been honoured (vv. 4 and 5).

Vv. 1, 2. "*I say the truth in Christ, I lie not, my conscience bearing me witness in the Holy Ghost, that I have a great grief and a continual lamentation in my heart.*"—No connecting particle joins this part to the preceding. The *asyndeton* is here, as always, the evidence of a lively emotion which breaks, so to speak, the logical bond; but this form attests at the same time with all the more energy the profound relation of feeling which unites this piece to the preceding. And is it not in fact one and the same feeling in the two contrasted aspects, that emotion of triumphant joy expressed at the end of the previous chapter, when, after conducting poor condemned

and lost creatures through the righteousness of faith and sanctification by the Spirit, he has brought them to the threshold of glory,—and the grief which he feels at seeing his Israel loved above all, yet deprived of such blessings? He has just been following a people of elect and glorified ones rising from the midst of fallen humanity, and Israel is wanting from among the number! There is between these two parts a bitter contemplation in which the misery of rejected Israel appears to him like the sombre reverse of the incomparable blessedness of the faithful who are adopted in Jesus Christ.—The apostle does not pronounce the word which expresses the cause of his grief. It is not an oversight, as Reuss thinks; but it costs him too much to pronounce the fatal word; every reader will divine it from his very silence. —The words: *in Christ,* must be joined to the preceding: *I speak the truth,* and not to what follows: *I lie not.* To make Paul say: "in Christ I lie not," would be to put into his mouth a poor commonplace. Ver. 2, and especially ver. 3, will tell what the fact is which he is concerned to affirm so solemnly. —A man, even a truthful man, may exaggerate his own feelings; but in the eyes of Paul there is something so holy in Christ, that in the pure and luminous atmosphere of His felt presence no lie, and not even any exaggeration, is possible. The parenthesis following: "I lie not" . . ., might be taken as a second declaration in a negative form, parallel to the affirmation which precedes. But it is difficult in this case to understand what the testimony of *his conscience* and of the *Holy Spirit* can add to the security already given by the words *in Christ.* It seems to me, then, that this parenthesis should be regarded as a confirmation of those first words themselves: "I do not lie in affirming that it is *under the view of Christ* that I declare what I there say." It is therefore on this declaration: "I speak in the communion of Christ," that the testimony of his conscience bears; and even this testimony, as too human, does not suffice. Paul declares that he feels at the same instant, through the Holy Spirit, the whole intimacy of this communion. The *σύν, with,* in the verb *συμμαρτυρεῖν, to testify with,* signifies: in concert with my own declaration. "In the mouth of two or three witnesses shall every word be established;" it seems as if Paul wished to confirm his

affirmation by a double testimony, that of his conscience and that of the Holy Spirit. Why so much solemnity in entering on his subject? We understand the reason when we think what he has in view: the rejection of Israel. Was he not the man whom the Jews accused of being moved in his whole work by a spirit of hostility to his people? But here is the expression of his real feelings attested by all he counts sacred, however extraordinary what he is about to say (ver. 3) may appear.

Ver. 2. Vv. 2 and 3 contain the matter of that *truth* so solemnly announced in ver. 1. The parallelism of the two propositions of the verse, as always, is the indication of a rising feeling. A triple gradation has been remarked between the two propositions. First, between the two subjects: λύπη, *grief*, which denotes an inward sadness; ὀδύνη, *lamentation*, which refers to the violent outburst of grief, though it should only be inwardly; then a gradation between the two epithets μεγάλη, *great*, and ἀδιάλειπτος, *continual*: it is so *intense* that it accompanies *all* the moments of his life; finally, between the two regimens μοι, *to me*, and τῇ καρδίᾳ μου, *to my heart*, the latter term denoting the deepest spring of the emotions of the *me*.—Here still Paul leaves us to read between the lines the tragical word which expresses the cause of this grief.

Ver. 3. "*For I could wish that myself*[1] *were anathema away from*[2] *Christ for my brethren, my kinsmen according to the flesh.*"—This inward fact is the proof of the intensity of the feeling expressed in ver. 2 (*for*); and it is to this almost incredible fact that the exceptional affirmations of ver. 1 applied.—The imperfect indicative ηὐχόμην, literally, *I was wishing*, has in Greek the force of throwing this wish into the past, and into a past which remains always unfinished, so that this expression takes away from the wish all possibility of realization.[3] The meaning therefore is: "I should wish, if such a desire could be realized." If the apostle had meant to

[1] T. R. reads, with C K L, Syr[sch], αὐτος ἐγω before ἀνάθεμα εἶναι, while all the rest put it after.

[2] D E G: ὑπο instead of ἀπο.

[3] Curtius, *Schulgramm.* § 109 and 110: "The indicative of the historical tenses expresses the contrast to reality in those *desires* which are to be expressly designated as impossible to be fulfilled; thus ἠβουλόμην, 'I should like certainly, but it cannot be.'"

speak of a wish really formed by him, though under certain conditions, he would have expressed this idea by the present optative εὐχοίμην, or by the aorist εὐξαίμην with ἄν (Acts xxvi. 29); comp. Gal. iv. 20, and also Acts xxv. 22 (where Agrippa expresses his desire, while stating it as unrealizable, that he might not have the appearance of encroaching on the authority of Festus). It is from not understanding or applying the meaning of the Greek imperfect indicative that recourse has been had to so many unnatural explanations, intended to spare the apostle a wish which seemed to have in it something offensive to Christian feeling. Thus the interpretation of the *Itala* (*optabam*), Ambrosiaster, Pelagius, the *Vulgate*, Luther, Chalmers: "*I wished* (formerly when in my blind fanaticism I persecuted the church of Christ)." The apostle would, on this view, be recalling the fact that it was his ardent love for his people which had then driven him away from the Christ (who had appeared in Jesus). But it is not of what he was formerly, it is of what he is now, as the *apostle of the Gentiles*, that Paul wishes to bear testimony; and that the expression: *far from Christ*, may prove the strength of his love to Israel, the testimony must go forth from a heart which has recognised Jesus as the Christ, and is able to appreciate Him at His proper value. Finally, some indication or other of the time when he formed this wish would have been necessary (ποτέ, *formerly*, vii. 9).—Some English expositors, among the last Morison and Tregelles, have made the first half of ver. 3 a parenthesis, and joined the end of the verse "for my brethren" . . ., with ver. 2.[1] What Paul, according to this view, meant to express by the wish, was the profound misery of Israel, a misery in which he himself also was formerly involved. But Morison has withdrawn this explanation, which is really inadmissible, and he now proposes to translate: *I might desire* (to go all that length).[2] The examples which he quotes to justify this meaning appear to me insufficient, and the idea itself lacks precision. Finally, Lange, after Michaelis, has made a still more unfortunate attempt. He translates: "I made a vow," and explains it of an engagement, accom-

[1] Morison, *An Exposition of the Ninth Chapter of Paul's Epistle to the Romans*, 1849.

[2] *The Expositor*, September 1877.

panied no doubt with an imprecation, which he took, it is held, at the hands of the high priest when he was preparing to set out to Damascus, there to persecute the Christians (Acts ix. 2). He undertook in some way or other, at the peril of his Messianic blessedness, to save Judaism by extirpating the heresy. To set aside such an explanation it is enough to point to the imperfect *ηὐχόμην*, which would require, since the matter in question is a positive fact, to be replaced by the aorist *ηὐξάμην*, or at least accompanied with some kind of chronological definition.—It need not be asked how this vow could ever be realized. Paul himself declares that it is an impossibility; but if its accomplishment depended only on his love, he would certainly express such a wish before the Lord.

The word *ἀνάθεμα, anathema*, from *ἀνατίθημι, to expose, to set in view*, always denotes an object consecrated to God. But this consecration may have in view either its preservation as a pious offering in a sanctuary (*donaria*)—in this case the LXX. and the N. T. use the form *ἀνάθημα*, for example 2 Macc. v. 16, and Luke xxi. 5,—or it may be carried out by the destruction of the consecrated object, as in the case of the *ban* (*chérem*); the LXX. and the N. T. prefer in that sense using the form *ἀνάθεμα* (for example, Josh. vii. 12; Gal. i. 8, 9; 1 Cor. xvi. 22). This distinction between the two forms of the word did not exist in classic Greek.—The expression is so strong, especially with the regimen *ἀπὸ Χριστοῦ, away from Christ*, that it is impossible to apply it either, with Grotius, to ecclesiastical excommunication, or, with Jerome, to a violent death inflicted by Christ (substituting *ὑπό, by*, for *ἀπό, far from*). Paul has evidently in mind the breaking of the bond which unites him to Christ as his Saviour. He would consent, if it were possible, to fall back again for ever into the state of *condemnation* in which he lived before his conversion, if by the sacrifice of his salvation he could bring about the conversion of his people Israel. The words: *away from Christ*, express the bitterness that such an anathema would have for his heart; and yet he would face it, if it were possible thus to exchange lots with his people. Here is, as it were, the paroxysm of patriotic devotion. The pronoun *myself*, if placed, as in the Byz. text, before the term: *to be anathema*, sets Paul in contrast to the Jews who are really in this state: "I should *myself*

like to be anathema (rather than they)." But if, with the other documents, it be placed after the words: *to be anathema*, it serves to contrast the real with the alleged Paul, who was made the mortal enemy of the Jews in consequence of the mission which he carried out among the Gentiles: "to be anathema *myself*, I who am represented as the despiser of my nation, and who have in fact the sad mission of consecrating the divorce between Israel and her God!" To the notion of *spiritual* and theocratic *kinship* denoted by the title *brethren*, the expression: *kinsmen according to the flesh*, adds the idea of natural human kinship by *blood* and *nationality*.

Vv. 4 and 5 are intended to justify the wish expressed in ver. 3, by declaring the glorious prerogatives which are fitted to render this people supremely precious to a truly Israelitish heart.

Ver. 4. "*Who are Israelites; to whom pertaineth the adoption, and the glory, and the covenants,*[1] *and the giving of the law and the service, and the promises.*"[2]—The pronoun *οἵτινες, who*, characterizes them in the context as persons for whom it would be worth while to accept even damnation.—The name *Israelites* is the name of honour belonging to the people; it is a title resting on the glorious fact related Gen. xxxii. 28. It contains all the prerogatives which follow.—These prerogatives are enumerated in ver. 4, to the number of six, all connected by *καί, and*, a form expressing rising exaltation of feeling.—*Υἱοθεσία, the adoption:* Israel is always represented as the Lord's *son* or *first-born* among all peoples, Ex. iv. 22; Deut. xiv. 1; Hos. xi. 1.—*Δόξα, the glory:* this term does not at all express, as Reuss thinks, *the final glory* of the kingdom of God; for this glory belongs to the Gentiles as well as to the Jews. The term is here taken in the special sense which it often has in the O. T.: *the visible*, luminous *appearance* of the Lord's presence, Ex. xxiv. 16, xxix. 43; 1 Kings viii. 11; Ezek. i. 28. The Rabbins had invented a particular term to denote this glorious appearance, the name *shekinah*, from *schakan, to dwell.*—*Διαθῆκαι, the covenants:* this word denotes the numerous covenants concluded by God with the patriarchs. The reading of some MSS.: *the covenant*, is a faulty correction.

[1] B D E F G read ἡ διαθηκη instead of αἱ διαθηκαι.
[2] D E F G read ἡ επαγγελια instead of αἱ επαγγελιαι.

What led to it was the term: *the old covenant.*—*Νομοθεσία, the giving of the law:* this term embraces along with the gift of the law itself, the solemn promulgation of it on Mount Sinai; comp. the saying of the psalmist, cxlvii. 20: "He hath not dealt so with any nation."—*Λατρεία, the service* (*cultus*), this is the sum-total of the Levitical services instituted by the law.—*Ἐπαγγελίαι, the promises:* this term carries our view from past benefits to the still greater blessings to come, which God promised to His people. The reading: *the promise,* in the Greco-Latin, is also an erroneous correction.

Ver. 5. "*Whose are the fathers, and of whom, as concerning the flesh, Christ came, who is over all, God blessed for ever, amen.*"—To blessings of an impersonal nature Paul adds, as crowning them, the gifts which consist in living persons, and which either preceded the above or followed them; such are *the patriarchs,* from whom the people sprang, and who are as it were its root; and *the Messiah,* who sprang from the people, and who is as it were its flower.—The first proposition literally signifies: "whose (Israelites') are the fathers," that is to say, to whom the fathers belong as national property. The heroes of a people are regarded by it as its most precious treasure.—But the apostle is careful not to apply the same form to the Messiah, which would signify that the Christ is the property of the Jews. He says here *ἐξ ὧν, from the midst of whom.* He proceeds from them as to origin, but He does not belong to them exclusively as to His destination. The antithesis between the two forms *ὧν, whose,* and *ἐξ ὧν, from among whom,* is certainly intentional.—But while fully recognising that the Christ comes from the Jews, the apostle is well aware that this mode of origin refers only to the human and phenomenal side of His person; and hence he immediately adds: *as to the flesh.* This expression should evidently be taken in the same sense as in ver. 3; for here as there the matter in question is a relation of filiation or origin. The term *flesh* therefore embraces *the human nature* in its totality; and it is a mistake to seek here the contrast between the *flesh* and the *spirit, σάρξ* and *πνεῦμα.* We find this same meaning of the word *flesh* again in ver. 8, where the human sonship is opposed to the divine (by faith in the promise). It is also in the same sense that John says (i. 14): "The Word was made flesh."

The antithesis to the word *flesh* in all these cases is not *spirit*, but *God;* comp. Gal. i. 16: "I conferred not with flesh and blood" (men in contrast to God); Matt. xxiv. 22; Rom. iii. 20; 1 Cor. i. 29, etc. The contrast is not, therefore, altogether the same in this passage as in i. 3 and 4. There, the point was the antithesis between the flesh and the spirit in the person of Jesus Himself; here, it is the contrast between His *divine* origin (which was implied already in viii. 3) and His *human*, and more especially His Israelitish origin.

Many commentators close the sentence with the words: *according to the flesh* (Seml., Fritzs., Ew., van Heng., Meyer, Baur, Tischendorf, 8th edition). In that case it only remains to take the following words as an exclamation of thanksgiving to the praise of the God who has so highly privileged Israel; so Oltramare translates: "Let Him who is over all things, God, be therefore blessed for ever! Amen." The epithet: ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων, *who is above all things*, or *above all*, would require to be regarded as paraphrasing the term παντοκράτωρ, *the universal sovereign*, by which the LXX. often render *Schaddaï*, *the All-powerful;* comp. 2 Cor. vi. 18; Rev. i. 8, iv. 8. This thanksgiving in the context would apply either to the sovereign freedom with which God distributes His gifts to whom He pleases, or to His providence, which, always extending to all, favours one people only, with the view of bringing to Himself all the rest. On the other hand, it is impossible not to be surprised at a conclusion so abrupt and negative in form, at least as to sense, of an enumeration so magnificent as the preceding; for there is evidently a limitation and, so to speak, a negation in the words: *as concerning the flesh.* They signify: "*At least* as concerning the flesh." This restriction goes in the teeth of the feeling which has inspired the whole passage thus far. It is a descent which, after the gradual ascent of the preceding lines, closes it with startling abruptness. Still more, the burst of gratitude which on this explanation would inspire this doxology, would be out of all harmony with the impression of profound grief which forms the basis of the whole passage. In fact, the privileges enumerated have been heaped up thus only to justify this painful impression; and here is the apostle all at once breaking out into a song of praise because

of those advantages which Israel have rendered unavailing by their unbelief! (comp. Gess). If, besides, the participle *ὁ ὤν, who is,* referred to a subject not mentioned in the previous proposition (God), this transition from one subject to another would require to be indicated in some way, either by the addition of a *δέ, now,* as in xvi. 25, Jude ver. 24, etc., or by giving a turn to the sentence such as this: *τῷ ἐπὶ πάντων Θεῷ, τῷ εὐλογημένῳ . . . δόξα,* "to God ever blessed be glory!" comp. xi. 36; or simply: *εὐλογητὸς ὁ Θεός,* as in 2 Cor. i. 3; Eph. i. 3. In his truly classical dissertation on this passage,[1] Hermann Schultz vigorously developes the argument often alleged against the interpretation which we are examining, that the participle *εὐλογημένος, blessed,* would require to be placed not after, but before the substantive *Θεός, God.* The usage is, that in forms of thanksgiving the first word proceeding from the heart of the grateful worshipper is the term *blessed,* and that this word precedes the name of God; comp. in the LXX. Gen. ix. 26 and xiv. 20; Ps. xviii. 46; xxviii. 6, xxxi. 21, xli. 13, lxvi. 20, lxviii. 35, lxxii. 18, 19, lxxxix. 52, etc.; and in the N. T. Matt. xxiii. 39; Mark xi. 9; Luke i. 68, xiii. 35, xix. 38; 2 Cor. i. 3; Eph. i. 3; 1 Pet. i. 3. The only exception which can be quoted would be Ps. lxviii. 19, if the text of the LXX. were not probably corrupted in this passage, and if especially the verb to be understood were not the indicative *ἐστί, is,* instead of the imperative *ἔστω, let Him be;* comp. ver. 34. Finally, it is difficult to understand in our passage the object of the participle *ὤν* (*who is,* who is *really*) applied to God; the form *ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων Θεός* (without *ὤν*) would have been perfectly clear; and Paul could not have any reason for insisting in speaking of God on the *reality* of the divine sovereignty. For he was not concerned to combat idolatry, as in chap. i. for example.

Erasmus, who first proposed to end the period after *σάρκα* (*flesh*), had likewise put the question whether the sentence might not close with the word *πάντων* (*all things,* or *all*): "of whom is the Christ according to the flesh, who is over all things; God be blessed for ever and ever!" Is this construction better than the preceding? Meyer thinks not. It

[1] *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie,* 1868.

seems to me that in the matter of improbability they are on a par. Yet the latter at least gives a more or less suitable conclusion to the proposition relative to the Christ. These last words: "who is over all," applied to Christ, contain up to a certain point the antithesis which we were led to expect from the restriction: *as concerning the flesh;* and by proclaiming the supreme dignity of the Christ, they bring out, as the context demands, the exceptional prerogative granted to the people of which He is a member. It would also be somewhat easier to explain the form of ὁ ὤν, *who is,* than on the previous construction. For the application to Christ of the idea of universal sovereignty might require this word ὤν, *who is really.* But independently of several difficulties which attach to the preceding explanation, and which remain in this one, there are new difficulties which belong to it, and which render it, if possible, still more inadmissible. The words: *who is over all things,* are not the natural antithesis of these: *as concerning the flesh.* The latter referred to origin; the former point only to position. Then, as Meyer observes, the doxology comes on us with intolerable abruptness: "God be blessed for ever and ever!" And more than all, the sole reason which would make it possible to explain to a certain extent the position of the participle εὐλογημένος (*blessed*) after Θεός (*God*), contrary to the uniform usage of the sacred writers, is wholly lost; for this displacement can only arise (see Meyer) from the forcible description of *God* in the words: *who is over all things.*[1]

The entire primitive church seems to have had no hesitation as to the meaning to be given to our passage; comp. Irenæus, Tertullian, Origen, Chrysostom, Augustine, Jerome, Theodoret; later, Luther, Calvin, Beza, Tholuck, Usteri, Olshausen, Philippi, Gess, Ritschl, Hofmann, Weiss, Delitzsch, Schultz. In fact, in writing the restriction: τὸ κατὰ σάρκα, *as concerning the flesh,* Paul had evidently in view this peculiarity: that the Christ was something else and more than a Jew, and it is with this unparalleled fact that he rightly concludes the enumeration of Israel's prerogatives. No doubt the

[1] We need not point out the weakness of this reason alleged by Meyer to justify his own explanation; but it is certain that the difficulty tells with twofold force against the second construction.

words: *who is over all things*, express in a certain measure the naturally expected idea of the supreme greatness of the Christ; but they are not enough for the apostle's object. For, if they connect themselves with the ἐξ ὧν, *from the midst of whom*, contrasting the *universal* supremacy of the Christ with His *national* origin, they bear no relation whatever to the still narrower restriction: *as concerning the flesh*. Now this latter leads us also to expect its antithesis, which appears only in the title *God*. This word is therefore the legitimate conclusion of the whole passage, as it forms its culminating point. Scripture frequently contrasts, as we have seen, *flesh* (human nature in its weakness) *with God;* comp. Isa. xxxi. 3. And if it is certain that Paul recognises in the divine being who appeared in Jesus the creator of all things (1 Cor. viii. 6; Col. i. 16, 17), the Jehovah of the O. T. who led the people in the cloud (1 Cor. x. 4), who before coming on the earth was *in the form of God* (Phil. ii. 6 et seq.), is it strange that he should have sometimes given the name of God to such a being, and that he should have done so especially in such a passage as this, where he is feeling in all its bitterness the contrast between the transcendent greatness of the gifts bestowed on Israel and the sad result in which they have terminated? It seems to us difficult to avoid seeing in the benediction which follows the words: "who is God over all things," an expression of homage rendered to this God-Christ, and intended to wipe out the dishonour cast on Him by Jewish unbelief, as in chap. i. the form of adoration, pronounced in ver. 25, was a way of protesting against the outrage inflicted on the true God by Gentile idolatry.

But it is precisely because of this word *God* that objections are raised to the application of such utterances to the person of Christ. It is objected that nowhere else does Paul designate Jesus in this way (Meyer), and that even in 1 Cor. viii. 6, Christ, as only *Lord*, is expressly distinguished from the *Father*, as the one *God* (Reuss). It is added, that by the words: *over all things*, Christ would seem to be placed above God Himself, or at least made equal to the supreme God. —Suppose this passage were really the only one in which Jesus receives the name of God from Paul, is it not the same with John, in whose writings this name is not given to Christ

confessedly more than once or twice (i. 1, xx. 28)? As to the general question, I am unwilling to give judgment from the various passages which are alleged by many commentators with the view of proving that Paul has given Jesus the name of God, Θεός, more than once. I have carefully weighed the reasons of those who deny the fact; and yet, after reading and re-reading Eph. v. 5 and Tit. ii. 13, I always come back to the first conviction which the Greek construction produces, viz. that Paul in these passages really meant to designate the Christ as Θεός. But this discussion would be out of place here, and could not in any case lead to an absolutely conclusive result.—As to the doxologies of the N. T., besides those of Revelation, which are addressed to the Lamb as well as to God, there is that of 2 Tim. iv. 13, which indisputably applies to Christ, and which must be assigned to St. Paul unless we deny to him the whole Epistle.—Let us add, that it would be wholly false to depend here on the rule (the correctness of which I do not examine), that when in the N. T. Christ is called Θεός, *God*, it is in every case without the article, and that the designation ὁ Θεός is reserved for the one God *and Father*. This rule does not apply to the case before us, for the article ὁ belongs not to the word Θεός, but to the participle ὤν. If Paul had meant here to use the form ὁ Θεός in application to God, he would have required to write: ὁ ὢν ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων Θεός. We have therefore the form Θεός without the article, as in John i. 1, that is to say, as a simple grammatical predicate.

Against our explanation Reuss with great assurance opposes 1 Cor. viii. 6. The reasoning of this critic may be valid against those who refuse to admit the subordination of the Son to the Father. But for those who prefer the true thought of Scripture to a theological formula, ancient, no doubt, but yet human, this argument does not affect them. The distinction between *the God and Father* and the God-Christ is in their eyes a perfectly established fact. And if there is nothing to hinder God the Father from frequently receiving the name Κύριος, *Lord*, neither is there anything to prevent the Lord Christ from receiving in certain cases the name Θεός, *God* (see Hofmann on this point).

The most singular objection is that which is taken from the words: *over all things* (or *over all*). Meyer says: "To all this

there is added the insurmountable difficulty that Christ would not be simply called God, but *God over all;* which would designate Him the Θεὸς παντοκράτωρ, the *sovereign* God, and would contradict the general view maintained in the N. T. of the dependence of the Son in relation to the Father." Meyer argues as if ἐπὶ πάντων, *over all things,* was descriptive of the word Θεός, *God,* and here denoted the being called God as the *supreme* God. But what does he say himself two pages farther on: "ἐπί, *over,* denotes *government over all things.*" The *over all things,* according to Meyer himself, is not at all a determination of the word Θεός. We must not, as his objection assumed, connect ἐπὶ πάντων with Θεός, but with the participle ὤν, a word which otherwise would be unmeaning there: "He who is *exalted over* all things, as God blessed for ever." Comp. Matt. xviii. 28. It is understood, of course, that to this πάντων, *all things,* the exception applies which is stated 1 Cor. xv. 27: "He is excepted which did put all things under Him." How could God be included in the πάντα, *all things?*

Gess, while holding with us that the conclusion of the verse applies to Christ, divides it into three clauses, placing a first comma after πάντων, and a second after Θεός, "who is above all things, (is) God, (is) blessed" . . .; so that Paul is taken to affirm three things of Christ: first, that He is appointed universal sovereign; next, that He is God; finally, —as follows from the two previous terms,—that He is for ever adored and blessed. I cannot agree with this explanation. The epithet *blessed* is too directly connected with the term *God* to be thus separated from it; and the expression: *God blessed,* seems, as well as the ἐπὶ πάντων, to be the attribute of the participle ὤν, and intended to form with this latter the complete antithesis to the restriction: *as to the flesh.* Besides, this breaking up of the proposition into three parallel clauses seems to me contrary to the gush of feeling which dictates this whole conclusion. Nearly the same reasons may be urged against the punctuation proposed by Hofmann (a comma after πάντων): "who is over all things, (who is) God blessed for ever."

Schultz, after demonstrating with the tone of a master the necessity of applying this whole conclusion (from the word *flesh*) to Jesus Christ, insists notwithstanding on this point:

that according to Paul's view this affirmation of Christ's divinity applies only to Jesus *glorified* (from the date of His exaltation at the close of His earthly life). Christ would thus be called God only in an inferior sense, as man raised to universal sovereignty. Three reasons render this explanation inadmissible—1. Paul requires to complete the idea of the Israelitish *origin* of Jesus by that of a higher *origin*. The matter in question, therefore, is not His *exaltation*, but His divine *pre-existence*. 2. The passages of the Epistles to the Corinthians, to the Colossians, and to the Philippians, which explain this name Θεός, *God*, relate to Christ before His incarnation, and not to Christ glorified by His ascension. 3. From the standpoint of biblical monotheism *to become* God, without *being* so by nature, is a monstrosity.

It seems to us, therefore, beyond doubt that Paul here points, as the crown of all the prerogatives granted to Israel, to their having produced for the world the Christ, who now, exalted above all things, is God blessed for ever.

It only remains to say a word about the term πάντων. Some translate: *all*, and understand either all *men*, or all the *servants* of God under the O. T.; others understand by the term *all things*, and apply it either to all the prerogatives bestowed on Israel, or to the universe in its entirety. This last meaning seems to us the most natural and the most agreeable to the context. What can form a people's supreme title to honour, if not the fact of having given to the world the universal monarch?

And yet such prerogatives did not exempt the Israelitish nation from the possibility of a rejection. In the very history of this people so peculiarly blessed there were antecedents fitted to put them on their guard against this terrible danger. This is the point the apostle brings out in the following passage, vv. 6–13, borrowing from Israelitish history two facts which prove that from the beginnings of this people God has proceeded by way of exclusion in regard to an entire portion of the elect race. Thus, when Isaac alone received the character of the chosen *seed*, to the exclusion of Ishmael, son of Abraham though he also was, vv. 6–9; and again, when of Isaac's two sons Jacob was preferred, and his eldest rejected, vv. 10–13.

Vv. 6-13.

Vv. 6–9. "*Not as though the word of God were made of no effect; for they are not all Israel,*[1] *which are of Israel. Neither because they are the seed of Abraham, are they all children; but, 'In Isaac shall thy seed be called;' that is, they which are the children of the flesh, these are not the children of God; but the children of the promise are counted for the seed. For this is the word of promise, 'At this time will I return, and Sarah shall have a son.'*"—The δέ, *but*, between vv. 5 and 6, is strongly adversative: "But all those privileges, excellent as they were, could not assure to Israel what the word of God did not promise;" that the divine election should apply to all the children of Abraham according to the flesh.—As the form οὐχ οἷόν τε signifies: *it is not possible*, this meaning has been adopted here by Beza and others: "*But it is not possible that* the word of God should be of no effect;" which would imply that this word proclaimed the exclusion of the Jewish nation as inevitable, and that consequently this exclusion could not fail to come about some time or other. But the apostle does not go so far. In the demonstration which follows, he proves the *possibility* of the rejection of the mass of the people, but not its necessity; then οἷον has only the meaning of *it is possible*, when it is followed by the particle τε; and finally, when it has this meaning, the verb following is in the infinitive, whereas we have here the perfect ἐκπέπτωκεν. This meaning must therefore be given up, and we must abide by the ordinary signification of the word οἷος, *such that*: "The thing is not such that," that is to say, the rejection of Israel must not be so interpreted, that the word of God is thereby annulled. There is only a grammatical difficulty in the way of this explanation; that is the conjunction ὅτι, *that*, which intervenes between οἷον and the verb ἐκπέπτωκεν: such as *that* it has been annulled. This *that* was already contained in οἷον, and forms a pleonasm. It has been variously explained; it seems to me the simplest solution is to suppose that it depends on an idea understood: "such that *one might say* that" . . ., or: "that *it comes about* that" . . .—*The word of God* here denotes the promises by which Israel had been declared to be

[1] D E F G read Ισραηλιται instead of Ισραηλ.

the people of God,—promises which seemed to exclude the possibility of their rejection. Hofmann, followed in this case by Volkmar, interprets the transition from ver. 5 to ver. 6 somewhat differently. He applies the *οὐχ οἷον, not that the thing is such that*, to Paul's desire to be cast off for the love of his people, and gives to ver. 6 this meaning: "Not that my wish signifies that without the sacrifice of my salvation which I am ready to make, the promise of God to Abraham would be nullified." This meaning is more than forced. How could Paul suppose that the keeping of God's promise depends, even hypothetically, on the wish which he has expressed, especially when, in the very act of uttering it, he himself declares it to be impracticable? Holsten makes the *οὐχ οἷον* bear on the grief itself: "not that I distress myself as if the word of God were made of no effect." This is less inadmissible, but far from natural. Could Paul suppose it possible for God to give man occasion to weep over the forgetfulness of His promises? The verb *ἐκπίπτειν, to fall from*, denotes the non-realization of the promise, its being brought to nothing by facts. And it must be confessed that the present rejection of Israel would be a giving of the lie to the divine election, if all the individuals composing the people of Israel really belonged to Israel, in the profound sense of the word. But that is precisely what is not the case, as the apostle declares in the second part of the verse. In this proposition Meyer applies the second *Israel* to the person of the patriarch Jacob; the first, to the people descended from him. But it is not till later that Paul comes to Jacob personally. We must beware of destroying in this place the significant relation between the first and second *Israel*. The word is used both times collectively, and yet in two different applications. *They who are of Israel* denote all the members of the nation at a given moment, as descendants of the preceding generation. By the first words: *are not Israel*, Paul signalizes among the nation taken *en masse*, thus understood a *true* Israel, that elect people, that *holy remnant*, which is constantly spoken of in the O. T., and to which alone the decree of election refers, so that rejection may apply to the mass of *those who are of Israel*, without compromising the election of the *true Israel*.

This possibility of rejection for the mass of the people is

what is proved by the two following examples. And first, that of Isaac:

Ver. 7. The first proposition of this verse has almost the same meaning as the second of ver. 6, but with a different shade intimated by the particle *οὐδέ, neither further.* The apostle, by way of transition to the following discussion, vv. 8 and 9, for the expression: *which are of Israel,* substitutes *seed of Abraham.* For he is going to speak of the lot of Abraham's two sons, Ishmael and Isaac. Both were *seed of Abraham;* but they did not both for that reason deserve the title of *child.* This term, taken absolutely, combines the characteristic of a child of Abraham with that of a child of God; for the subject in question is evidently that of the true members of God's family.—The simple fact of descending from Abraham is so far from making a man *his child,* in this exalted sense, that God, on the contrary, excludes from the divine family every other descendant of Abraham than Isaac and his seed, when He says to Abraham, Gen. xxi. 12 (literally): "In Isaac shall thy seed be called." This last word evidently denotes the seed of Abraham properly so called, that which was to remain the depositary of the promise of salvation for the world. We might identify the person of Isaac with his seed, and understand the *ἐν, in,* in this sense: in the very person of Isaac (as containing in him all his descendants). The verb *καλεῖν, to call,* would be taken here, asin iv. 17, in the sense of: *to call into existence.* But as Isaac was already born, and as the verb *kara* refers rather to the *name* to be given, it is more natural to distinguish Isaac from the seed, to understand *καλεῖσθαι* in the sense of: *to bear the name of,* and to explain the *ἐν* in the sense of *through:* "By Isaac it is that the race shall be born who shall truly bear the name of *seed.*"

Ver. 8. In this verse Paul detaches the general principle from the particular fact which has just been cited. The *τουτέστι, that is,* exactly expresses his intention to derive from the historical fact the principle on which it rests. Ishmael's birth proceeded *from the flesh,* that is to say, had nothing in it except what was human. In Isaac's, God interposed with his promise; and it was from this divine promise, according to chap. iv., that Abraham by faith drew the strength which rendered him capable of becoming father of the promised seed.

In consequence of this higher element, only Isaac and his descendants can be regarded as *God's children.* This is what explains the second proposition of the verse, in which the name of the (promised) seed is expressly given to the descendants obtained by faith in the promise.—The first proposition of this verse implicitly legitimates the rejection of the Jews according to the flesh; the second, the adoption of the believing Gentiles.

Ver. 9. This verse is simply intended to justify the expression: *children of the promise,* ver. 8. When the apostle says: *a word of promise,* he means: a word which had the free character of a promise, and which did not in the least imply the recognition of a right. The quotation is a combination of vv. 10 and 14 of Gen. xviii. according to the LXX. The term: *at this time,* signifies: "Next year, at the moment when this same time (this same epoch) will return."

But could Isaac and his race, though proceeding from Abraham, and that through the intervention of a divine factor, be regarded without any other condition as real children of God? Evidently not; for if the faith of Abraham himself ceased to belong to them, they became again a purely carnal seed. It must then be foreseen that the same law of exclusion which had been applied to Ishmael, in favour of Isaac, would anew assert its right even within the posterity of the latter. This is what came about immediately, as is seen in the second example quoted by the apostle, that of Esau and Jacob.

Vv. 10–13. "*And not only this; but when Rebecca also had conceived by one, even by our father Isaac (for the children being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil,*[1] *that the purpose of God according to election*[2] *may stand, not of works, but of Him that calleth); it was said unto her, The elder shall serve the younger, as it is written: Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated.*"—This second fact is still more significant than the former. We are now in the pure line of Abraham by Isaac, the ancestor from whom is the *promised* seed; and yet his wife sees that divine selection which had been exercised in regard to the sons of Abraham reproduced as between her

[1] ℵ A B read φαυλον instead of κακον.

[2] T. R., with some Mnn. only, places του θεου before προθεσις, whereas all the Mjj., It., etc., place it after this word.

own children.—The nominative *Rebecca*, in Greek, might be regarded as a provisional nominative, its true logical relation being expressed in ver. 12 by the dative *αὐτῇ, to her;* but it is more natural to find a verb in the preceding context, of which this nominative is the subject: She was treated in the same manner, or had to undergo the same lot, *ἐπάθη τὸ αὐτό*. —The expression *by one* is occasioned by the contrast here to the case of Isaac and Ishmael. There, there were two mothers, which might justify the preference accorded to Isaac. Here, where the children were of the same mother, the only possible difference would have been on the father's side. But as the case was one of twins, the commonness of origin was complete; no external motive of preference could therefore influence the divine choice. This is what is brought out once again by the last words: *Isaac, our father.* The *our*, no doubt, applies in the first place to the Jews, but also to Christians as children of Isaac by faith (iv. 1).

Ver. 11. Nay more, the preference given to Jacob was expressed even before the birth of the twins, before they had done any act whatever; so true is it, that it was not founded on any particular merit which Jacob might possess. The two subjective negations *μήπω* and *μηδέ* are used here because they contain a reflection of the author on the fact; as is expressed in the translation. No doubt it might have been said in answer to the apostle, that God foresaw the good works of Jacob and the evil acts of Esau, and that His predilection for the former was founded on this prevision. The view might even have been supported by a word used by the apostle, that of *foreknowledge*, viii. 29. But supposing the apostle had wished to discuss the question thoroughly, he might have replied in turn that the divine prevision, on which election rests, relates not to any *work* whatever as being able to establish some merit in favour of the elect, but on his faith, which cannot be a merit, since faith consists precisely in renouncing all merit, in the humble acceptance of the free gift. Faith foreseen is therefore a wholly different thing from works foreseen. The latter would really establish a right: the former contains only a moral condition, that, namely, which follows from the fact that possession in the case of a free being supposes acceptance. Work foreseen

would impose obligation on God and take away from the freedom of His grace; faith foreseen only serves to direct its exercise. *To accept* and *to merit* are two different things. But the apostle does not enter on this discussion, and simply states the fact that it was no *merit* on Jacob's part which constrained God to organize His plan as He did. This plan certainly was not arbitrarily conceived, but it contains nothing which gives it the character of an obligation or debt.—Before citing the oracle which he intends to quote here (ver. 12), the apostle explains the object of God's way of acting, announced in the oracle. What God meant by choosing the youngest of the two sons and setting aside the eldest was, that His liberty of organizing His plans in virtue of His free choice between individuals might remain perfectly intact.—We know already what the πρόθεσις is, the purpose formed beforehand (see on viii. 27). This purpose to be realized needs human instruments; and it is to the choice of these individuals that the word ἐκλογή, *election*, refers. The expression: *the purpose of God according to election* (not as in the T. R.: *the purpose according to the election of God*), denotes therefore a plan of conduct in the preparation of salvation, which God draws out in virtue of a choice which He has made between certain individuals, in order to secure the man who best suits His purpose. Such a plan is the opposite of one founded on the right or merit of one or other of those individuals. God's free will indeed would be at an end if any man whatever might say to Him: "I have a *right* to be chosen, and used by Thee rather than that other." Suppose Saul had been chosen king in consequence of some merit of his own, when the time came for substituting David for him, God would have had His hands bound. In like manner, if in virtue of his right of seniority Esau must necessarily have become the heir of the promise, a man who suited His purposes less than another would have been imposed on God. The plan and choice of God must not therefore be tied up by any human merit, that the will of the only wise and good may be exercised without hindrance. This is the principle of His government which God wished to guard by choosing, in the case of which Paul speaks, the younger instead of the elder. It was easy for the Jews, who pretended to have a right to the divine election, to apply this

principle to themselves.—The word *μένῃ, may stand,* may be understood in the logical sense: "may stand well established in the conscience;" but is there not something more in Paul's thought? Does he not mean: "may stand *in reality*"? It is not only in the thought of man, but really that the liberty of God would be compromised if any human merit regulated His choice. God, who had determined to use Jacob and put aside Esau, might have caused Jacob to be born first. If He has not done so, it is precisely *that* His right of free choice may stand not only established, but intact.—Tholuck rightly observes that the apostle, by using the present *μένῃ, may stand,* instead of the aor. *μείνῃ, might stand,* extends this consequence of the fact to all times: it applies therefore also to the Jews of Paul's day.—The two regimens: "*not of works, but*" . . . might be made to depend on a participle understood: *οὖσα, being,* which would be a qualification of the verb *μένῃ, may stand.* But it is more natural to take this verb in an absolute sense, and to connect the two clauses with the subject of the sentence: *the purpose according to election.* Paul adds: "purpose not of works, but" . . .; that is to say, the choice on which the plan rests was not made in accordance with a merit of works, but solely according to the will of the caller. Chap. viii. 29 has shown us that though this choice is unmerited, yet neither is it arbitrary.

Ver. 12. The oracle quoted is taken from Gen. xxv. 23. The question whether it refers to the two *brothers* personally, or to the two *peoples* who shall spring from them, is settled by the words preceding: "Two nations are in thy womb, and two manner of people shall issue from thee." Hence it follows that the oracle neither speaks of the two peoples separately from their fathers, nor of the two fathers separately from their descendants. Possibly Genesis gives greater weight to the idea of the two peoples, whereas Paul (ver. 11) thinks chiefly of the two fathers. It matters little; for a profound solidarity, at once physical and moral, connects the character of the race with that of the father.

The theocratic inferiority of Esau resulted historically from his profane spirit, which showed itself in the sale of his birthright; it was sealed by the blessing of Jacob. As to the people who sprang from Esau, this same inferiority appeared,

first, in the fact that their dwelling-place was assigned outside the promised land properly so called, then in their submission to Israel under David, and finally, after several alternations of subjection and independence, in their final incorporation with the Jewish state under John Hyrcanus, and their obliteration from the number of the nations.—The translation of the words *μείζων* and *ἐλάσσων* by *elder* and *younger*, is rejected by Meyer as opposed to the natural meaning of the two terms. But it is quite impossible to give a different meaning than *elder* to the word *μείζων* in the passage Gen. xxix. 16, where it is contrasted with the term *ἡ νεωτέρα, the younger.* Even in Hebrew the meaning of the narrative is not certainly that Leah was physically *greater* than her younger sister. And in our passage how can Meyer hold that the term *greater* signifies that Esau was the stronger of the twins in their mother's womb!

Ver. 13. A second quotation, meant to confirm the first; it is taken from Mal. i. 2, 3. The conjunction *as* may be understood in two ways: either in the sense that God's love to Jacob and His hatred to Esau were the *cause* of the subjection of the latter to the former; or it may be thought that Paul quotes this saying of Malachi as demonstrating by a striking fact in the later history of the two peoples the truth of the relation expressed in ver. 12. Malachi lived at a period when, in their return from exile, Israel had just received a marvellous proof of God's protection, while Edom was still plunged in the desolation into which it had been thrown by its eastern conquerors. Beholding those ruins on the one side and this restoration on the other, Malachi proclaims, as a fact of experience, the twofold divine feeling of love and hatred which breaks forth in these opposite modes of treatment. *I have loved* and *I have hated* do not signify merely: I have preferred the one to the other; but: I have *taken* Jacob *to be mine*, while I have *set aside* Esau. Calvin here employs the two verbs *assumere* and *repellere*. God has made the one the depositary of His Messianic promise and of the salvation of the world, and denied to the other all co-operation in the establishment of His kingdom. And this difference of dealing is not accidental; it rests on a difference of feeling in God Himself. On the one hand, a union founded on moral

sympathy; on the other, a rupture resulting from moral antipathy; on *hating*, comp. Luke xiv. 26: "If any man hate not his father and mother . . ., and his own life" . . .—God's love to Jacob is neither *merited* nor *arbitrary*. When we think of the patriarch's many grave sins, when we think of Israel's endless apostasies, it will be seen that *merit* cannot enter into the case. But when we take account of God's prevision of the power of faith, and of its final triumph in that man and people (the *foreknowing* of viii. 29), it will be seen—as follows otherwise from the divine essence itself—that neither is the prerogative bestowed on Jacob arbitrary. As to Esau, let the three following facts be remarked in regard to the *hatred* of which he is the object:—1. In speaking of Jacob and Esau, either as men or nations, neither Genesis nor Malachi nor St. Paul have *eternal salvation* in view; the matter in question is the part they play regarded from the theocratic standpoint, as is proved by the word δουλεύειν, *to serve*. 2. Esau, though deprived of the promise and the inheritance, nevertheless obtained a blessing and an inheritance for himself and his descendants. 3. The national character inherited from the father of the race is not so impressed on his descendants that they cannot escape it. As there were in Israel many Edomites, profane hearts, there may also have been, as has been said, many Israelites, many spiritual hearts, in Edom. Comp. what is said of the *wise men* of Teman, Jer. xlix. 7, and the very respectable personage Eliphaz (notwithstanding his error) in the Book of Job.

The two examples of exclusion, given in the persons of Ishmael and Esau, have served to prove a fact which Israel embraced with their whole heart: God's right to endow them with privilege at the expense of the Arab (Ishmael) and Edomite (Esau) nations, by assigning to them in the history of redemption the preponderating part to which the right of primogeniture seemed to call those excluded. Now, if Israel approved the principle of divine liberty when it was followed in a way so strikingly in their favour, how could they repudiate it when it was turned against them?

To explain the apostle's view, we have added at each step the explanatory ideas fitted to complete and justify his thought; this was the business of the commentator. But he himself

has not done so; he has been content with referring to the biblical facts, setting forth thereby the great truth of God's liberty. And hence this liberty, thus presented, might appear to degenerate into arbitrariness, and even into injustice. This gives rise to the objection which he puts in ver. 14, and treats down to ver. 24; this is the second part of this discussion: Does not liberty, such as thou claimest for God in His decrees and elections, do violence to His moral character, and especially to His justice? It is to this question that vv. 14–18 give answer; the apostle there proves that Scripture recognises this liberty in God; and as it can ascribe to Him nothing unworthy of Him, it must be admitted that this liberty is indisputable. Then in vv. 19–24 he shows by a figure that the superiority of God to man should impose silence on the proud pretensions of the latter, and he applies this principle to the relation between God and Israel.

Vv. 14–24.

Vv. 14–16. "*What shall we say then? Is there not unrighteousness with God? Let it not be! For He saith to Moses, I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I have compassion. So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy.*"[1]—Several commentators, and Mangold among the last, have taken vv. 15–18 not as the answer to the objection raised in ver. 14, but as the continuation and justification of the objection itself. But nothing is needed to refute this opinion beyond the exclamation: μὴ γένοιτο, *let it not be,* which cannot be a simple parenthesis; besides, the form of the question with the negation μή, in ver. 14, already assumes a negative answer, the development of which is necessarily expected in what follows.—The answer is taken solely from Scripture, which is an authority for Paul's opponent in the discussion as well as for himself. This opponent is a Jew, who thinks that the sovereign liberty which the apostle ascribes to God, and by which he seeks to justify the rejection of Israel, wrongs the divine character. It must, indeed, be

[1] T. R. reads, with K: ελεουντος, instead of ελεωντος, which is read in all the other Mjj.

borne in mind that the Jewish conscience, being developed under the law, was accustomed to consider God's dealings with man as entirely dependent on human merit or demerit. Man's doings regulated those of God.

Ver. 15. Scripture itself, that foundation of all Israel's theocratic claims, demonstrates divine liberty as it is taught by Paul. This liberty therefore cannot involve any injustice. And first, a quotation proving the absence, in the case of man, of all right to God's favours. It is taken from Ex. xxxiii. 19, where God, when condescending to grant the bold request of Moses that he might behold His glory with his bodily eyes, gives him to understand that nothing in him, notwithstanding all he has been able to do up till now in God's service, merited such a favour. If God grants it to him, it is not because he is that Moses who asks it, or because there is any right in the matter; it is pure grace on God's part. The passage is cited according to the LXX. The only difference between it and the Hebrew is, that here in each proposition the first verb is in the past (present), the second in the future; while in the Greek the first is in the future, the second in the present. It matters little for the sense. The two verbs in the present (or past) express the internal feeling, the source, and the verbs in the future the external manifestations, the successive effects. But the emphasis is neither on the first nor on the second verbs; it is on the pronoun ὃν ἄν, *him, whosoever he may be.* It is the idea of God's free choice which reappears. The condescension of God to Moses is certainly not an arbitrary act; God knows why He grants it. But neither is it a right on the part of Moses, as if he would have been entitled to complain in case of refusal. The difference of meaning between the two verbs ἐλεεῖν and οἰκτείρειν is nearly the same as that between the two substantives λύπη and ὀδύνη, ver. 2. The first expresses the compassion of the heart, the second the manifestations of that feeling (cries or groans).

Ver. 16 enunciates the general principle to be derived from this divine utterance in the particular case of Moses. When God gives, it is not because a human *will* (*he that willeth*) or a human *work* (*he that runneth*) lays Him under obligation, and forces Him to give, in order not to be unjust by refusing. It is in Himself the initiative and the efficacy are (*Him that*

calleth), whence the gift flows. He gives not as a thing due, but as a fruit of His love; which does not imply that therein He acts arbitrarily. Such a supposition is excluded, precisely because the giver in question is God, who is wisdom itself, and who *thinks* nothing good except what *is* good. The principle here laid down included God's right to call the Gentiles to salvation when He should be pleased to grant them this favour. The words: "of him that *willeth*, of him that *runneth*," have often been strangely understood. There have been found in them allusions to the *wish* of Isaac to make Esau the heir of the promise, and to Esau's *running* to bring the venison necessary for the feast of benediction. But Isaac and Esau are no longer in question, and we must remain by the example of Moses. It was neither the wish expressed in his prayer, nor the faithful care which he had taken of Israel in the wilderness, which could merit the favour he asked; and as no man will ever surpass him in respect either of pious willing or holy working, it follows that the rule applied to him is universal. So it will always be. Israel, in particular, should understand thereby that it is neither their fixed theocratic necessities, nor the multitude of their ceremonial or moral works, which can convert salvation into a debt contracted toward them by God, and take away from Him the right of rejecting them if He comes to think it good to do so for reasons which He alone appreciates.—But if the words of God to Moses prove that God does not *owe* His favours to any one whomsoever, must it also be held that He is free to *reject* whom He will? Yes. Scripture ascribes to Him even this right. Such is the truth following from another saying of God, in reference to the adversary of Moses, Pharaoh.

Vv. 17, 18. "*For the Scripture saith unto Pharaoh, Even for this same purpose have I raised thee up, that I might show my power in thee, and that my name might be declared throughout all the earth. Therefore hath He mercy on whom He will, and whom He will He hardeneth.*"—Having given an instance of the liberty with which God dispenses grace, Paul gives an example of the way in which He hardens. This example is the more appropriately chosen, because the two personages brought on the scene are, in the Bible history, as it were the counterparts of one another. The logical connection expressed

by *for* is this: There is nothing strange in Scripture ascribing to God the right of dispensing grace, since it ascribes to Him even the yet more incomprehensible right of condemning to hardness. These two rights indeed mutually suppose one another. The God who had not the one would not have the other. The passage quoted is Ex. ix. 16. God pronounces this sentence after the sixth plague. The verb ἐξεγείρειν (Osterv.: *I have called thee into being;* Oltram.: *I have raised thee up*) signifies properly: to bring out of a state of insensibility or inaction; from sleep, for example, as in Xenophon: "having seen this dream, *he awoke* (ἐξηγέρθη);" or from death, as 1 Cor. vi. 14: "God will also raise up us by His power" (ἐξεγερεῖ). This passage is, with the one before us, the only place where this word is used in the N. T.—But it is employed in the LXX. in the sense of *raising up, causing to be born,* thus Zech. xi. 16: "I raise you up (ἐξεγείρω) a shepherd;" Hab. i. 6: "I raise up (I cause to come) against you the Chaldeans." It is in this last sense that the simple ἐγείρειν is used in the N. T., Matt. xi. 11: "There hath not been raised up (ἐγήγερται) . . . a greater than John the Baptist;" John vii. 52: "Out of Galilee no prophet hath been raised up (ἐγήγερται)." The simple verb ἐγείρειν is likewise used, Jas. v. 15, to signify *to cure* of a disease: "And the Lord will raise him up (ἐγερεῖ)." All these different shades of meaning have been applied by commentators to our passage. According to some (Aug., Fritzs., de Wette), the meaning is: "I aroused thee to resistance against me." Reuss also says: "Pharaoh acts as he does in regard to the Israelites, because *God excites him thereto.* In this case the apostle must have departed completely from the meaning of the Hebrew word *héémid* (not *héir*), which simply signifies: *to cause to stand up.* And would there not be something revolting to the conscience in supposing that God could have Himself impelled Pharaoh inwardly to evil? Comp. Jas. i. 12. Others (Hofmann, Morison), fixing on the sense of the Hebrew word, according to which the LXX. have translated (διετηρήθης, *thou hast been preserved*), as on that of the simple verb ἐγείρειν, Jas. v. 15, think that God is thereby reminding Pharaoh that He could have left him to die (in one of the previous plagues), or that He could at that very moment visit him with death with

all his people; comp. ix. 15. But in the former case God would be made to allude to a fact which there is nothing to indicate; and in the second, the verb employed would not be suitable; for it expresses more than the idea of simple preservation, as is acknowledged by Hofmann himself. A third set give the word the meaning of: "I have established thee as *king*" (Flatt, for example). But so special a qualification as this would require to be expressed more precisely. This last meaning, however, comes near what seems to us to be the true one. We think, indeed, that we should here apply the meaning *raise up* in all its generality. "I have caused thee to appear at this time, in this place, in this position" (Theoph., Beza, Calv., Beng., Olsh., Rück., Thol.., Philip., Beyschl.). The subject in question is not the *wicked* disposition which animates Pharaoh, but the entire situation in which he finds himself providentially placed. God might have caused Pharaoh to be born in a cabin, where his proud obstinacy would have been displayed with no less self-will, but without any notable historical consequence; on the other hand, He might have placed on the throne of Egypt at that time a weak, easy-going man, who would have yielded at the first shock. What would have happened? Pharaoh in his obscure position would not have been less arrogant and perverse; but Israel would have gone forth from Egypt without *éclat*. No plagues one upon another, no Red Sea miraculously crossed, no Egyptian army destroyed; nothing of all that made so deep a furrow in the Israelitish conscience, and which remained for the elect people the immoveable foundation of their relation to Jehovah. And thereafter also no influence produced on the surrounding nations. The entire history would have taken another direction. God did not therefore create the indomitable pride of Pharaoh as it were to gain a point of resistance and reflect His glory; He was content to use it for this purpose. This is what is expressed by the following words: ὅπως, *that thus*, not simply *that* (ἵνα). Comp. Ex. xv. 14, 15, those words of the song chanted after the passage of the Red Sea: "The nations heard it; terror hath taken hold on the inhabitants of Palestina. The dukes of Edom have been amazed; trembling hath taken hold upon the mighty men of Moab; the inhabitants of Canaan have melted away." Also the words of

Rahab to the spies sent by Joshua, Josh. ii. 9, 10: "Terror hath taken hold of us, the inhabitants of the land have fainted; for we have heard how the Lord dried up the waters of the Red Sea from before you . . .; the Lord your God, He is God in heaven above and in earth beneath." Read also the words of the Gibeonites to Joshua, Josh. ix. 9: "From a very far country thy servants are come, because of the name of the Lord thy God; for we have heard the fame of Him, and all that He did in Egypt." Thus it was that the catastrophes which distinguished the going out from Egypt, provoked by Pharaoh's blind resistance, paved the way for the conquest of Canaan. And even to the present day, wherever throughout the world Exodus is read, the divine intention is realized: "to show my power, and make known my name throughout all the earth."

Ver. 18. From this particular example Paul deduces, as in ver. 16, the general principle, while reproducing by way of antithesis the maxim of ver. 16, so as to combine the two aspects in which he wishes here to present divine liberty: "No man can say either: I am, whatever I may do, safe from the judgment of God, or such another, whatever he may do, is unworthy of the divine favour."—The repetition of the words: *him that willeth*, as well as their position at the head of the two sentences, shows that the emphasis is on this idea. To a son who should complain of the favours granted to one of his brothers, and of the severe treatment to which he is himself subjected, might it not be said: "Thy father is free both to show favour and to chastise;" it being understood that the man who answers thus does not confound liberty with caprice, and assumes that the father's character sufficiently secures the wise and just exercise of his liberty? We must here cite the observation of Bengel, fixing the antithesis Paul has in view, and explaining his words: "The Jews thought that in no case could they be abandoned by God, and in no case could the Gentiles be received by God." The apostle breaks the iron circle within which this people claimed to confine the divine conduct toward themselves and the Gentiles, saying: to the Gentiles wrath; to us, the only elect, clemency!

What is meant by the term *hardening*, and what leads the apostle to use the expression here? The notion of

hardening was not contained in the term *raised up*, but in its relation to the conjunction *that* which follows (see Meyer); besides, the narrative of Exodus was in the memory of every reader. God, in raising up Pharaoh, foresaw his proud resistance, and had in reserve to chastise it afterwards by a complete blindness which was to be the means of reaching the desired result.—*To harden* signifies: to take from a man the sense of the true, the just, and even the useful, so that he is no longer open to the wise admonitions and significant circumstances which should turn him aside from the evil way on which he has entered. We need not therefore seek to weaken the force of the term, as Origen and Grotius do, who regard it as only a simple *permission* on the part of God (leaving the sinner to harden himself), or like Carpzov, Semler, etc., who explain it in the sense of *treating harshly*. The word *harden* cannot signify, in the account Ex. iv.–xiv., anything else, as God's act, than it signifies as the act of Pharaoh, when it is said that he *hardened himself*. But what must not be forgotten, and what appears distinctly from the whole narrative, is, that Pharaoh's hardening was at first *his own act*. Five times it is said of him that he himself hardened or made heavy his heart (vii. 13, 14, vii. 22, viii. 15, viii. 32, ix. 7; we do not speak here of iv. 21 and vii. 3, which are a prophecy), before the time when it is at last said that God hardened him (ix. 12); and even after that, as if a remnant of liberty still remained to him, it is said for a last time that he hardened himself (ix. 34, 35). It was a parallel act to that of Judas closing his heart to the last appeal. Then at length, as if by way of a terrible retribution, God hardened him five times (x. 1 and 20, x. 27, xi. 10, and xiv. 8). Thus he at first closed his heart obstinately against the influence exercised on him by the summonses of Moses and the first chastisements which overtook him; that was his sin. And thereafter, but still within limits, God rendered him deaf not merely to the voice of justice, but to that of sound sense and simple prudence: that was his punishment. Far, then, from its having been God who urged him to evil, God punished him with the most terrible chastisements, for the evil to which he voluntarily gave himself up. In this expression *hardening* we find the

same idea as in the παραδιδόναι ("God *gave* them *up*"), by which the apostle expressed God's judgment on the Gentiles for their refusal to welcome the revelation which He gave of Himself in nature and conscience (i. 24, 26, 28). When man has wilfully quenched the light he has received and the first rebukes of divine mercy, and when he persists in giving himself up to his evil instincts, there comes a time when God withdraws from him the beneficent action of His grace. Then the man becomes insensible even to the counsels of prudence. He is thenceforth like a horse with the bit in his teeth, running blindly to his destruction. He has rejected salvation for himself, he was free to do so; but he cannot prevent God from now making use of him and of his ruin to advance the salvation of others. From being the *end*, he is degraded to the rank of *means*. Such was the lot of Pharaoh. Everybody in Egypt saw clearly whither his mad resistance tended. His magicians told him (Ex. viii. 19): "This is the finger of God." His servants told him (Ex. x. 7): "Let these people go." He himself, after every plague, felt his heart relent. He once went the length of crying out (ix. 27): "I have sinned this time; the Lord is righteous." Now was the decisive instant . . . for the last time after this moment of softening he hardened himself (ix. 33). Then the righteousness of God took hold of him. He had refused to glorify God actively, he must glorify Him passively. The Jews did not at all disapprove of this conduct on God's part as long as it concerned only Pharaoh or the Gentiles; but what they affirmed, in virtue of their divine election, was, that never, and on no condition, could they themselves be the objects of such a judgment. They restricted the liberty of divine judgment on themselves, as they restricted the liberty of grace toward the Gentiles. Paul in our verse re-establishes both liberties, vindicating God's sole right to judge whether this or that man possesses the conditions on which He will think fit to show him favour, or those which will make it suitable for Him to punish by hardening him. — Thus understood—and we do not think that either the context of the apostle or that of Exodus allows it to be understood otherwise—it offers nothing to shock the conscience; it is

entirely to the glory of the divine character, and Holsten has no right to paraphrase or rather to caricature the view of Paul by saying: "God shows grace, pure arbitrariness; God hardens, pure arbitrariness."

Perhaps we shall be charged with introducing into the explanation of the apostolic text clauses which are not found in it. This charge is just; only it is not against us that it comes. The reserves indicated in our interpretation arose of themselves, we think, from the *special case* the apostle had in view. For he was not here writing a philosophy or a system of Christian dogmatics; he was combating a determined adversary, Jewish Pharisaism with its lofty pretensions both in relation to the Gentiles, and relatively to God Himself. Paul, therefore, only unveils the side of the truth overlooked by this adversary, that of divine liberty. Certainly if Paul had been disputing with an opponent who started from the opposite point of view, and who exaggerated divine liberty so as to make it a purely arbitrary and tyrannical will, he would have brought out the opposite side of the truth, that of the moral conditions which are taken into account by a wise and good sovereignty, like that of God.—This occasional character of the apostle's teaching in this chapter has not always been considered; men have sought in it a general and complete exposition of the doctrine of the divine decrees; and so they have completely mistaken its meaning. And hence we have been forced to put ourselves at the general standpoint by supplying the clauses which the apostle took for granted, and the statement of which was not required by the particular application he had in view.

The apostle has proved from Scripture God's liberty to show grace when He thinks right, as well as His liberty to chastise by hardening when He thinks right. On this point the adversary can make no reply; he is forced to accept the apostle's demonstration. But here is his rejoinder: "Granted! says he, God has the right to harden me. But at least let Him not claim to complain of me after having hardened me." To this new rejoinder the apostle answers first by a *figure*, which he will afterwards *apply* to the case in question. The figure of the potter:

Vv. 19–21: "*Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth he yet*[1] *find fault? For*[2] *who can resist His will? Much*

[1] The ουν between τι and ετι is omitted by ℵ A K L P.

[2] The γαρ is omitted by T. R. (not by ε), with some Mnn. only.

rather,[1] *O man, who art thou that replies against God? Shall the vessel of clay say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus?. Or hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour?*"—The word *then* proves that the interlocutor accepts the answer made to his first objection (ver. 14), but that he starts from it to raise a new one. The ἔτι, *yet,* after τί, signifies: *yet,* after hardening me. The verb μέμφεσθαι, *to find fault,* to speak with anger, applies to the perdition with which God threatens sinners who are hardened by Him. When He hardens any one, God cannot ask that he should not harden himself. The question, *Who can resist His will?* literally signifies, *Who hath resisted,* or rather *Who resisteth?* . . . For the perfect of the verb ἵστημι and its compounds has really the sense of the present: "I have placed myself there, and continue there." It is therefore clear that the question: "Who is he that resisteth Him?" signifies: "Who is he that *can* resist Him?" Hofmann thinks that the interlocutor means: Who, in this case (that of my hardening), *hath resisted* God? Answer: "Nobody; for in hardening myself I have done nothing but obey Him." This meaning is not impossible; it is ingenious, but more far-fetched than the preceding.

Ver. 20. Most commentators do not hold that in the following answer Paul comes seriously to discuss the objection. *Abrumpit quæstionem,* says Melanchthon. Holsten observes that Paul raises the question, not to resolve it, which would be impossible, but to crush it. We acknowledge that in vv. 19 and 20 Paul pleads solely man's incompetency to discuss the dealings of God. But we shall see that he does not stop there, and that he enters more profoundly into the marrow of the question than is generally thought. It would be surprising, indeed, if a conclusion not-to-be received should be found to be the last word of Paul's logic. It would have been better for him in that case not to have made his interlocutor bring him to such a strait.—The particle μενοῦνγε, translated by *much rather,* is omitted by the Greco-Latins; wrongly, without doubt. It falls into

[1] Μενουνγε is placed, by T. R. with K L P, Syr., before ω ανθρωπε; by ℵ A B after these words; it is omitted by D F G, It.

three words: μέν, *certainly*; οὖν, *therefore*, and γέ, *at least*; that is to say, what follows remains in any case true, though all the rest should be false. Hence: *much more certainly still*; comp. Phil. iii. 8 (*much more*).[1] It therefore signifies here: "I do not examine the intrinsic truth of what thou allegest; but, however that may be, what is more certain is, that thou art not in a position to dispute with God." The address: *O man!* reminds the adversary of the reason of his incompetency; it is his absolute inferiority in relation to the Creator. The exclamation ὦ ἄνθρωπε, *O man*, is placed by the Byzs. at the beginning of the sentence, but by the Alexs. after μενοῦνγε, which is undoubtedly preferable. For the address: *O man!* justifies the use of this particle; and the two terms *man* and *God* placed, the one at the beginning of the sentence, the other at the end, form a better antithesis. The term ἀνταποκρίνεσθαι does not simply mean: *to reply*; but, as is proved by the only parallel in the N. T. (Luke xiv. 6): *to reply to a reply, to reduplicate*, as it were. God, indeed, had already answered once in the previous sayings. This word implies the *spirit* of contention.—The comparison of the relation between God and man to that between the vessel and the potter seems logically defective. Man free and responsible cannot be a mere instrument in the hands of God. Moreover, endowed as he is with sensibility to pleasure and pain, he cannot be manipulated like worthless matter. And certainly, if the question addressed by the vessel to the potter: "Why hast thou made me thus?" signified: "Why hast thou created me good clay or bad clay?" and in the application to man's relation to God: "Why hast thou created me with the disposition to good or to evil?" the comparison would have no meaning. For the potter does not commit the absurdity of holding the clay *responsible* for its superior or inferior quality. But the question is not in the least about the *production* of the clay, and consequently about its *qualities*,

[1] On μήν γε Passow says: "The matter of the sentence is thereby set forth as an *acknowledged* fact." On μὲν οὖν he says: "Most frequently in replies this expression confirms the saying of the interlocutor; but sometimes also it distinctly sets it aside, and must be rendered by: *On the contrary.*" This is the case in our passage.

but solely about the *use* which is made of it by the potter. He does not create the clay; he takes it as he finds it, and adapts it as best he can to the different uses he proposes to himself. And besides, it is not the yet shapeless clay which asks: "Why hast thou made me thus (with or without such or such qualities)?" it is the fully manufactured *vessel* (*τὸ πλάσμα*) which thus interrogates him *who has given it its* present *form* (*τῷ πλάσαντι*). Consequently, in the application made of this to the relation between man and God, this same question does not signify: "Why hast Thou *created* me good or evil?"—in that case the question could not be summarily set aside by Paul—but: "Why, in the development of Thy work here below, hast Thou assigned me an honourable use (by favouring me with Thy grace, like Moses) or a vile use (by hardening me like Pharaoh)? Why does such a man serve the end of Thy glory by his salvation; such another the end of Thy glory by his dishonour?" This is the question in regard to which Paul reminds his Israelitish disputant of man's incompetency as before God. As it belongs only to the potter, in virtue of the knowledge he has of his art, to determine the use which he shall make of the different parts of the mass in his hands to extract from each the best result possible, so it belongs to God alone to assign to the different portions of humanity, to the Jews no less than to the rest of men, the use which suits Him best, with a view to His final aim. The question whether, in determining the use of one and another, He will act without rhyme or reason, or whether, on the contrary, He will adapt the use made of each to His moral predispositions, finds no place in the mind of any one who understands that God's perfections always act in harmony, and that consequently His power is ever the servant of His goodness, justice, and wisdom. As that which justifies the power of the potter over the lump of clay is not only the superiority of his strength, but that of his understanding; so, with stronger reason, what explains the sovereignty of God and His right over mankind is not only His almightiness, but His supreme understanding and His infinite moral perfection. And what follows, vv. 22–24, proves that such is the view of the apostle. For to what purpose are the expressions *θέλων*,

willing (ver. 22), and ἵνα, *that* (ver. 23), if not to bring out, as we shall see, God's perfect wisdom in the choice of His ends and the employment of His means? It is obvious, therefore, that the *use* God makes of man at a given moment (a Pharaoh, for example, as a vessel of dishonour), far from excluding his moral liberty, supposes and involves it. For the honour or dishonour to which God turns him in the execution of His work is not independent, as appears from this example, of the attitude taken by man in relation to God. The work of the skilful potter is not the emblem of an arbitrary use of strength; but, on the contrary, of a deliberate and intelligent employment of the matter at his disposal. Such is the apostle's complete view. But it is quite true, as Lange says: "When man goes the length of making to himself a god whom he affects to bind by his own rights, God then puts on His majesty, and appears in all His reality as a free God, before whom man is a mere nothing, like the clay in the hand of the potter." Such was Paul's attitude when acting as God's advocate, in his suit with Jewish Pharisaism. This is the reason why he expresses only *one side* of the truth. The following passage, ver. 30–x. 21, will show that he is very far from mistaking or forgetting the other.

The ἤ, *or*, of ver. 21, means: "Or, if it were otherwise, it must be admitted the potter has not?" . . . Comp. Matt. xx. 15. The genitive τοῦ πηλοῦ, *of the lump of clay*, is dependent not on ὁ κεραμεύς, *the potter*, but on ἐξουσίαν, *power*: the power which he has to use the clay. The subject, the *potter*, is placed between the two words, the better, as it were, to command them.—What does the lump represent? Some think that it is the *people of Israel*, and that God is described as having the right to make them either His elect people, or a rejected nation. This meaning breaks down on vv. 23 and 24, where we see that the vessels unto honour are elected from among the Gentiles as well as from among the Jews. The lump therefore represents the whole of *humanity*, not humanity as God creates it, but in the state in which He finds it every moment when He puts it to the service of His kingdom. This state includes for each individual the whole series of free determinations which have gone to make him what he is.

Let not Israel therefore say to God: Thou hast no right to make of me anything else than a vessel of honour; and Thou hast no right to make of that other body, the Gentiles, anything else than a base vessel. It belongs to God Himself to decide, according to His wisdom, the part which He will assign to every human being. Comp. 2 Tim. ii. 20, 21, where the words: "If a man therefore purge himself from these, he shall be a vessel unto honour," show clearly the truth of the standpoint which we have just expounded.—The forms ὃ μέν, ὃ δέ, might be explained as a remnant of the most ancient form of the Greek article; but it is perhaps more correct to admit an ellipsis: ὃ μὲν ποιεῖ εἰς τιμήν, εἰς τιμὴν ποιῆσαι, etc. —Let us add, that the figure here developed by Paul is familiar to the writers of the O. T. (Isa. xxix. 16, xlv. 9, 10; Jer. xviii. 6, etc.), and thus had the force of a quotation. Application of the figure, vv. 22–24.

Vv. 22–24. "*Now if God, willing to show His wrath, and to make His power known, endured with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction: And*[1] [*if*] *that He might make known the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which he had afore prepared unto glory, us, whom He also called, not of the Jews only, but also of the Gentiles*" . . .—Many commentators, Tholuck for example, find in the δέ, *now*, which they translate by *but*, the indication of a strong contrast, and think that Paul is setting over against God's *abstract right*, expounded in vv. 19–21, the *real* use which He has made of it in the history of the Jewish people: Thou, O man, art in any case incompetent to dispute God's right; but what, when I shall prove to thee that He has not used it rigorously, and that His conduct toward thee is still marked with the most wonderful long-suffering! But such a contrast would have demanded a stronger adversative particle (ἀλλά, *but*); and this notion of a purely abstract right is rather philosophical than religious. Is it not simpler to take vv. 19–21 as giving the figure, and vv. 22–24 the application? It is evident that the figure of *vessels unto dishonour*, ver. 21, finds its corresponding expression in *vessels of wrath*, ver. 22, as the figure of *vessels unto honour*, ver. 21, finds its corresponding term in *vessels of mercy*, ver. 23. It is equally obvious that to the liberty used

[1] B, Vulg. and some Mnn. omit καί

by the potter over the lump of clay which is at his disposal, to make of it vessels of different destinations, ver. 21, there corresponds the power of God, displayed either in the form of wrath or in that of grace in vv. 22 and 23. It is therefore the transition from the figure to the application which is indicated by the δέ, and the particle ought therefore to be translated by *now*. But in the form: *Now if*, there is at the same time contained a gradation. For Paul means thereby that God has not even dealt with Israel as the potter with his vessel. We seek the principal proposition on which depends the sentence: *Now, if willing . . .*, and we do not find it; but it is easy to understand it from what precedes: "Wilt thou still find fault, O Jew? wilt thou do what the vessel would not dare to do against the potter? Wilt thou still accuse God of being unjustly angry?" We shall see afterwards the point in the following passage where this understood principal proposition finds its logical place.

Ver. 22 describes God's dealing with the vessels unto dishonour; vv. 23 and 24 will describe His dealing with the vessels of value. The relation between the participle θέλων, *willing*, and the verb ἤνεγκεν, *He endured*, may be explained in three ways, expressed each by one or other of the conjunctions, *when*, *because*, or *though*. In the first connection the meaning would be: "When He had the intention of" . . . Instead of striking at once, as He already purposed doing, He bore with patience. The relation thus understood is only slightly different from that which would be expressed by *though*. The connection expressed by *because* (de Wette, Rück., and others), would signify that God's long-suffering had no other end than to bring about an accumulation of wrath; but would such long-suffering deserve the name? It is obvious from ii. 4 and 5 that if the long-suffering produces this painful result, this is not the *intention* of Him who bears long, but the fault of those who abuse His forbearance to harden themselves the more. The true relation is consequently that expressed by the conjunction *though* (Fritz., Philip., Meyer). There is, in fact, a natural contrast between the long-suffering and the manifestation of wrath, and it is this contrast which is expressed by the *though*.—God's intention in regard to the Jews was moving on to the *display* of His wrath and the *manifesta-*

tion of His power. In these expressions there is an evident allusion to the saying of God regarding Pharaoh, as just quoted, ver. 17; comp. the expressions, ἐνδείξασθαι τὴν ὀργήν, *to show wrath*, ver. 22, and ἐνδείξωμαι ἐν σοί, *to show in thee*, ver. 17; τὸ δυνατὸν αὐτοῦ, *His power*, ver. 22, τὴν δύναμίν μου, *my power*, ver. 17. This because unbelieving Judaism was playing toward the church, at the date of Paul's writing, exactly the same part as Pharaoh formerly played toward Israel themselves. As this tyrant sought to crush Israel in its cradle, so Israel was endeavouring to crush the church at its first steps in the world. And hence God's dealings with Pharaoh must be now reproduced in the judgment of Israel.—*The manifestation of wrath* refers at once to the doom of destruction which was already suspended over the head of the nation in general, and to the condemnation of all unbelieving Israelites in particular; comp. ii. 5, and the saying of John the Baptist, Matt. iii. 10 and 12. We might refer the manifestation of God's *power* to the mighty efficacy of God's Spirit creating a new people in Israel from the day of Pentecost onwards, and thus preparing the spiritual Israel, which was to replace the carnal Israel when the latter is to be rejected. But it is to vv. 23 and 24 that this idea belongs; and the allusion to the power displayed in the destruction of Pharaoh and his army (ver. 17) leads us rather to apply this expression to the near destruction of Jerusalem and of the Jewish people by the arm of the Romans, which was to be in this unexampled catastrophe the instrument of God's wrath and power.—The execution of this destruction, long ago determined and clearly announced by Jesus Himself, God delayed for forty years; that is the *long-suffering* of which the apostle here speaks. It seems as if, at the very moment when Israel was laying its deicidal arm on the person of the Messiah, God should have annihilated it by a thunderbolt. But, agreeably to the prayer of Him who said, "Father, forgive them," a whole period more of long-suffering was granted them, and not only of long-suffering, but of tender and urgent invitation by the preaching of the apostles. Is not Paul then right in characterizing God's dealings with Israel by the words: "Though He was already determined to . . . He endured with much long-suffering"? Comp. the accumulated expressions of *goodness, forbearance*, and long-

suffering. Chrysostom and de Wette have applied this word *endured* to God's patience with Pharaoh. This was to make a simple allusion the explanation; Paul has finished with Pharaoh long ago. According to Meyer, Paul means that God put off the judgment of the Jewish people, because as the destruction of Jerusalem was to be the signal of the end of the world, if God had hastened this event there would have remained no more time for the conversion of the Gentiles. This idea is bound up with the explanation given by Meyer of the *that*, ver. 23. But it is difficult to suppose that Paul, who, according to 1 Thess. ii. 16, was expecting the destruction of the Jewish people as close at hand, and who yet, according to chap. xi., placed the conversion of all Gentile nations and the restoration of the Jews before the end of the world, could have imagined that all these phases of the great drama of humanity were to be accomplished in so brief a time. The meaning which we have given presents none of these difficulties.—But those Jews to whom God extends such marvellous long-suffering are none the less already *vessels of wrath fitted to destruction.* The term: *vessels of wrath*, signifies, according to Lange: "vessels on which wrath falls," that is to say, which He will break in His wrath. But ver. 21 and the completely parallel passage, 2 Tim. ii. 20, show that the point in question is the *use*, and consequently the *contents* of those vessels. The meaning is therefore: all saturated with wrath; not for the purpose of emptying it on others, like the angels who hold the seven vials of divine wrath, Rev. xvi. (Lange's objection), but to taste all its bitterness themselves. —The perfect participle *κατηρτισμένα, prepared, fitted to*, has given rise to great discussions; for the apostle does not tell us *by whom* this preparing was made. Meyer contends that it should be ascribed to *God Himself.* He supports his view by the regimen following: *to destruction*, which indicates a judgment *of God.* But we find in ii. 4 an authentic explanation from the apostle himself on this subject. If the Jews are actually ripe for judgment, he says, it is not the fault of God, who has faithfully pointed them to repentance and salvation; it is the effect of their own *hardening* and *impenitent heart* which has changed the treasures of divine grace into treasures of wrath heaped on them. What answer does Meyer

give to this? He holds that the apostle moves between two irreconcilable theories. In chap. ii. Paul stood, it is true, at the viewpoint of human liberty; but here he starts from the standpoint of absolute divine will. But is it probable that a mind so logical as Paul's should accept such an irreducible duality of views? And what seems stranger still is, that from ver. 30 of our chapter onwards, and in the whole of chap. x., he replaces himself anew at the standpoint of human liberty, and reproduces exactly the same explanation as in chap. ii.! Finally, while in the following verse he directly ascribes to God the preparation of the elect for salvation: "*which He has* prepared unto glory," he deliberately avoids expressing himself thus in speaking of the preparation of the Jews for destruction. He here employs, instead of the active verb *prepare*, with God as its subject, the passive participle: *fitted to*. The understood subject of this action of *fitting* appears not only from ii. 4, but more clearly still if possible from the passage, 1 Thess. ii. 15, 16: "the Jews, who both killed the Lord Jesus and their own prophets, and persecuted us; and they please not God, and are contrary to all men: forbidding us to speak to the Gentiles that they might be saved, to fill up their sins alway; but wrath is come upon them to make an end of them." It thus appears who is the author of the present ripeness of the Jews for judgment in Paul's view. It is not God assuredly who has Himself prepared vessels *which please Him not*, and of which *He is in haste to make an end*. De Wette even acknowledges that the apostle "*avoids saying* by whom they have been fitted to destruction." —The perfect participle used by the apostle denotes a *present state* which has been previously formed in a certain manner; but this participle indicates absolutely nothing as to the mode in which this state has been produced; hence the expressions *ripe* or *ready for* . . . very well render the thought contained in this term; comp. Luke vi. 40. The choice of the verb καταρτίζειν, *to arrange perfectly, equip* (for example, a vessel, that it may be ready to set sail, see Passow), shows also that the point in question is not the beginning of this moral development (which would have required the term ἑτοιμάζειν, ver. 23), but its end. In using this term, Paul means to designate the *result* of the historical development of the people: their present state

as being that of *full ripeness* for divine judgment. So this expression has been rightly explained by the Greek Fathers, Grot., Calov., Beng., Olsh., Hofm., etc. As to the manner in which St. Paul viewed the formation of this state of perdition, we may determine it with certainty by what he has said in chap. i. of the analogous development wrought among the Gentiles. First, they voluntarily extinguished the light which burned in them by natural revelation; then, as a punishment, God *gave them up* to their evil propensities, and thereafter evil overflowed like a flood; comp. i. 24, 26, and 28. The same was the case with Pharaoh; he began by hardening himself when confronted with the first signs of the divine will; then God hardened him; again he hardened himself; and finally, judgment took hold of him. Thus it is always that the two factors, the human and the divine, concur in the tragical development of such a moral state. As is admirably said by Lange: "These two points of view [which are alleged to be contradictory] fall into one, according to which every development in sin is a tissue of transgressions due to human responsibility, and of judgments coming from God." It is exactly so with Israel. The development of their state of perdition begins face to face with the Mosaic and prophetic revelations, whose sanctifying influence they reject; it continues in presence of the appearance and work of Jesus Himself; and now it reaches its goal with the rejection of the apostolical preaching and the perfidious obstacles raised by Israel against this preaching throughout the whole world. After such a history this people deserved the judgment of hardening which overtook them (xi. 8–10), more even than Pharaoh.—*Perdition*, ἀπώλεια, does not merely denote external punishment, the destruction of Jerusalem and the dispersion of the people; it is also the condemnation of the wilfully unbelieving Israelites. It is quite obvious, indeed, that this ripeness of the people for condemnation did not prevent the individual conversion of any of its members, any more than the collective entrance of the Gentiles into the kingdom of God, ver. 27, prevents the unbelief and hardening of individuals among them. And this is what explains the object of God's *long-suffering* toward this people even when ripe for destruction; He wished to allow all those who might yet separate from this mass time to respond to the gospel call

(Acts ii. 40). To the long-suffering of God with the already devoted nation, there is added the merciful work whereby God draws from within it the foreknown believers to form the nucleus of the church (vv. 23, 24).

Ver. 23. Here God is presented to us as the potter, labouring to form the vessels of honour.—How are we to construe the proposition: *And that He might make known?* The most forced construction is that of Ewald, Hofmann, and Schott, who find here the principal clause on which depends the subordinate: Now, if God, willing . . . ver. 22. The sense would in that case be: "Now, if God, willing to show . . ., endured . . ., He also (*καί*) acted that (*ἵνα*)." Such an ellipsis seems inadmissible. — Calvin, Grotius, Meyer, Lange leave nothing to be understood, but make the *καὶ ἵνα, and that,* directly dependent on the: *He endured,* in the preceding sentence: "If, willing to show His wrath . . ., God endured . . ., *and also that*" . . . Here on this view would be a second aim in God's long-suffering, added by Paul as subsidiary to the first. The principal proposition on which the *if* depends would remain understood, as we said in the outset; it would be: "What can be said? Canst thou find fault?" The meaning is nearly the same as in the previous construction; only the grammatical form is a little more flowing. But it is difficult to believe that God's dealing with the vessels of honour should be given as a mere appendix, supplementary to His dealing with the vessels of wrath. The two things ought at least to be put on an equal footing, as in ver. 21.—Beza, Rückert, and Beyschlag make the *that* dependent on *κατηρτισμένα, fitted to:* "Vessels of wrath fitted to destruction, and also that (*καὶ ἵνα*) God might make known the riches of His grace." But how make the idea of the manifestation of grace, which is one of the two fundamental ideas of the whole passage, dependent on an expression so subordinate as this participle?—There remains only one possible construction, that of some ancients, and of Philippi, Reuss, and others, that is, to understand here the *εἰ, if,* of ver. 22, and to make ver. 23 a proposition parallel to the preceding: "If willing . . . God endured . . . and [if] that" . . . But where, in this case, is the verb dependent on this second *if* and parallel to *He endured?* Either there

must be held to be a new ellipsis to be added to that of the principal verb,—which is very clumsy,—or this verb must be found in the ἐκάλεσεν, He called, of ver. 24. Undoubtedly the relative pronoun οὕς, *whom*, "*whom* He called," seems to be opposed to this solution. But we have already seen—and it is a turn of expression not unusual in Greek—that Paul sometimes connects with a dependent proposition a member of the sentence which properly belonged to the principal proposition; comp. iii. 8, and especially Gal. ii. 4, 5: "*to whom* we did not give place," for: "we gave not place *to them*." It is precisely for this reason, no doubt, that he here adds to the relative οὕς, *whom*, the pronoun ἡμᾶς, *us*, this apposition being, as it were, the last remnant of the regular construction which had been abandoned. And why this incorrectness? Is it a piece of negligence? By no means. By this relative οὕς, *whom*, as well as by the καί, *also*, added to the verb *He called*, ver. 24, the apostle means to bring out the close bond which connects with one another the two acts of *preparing beforehand*, ver. 23, and *calling*, ver. 24; comp. viii. 30, where the same relation of ideas is expressed under the same form: "Whom He did predestinate, them He *also called*." Our translation has rendered (ver. 24) this turn of the original as exactly as our language permits.

By the words: *to make known the riches of His glory*, Paul alludes to the example of Moses, ver. 15, who had asked God to *show him His glory*, exactly as by the expression of ver. 22 he had reminded his readers of those relative to Pharaoh. These riches of glory are the manifestation of His mercy which heaps glory on the vessels of honour, as the manifestation of wrath brings down perdition on the vessels that are worthless. Glory is here particularly the splendour of divine love.—*Vessels of mercy*: Vessels that are to be filled with salvation by mercy.—*Which He prepared beforehand*, ἃ προητοίμασε. This expression means more than the *ready* or *fitted for* of the previous verse; it was God Himself who had beforehand prepared everything to make those beings the objects of His grace. This saying is explained by the analogous expressions viii. 29, 30; comp. the πρό, *beforehand*, which enters into the composition of the verb, as into that of the two verbs viii. 29; then the relation of the verbs *prepared*

beforehand and *call*, which is the same as that between the verbs *predestinate* and *call*, ver. 30; and, finally, the *καί, also*, before *ἐκάλεσε, called*, which reproduces that of viii. 30. Jesus expresses an idea analogous to this, Matt. xxv. 34: "Inherit the kingdom *prepared for you* from the foundation of the world;" with this difference, that in this saying it is the kingdom which is prepared in advance for believers, whereas here it is believers who are so for the kingdom. In this term: *prepared beforehand*, there are contained the two ideas of *foreknowledge* (prevision of faith) and *predestination* (destination to glory), expounded viii. 29. Let us further remark these four striking differences between this expression and the corresponding term of the preceding verse (*κατηρτισμένα*): 1. The preposition *πρό, beforehand*, is wanting in the participle of ver. 22. 2. There the passive form, instead of the active used here. 3. Here the aorist, referring to the eternal act, as in viii. 29, instead of the perfect (ver. 22), which denoted the present fact. 4. Here the verb *ἑτοιμάζειν, to prepare*, which indicates the beginning of the development, instead of that of ver. 21, which indicated its result. These four differences are not accidental, and leave no doubt as to the apostle's view.

Ver. 24. And those predestined to glory, He has drawn by long-suffering, not only from the midst of the lost mass of the Jews, but also from among the Gentiles. This was what Jesus had declared: "I have yet other sheep which are not of this fold" (John x. 16). And this Paul had in view in the words: *the riches of His glory*. While He gleaned among the Jews, He reaped a harvest among the Gentiles, and thus carried out, in spite of Jewish pretensions, the free and large plan of salvation which He had formed on the sole prevision of faith.—The *καί, also*, reminds us of the relation between the eternal decree and the call in time.—It is thus a new people of elect ones, composed of the believing portion of the old Israel and of the entire multitude of the believing Gentiles, whom the apostle sees rising to the divine call to take the place of that carnal Israel; comp. Luke xiv. 15–24 and Rev. vii. 9 et seq. He cannot but think with a profound feeling of gratitude that it is by his own ministry this rich exercise of grace is effected; that he is himself in a way the

hand of God, to form out of the mass of the Gentile world that multitude of vessels unto honour!

Here should be placed logically the principal proposition, which is interrogative, but understood, on which rest the two preceding subordinate propositions, beginning with *now if*, ver. 22, and *and if*, ver. 23: "And if those Jews, already ripe for perdition, are still borne with by God, who holds His arm ready to strike them and cast them far from Him, and if as to those believers whom He has prepared beforehand He does not confine Himself to take them from Israel, but goes in search of them to the very ends of the earth . . ., *will mankind be entitled to find fault with God who thus directs their destinies?* Will the Jewish people in particular be able to reproach God for the way in which He exercises His justice on them, seeing they have so justly brought this judgment upon them, and for the use which He at the same time makes of His mercy, calling His elect from the whole mass of mankind, without disturbing Himself about the reprobation which Israel is pleased to suspend over one whole part of this mass? . . . Yea, O Jew, who dost venture to dispute with God, what hast thou to say!" And I ask every reader who has attentively followed this explanation of the apostle's words, what can be said against this defence of God's dealings? Do not all the divine perfections concur harmoniously in realizing God's plan, and has not the freedom of man its legitimate place in the course of history, in perfect harmony with God's sovereign freedom in His acts of grace as well as in His judgments?

The word of God has not therefore been made of no effect by the fact of the rejection of the Israelitish nation (ver. 6). For, 1st, the principle of divine *selection* which controlled the early destinies of the patriarchal family is only realized anew in the distinction between believing Israelites and the carnal and rejected mass (vv. 6–13). 2d. God, when making choice of this people to prepare for the salvation of the world, did not abdicate His freedom to reject them on certain conditions, and if He came to think this good; neither did He abdicate His liberty of calling other individuals not belonging to this people, on certain conditions, and if He came to see good reason. And the use which He actually makes of this

liberty, in rejecting His obstinately rebellious people while sparing them as long as possible, and even after the greatest crimes, is not tantamount to the annulling of His word (vv. 14–24). But, 3d, more remains to be said: this double dispensation of the calling of the Gentiles and of the rejection of Israel is nothing else than the *fulfilling* of His very word; for it was announced beforehand. This is what is proved by the third part of this discussion, vv. 25–29.

Vv. 25–29.

And first, vv. 25 and 26: the proclamation by the prophets of the calling of the Gentiles; then vv. 27–29: that of the rejection of the mass of the Jewish people.

Vv. 25, 26. "*As He saith also in Osee, I will call them my people, which were not my people; and her beloved, which was not beloved. And it shall come to pass, that in the place where it was said unto them, Ye are not my people; there shall they be called the children of the living God.*"—The words *as also* evidently refer to the last words of ver. 24: "but also of the Gentiles." To facilitate the exposition of the following quotation, Hofmann has thought it best to apply this *as also* to the first words of ver. 24: "not of the Jews only." But this reference is not in keeping with the apostle's thought; for when he really passes to the prophecies relating to Israel, ver. 27, he expressly indicates this transition. The difficulty which has driven Hofmann to his view is this: Hosea, in the two passages quoted, ii. 23 and i. 10, is certainly speaking of the Israelites of the ten tribes scattered in distant lands, and not of Gentiles; how can the apostle apply them to the latter? St. Peter does exactly the same thing (1 Pet. ii. 10). Hodge remarks that the ten tribes having relapsed into idolatry, were thus in the same state as the Gentiles, so that what was said of the former could equally be applied to the latter. Then he cites the fact, as Tholuck does, that in Scripture a general truth enunciated in regard to a particular class of men is afterwards applied to all those whose character and position are found to be the same. And, indeed, in the mouth of God the expressions: "that which is not of my people;" "her which is not beloved;" "I will call them my people . . ., beloved,"

express a principle of the divine government which comes into play everywhere when circumstances reappear similar to those to which they were originally applied. This was the case with the Gentiles yet more completely, if that is possible, than with the inhabitants of Samaria. We shall add, that the exiled Israelites being mingled with the Gentiles, and forming one homogeneous mass with them, cannot be brought to God separately from them. Isa. xlix. 22 represents the Gentiles as carrying the sons of Israel in their arms and their daughters on their shoulders, and consequently as being restored to grace along with them.—Instead of: *I will call,* Hosea simply says: *I will say to.* The meaning is the same; for *I will call* applies to the *new name* which will be given them (see the full context of Hosea). Only by the form *I will call,* Paul alludes to the calling of the Gentiles *to salvation.*

Ver. 26. The second saying quoted (Hos. i. 10) is attached to the preceding as if it followed it immediately in the prophet. More than once in the following chapters we find this combination of originally distinct sayings. Some apply the expression in Hosea: *in the place where,* to the land of Samaria, in the meaning that God there *pronounced* the rejection of the people. In that case, Paul, in applying this saying to the Gentiles, would have perverted it entirely from its meaning. But is it not more natural to apply this word: *the place where,* to the strange land where the Jews were long captive, and as it were abandoned of God? Was it not there God said to them by the voice of fact during long ages: "Ye are not my people"? Is it not there that they will begin anew to feel the effects of grace when God shall visit them, and recall them as well as the Gentiles, with whom they are at present confounded?

Vv. 27–29. "*But Esaias crieth concerning Israel, Though the number of the children of Israel be as the sand of the sea, the remnant*[1] *[only] shall be saved: for the Lord will make a short and summary reckoning on the earth:*[2] *and, as Esaias foretold, Except the Lord of Sabaoth had left us a seed, we had been as Sodom, and been made like unto Gomorrha.*"—*Δέ, on the other*

[1] ℵ B read ὑπολειμμα instead of καταλειμμα.

[2] We, along with ℵ A B, Syr[sch], reject after συντετμημενον the words following: ἡ δικαιοσυνη ὁτι λογον συντετμημενον.

hand (but). Paul's object is not merely to contrast Israel with the Gentiles, for in that case the words *concerning Israel* would begin the sentence. He wishes at the same time to show how the one prophet completes the other. His meaning is this: "To the saying of Hosea regarding the Gentiles there is added, to complete the revelation of God's plan, the following declaration of Isaiah concerning Israel."—The expression *κράζει, cries,* indicates the threatening tone of the herald called to proclaim thus the judgment of the Sovereign. In this relation the preposition *ὑπέρ, over,* might well have its local sense: this threat henceforth hangs *over the head* of Israel.—The quotation is taken from Isa. x. 22, 23. The article *τό, the,* before the word *remnant,* characterizes this remnant as a thing known; and, indeed, one of the most frequent notions of the Book of Isaiah is that of the *holy remnant,* which survives all the chastisements of Israel, and which, coming forth purified from the crucible, becomes each time the germ of a better future. The T. R. reads *κατάλειμμα,* which is the term used by the LXX.; we ought probably to read with the Alexs. *ὑπόλειμμα.* The view of the apostle is not, as Hofmann and others think, that this remnant will *certainly* subsist; that is not the question. In the context, both of Isaiah and of the apostle, there is a contrast between the innumerable multitude which as it seemed ought to form Jehovah's people and which perishes, and the poor remnant which alone remains to enjoy the salvation.

Ver. 28 explains this idea of a *saved remnant.* This time, indeed, judgment will be carried out neither by halves nor over a long period. It will be, says Isaiah, a sudden and summary execution which will fall not upon this or that individual, but on the nation as a whole. Such is the meaning of the Hebrew and of the LXX., though the latter have somewhat modified the form of the original. Isaiah says literally: "Destruction is resolved on; it makes righteousness overflow; for the Lord works on the earth destruction and decree." The LXX. translate: "The Lord fulfils the sentence; He cuts short righteously, because He will execute a summary reckoning upon all the earth." Paul reproduces this second form while abridging it; for it is probable we should prefer the shortest reading, that of the oldest Mjj. and of the Peschito

(see the note), since that of the T. R. merely restores the text of the LXX. The word λόγος might undoubtedly signify *decree;* but in connection with the terms *number* and *remnant* of ver. 27, as well as with the two participles συντελῶν and συντέμνων, *consummating* and *cutting short*, the word ought here to preserve its natural meaning of *reckoning:* "God will this time make His reckoning with Israel by a short and summary process." In this threatening the feeling of indignation prevails. Paul subjoins to it a second saying, ver. 29, which rather breathes sadness and compassion; it is taken from Isa. i. 9. He no longer quotes it with the word κράζει, *he cries;* he uses the calmer term προείρηκεν, *he said before.* Some expositors explain this preposition πρό, *before*, contained in the verb, by the circumstance that in the Book of Isaiah this passage occurs before that which had just been quoted, vv. 27 and 28. This meaning is puerile; for the position has no importance. Paul wishes to bring out the idea that the prophetical mouth of Isaiah having once declared the fact, it must be expected that one day or other it would be realized. The meaning of this saying is, that without a quite peculiar exercise of grace on the part of the Lord, the destruction announced vv. 27 and 28 would have been more radical still, as radical as that which overtook the cities of the plain, of which there remained not the slightest vestige.—Σπέρμα, *a germ, a shoot;* this word expresses the same idea as ὑπόλειμμα, *the remnant*, ver. 27. But, as is well said by Lange, it adds to it the idea of the glorious future which is to spring from that remnant.—Instead of saying: *we should have been made like to*, Paul says, with the LXX., *made like as*, thus heaping up two forms of comparison, so as to express the most absolute assimilation. Such would have been the course of justice; and if Israel will find fault, they have only one thing for which to blame God, that is, for not having annihilated them utterly.

No, certainly; by concluding a special covenant with Israel, God had not abdicated the right of judging them, and alienated His liberty in respect of them and of the rest of mankind. His promise had never had this bearing, and the rejection of Israel does it no violence. But thus far the problem had been treated only from the formal point of view;

the question had been only as to God's *right*. The apostle now enters upon the matter involved. The right being established, it remains to examine what use God has made of it. This is the subject treated by the apostle in the following passage, which extends from ver. 30 to the end of chap. x.

TWENTY-SECOND PASSAGE (IX. 30–X. 21).

Israel the Cause of their own Rejection.

Vv. 30–33.

In vv. 30–33 the apostle gives summarily the solution of the problem; then he developes it in chap. x.

Vv. 30, 31. "*What shall we say then? That the Gentiles, which followed not after righteousness, have obtained righteousness, but the righteousness which is of faith; and that Israel, which followed after the law of righteousness, hath not attained to the law of righteousness.*"[1]—The question: *What shall we say then?* has in the present case peculiar gravity: "The explanation of the fact not being found by saying, God has annulled His word; what, then, is the solution of the enigma?" Thus, after setting aside the false solution, Paul invites his reader to seek with him the true one; and this solution he expresses in ver. 31 in a declaration of painful solemnity, after prefacing it in ver. 30 with a saying relating to the lot of the Gentiles. While the latter have obtained what they sought not, the Jews have missed what they sought; the most poignant irony in the whole of history. Some expositors have thought that the proposition which follows the question, *What shall we say then?* was not the answer to the question, but a second question explanatory of the first. We must then prolong the interrogation to the end of ver. 31. But what do we find there? Instead of an answer, a new question, διατί, *wherefore?* This construction is clearly impossible. It is the same with the attempt of Schott, who makes a single question of the whole sentence from the τί οὖν to δικαιοσύνην (the second): What shall we say then of the fact that the Gentiles

[1] The word δικαιοσυνης, which is here read by the T. R., is found in F K L P, Syr.; it is omitted in ℵ A B D E G.

have obtained . . . ? and who finds the answer to this question in the last words of the verse: "but the righteousness of faith!" —The solution given by the apostle may be thus expressed: "That, whereas the Gentiles have obtained . . ., Israel, on the contrary, has failed" . . .—*Ἔθνη*, without article: Gentiles, beings having this characteristic. The subjective negative *μή* might be rendered: "*without their* seeking." — *Δικαιοσύνην*, without article, *a righteousness*. It is a mistake to give to this word here, as Meyer does, the moral sense of *holiness;* for it could not be said of the Greeks that they did not often aspire after a high morality. What they never sought was *righteousness*, in the religious sense of the word, justification. The idea which they formed of sin as a simple error, and of the Deity as not looking very narrowly at human actions, did not lead them to the pursuit of righteousness in this sense. And yet they obtained it, precisely because they were exempt from the false pretensions which barred access to it in the case of the Jews. They were like the man of whom Jesus speaks, who, crossing a field, discovers a treasure in it which he was not seeking, and without hesitating makes sure of its possession. The verb *κατέλαβεν*, literally, *put the hand on*, suits this mode of acquisition. It must, however, be further explained how the matter could transpire in this way; hence the last words: "but the righteousness which is of faith." The *δέ*, *but*, is explicative (as in iii. 22): "but the righteousness thus obtained could, of course, only be a righteousness of faith."

Ver. 31. The lot of the Gentiles presents a contrast fitted to bring out more clearly the tragical character of that of Israel. This people, which alone followed the law of righteousness, is precisely the one which has not succeeded in reaching it. Some (Chrys., Calv., Beng., etc.) have stumbled at this expression, *the law of righteousness*, and have translated it as if it were *the righteousness of the law*. They have not understood the apostle's expression. What Israel sought was not so much righteousness itself in its moral essence, as the law in all the detail of its external and manifold observances. The expression is therefore chosen deliberately, "to remind the reader," as Holsten well says, "of the weakness of the religious conscience of Israel, which was ever seeking an

external standard." If the Jews in general had been seriously preoccupied, like young Saul, with true moral righteousness, the law thus applied would have become to them what it was in its destination, *the schoolmaster to bring them to Christ* (Gal. iii. 23, 24). But seeking only the letter, they neglected the spirit. Levitical prescriptions, minutiæ about Sabbaths and meats, fastings, tithes, washings of hands, of bodies, of furniture, etc., such were their sole pursuits. The object of their labour was thus really *the law*, from which *righteousness* should have proceeded, and not *righteousness* itself, as the true contents of the law. Therein there was a profound moral aberration which led them to the refusal of true righteousness when it was presented to them in the person of the Messiah.—By designating true righteousness in the same sentence by the same expression, *the law of righteousness*, the apostle wishes by the identity of terms to exhibit the contrast in the things: pursuing the shadow, they missed the reality.—The term *law* is taken the second time in that more general sense in which we have found it so often used in our Epistle (iii. 27, vii. 21 and 25, viii. 2): a certain mode of being, fitted to determine the will. The reference is to the true mode of justification.—The strongly supported reading which rejects the word δικαιοσύνης, *of righteousness*, would signify: "they have not attained *to the law*." But what would that mean? They have not attained to the fulfilment of the law? The expression: "attain to the law," would be very strange taken in this sense. Or would it apply, as some have thought, to the law of the gospel? But where is the gospel thus called nakedly *the law?* This reading is therefore inadmissible, as Meyer himself acknowledges, notwithstanding his habitual predilection for the Alexandrine text, and in opposition to the opinion of Tischendorf.

Vv. 32, 33. "*Wherefore? Because* [*seeking*] *not by faith, but as it were by works,*[1] *they stumbled*[2] *at the stumbling-stone; as it is written, Behold, I lay in Sion a stumbling-stone and rock of offence: and he*[3] *who believeth on Him shall not be ashamed.*" —The apostle has just declared (ver. 30) the moral fact which

[1] T. R. reads νομου after ιργων, with D E K L P, Syr.
[2] T. R. reads γαρ after προσεκοψαν, with E K L P, Syr.
[3] T. R. reads πας after και, with K L P.

is the real cause of Israel's rejection, and he now asks how this fact could have come about. The question, *wherefore?* does not signify *for what end* (εἰς τί)? but *on account of what* (διὰ τί)? If, with the T. R. and some Byz. Mjj., we read γάρ, *for*, with *they stumbled*, this verb necessarily begins a new proposition, and a finite verb must be understood with the conjunction *because:* "because *they sought*, not by faith, but as it were by works." But this reading seems too slenderly supported to be admissible, and it is difficult to extract from it a rational meaning; for the act of *stumbling* is rather the *effect* than the *cause*, or than the *proof* of seeking in a false way. It would require, consequently, to be, "they stumbled *therefore*." If, with the most numerous and important documents, we reject the *for*, two possible constructions remain: Either the whole may be taken as a single proposition (see the translation); the two regimens: *not by faith* and *as it were by works*, depend in this case on *they stumbled*, the participle *seeking* being understood; this construction is somewhat analogous to that of ver. 11. The meaning is excellent. "Wherefore did they not find true righteousness? Because, seeking it in the way of works, they ended in stumbling against the stumbling-stone, the Messiah who brought to them true righteousness, that of faith." Or it is possible, even without the *for*, to find here two propositions, as is done by most commentators; the first: "Because they sought not in the way of faith, but in that of works;" the second, which would follow by way of *asyndeton*, and which would require to be regarded as pronounced with emotion: "Yea; they stumbled" . . . ! But what prevents us from adopting this last construction is, that the idea of *stumbling* thus comes on us too abruptly. It would require a καὶ οὕτως, *and so*, to establish the relation between the two acts of *seeking* in the false way and *stumbling*. We hold, therefore, by the preceding construction.—Paul can with good reason make it a *charge* against the Jews that they have not sought righteousness in the way of faith; for he had shown (chap. iv.) by the example of Abraham that this way was already marked out in the O. T.; comp. also the saying of Habakkuk quoted (i. 17), and that of Isaiah about to be referred to (ver. 33), etc. Every day the experiences made under the law should have brought the serious Jew to the

feet of Jehovah in the way of repentance and faith to obtain pardon and help (see the Psalms). And following this course, they would have avoided stumbling at the Messianic righteousness; they would, on the contrary, have grasped it greedily, as was done by the *élite* of the people. The *as it were*, added to the regimen *by works*, signifies quite naturally: "As if it were possible to find righteousness by this means." Meyer explains it somewhat differently. "To seek righteousness by a process *such as* that of works." But the first meaning much better describes the contrast between the real and the imaginary means.—The complement *νόμου, of the law*, in the T. R. is omitted by the Alexs. and the Greco-Latins; it adds nothing to the idea. Seeking in this false way, they have ended by stumbling on the stone which made them fall. This stone was Jesus, who brought them a righteousness acquired by Himself and offered only to faith. The figure of *stumbling* is in keeping with all those that precede: *follow after, attain to, reach* (obtain). In their foolish course, Israel thought they were advancing on a clear path, and lo! all at once there was found on this way an obstacle upon which they were broken. And this obstacle was the very Messiah whom they had so long invoked in all their prayers! But even this result was foretold.

Ver. 33. Paul combines in this quotation Isa. xxvii. 16 and viii. 14, and that in such a way that he borrows the first and last words of his quotation from the former of these passages, and those of the middle from the latter. It is hard to conceive how a great number of commentators can apply the saying of Isaiah, xxviii. 16: "Behold, I lay in Zion for a foundation a stone, a tried stone" . . . etc., to the theocracy itself (see Meyer). The theocracy is the edifice which is raised in Zion; how should it be its foundation? According to viii. 14, the foundation is Jehovah; and it is on this stone that the unbelieving Israel of both kingdoms stumble, while on this rock he that believes takes refuge. In chap. xxviii. the figure is somewhat modified; for Jehovah *is* no longer the foundation; it is He who *lays* it. The foundation here is therefore Jehovah in His final manifestation, the Messiah. We thus understand why Paul has combined the two passages so closely; the one explains the other. It is in the sense

which we have just established that the same figure is applied to Christ, Luke ii. 34, xx. 17, 18; 1 Pet. ii. 4 (comp. *Bible annotée* on the two passages of Isaiah, quoted by the apostle). The terms *stone, rock,* express the notion of consistency. We break ourselves struggling against the Messiah, rather than break Him. — The two words *πρόσκομμα* and *σκάνδαλον, stumbling* and *scandal,* are not wholly synonymous. The former denotes the shock, the latter the fall resulting from it; and so the former, the moral conflict between Israel and the Messiah, and the latter, the people's unbelief. The first figure applies, therefore, to all the false judgments passed by the Jews on the conduct of Jesus—His healings on the Sabbath, His alleged contempt of the law, His blasphemies, etc.; the second, to the rejection of the Messiah, and, in His person, of Jehovah Himself.—The adj. *πᾶς, every one,* which the T. R. adds to the word *he who believeth,* is omitted by the Alexs. and the Greco-Latins, and also by the Peschito. The context also condemns it. The point to be brought out here is not that *whosoever* believeth is saved, but: that *it is enough* to believe in order to be so. The word *every one* (which is not in Isaiah) has been imported from x. 11, where, as we shall see, it is in its place.—The Hebrew verb, which the LXX. have translated by: *shall not be confounded,* strictly signifies: *shall not make haste* (flee away), which gives the same meaning. There is no need, therefore, to hold, with several critics, a difference of reading in the Hebrew text (*jabisch* for *jakisch*).

General considerations on chap. ix. — Though we have not reached the end of the passage beginning with ver. 30, the essential thought being already expressed in vv. 30–33, we may from this point cast a glance backwards at chap. ix. taken as a whole.—Three principal views as to the meaning of this chapter find expression in the numerous commentaries to which it has given rise:—

1. Some think they can carry up the thought of Paul to complete logical unity, by maintaining that it boldly excludes human freedom, and makes all things proceed from one single factor, the sovereign will of God. Some of these are so sure of their view, that one of them, a Strasburg professor, wrote most lately: "As to determinism, it would be to carry water to the Rhine, to seek to prove that this point of view is that of St. Paul."[1]

[1] M. Adolphe Krauss, *Literatur-Zeit.* iii. 13.

2. Others think that the apostle expounds the two points of view side by side with one another, — that of absolute predestination, to which speculative reflection leads, and that of human freedom, which experience teaches,—without troubling himself to reconcile them logically. This opinion is perhaps the most wide-spread among theologians at the present hour.

3. Finally, a third class think that in Paul's view the fact of human freedom harmonizes logically with the principle of divine predestination, and think they can find in his very exposition the elements necessary to harmonize the two points of view. Let us pass under review each of these opinions.

I. In the first, we immediately distinguish three groups. In the first place: the *particularistic predestinarians*, who, whether in the salvation of some or in the perdition of others, see only the effect of the divine decree. Such, essentially, are St. Augustine, the Reformers, the theologians of Dort, and the churches which have preserved this type of doctrine down to our day, whether pushing the consequence the length of ascribing the fall itself and sin to the divine will (*supralapsarians*), like Zwingle, who goes so far as to say, in speaking of Esau: "quem divina providentia creavit ut viveret *atque impie* viveret" (see Th. p. 500); or whether they stop half way, and, while ascribing the fall to human freedom, make the divine decree of human election bear solely on those among lost men whom God is pleased to save (*infralapsarians*).—But, first, it is forgotten that the apostle does not think for a moment of speculating in a general way on the relation between human freedom and divine sovereignty, and that he is occupied solely with showing the harmony between the particular fact of the rejection of the Jews and the promises relating to their election. Then it would be impossible, if he really held this point of view, to acquit him of the charge of self-contradiction in all those sayings of his which assume—1st. Man's entire freedom in the acceptance or rejection of salvation (ii. 4, 6–10, vi. 12, 13); 2d. The possibility of one converted falling from the state of grace through want of vigilance or faithfulness (viii. 13; 1 Cor. x. 1–12; Gal. v. 4; Col. i. 23, a passage where he says expressly: "*if at least* ye persevere"). Comp. also the words of Jesus Himself, John v. 40: "But ye will not come to me;" Matt. xxiii. 37: "How often would I . . . but ye would not." Finally, throughout the whole chapter which immediately follows, as well as in the four verses we have just expounded, vv. 30–33, the decree of the rejection of the Jews is explained, not by the impenetrable mystery of the divine will, but by the haughty tenacity with which the Jews, notwithstanding all God's

warnings, affected to establish their own righteousness and perpetuate their purely temporary prerogative.

In this first class we meet, in the second place, with the group of the *latitudinarian determinists*, who seek to correct the harshness of the predestinarian point of departure by the width of the point reached; the final goal, indeed, according to them, is *universal salvation*. The world is a theatre on which there is in reality but one actor, God, who plays the entire piece, but by means of a series of personages who act under His impulse as simple automata. If some have bad parts to play, they have not to blame or complain of themselves for that; for their culpability is only apparent, and . . . the issue will be happy for them. All's well that ends well. Such is the view of Schleiermacher and his school; it is that to which Farrar has just given his adherence in his great work on St. Paul.[1]—But how are we to reconcile this doctrine of universal salvation, I do not say only with declarations such as those of Jesus, Matt. xii. 23 ("neither in this world nor in the world to come"), xxvi. 24 ("it were better for that man that he had never been born"), Mark ix. 43–48, but also with the sayings of Paul himself, 2 Thess. i. 9; Rom. viii. 13? These declarations, indeed, seem incompatible with the idea of a universal final salvation. Neither does this idea seem to us to arise from the sayings of the apostle here and there whence it is thought possible to deduce it, such as 1 Cor. xv. 22 ("in Christ all made alive") and 28 ("God all in all"); for these passages refer only to the development of the work of salvation in believers. It is impossible to allow that a system according to which sin would be the act of God Himself, remorse an illusion arising from our limited and subjective viewpoint, and the whole conflict, so serious as it is between guilty man and God, a simple apparent embroilment with the view of procuring to us in the end the liveliest sensation of re-established harmony,—entered for a single moment the mind of the apostle.

We may say as much of the third form in which this determinist point of view presents itself, that of *pantheistic absorption*.

[1] *The Life and Work of St. Paul*, vol. ii. p. 241 et seq. After saying that St. Paul does not recoil before the apparent contradiction of an eternal paradox,—which would suppose that he allows the juxtaposition of two contradictory points of view,—this writer arrives definitively at the solution of Schleiermacher. The rejection of some only serves to pave the way which leads to universal restoration. God wills the salvation of all. The duality of election resolves itself into a council of grace which embraces all men. Human sin is no more regarded except as a transitory step (a *moment*) leading to this absolute end: God all in all. Such are the ideas enunciated by Farrar, particularly in pp. 245 and 246

No one will ever succeed in explaining the words of the apostle by such a formula. Paul emphasizes too forcibly the value and permanence of personality, as well as the moral responsibility of man; and it must not be forgotten that if he says: "God shall be *all*," he adds: *in all*.—In none of these three forms, therefore, can the system which makes everything, even evil, proceed from divine causality, be ascribed to Paul.

II. Must we take refuge in the idea of an *internal contradiction* attaching to the apostle's mode of view, whether this contradiction be regarded as a logical inconsequence attributable to the weakness of his mind (so Reiche and Fritzsche, who go so far as to deplore that the apostle "was not at the school of Aristotle rather than that of Gamaliel"); or with Meyer, Reuss, and a host of others, the problem be regarded as insoluble in its very nature, and in consequence of the limits of the human mind; so that, as Meyer says, whenever we place ourselves at one of the two points of view, it is impossible to expound it without expressing ourselves in such a way as to deny the other, as has happened to Paul in this chapter?—We think that in the former case the most striking character of St. Paul's mind is mistaken, his logical power, which does not allow him to stop short in the study of a question till he has thoroughly completed its elucidation. This characteristic we have seen throughout the whole of our Epistle. As to Meyer's point of view, if Paul had really thought thus, he would not have failed, in view of this insoluble difficulty, to stop at least once in the course of his exposition to exclaim, after the fashion of Calvin: *Mysterium horribile!*

III. It is therefore certain that the apostle was not without a glimpse of the real solution of the apparent contradiction on which he was bordering throughout this whole passage. Was this solution, then, that which has been proposed by Julius Müller in his *Sündenlehre*, and which is found in several critics, according to which Paul in chap. ix. explains the conduct of God from a purely *abstract* point of view, saying what God has the right to do, speaking absolutely, but what He does not do in reality? It is difficult to believe that the apostle would have thus isolated the abstract right from its historical execution, and we have seen in ver. 21 et seq. that Paul directly applies to the concrete case the view of right expounded in the instance of the potter.—Must we prefer the solution defended by Beyschlag in the wake of many other critics, according to which the question here relates solely to *groups of men*, and to those groups of men solely as to the *providential part* assigned them in the general course of God's kingdom; but not to the lot of *individuals*, and much less still as to the matter of their

final salvation? That it is so in regard to Esau and Jacob, does not seem to us open to doubt, since in those cases we have to do with national dispensations in the course of the preparatory economy. But it seems to me impossible to apply this solution to the essential point treated in the chapter, the rejection of the Jews and the calling of the Gentiles. For among those rejected Jews, Paul proves an election of redeemed ones, who are certainly so, in virtue of their individual faith; and among those Gentile nations who are called, he is very far from thinking there are none but saved individuals; so that the vessels of wrath are not the Jewish nation as such, but the individual unbelievers in the nation; and the vessels of mercy are not the Gentile peoples as such, but the individual believers among them. The point in question therefore is, the lot of individual Jews or Gentiles. When Paul says: "fitted to destruction" and "prepared unto glory," he is evidently thinking not only of a momentary rejection or acceptance, but of the final condemnation and salvation of those individuals. What is promised as to the final conversion of Israel has nothing to do with this question.—Neither can we adopt the attempt of Weiss to apply the right of God, expounded in chap. ix., solely to the competency belonging to God of *fixing the conditions* to which He chooses to attach the gift of His grace. The apostle's view evidently goes further; the cases of Moses and Pharaoh, with the expressions *to show grace* and *to harden*, indicate not simple conditions on which the event may take place, but a real action on God's part to produce it.—A multitude of expositors, Origen, Chrysostom, the Arminians, several moderns, such as Tholuck, etc., have endeavoured to find a formula whereby to combine the action of man's moral freedom (evidently assumed in vv. 30–33) with the divine predestination taught in the rest of the chapter. Without being able to say that they have entirely succeeded in showing the harmony between the two terms, we are convinced that it is only in this way that the true thought of the apostle can be explained; and placing ourselves at this viewpoint, we submit to the reader the following considerations, already partly indicated in the course of the exegesis:—

1. And first of all, the problem discussed by the apostle is not the speculative question of the relation between God's sovereign decree and man's free responsibility. This question appears indeed in the background of the discussion, but it is not its theme. This is simply and solely the fact of the *rejection* of Israel, the *elect* people; a fact proved in particular by the preamble ix. 1–5, and the vv. 30–33, introduced as a conclusion from what precedes by the words: "What shall we

say *then?*" We should not therefore seek here a theory of St. Paul, either regarding the divine decrees or human freedom; he will not touch this great question, except in so far as it enters into the solution of the problem proposed.

2. We must beware of confounding *liberty* and *arbitrariness* on the part of God, and *aptitude* and *merit* on the part of man. To begin with this second distinction, the free acceptance of any divine favour whatever, and of salvation in general, is an aptitude to receive and possess the gift of God, but does not at all constitute a merit conferring on man the right to claim it. We have already said: How can faith be a merit, that which in its essence is precisely the renunciation of all merit? This distinction once established, the other is easily explained. Face to face with human merit, God would no longer be *free*, and this is really all that Paul wishes to teach in our chapter. For his one concern is to destroy the false conclusion drawn by Israel from their special election, their law, their circumcision, their ceremonial works, their monotheism, their moral superiority. These were in their eyes so many bonds by which God was pledged to them beyond recall. God had no more the right to free Himself from the union once contracted with them, on any condition whatever. The apostle repels every *obligation* on God's part, and from this point of view he now vindicates the fulness of divine *liberty*. But he does not dream of teaching thereby divine *arbitrariness*. He does not mean for a moment that without rhyme or reason God resolved to divorce Himself from His people, and to contract alliance with the Gentiles. If God breaks with Israel, it is because they have obstinately refused to follow Him in the way which He wished the development of His kingdom henceforth to take (see the demonstration in chap. x.). If He now welcomes the Gentiles, it is because they enter with eagerness and confidence on the way which is opened to them by His mercy. There is thus no caprice on God's part in this double dispensation. God simply uses His liberty, but in accordance with the standard arising from His love, holiness, and wisdom. No anterior election can hinder Him either from showing grace to the man who was not embraced in it at the first, but whom He finds disposed to cast himself humbly on His favour; or to reject and harden the man to whom He was united, but who claims to set himself up proudly in opposition to the progress of His work. A free initiative on God's part in all things, but without a shadow of arbitrariness—such is the apostle's view. It is that of true monotheism.

3. As to the speculative question of the relation between God's eternal plan and the freedom of human determinations,

it seems to me probable that Paul resolved it, so far as he was himself concerned, by means of the fact affirmed by him, of *divine foreknowledge.* He himself puts us on this way, viii. 29, 30, by making foreknowledge the basis of predestination. As a general, who is in full acquaintance with the plans of campaign adopted by the opposing general, would organize his own in keeping with this certain prevision, and would find means of turning all the marches and counter-marches of his adversary to the success of his designs; so God, after fixing the supreme end, employs the free human actions, which He contemplates from the depths of His eternity, as factors to which He assigns a part, and which He makes so many means in the realization of His eternal design. Undoubtedly Paul did not think here of resolving the speculative question, for that did not enter into his task as an apostle; but his treatment furnishes us by the way with the necessary elements to convince us that if he had meant to do so, it would have been in this direction he would have guided our thoughts.

What are we to conclude from all this? That the apostle in this chapter, far from vindicating, as is ordinarily thought, the rights of divine election over against human freedom, vindicates, on the contrary, the rights of God's freedom in regard to His own election relating to Israel. His decree does not bind Him, as an external law imposed on His will would. He remains sovereignly free to direct His mode of acting at every moment according to the moral conditions which He meets with in humanity, showing grace when He finds good, even to men who were not in His covenant, rejecting when He finds good even men who were embraced in the circle which formed the object of His election. St. Paul did not therefore think of contending in behalf of divine sovereignty against human freedom; he contended for God's freedom in opposition to the chains which men sought to lay on Him in the name of their own election. We have here a treatise not *for*, but *against* unconditional election.

CHAP. X. 1–4.

The apostle has summarily enunciated the real solution of the enigma in vv. 30–33. The proud claim of the people to uphold their own righteousness caused them to stumble at the true righteousness, that of faith, which God offered them in the person of the Messiah. Chap. x. developes and establishes this solution of the problem. Notwithstanding their religious zeal, the Israelitish nation, blinded by their

self-righteousness, did not understand that *the end of the legal dispensation* must be the consequence of the coming of the Messiah (vv. 1–4); because He came to inaugurate a wholly new order of things, the characteristics of which were opposed to those of the legal system: 1st. The complete *freeness* of salvation (vv. 5–11); 2d. The *universality* of this free salvation (vv. 12–21).

In the act of unveiling the spiritual ignorance of the elect people, which forced God to separate from them for a time, Paul is seized with an emotion not less lively than that which he had felt when beginning to treat this whole matter (ix. 1 et seq.), and he interrupts himself to give vent to the feelings of his soul.

Vv. 1, 2. "*Brethren, my heart's good pleasure and the prayer*[1] *I address to God for them*[2] *are for their salvation.*[3] *For I bear them record that they have a zeal of God, but not according to knowledge.*" — The emotion with which the apostle's heart is filled betrays itself in the *asyndeton* between ver. 33 and ver. 1. By the word *brethren*, he joins his readers with him in that outburst of feeling to which he is about to give utterance. — The word εὐδοκία, *good pleasure, complacency of heart*, has been taken by many in the sense of *wish*; thus to make the term run parallel with the following: *my prayer*. But it is not necessary to give it this meaning, of which no example can be quoted. The apostle means that it is to this thought of Israel's salvation the regard of his heart rises with constant complacency; that therein, as it were, is found the ideal of his heart. To this idea there attaches quite naturally that of the prayer by which he asks the realization of the ideal. The three variants presented by the T. R. (indicated in the note) should be set aside. The two last arise no doubt from the circumstance that with this passage there began a public lesson, which made it necessary to complete the proposition.—The regimen ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν, *for them*, might depend on the verb *is*,

[1] The η which the T. R. places before δεησις is read only in K L and the Mnn.

[2] Instead of υπερ του Ισραηλ, which the T. R. reads with K L and Mnn., all the others read υπερ αυτων.

[3] Εστι of the T. R. is only read in K L P and Mnn.; omitted in all the rest.

or rather *are*, understood: my good pleasure and my prayer are *in their interest;* and this idea of interest, contained in the prep. ὑπέρ, would be afterwards determined by the apposition εἰς σωτηρίαν: "are in their interest, that is to say, for their salvation." But why add this explanation, which seems superfluous? Is it not better to make the regimen *for them*, as well as the preceding one *to God*, dependent on the word *prayer*, which has an active and verbal meaning, and to make εἰς σωτηρίαν, *to salvation*, the regimen of the whole proposition: "My good pleasure . . . and my prayer for them (on their account) tend to their salvation"? It was a matter of course that Paul prayed on account of Israel; but did he pray for their chastisement or their salvation? That was the question which might have been asked.—Bengel here observes, "that Paul would not have prayed for the Jews if they had been absolutely reprobate." And this remark is quoted by some with approbation. I do not think it accurate, for an absolute reprobation might indeed overtake unbelieving individuals of Paul's time, without its being possible to conclude therefrom to the eternal rejection of the people. Even in this case, therefore, Paul could pray for their future conversion.

Ver. 2. In this verse Paul justifies his so lively interest in the lot of the Jews, expressed in ver. 1. What has not been done, what has not been suffered, by those Jews devoted to the cause of God, under successive Gentile powers? Notwithstanding the most frightful persecutions, have they not succeeded in maintaining their monotheistic worship for ages in all its purity? And at that very time what an admirable attachment did they show to the ceremonies of their worship and the adoration of Jehovah! When Paul says μαρτυρῶ, *I bear them witness*, he seems to be alluding to his conduct of other days, and to say: I know something of it, of that zeal!—Unhappily this impulse is not guided according to the standard (κατά) of a just *knowledge*, of a real discernment of things. And it is this want of understanding which has spoiled the effects of this admirable zeal. He does not use the word γνῶσις, *knowledge* (in the ordinary sense of the word), for the Jews certainly do not lack religious knowledge. The compound term ἐπίγνωσις, which he employs here, rather

signifies *discernment*, that understanding which puts its finger on the true nature of the thing. They have failed to discern the true meaning and the true scope of the legal dispensation; they are ardently attached to all its particular rites, but they have not grasped their moral end.

Vv. 3, 4. "*For they being ignorant of God's righteousness, and seeking to establish their own righteousness,*[1] *have not submitted themselves unto the righteousness of God. For Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth.*" —These verses are meant to explain the terrible misunderstanding which weighed on the mind of Israel, and which now brings about the separation between God and His people. Not understanding that it was from God their righteousness was to come, Israel were led to maintain their legal dispensation at any cost, and to mistake the limit which God had purposed to assign it.—The term ἀγνοοῦντες, *not knowing*, is directly related to the preceding expression: *not according to knowledge.* Under the discipline of the law, the discernment of true righteousness, that which God grants to faith, should have been formed in them. For, on the one hand, the conscientious effort to observe the law would have brought them to feel their weakness (comp. chap. vii.); and, on the other, the profound study of the Scriptures would have taught them, by the example of Abraham (Gen. xv. 5) and by sundry prophetic declarations (Isa. l. 8, 9; Hab. ii. 4), that "righteousness and strength come from the Lord." But through not using the law in this spirit of sincerity and humility, they proved unfit to understand the final revelation; and their mind, carried in a false direction, stumbled at the divine truth manifested in the appearing of the Messiah (ver. 32). Several commentators understand ἀγνοοῦντες in a very forcible sense: *mistaking.* Meyer insists on retaining the natural sense: *not knowing.* This latter sense may suffice, indeed, provided it be not forgotten that in this case, as in many others, the want of knowing is the result of previous unfaithfulnesses; comp. 1 Cor. xiv. 38 and Acts xvii. 30.—Though we did not know from the first part of the Epistle the meaning of the term: *righteousness of God*, it would appear clearly here from the contrasted expression: *their own righteousness.* The latter is a sentence

[1] A B D E P omit the word δικαιοσυνην.

of justification which man obtains in virtue of the way in which he has fulfilled the law. God gives him nothing; He simply attests and proclaims the fact. The *righteousness* of God, on the contrary, is the sentence of justification which He confers on faith of His own good will.—In the first proposition the subject in question is the *notion* of God's righteousness, which has not succeeded in finding an entrance into their mind; in the second, the word is taken in the concrete sense; the subject is righteousness, as it has been really offered them in Christ.—*Στῆσαι, to establish;* this word means: to cause to stand erect as a monument raised, not to the glory of God, but to their own.—This proud attempt has issued in an open revolt, in the rejection of Christ and of the righteousness of God offered in Him. The verb *οὐχ ὑπετάγησαν, they have not submitted themselves,* characterizes the refusal to believe as a *disobedience;* it is the counterpart of the passages in which faith is called an *obedience* (i. 5, vi. 17). This verb may have the passive or middle sense; here it is evidently the second (viii. 7, xiii. 1).

But this voluntary revolt has cost Israel dear; for this is precisely the cause of their rejection.

Ver. 4. It is on this point, indeed, that their view and that of God have come into collision. The Messiah brought a free righteousness offered to faith; His coming consequently put an end to man's attempt to establish his own righteousness on the observance of the law; thus, then, fell the whole legal economy, which had now fulfilled its task. It was not so the Jews understood it. If they in a measure accepted the salvation of the Gentiles, they thought of it only as an annexation to Israel and a subjection to the sovereignty of Moses. It was under this idea "that they compassed sea and land, as Jesus says, to make proselytes" (Matt. xxiii. 15). The Messiah was simply to consummate this conquest of the world by Israel, destroying by judgment every Gentile who resisted. His reign was to be the perfect application of the legal institutes to the whole world. It is easy to understand the error and the irritation which could not fail to take possession of the people and their chiefs, when Jesus by His decided spirituality seemed to compromise the stability of the *law of ordinances* (Matt. v., ix. 11–17, xv. 1 et seq.); when He announced plainly that He came not to repair the old Jewish

garment, but to substitute for that now antiquated regime, a garment completely new. In this familiar form He expressed the same profound truth as St. Paul declares in our verse: The law falls to the ground with the coming of Him who brings a completely made righteousness to the believer.—The word τέλος may signify *end* or *aim;* but not, as some have understood it here (Orig., Er.): *fulfilment* (τελείωσις), a meaning which the word cannot have. The meaning *aim*, adopted by Calov, Grot., Lange, and others, is in keeping with Gal. iii. 24, where the law is called *the pedagogue* to bring the Jews to Christ. But the context seems rather to require that of *end* (Aug., Mey., etc.). There is a contrast between this word τέλος and the term στῆσαι, *to hold erect* (ver. 3). This latter meaning, that of *end*, no doubt implies the notion of *aim;* for if the law terminates with Christ, it is only because in Him it has reached its aim. Nevertheless it is true that the contrast established in the following development between the righteousness of the law and that of faith requires, as an explanation properly so called, the meaning of *end*, and not *aim*. Of two contrary things, when the one appears, the other must take end.—This new fact which puts an end to the law, is the coming of Christ made righteousness to the believer. The εἰς indicates the destination and application: "in righteousness offered and given to the believer, whoever he may be, Jew or Gentile;" comp. 1 Cor. i. 30. These words: *every one that believeth*, express the two ideas which are about to be developed in the two following passages: that of the *freeness* of salvation, contained in the word *believeth* (vv. 5–11); and that of its *universality*, contained in the word *every one* (vv. 12–21).

Vv. 5–11.

Ver. 5. "*For Moses describeth the righteousness which is of the law thus: The man who hath done* [*the law*], *shall live by it.*"[1]—In this translation we have followed, for the first of the three variants indicated in the note, the reading of the T. R., which is supported not only by the Byz. documents, but also

[1] The numerous variants of this verse may be reduced to these three principal ones:—

The ὅτι, *that*, is placed by T. R., with B E F G K L P, It. Syr., after the

by the *Vatic.* and the two ancient Latin and Syriac versions. It is easy to explain the origin of the other reading which has transposed the ὅτι, *that*, by placing it immediately after the verb γράφει, *writes;* it seemed that it should run: *Moses writes that.* As to the second variant, the authorities in favour of the T. R. ("he that hath done *those things*") are somewhat less strong, and especially it is probable that this object αὐτά (*those things*) was added under the influence of the text of the LXX.; no reason can be imagined why this word should have been rejected. With regard to the third, we think the T. R. must also be abandoned, which reads at the end of the verse ἐν αὐτοῖς, *by them* (those things), and prefer the reading ἐν αὐτῇ, *by it* (this righteousness). This last reading has on its side the same reasons which have decided us in regard to the second variant, and the authority of the *Vaticanus* besides. — Accordingly, the object of the verb γράφει, *writes*, is not the saying of Moses quoted afterwards, but the words: *the righteousness which is of the law*, so that we must here take the word γράφειν, with Calvin, in the sense of *describe* (Moses describit): "Moses thus describes this way for him who would follow it." Then (second variant) the participle: *he who has done*, must be taken in an absolute sense; for it has no expressed object; comp. iv. 4 (*he that worketh*, ὁ ἐργαζόμενος), literally: "He who *has acted*" (in contrast to him who *has believed*). In the translation we have been obliged to supply an object; that object is: what there was to be done, consequently the law. Finally, the ἐν αὐτῇ, *by it*, which we adopt (third variant), refers evidently to the whole phrase: "the righteousness which is of the law." This would be the means of salvation and life to him who should really do (the law).

But if it is certain that this way is impracticable for fallen man, how is it to be explained that Moses seriously proposed it to the people of God? Or must it be thought that there was here a sort of irony: "Try, and thou shalt see that it is

words την εκ του νομου, *the righteousness of the law*, while ℵ A D place it after γραφει, *writes*.

The ουτα, *these things*, which T. R., with B F G K L P, gives as object to ο ποιησας, *he who hath done*, is omitted by ℵ A D E,

Instead of εν αυτοις, *by them* (those things), which T. R. reads, with D E F G K L P, Syr., we find in ℵ A B: εν αυτη, *by it* (righteousness).

too hard for thee." It is enough to reperuse the passage of the law, Lev. xviii. 5, to be convinced that the latter cannot be the sense in which this invitation was addressed to the people by the lawgiver. Now, if this exhortation and promise were serious, the way thus traced out was practicable. And, in fact, the law of Jehovah rightly understood was not given independently of His grace. The law, taken in the full sense of the word, contained an entire provision of means of grace unceasingly offered to the pious Israelite. From the moment he sinned, he could have recourse humbly to the pardon of his God, either with or without sacrifice, as the case might be; comp. Ps. li. 16, 17: "Thou delightest not in sacrifice . . .; the sacrifice of God is a broken spirit;" vv. 10–12: "Create in me a clean heart, O God; let the spirit of freedom uphold me . . .; restore unto me the joy of Thy salvation." The law thus humbly understood and sincerely applied was certainly the way of salvation for the believing Jew; it led him to an ever closer communion with God, as we find exemplified so often in the O. T., and what was yet wanting to this theocratic pardon and salvation was to be granted one day in the Messianic pardon and salvation which closed the perspective of the national hope. There was nothing, then, more serious for the Israelite who understood and applied the law in its true spirit and in its full breadth than the saying of Moses. But, unfortunately, there was another way of understanding the law and using it. It was possible to take the law in a narrower sense, solely in the form of command, and to make this institution thus understood a means of self-righteousness, and of proud complacency in self-merit. Such was the spirit which reigned in Israel at the time when Paul wrote, and particularly that of the school in which he had been brought up. Pharisaism, separating the commandment from grace, deemed that its fulfilment, realized by man's own strength, was the true title to divine favour. It is against this point of view that Paul here turns the law itself. He takes it as it is regarded by those whom he wishes to convince, as simple law, *nuda lex* (Calvin), law properly so called. And he reasons thus: "You wish to be justified by your own *doing*. Well! But in that case let your *doing* be complete! If your obedience is to make you live, it must be worthy of Him to whom

it is offered." Such is the hopeless pass into which the apostle had himself been driven by the law thus understood and practised, and into which he drives the Pharisees of his time. If man wishes to raise the edifice of his own righteousness, let him take out every element of grace in the law; for the instant he has recourse to grace for little or for much, it is all over with work: "work is no more work" (xi. 6). This is probably also the reason why the apostle expresses himself as he does according to the true reading, saying, not: "Moses writes that" . . ., but: "Moses thus describes the righteousness of the law, to wit, that" . . . The intention of Moses was not to urge to such righteousness. But in his saying there is formulated the programme of a righteousness that is of the law "as law." If the law be once reduced to commandment, the saying of Leviticus certainly implies a mode of justification such as that of which the apostle speaks. Calvin is therefore right in saying: *Lex bifariam accipitur;* that is to say, the law may be regarded in two aspects, according as we take the Mosaic institution in its fulness, comprehending therein the elements of grace which belonged to it in view of a previous justification and a real sanctification, or as we lose these elements of grace out of view to fasten only on the commandment and turn it to the satisfaction of human pride.

Vv. 6, 7. "*But the righteousness which is of faith speaketh on this wise, Say not in thine heart, Who shall ascend into heaven? that is, to bring Christ down. Or, who shall descend into the deep? that is, to bring up Christ again from the dead.*" — Few passages have been so variously understood as this. And, first, was the intention of the apostle to give a real *explanation* of the passage quoted (Aug., Abail., Buc., Cal., Olsh., Fritzs., Meyer, Reuss),—whether this explanation be regarded historically exact, or as a violence done to the text of Moses (as Meyer, who here finds an application of the Rabbinical method of seeking hidden meanings in the simplest texts; or Reuss, who expresses himself thus: "Paul finds a passage from which he extorts the desired sense . . . by means of explanations which contradict the meaning of the original")? — Or must it be held that the apostle only meant here *to employ* the expressions of which Moses made use, while giving them a new sense (Chrys., Beza, Beng., Thol., Rück., Philip.,

Hofm., etc.)? A third class may be formed of those who, like Calvin, Lange, Hodge, etc., find in Paul a fundamental thought identical with that of the text of Moses, but one which is expounded here with great freedom in form. It is clear that these three classes, the last two especially, cannot always be distinguished precisely.

Let us remark in the outset the change of subject as we pass from ver. 5 to ver. 6. Paul no longer says here: "*Moses* writes (or describes)." It is no longer he who speaks either directly or indirectly. It is *the righteousness of faith* itself which takes the word, borrowing, in order to reveal its essence, certain expressions from the passage quoted, Deut. xxx. 11–14. Meyer endeavours in vain to weaken the bearing of this difference. It is clear that Paul is no longer *quoting* Moses himself as in ver. 5, but making another personage speak, while ascribing to him in a free way the language of Moses.—What now did the latter mean when uttering the words quoted here? The passage in the original context applies to the law which Moses had just been repeating to the people according to its spirit rather than according to its letter. Moses means that the people need not distress themselves about the possibility of understanding and practising this law. They need not imagine that some one must be sent to heaven or beyond the seas, to bring back the explanation of its commandments, or make its fulfilment possible. This law has been so revealed by the Lord, that every Israelite is in a condition to understand it with the heart and profess it with the mouth; its fulfilment even is within the reach of all. It is evident that in expressing himself thus the lawgiver is not taking up the standpoint of an independent morality, but of Israelitish faith, of confidence in the nearness of Jehovah, and in the promise of His grace and succour. It is not without meaning that the Decalogue began with the words: "I am the Lord thy God, who brought thee out of the land of Egypt," and that every series of laws terminated with the refrain: "I am the Lord." Consequently the understanding and fulfilling of the law which Moses declares possible, have nothing in common with meritorious work; they are the fruits of a heart in the full communion of confidence and love with the God of the covenant. And how, indeed, could Moses, who had written of Abraham the

words: "His faith was imputed to him for righteousness," have thought that the way of faith was to be replaced after a few centuries by that of meritorious work? Comp. Gal. iii. 17 et seq. That element of grace which, according to Moses himself, formed the basis of the whole covenant throughout its different phases, patriarchal and Mosaic, is here disentangled by Paul from its temporary wrapping (in Deuteronomy), as Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount disentangles the spirit from the letter of the Decalogue. He does not put into the passage of Moses what is not there, but he draws from it, in order to set in relief its profoundest element, the grace of Jehovah wrapped up and attested in the commandment itself. This grace, already existing in the Jewish theocracy, was the fruitful germ deposited under the surface, which was one day to burst forth and become the peculiar character of the new covenant. The apostle therefore was perfectly right in taking this saying as the prelude of gospel grace. It is easy, however, to understand why, feeling himself at some distance from the letter, in this application, he has not introduced Moses himself, but the righteousness of faith emerging as it were itself in the expressions of the lawgiver.

The differences between the text of Moses and that of Paul are numerous. Moses says: "This commandment is not in heaven above, saying (that is, thou shouldst say)" . . . Paul adds: *in thy heart*,—an expression which, as Philippi says, commonly refers to an evil thought which one is afraid to utter. Comp. Matt. iii. 9; Rev. xviii. 7. Moses continues thus: "and having heard, we shall do it." Paul omits these words as not having to do directly with his object, namely, to bring out the element of grace contained in the passage. He does so also with the same expressions repeated vv. 13 and 14. Finally, for the phrase *beyond the sea*, he substitutes: *into the deep* (abyss), a word which evidently denotes here the abode of the dead; comp. ver. 7. Did he understand the expression *beyond the sea* in the sense of the depth, or has he departed entirely from the figure supported by the fact that the word *abyss* sometimes denotes the immensity of the seas? or, finally, is he alluding to the idea of antiquity, which placed the fields of the blessed beyond the ocean? None of these is probable; he has been led to the expression by the contrast so frequent in Scripture between

heaven and Hades (Job xi. 8; Amos ix. 2; Ps. cvii. 26, cxxxix. 8). He wished to contrast what is *deepest* with what is *highest;* to depict on the one hand the *condemnation* from which Christ rescues us (ver. 7), and on the other, the full *salvation* to which He raises us (ver. 6); and, keeping as close as possible to the figurative expressions of Moses, he has taken Sheol and heaven as types of these two states. By these slight transformations Paul substitutes for the yet imperfect grace attached by the Lord to the gift of the law, the perfect bestowals of grace belonging to the new covenant. In the application which he makes of the saying of Moses, he points out not only the help of Jehovah ever near the believer to sustain him *in the fulfilment* of the law, but the law already *completely fulfilled*, both in its prescriptions and threatenings, by the life and death of Christ, so that all that remains for him who seeks salvation is to appropriate and apply this fulfilment as his own. Moses reassured the sincere Jew by showing him that *doing* would follow easily from *believing*. Paul reassures every man desirous of salvation by offering to him a *doing* wrought by another, and which his *believing* has only to lay hold of. To penetrate, therefore, to the spirit of Moses' saying, and to prolong the lines of the figures used by him, are all that is needed to land us in the gospel. There was a piquancy in thus replying to Moses by Moses, and in showing that what the lawgiver had written was still more true of the gospel than of the law.

The meaning of this saying in Paul is not, therefore, as was believed by the Greek Fathers, and as is still thought by Meyer and a good many others: "Beware of being *unbelieving* toward Christ incarnate (ver. 6) and risen (ver. 7)." 1. This thought is foreign to the context, for Paul has no idea of contrasting *believing* with *not believing*, but *doing* with *believing*. 2. There would be no connection between the application of this saying by Paul, and its signification in Deuteronomy. 3. How could we suppose the apostle addressing this saying to *non-believers?* Has the righteousness of faith then the right to say to them: I prohibit your not believing? What would be the use of such a prohibition? The apostle is addressing Christians, who hold the supernatural facts of Christ's history, but who do not yet understand the full saving efficacy con-

tained in them; and this is what he would have them to perceive. The same objections apply equally to other explanations, such as that of Reiche: "Who shall ascend into heaven to convince himself that Jesus is really there?" and: "Who shall descend into the abyss to assure himself that He has indeed risen from it?" Or that of Grimm: "Who shall ascend to bring Christ down from heaven, and thus prove the reality of His glorified existence?" Or that of Holsten: "Who shall go to convince himself in heaven and in the abyss that God has power to effect the incarnation of Christ and the resurrection of His body?" In all these explanations the person dealt with is always one who has to be convinced of the facts of salvation. But we do not convince of a historical fact by giving command to believe it. He to whom the righteousness of faith speaks with this tone of authority is one who believes those facts, and whom it exhorts to draw the saving consequences which rationally flow from them.—Calvin already comes near the true practical bearing of the passage when he thus explains: "Who shall ascend into heaven to prepare our abode there? Who shall descend into the abyss to rescue us from the sepulchre?" Only the context proves that the subject in question is not our future resurrection and glorification, but our present justification by faith. —Philippi, Lange, and Reuss seem to us to come still nearer the truth when they take these words as indicating works which Christ has already really accomplished to save us, so that it only remains for us to accept this fully wrought salvation. But when Philippi and Lange apply the first question, that of ver. 6, to the fact of the *incarnation*, explaining it with Meyer: "Who shall ascend to bring Christ down (by incarnation) to work out our salvation?" it is impossible for me to follow them; first, because there is no need of an ascension, but prayer is enough to obtain a gift of grace from God; and further, because in that case there would cease to be any real connection between the application made by Paul of this saying and its meaning in Moses.

If we start, as is natural, from this last point (the original meaning of the saying), the following is the explanation of vv. 6 and 7: "O thou, who desirest to reach the heaven of communion with God, say not: How shall I ascend to it? as

if it were necessary for thee thyself to accomplish this ascent on the steps of thine own obedience. That of which thou sayest: Who will do it (how shall I do it)? is a thing done; to ask such a question is to deny that Christ has really done it. It is to undo, at least so far as thou art concerned, what He has done. Thou whom thy sins torment, say not any more: Who shall descend into the abyss, there to undergo my punishment? That of which thou sayest: Who will do it (how shall I do it)? is a thing done. To ask such a question is to deny that Christ has done it; it is to undo, at least so far as thou art concerned, what He has done. Expiation is accomplished; thou canst have it by faith.

The form τίς, *who?* has this meaning: it is not every man individually that is asked to fulfil these two conditions of salvation—obedience and expiation. In that case every man would be called to be his own Christ. The righteousness of faith forbids us to make such pretensions, which can only issue in our discouragement or embitterment. Instead of the part of Christs, it brings us down to that of believers; and hence the reason why Paul, in the following words, makes use twice of the name of *Christ*, and not that of *Jesus*, as he would certainly do if he meant to speak here of the historical facts as such; comp. viii. 11.

Twice the apostle interrupts his quotation of the Mosaic saying with one of those brief explanations which, in the Rabbins, get the name of *Midrasch*, and of which we find other examples in Paul, *e.g.* 1 Cor. xv. 55 and 56. To support his explanation of the questions vv. 6 and 7 (as addressed to an unbeliever), Meyer, with many others, has been obliged to make these two short explanations, interjected by the apostle, dependent on the two preceding questions, as if they were a continuation of them: "Who shall ascend into heaven, that is to say, *with the view* of bringing the Christ down? Who shall descend into the deep, that is to say, *with the view* of bringing the Christ up?" This meaning of τοῦτ' ἔστι, *that is to say*, is far from natural; for what we expect is the indication of the reason why the righteousness of faith forbids such speaking, not the mention of the motive which leads the interrogator to raise this question. Besides, there is a τοῦτ' ἔστι perfectly parallel in ver. 8; now, there it is impossible to

take the phrase in the sense which Meyer here gives to it. The word is therefore directly connected with μὴ εἴπῃς, *say not.* "Say not: Who shall ascend? for that (speaking thus) *is* to bring down . . ., or: Who shall descend? for that (speaking thus) *is* to bring up" . . . And, in point of fact, to wish to do a thing oneself (or ask that some one should do it) is evidently equivalent to denying that it is already done. Consequently, to say: Who shall ascend to open heaven for us? is to deny that Christ has already ascended for this end; it is *logically* to bring Him down again to this earth. It is therefore impossible to follow the almost unanimous leading of commentators, and refer the here imagined descent of Christ to the incarnation; rather it is a giving of the lie to the fact of the *ascension* (as Glöckler has understood it): "What thou wouldst do, ascend to heaven by thine own obedience, thou canst not; but Christ, by His perfect obedience, has won heaven both for Himself and thee. To ask: How shall I do it? or: Who shall do it? is therefore equivalent to denying that He has ascended. If thou dost really believe in His ascension, as thou professest to do, thou canst not deal thus with it."—In the second question, ver. 7, de Wette and Meyer observe that there is no need of putting two points (:) after the ἤ, *or;* the quotation continues.—The *abyss* frequently denotes the abode of the dead and of fallen angels (Luke viii. 31). For as the azure of the sky represents perfect salvation, so the depth of the sea is the natural figure for the abode of death and the state of condemnation.—The meaning given by Meyer: τοῦτ' ἔστι, *that is to say,* is still more inadmissible here than above. In fact it is an impossible supposition, that of a man going down into hell to raise up Christ there. If He is the Christ, He will certainly rise of Himself; if He is not, He will not rise at all. And in whose mouth should we put such a question? In that of a believer? But a believer does not doubt the resurrection. In that of an unbeliever? But an unbeliever would say: Who shall descend? not certainly with the view of going to raise Him up, which has no meaning, but with the view of going to see whether He has risen, or of going to prove that He has not; and besides, such a man would not thus off-hand call Jesus *the Christ.* It seems to me that it is a mistake to refer the word ἀναγαγεῖν.

to bring up, to cause to ascend, as is generally done, to the fact of the resurrection. This expression must of course be understood in a sense analogous to that of the word *bring down*, ver. 6. Now this latter signified: to deny, by wishing to gain heaven oneself, that Christ has ascended thither to open it for us; to replace things as they would be without the ascension. *To bring up* consequently signifies: to deny, by wishing oneself to undergo condemnation for his sins, that Christ has blotted them out; to replace things as they would be without His expiatory death. Meyer objects that ver. 9 expressly speaks of the resurrection; but he resolves this objection himself when he says, in the explanation of ver. 9: "Without the resurrection, the death of Jesus would not be the expiatory death." What is in question here is not the historical fact of His death, but its expiatory value, of which the resurrection is the monument. It is by the resurrection that the death appears not merely as that of Jesus, but as that of the *Christ*. Meyer again objects, that the death would require to have been placed by Paul before the ascension. But Paul was following the order of the words of Moses, and this order really better suited the didactic meaning which he was introducing into them. First the conquest of heaven by Christ's holy life and perfect obedience; then the abolition of condemnation by His expiatory death.

We may now sum up the general meaning of the passage: All the *doing* asked of man by the law (ver. 5), and which he could never accomplish otherwise than imperfectly, is now accomplished perfectly by the Christ, whether it relate to the conquest of heaven by holiness, or to the abolition of condemnation by expiation. All, therefore, that remains to man in order to be saved, is *to believe* in this work by applying it to himself; and this is what is commanded us by the righteousness of faith, ver. 8, after it has forbidden us, vv. 6 and 7, to pretend ourselves to open heaven or to close hell. This argument showed at a glance, that Christ having charged Himself with the *doing*, and having left us only the *believing*, His work put an end to the legal dispensation, which the apostle wished to prove (ver. 4).

Ver. 8. "*But what saith it? The word is nigh thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart. Now, that is the word of faith which*

we preach."—In the passage quoted, Moses said: "Believe on Him who is revealed to thee in the law. With Him in the heart and on the lips thou shalt understand it, and thou shalt certainly fulfil it." This saying was in the ancient economy a relative truth. It becomes in Christ absolute truth. In these words Moses had in a sense, without suspecting it, given the exact formula of the righteousness of faith; and it is because the apostle was conscious of this fundamental identity of feeling between Moses and the gospel on this point, that he could venture, as he does here, to apply the saying of the one to the teaching of the other. There is therefore in this passage neither a simple *imitation* of the words of Moses, nor a false Rabbinical pretence to *interpret it* correctly. Paul has done what we do or should do in every sermon: 1st. Disentangle from the temporary application, which is the strict sense of the text, the fundamental and universal principle which it contains; 2d. Apply freely this general principle to the circumstances in which we are ourselves speaking.

Nigh thee signifies (in the mouth of Moses): of possible, and even easy accomplishment. The term is explained by the two expressions: *in thy mouth* and *in thy heart,* the former of which means: easy to be learned and repeated; the second: easy to be loved; of course: in communion with Jehovah and by the aid of His Spirit both promised to faithful Israelites. "Such expressions, says Paul, are exactly those which find their full reality when they are applied to the *word of faith,* which forms the subject of gospel preaching." If faith is an emotion of the heart, and its profession a word of invocation: Jesus Lord! is it possible to realize this formula of Moses: *in thy mouth* and *in thy heart,* better than is done by the word of faith?—Salvation thus appears to us as a perfectly ripe fruit which divine grace places before us, and on which we have only to put the hand of faith. To Christ belongs the *doing;* to us the *believing.* This idea of the absolute nearness of the finished salvation is *analysed* in vv. 9 and 10 (starting from the expressions of ver. 8), and *justified* once more by a scriptural quotation (ver. 11), which contains at the same time the transition to the following passage.

Vv. 9, 10. "*Seeing that if thou shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and shalt believe in thine heart that God hath*

raised Him from the dead, thou shalt be saved. For with the heart man believeth unto righteousness; and with the mouth confession is made unto salvation."—The two terms: *confessing with the mouth* and *believing with the heart*, reproduce the ideas *in thy mouth* and *in thy heart*, of ver. 8. These are the two conditions of salvation; for while faith suffices to take hold of the finished expiation, when this faith is living, it inevitably produces profession, and from this follows incorporation into the flock already formed, by means of invocation and baptism. *Profession* is put first here, in keeping with the words of Moses (ver. 8: *in thy mouth*); the order is that which from the external ascends to the internal; it reminds us that profession would be nothing without faith.—The object of the profession is the title *Lord* given to Christ, as is done in the invocation by which we publicly declare ourselves subjects; comp. 1 Cor. xii. 3 (according to the true reading). Here again we find the idea of ver. 6, that of the glorified Christ. The same relation between the sovereignty of Christ and the Christian profession appears in Phil. ii. 9–11: "Wherefore God hath supremely exalted Him . . . that every tongue should confess that He is Lord." This allusion to ver. 6 proves clearly that the reference there was not to the incarnation; for Jesus is called by the title of Lord, as the glorified, and not as the pre-existent Christ.—On the other hand, the special object of *faith* is Christ risen. The reason is clear: it is in the external fact of the resurrection that faith apprehends its essential object, the moral fact of justification; comp. iv. 25.—Paul concludes this long sentence with a brief summary word: σωθήσῃ, *thou shalt be saved*, as if he would say: After that all is done. Ver. 10 demonstrates in fact that these conditions once complied with, salvation was sure.

Ver. 10. The idea of *salvation* is analysed; it embraces the two facts: *being justified* and *being saved* (in the full sense of the word). The former is especially connected with the act of *faith*, the latter with that of *profession*. Paul, in expressing himself thus, is not swayed, as de Wette believes, by the love of parallelism. There is in his eyes a real distinction to be made between *being justified* and *being saved*. We have already seen again and again, particularly in chap. v. 9 and 10, that justification is something of the present; for it intro-

duces us from this time forth into reconciliation with God. But salvation includes, besides, sanctification and glory. Hence it is that while the former depends only on faith, the latter implies persevering fidelity in the profession of the faith, even to death and to glory. In this ver. 10, Paul returns to the natural and psychological order, according to which faith precedes profession. This is because he is here expounding his thought, without any longer binding himself to the order of the Mosaic quotation. And to put, as it were, a final period to this whole passage, the idea of which is the perfect freeness of salvation, he repeats once more the passage of Isaiah which had served him as a point of departure (ix. 33).

Ver. 11. "*For the Scripture saith, Whosoever believeth on Him shall not be ashamed.*"—That is to say, it suffices to believe in Him who has fulfilled all, to be saved exactly as if one had fulfilled all himself. Here again the apostle quotes according to the LXX. (see on ix. 33). The most miserable of believers will not be deceived in his hope, if only he believes. The apostle here adds the word πᾶς, *every one, whosoever*, which was not authentic (ix. 33), but which is not wanting in any document in our verse. He might, indeed, deduce it with reason from the idea of the verse taken as a whole. Yet he does not add it by accident; for with the idea of the *freeness* of salvation he proceeds to connect that of its *universality*. This was the second point to which the ignorance of the Jews extended, and one of the two causes which rendered their rejection necessary for the execution of God's plan. Imagining that salvation was bound up with the fulfilment of the ordinances of the law, they monopolised it to their advantage, consenting to share it only with those of the Gentiles who would accept circumcision and the Mosaic dispensation, and thereby become members of the people of Israel. Through this conception, they came into conflict with the mind of God, which had in view the preaching of a free salvation to the whole world, and consequently the abolition of the legal system. This divine universalism, with its consequence, the free preaching of the gospel to all men, is the subject of the following passage. By introducing the word πᾶς, *every one, whosoever* (ver. 11), into the saying of Isaiah, the apostle announces this new idea which he proceeds to develope.

Vv. 12–21.

Paul has justified the matter of his preaching, salvation by grace; he now justifies its *extension*. Not that, as Baur, Holsten, etc., think, he wishes thereby to remove the scruples of the Judeo-Christian conscience against his apostleship among the Gentiles; but—as the context says clearly enough—to indicate the second point in regard to which the Jews have showed themselves *ignorant* (ver. 4) as to the plan of God, and because of which they have brought on themselves the rejection with which they are overtaken. When man would put himself against the plan of God, God does not stop; He sets aside the obstacle. Such is the connection of ideas which leads to the following passage.

Vv. 12, 13. "*For there is no difference between the Jew and the Greek: for there is one and the same Lord for all, rich unto all that call upon Him. For whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved.*"—Salvation being *free*, there is no longer any restriction to its application: it is necessarily *universal*. It is this logical consequence which the apostle expounds (ver. 12), and which he confirms (ver. 13) by a new Scripture passage.—What formed the separation between the two fractions of mankind, the Jews and the Greeks, was the law (Eph. ii. 14, the μεσότοιχον, the *partition wall*). This wall once broken down (as has just been proved) by the work of the Messiah, mankind no longer forms more than a single social body, and has throughout *the same Lord*, and a Lord *rich* enough to communicate the blessings of salvation to this whole multitude on one single condition: the *invocation* of faith. Israel had never imagined anything like this; and yet it was so clearly announced, as is proved by ver. 13.—In the second proposition of ver. 12, the subject might be the pronoun ὁ αὐτός, *the same*: "the same (being) is Lord of all." It seems to me, however, more natural to join the word κύριος, *Lord*, to the subject, and then to understand it as the predicate: "The same Lord is (Lord) of all." See the same construction ii. 29. In any case, there is no reason for making the participle πλουτῶν, *who is rich*, the principal verb in this sense: "The same Lord *is rich* for all;" for the essential idea is not that of the Lord's riches, but that of His

universal and identical sovereignty over all men. To us this idea is commonplace; it was not so at the beginning. It strikes St. Peter like a sudden flash the first time he gets a glimpse of it (Acts x. 34–36).—The condition of *invocation* recalls the idea developed above of *profession* (the ὁμολογία) in vv. 9 and 10. The true profession of faith is, in fact, this cry of adoration: Lord Jesus! And this cry may be equally uttered by every human heart, Jewish or Gentile, without the need of any law. So it comes about that universalism founded on faith henceforth excludes the discipline of the law.—The idea: *rich unto all,* establishes the full equality of believers in their participation of the blessings of salvation. The common Lord will give not less abundantly to one than to another; comp. John i. 16: "and of his fulness have *all* we received."

Ver. 13. Joel (ii. 32) had already announced this new fact: that salvation would depend only on the believing invocation of the name of Jehovah in His final Messianic manifestation. Legal rights had vanished from before his eyes; there remained the adoration of Jehovah in His supreme revelation. Paul applies this prophetic word with full right to the coming of Jesus. Now, if the invocation of the name of Jehovah, revealed in the person of the Messiah Jesus, is to be the means of salvation for all, what follows therefrom? The need of a universal preaching of the name which must be invoked by all.

Vv. 14, 15. "*How then shall they call*[1] *on Him in whom they have not believed? And how shall they believe*[2] *in Him of whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear*[3] *without a preacher? And how shall they preach,*[4] *except they be sent, as it is written, How beautiful are the feet of them that publish peace,*[5] *and bring glad tidings of*[6] *good things!*"—No invocation without faith; no faith without hearing; no hearing without preaching; no preaching without sending. A universal apostolate is therefore the necessary corollary of a free and

[1] T. R. reads, with K L P: ἐπικαλέσονται; all the others: ἐπικαλέσωνται.
[2] T. R. reads, with A K L: πιστεύσουσιν; all the others: πιστεύσωσιν.
[3] T. R. reads, with L: ἀκούσουσιν; B: ἀκούσωσιν; all the others: ἀκούσονται.
[4] T. R. says, with many Mnn.: κηρύξουσιν; all the other Mjj.: κηρύξωσιν.
[5] ℵ A B C omit the words τῶν εὐαγγελιζομένων εἰρήνην.
[6] A B C D E F G omit the article τά before ἀγαθά.

universal salvation. Such are the contents of our two verses, which are directed, not against Judeo-Christian prejudices, but against the ignorance of Israel, the final result of which was necessarily their rejection. Paul points out to the Jews, who took offence at the wide and universal character of his apostleship, the internal necessity on which it was based, and the positive prophetical texts which justified it. We are therefore still at the development of this theme: The ignorance of Israel the cause of their rejection.

And first, no invocation without faith. It is difficult to decide between the T. R. ἐπικαλέσονται, *shall they call on*, and the Alex. and Greco-Latin texts: ἐπικαλέσωνται, *shall they be able to call on*. This same variant reappears in the following verbs, and that without the critical authorities being consequent with themselves. The simple future is more natural, though the subjunctive may easily be defended.—No faith without the hearing of the gospel message. The pronoun οὗ, *whom*, presents a difficulty; for the meaning is: "Him *whom* they have not heard." Now, men cannot hear Jesus Christ. Meyer answers, that they can hear Him by the mouth of His messengers: "whom they have not heard *preaching* by His apostles." But could this idea be left to be wholly understood? Hofmann gives to οὗ a local meaning: *in the place where*: "How could He be invoked *in the place where* men have not heard (Him spoken of)?" But the ellipsis of the last words would be very marked. It seems to me simpler to apply the pronoun οὗ to Jesus, not as *preaching* (Meyer), but as *preached*; comp. Eph. iv. 21: "If at least ye *have heard Him*, and have been taught by Him." It is true the pronoun which is the object of *have heard*, in this passage, is in the accusative (αὐτόν), and not, as here, in the genitive. But this difference is easily explained; the act referred to in Ephesians is one of the understanding which penetrates the object, while here it is only a simple hearing, the condition of faith.

Ver. 15. No preaching without sending. Paul is not thinking here of some human association sending out missionaries. The term ἀποσταλῶσιν, *be sent*, evidently alludes to the *apostleship* properly so called, the normal mission established by the Lord Himself by the sending of the apostles. This mission included in principle all subsequent missions.

At this thought of a universal apostleship the feeling of the apostle rises; he sees them, those messengers of Jesus, traversing the world, and, to the joy of the nations who hear them, sowing everywhere the good news. The passage quoted is taken from Isa. lii. 7. A similar saying is found in Nahum (i. 15), but in a briefer form: "Behold upon the mountains the feet of him that publisheth peace." In this prophet the saying applies to the messenger who comes to announce to Jerusalem the fall of Nineveh. In Isaiah, it is more in keeping with the text of Paul, and refers more directly to the preaching of salvation throughout the whole world. This message of grace is to be the consequence of the return from the captivity. The point of time referred to is when, as Isaiah says, xl. 5, "all flesh shall see the salvation of God." The words: "of them that publish peace," are wrongly omitted by the Alex. MSS. The copyist has confounded the two εὐαγγελιζομένων, and thus omitted the intermediate words. It cannot be supposed that it is the T. R. and its documents which have added these words; for they would have been copied more exactly from the text of the LXX. (comp. the substitution of the εἰρήνην for the ἀκοὴν εἰρήνης). Besides, this is one of the passages in which Paul designedly abandons the translation of the LXX. to conform his quotation to the Hebrew text, the first words of which were utterly misrendered by the Greek version: ὡς ὥρα ἐπὶ τῶν ὀρέων, *as fair weather on the mountains*. . . . The apostle at the same time allows himself some modifications even of Isaiah's text. He rejects the words: on the *mountains*, which did not apply to the preaching of the gospel; and for the singular: *him that publisheth*, he substitutes the plural, which better suits the Christian apostleship. — We must naturally contrast the terms *peace* and *good things* (in our [French] translations: *good news*) with the establishment of the legal dispensation throughout the whole world; comp. Eph. ii. 27, the thought and even expressions of which are so similar to those of our passage. If, with three Mjj., we read the article τά before ἀγαθά (*the* good things, instead of good things), Paul makes express allusion to those well-known foretold blessings which were to constitute the Messianic kingdom.

Such was to be the end of the old covenant: not the extension of the law to all nations, but a joyful and universal proclamation of peace and of heavenly grace on the part of a Saviour rich unto all. And if Israel had known the part assigned them, instead of making themselves the adversaries of this glorious dispensation, they would have become its voluntary instruments, and transformed themselves into that army of apostles who are charged with publishing the mercies of God. This divine plan was frustrated through their ignorance, both of the real nature of salvation and of its universal destination. Such is the force of the following verses.

Vv. 16, 17. "*But they have not all obeyed the gospel; for Esaias saith, Lord, who hath believed our report? So then faith cometh of hearing, and hearing by the word of God.*"[1]— The word ἀλλά, *but*, contrasts strongly what has been produced (by the fact of Jewish unbelief) with what should have been the result, faith and the salvation of Israel first of all.— Πάντες, *all*, denotes the totality of those who hear the word; and the exception indicated by the οὐ πάντες, *not all*, applies in the context to the mass of the Jewish people who have formed an exception to the general faith which the gospel was finding in the world. The term: *have not obeyed*, reminds us of that in ver. 3: *have not submitted themselves.* There is disobedience in not accepting what God offers. The term *gospel* (*evangel*) reproduces the word *evangelizing* (publishing good tidings), ver. 15.—But that was to be expected (*for*). This disobedience was in fact foreseen and proclaimed, Isa. liii. 1, without, however, the guilt of Israel being thereby diminished, divine foreknowledge not annulling human liberty. —Isaiah in this passage proclaims the unbelief of the people of Israel in regard to the Messiah, giving a description of His entire appearance in His state of humiliation and pain. He well knew that such a Messiah would not answer to the ambitious views of the people, and would be rejected by them. The subject of the unbelief thus proclaimed is not his prophecy only, but above all the fact in which it is to be realized.—The word ἀκοή, which we translated by *our report*, signifies: *our hearing*, and may denote either: what we

[1] T. R., with A K L P, Syr., reads θεοῦ; ℵ B C D E: Χριστοῦ; F G omit all regimen.

(prophets) hear from the mouth of God, and proclaim to you, Jews; or: what you (Jews) hear *from us* (by our mouth). The second meaning is certainly more natural, and agrees better with the meaning of the same word in ver. 17.—In quoting this saying, the apostle has in mind not only the unbelief of the Jewish people in Palestine in regard to the preaching of the apostles, but also that of the synagogues of the whole world in relation to his own.

Ver. 17. There was no logical necessity obliging the apostle to return to the two ideas contained in this verse, and already expressed in ver. 14. But he takes them up again in passing, as confirmed by the words of Isaiah just quoted, and to give occasion more clearly to the objection about to follow in ver. 18. Ἄρα: *so then* (precisely as I was saying).—The meaning of ἀκοή, *hearing*, is not modified in passing from ver. 16 to ver. 17. It is still the hearing of what is preached as from God; only Paul here distinguishes between the two ideas of *hearing* and *preaching* (*the word of God*), which were blended in the first of these two terms, ver. 16, in the passage of Isaiah (in consequence of the complement ἡμῶν, *of us* [*our*], prophets and apostles). It is unnecessary, therefore, to apply the expression *word of God*, as Meyer would, to *the command* by which God sends the preachers. This meaning has not the slightest support in the words of Isaiah, and it is contrary to the use of the term ῥῆμα, *word*, in vv. 8, 9, where it denotes the work of salvation as preached. It must be the same here. Ἐκ, *of:* faith *is born* of hearing; διά, *by:* hearing *is wrought by* the word preached.—The complement *of God* in the T. R. denotes the *author* of the word, while the complement *of Christ* in the Alex. and Greco-Lat. reading would express its subject. The first reading agrees better with the context.—The question is therefore relatively to the unbelief of the Jews: Has this double condition been fulfilled toward them? If not, here would be a circumstance fitted to exculpate them, and to throw back on God the blame of their unbelief and rejection. The apostle does not fail, before closing, to raise this question.

Ver. 18. "*But I say, Have they not heard? Yea, much more, their sound went into all the earth, and their words unto the ends of the world.*"—It is not God who has failed in His

part. No; they who have not believed (the majority of Israel) cannot excuse themselves by saying that the mission, which is an essential condition of faith, was not carried out in their case. As (according to Ps. xix. 1 et seq.) the heavens and their hosts proclaim God's existence and perfections to the whole universe, and, mute as they are, make their voice re-echo in the hearts of all men; so, says St. Paul, with a sort of enthusiasm at the memory of his own ministry, the voice of the preachers of the gospel has sounded in all countries and in all the cities of the known world. There is not a synagogue which has not been filled with it; not a Jew in the world who can justly plead ignorance on the suljject.—*Μὴ οὐκ ἤκουσαν*: "It is not, however, the case that they have not heard, is it?" Evidently the apostle is speaking of *those who have not believed*, consequently of the Jews. How can Origen and Calvin think here of the Gentiles? It is the case of the Jews which is being pleaded. The pronoun *αὐτῶν*, *their* (voice), refers not to the subject of the previous sentence, but to that of the sentence of the Psalm quoted by Paul: *the heavens.*—No one certainly will think that Paul meant here to give the explanation of this passage; it is an application of the Psalmist's words, which is still freer than that made of the passage from Deut. in vv. 6–8.

The apostle has just advanced, and then refuted, a first excuse which might be alleged in favour of the Jews; he proposes a second, the insufficiency of which he will also demonstrate.

Ver. 19. "*But I say, Did not Israel know?*[1] *First Moses saith, I will provoke you to jealousy by a people who are not a people, by a foolish nation I will anger you.*"—*Μὴ οὐκ*: "It is not the case, however, is it, that Israel did not know?" *Know* what, then? Critics answer the question differently. Some, from Chrysostom to Philippi and Hofmann, say: The gospel. But what difference in that case would there be between this excuse and the former? Philippi seeks to evade this difficulty by explaining the verb *ἔγνω* not in the sense of *know*, but in the sense of *understand*: "Is it credible that Israel did not understand what the Gentiles apprehended

[1] T. R., with L, Syr., puts Ισραηλ after ουκ εγνω, while the rest put it before these words (after μη).

at once (the gospel)?" But in that case the answer would be: "Yes, certainly it is credible, for it is the fact." Now the form of the question (with μή) admits only of a negative answer. The object of the verb *did know* ought naturally to be taken from what precedes; it is therefore the essential idea of this whole passage, the universality of the preaching of the gospel. Paul asks: It is not, however, the case, is it, that Israel did not know what was coming? that they were taken by surprise by this sending of the message of grace to the Gentiles throughout the whole world, as by an unexpected dispensation? If it were so, this might form an excuse for them. But no; Moses even (ver. 19), and again more distinctly Isaiah (vv. 20, 21), had warned them of what would happen, so that they cannot excuse themselves by saying that they are the victims of a surprise. The sequence and progress of the argument are thus vindicated in a way which is perfectly natural and well marked. It is not even necessary to introduce here, with Ewald and several others, the more special idea of the transference of the kingdom of God from the Jews to the Gentiles.—Moses is called *first* relatively to Isaiah (following verse), simply because he preceded him. Hofmann has attempted to connect this epithet with Israel: "Did Israel not hear the gospel *first*, as was their right?" But the answer would require to be affirmative; and this is excluded by the μή. It is clear that what Paul is concerned to bring out by this word *first* is not the simple fact of the priority of Moses in time to Isaiah, but the circumstance that from the very opening of the sacred volume the mind of God on the point in question was declared to Israel.—The words quoted are found in Deut. xxxii. 21: "As Israel have provoked the Lord to jealousy by worshipping that which is not God, so the Lord in His turn will provoke them to jealousy by those who are not His people." It is inconceivable how commentators like Meyer can apply these last words to the remains of the Canaanites whom the Israelites had allowed to remain among them, and whom God proposed to bless to such a degree as to render the Israelites jealous of their well-being. Such are the exegetical monstrosities to which a preconceived system of prophetical interpretation may lead. Moses certainly announces to the Jews in these

words, as Paul recognises, that the Gentiles will precede them in the possession of salvation, and that this will be the humiliating means whereby Israel themselves shall require at length to be brought back to their God.—The former of the two verbs (παραζηλοῦν) means that God will employ the stimulant of *jealousy;* and the latter (παροργίζειν), that this jealousy will be carried even to *anger;* but all in view of a favourable result, the conversion of Israel. The words: *by those who are not a people,* have been understood in the sense: that the Gentiles are not strictly *peoples,* but mere assemblages of men. This idea is forced, and foreign to the context. We must explain: *those who are not a people,* in the sense: those who are not a people, par excellence, *my* people.

What Moses had only announced darkly in these words, Isaiah proclaimed with open mouth. He declares unambiguously: God will one day manifest Himself to the Gentiles by a proclamation of grace, while the Jews will obstinately reject all the blessings which shall be offered to them.

Vv. 20, 21. "*But Esaias is very bold, and saith, I was found*[1] *of them that sought me not; I was made manifest unto them that asked not after me. But to Israel He saith, All day long I have stretched forth my hands unto a disobedient and gainsaying people.*"—'Αποτολμᾷ: "he declares without mincing matters." The passage quoted is Isa. lxv. 1. Most modern critics apply this saying of Isaiah to the *Jews* who did not seek the Lord, while Paul applies it to the Gentiles. Hofmann, while starting from the prevailing explanation, seeks to justify Paul's quotation; but without success. Meyer acknowledges the difference between the two interpretations, Paul's and that of modern exegesis. But, he says, Paul saw in unbelieving Israel *a type* of the Gentile world. This solution is impossible; for, as we shall see, Isaiah distinctly *contrasts* those of whom he is speaking in ver. 1 with unbelieving Israel, ver. 2. We think that the simple and unbiassed study of the passage from Isaiah leads irresistibly to the conclusion that the prophet really meant to speak in ver. 1 of the Gentiles reaching salvation notwithstanding their ignorance, and to contrast them with the Jews in their obstinate rebellion against God, who had long revealed Himself to them, ver. 2. In fact

[1] B D F G read ἐν after εὑρέθην.

—1. The term *goï* expressly distinguishes as *Gentiles* those to whom ver. 1 refers, as the term *am* (*the people*), in ver. 2, positively describes Israel. 2. This contrast is the more certain that the prophet adds to the term *goï*, *the nation*, the commentary: "(the nation) which was not called by my name." Could he thus designate Israel? 3. Is it possible to mistake the contrast established by the prophet between those who, not inquiring after the Lord, whom they do not yet know, find Him because He consents to manifest Himself to them spontaneously (ver. 1), and the people, properly so called, whom for ages He has not ceased to call to Him, who know Him as their God, but who obstinately reject His mercies (ver. 2)? Let us add, 4, that the two ideas of the future unbelief of the Jews in relation to the Messiah, and of the calling of the Gentiles to fill for the time their place in the kingdom of God, are very distinctly expressed elsewhere in Isaiah; so lii. 13–15: the kings and peoples of the Gentiles, who had not heard any prophecy, believe in the suffering and exalted Messiah, while the Jews reject Him, though to them He had been clearly foretold (liii. 1); so again xlix. 4: the failure of the Messiah's work in Israel, forming a contrast to the rich indemnification which is bestowed on Him through the conversion of the Gentiles (ver. 6). It is clear that the alleged advances in the interpretation of the prophets may, after all, on certain points be only retrogressions.

The thought of vv. 20 and 21 is analogous to that of x. 30 and 31. The unsophisticated ignorance and corruption of the Gentiles are an easier obstacle for the light of God to dissipate than the proud obduracy of the Jews, who have for long been visited by divine grace. The words: *I was made manifest*, are intended by the apostle to refer to that universal preaching which is the idea of the whole passage.

Ver. 21. What leads up to this verse is the lively feeling of the contrast between the conduct of Israel and that of the Gentiles. It sums up the idea of the whole chapter: the obstinate resistance of Israel to the ways of God. The Lord is represented, Isa. lxv. 2, under the figure of a father who, from morning to evening, stretches out his arms to his child, and experiences from him only refusal and contradiction. It is thus made clear that the apostle in no wise puts the

rejection of Israel to the account of an unconditional divine decree, but that he ascribes the cause of it to Israel themselves.—The preposition πρός might signify: *in relation to*, as in Luke xix. 9 and xx. 19. But yet the natural meaning is *to;* and this meaning is quite suitable: "He saith to Israel." For if in the prophetical discourse God spoke of Israel in the third person, in the book written for the people it is to them that He addresses this saying; comp. iii. 19.—*All day long:* do not these words designate the whole theocratic epoch, which, in the eyes of the Lord, is like a long day of labour in behalf of His people? But what a response have they made to such fidelity! The words καὶ ἀντιλέγοντα, *and gainsaying*, were added to the Hebrew text by the LXX. They characterize the hair-splittings and sophisms whereby the Israelites seek to justify their persevering refusal to return to God; comp. in the Book of Malachi the refrain: "And ye say" . . .!

Thus Israel, blinded by the privileges bestowed on them, sought only one thing: to preserve their monopoly, and for this end to perpetuate their law (ver. 4). They have hardened themselves, consequently, against the two essential features which constituted the Messianic dispensation, a free salvation (vv. 5–11) and a salvation offered to all by universal preaching (vv. 12–17). And to extenuate this sin, they are wholly without excuse. The messengers of salvation have followed them to the very ends of the earth to offer them grace as well as the Gentiles; neither had God failed to warn them beforehand, from the very beginning of their history, of the danger they ran of seeing themselves outstripped by the Gentiles (vv. 18–20). All to no purpose. They have held on in their resistance . . . (ver. 21). After this, is not the case fully ripe for trial? Do not the facts attest that it is not God who has arbitrarily excluded them, but themselves who have placed God under the necessity of pronouncing their rejection?

Yet there is a mercy which, where the sin of man abounds, yet more abounds. It has a last word to speak in this history. Its work towards the rebellious people seems closed; but it is far from being so. And chap. xi. proceeds to show us how God, in the overflowing of His grace, reserves to Himself the right to make this severe and painful dispensation issue in the most glorious result.

TWENTY-THIRD PASSAGE (CHAP. XI.).

God's Plan in Israel's Rejection.

The apostle has proved in chap. ix. that when God elected Israel, He did not lose the *right* one day to take the severest course against them, if it should be necessary. Then he has showed in chap. x. that *in fact* there was a real ground and moral necessity for this measure. He proceeds, finally, to establish in chap. xi. that it was only taken in accordance with all due regard to the position of this people, and within the limits in which it should subserve the salvation of mankind and that of Israel themselves.

This chapter embraces the development of two principal ideas, and then a conclusion. The *first* idea is this: The rejection of Israel is not total, but *partial* (vv. 1–10). It bears only on that portion referred to in the demonstration of God's right, given in chap. ix. The *second:* This partial rejection even is not eternal, but *temporary* (vv. 11–32). For after it has served the various ends which God had in view in decreeing it, it shall come to an end, and the entire nation shall be restored, and with the Gentiles shall realize the final unity of the kingdom of God. The *conclusion* is a glance at this whole vast plan of God, and the expression of the feeling of adoration which is inspired by the contemplation, vv. 33–36.

Vv. 1–10.

The *partial* character of the rejection of God's people is proved, first, by the conversion of St. Paul himself (ver. 1); then by the existence of a whole Judeo-Christian church (vv. 2–6). And if this church does not contain the entire Jewish people, it is the effect of a judgment of a partial hardening rendered necessary by the moral state of the people (vv. 7–10).

Ver. 1. "*I say, then, Hath God cast away His people? Let it not be! For I also am an Israelite, of the seed of Abraham, of the tribe of Benjamin.*"—From all that preceded, chaps. ix. and x., the reader might have concluded that God had completely and finally broken with all that bore the name of

Israel; hence the *then*. — The form of the question is such (μή) that only a negative answer can be expected. This is likewise indicated by the pronoun *αὐτοῦ, his*, which of itself implies the moral impossibility of such a measure.—The expression *His people* does not refer, as some have thought, to the *elect* part of the people only, but, as the expression itself shows, to the *nation* as a whole. It is evident, indeed, that the rest of the chapter treats not of the lot of the Israelites who have believed in Jesus, but of the lot of the nation in its entirety. Thus, then, this question of ver. 1 is the theme of the whole chapter.—The apostle takes a first answer, by way of preface, from his own case. Is not he, a Jew of well-approved Israelitish descent, by the call which he has received from above, a living proof that God has not cast away *en masse* and without distinction the totality of His ancient people? De Wette and Meyer give a wholly different meaning to this answer. According to them, Paul would say: "I am too good an Israelite, too zealous a patriot, to be capable of affirming a thing so contrary to the interests of my people." As if the interests of truth were not supreme, in Paul's view, over national affections! And what in this case would be meant by the epithets *descendant of Abraham* and *of Benjamin*, which Meyer alleges against our explanation? May not one, with his civil status as an Israelite perfectly unquestionable, comport himself as a bad patriot? What Paul means by them is this: "It is nothing my being an Israelite of the purest blood; God has nevertheless made of me such as you see me, a true believer." Meyer still urges the objection of the exceptional position of a man like Paul; but the apostle does not confine himself to pleading this personal fact; he adds to it immediately, from ver. 2 onwards, the patent fact of the whole Judeo-Christian portion of the church.—Weizsäcker makes the important remark on this ver. 1: "Paul could not possibly take his proof from his own person, if the mass of the Christians of Rome were Judeo-Christian, and so themselves the best refutation of the objection raised."

Vv. 2, 3. "*God hath not cast away His people which He forcknew. Or wot ye not what the Scripture saith in the passage about Elias; how he maketh intercession to God against Israel:*[1]

[1] T. R. reads here λεγων, with ℵ L, Syr^{sch}.

Lord, they have killed Thy prophets,[1] *digged down Thine altars, and I am left alone, and they seek my life.*"—The formal denial which begins ver. 2 is intended to introduce the more general proof, the exposition of which begins with the words: *Or wot ye not?* Several commentators (Or., Aug., Chrys., Luth., Calv., etc.) have explained the words: *whom He foreknew,* as a restriction narrowing the general notion of the people of Israel: "He could undoubtedly cast away the mass of the people, but not the *foreknown* elect who form, strictly speaking, *His people.*" This meaning is inadmissible; for, as we have already seen in ver. 1, the matter in question here is not the lot of this elect portion, but that of the people as a whole. Is it not of the entire people that the apostle speaks when, in vv. 28 and 29, he says: "*As touching the election,* they are loved for the Father's sake; for the gifts and calling of God are without repentance"? These words are the authentic explanation of the expression in ver. 2: *His people whom He foreknew.* Of all the peoples of the earth one only was chosen and known beforehand, by an act of divine foreknowledge and love, as the people whose history would be identified with the realization of salvation. In all others salvation is the affair of *individuals,* but here the notion of salvation is attached to the *nation* itself; not that the liberty of individuals is in the least compromised by this collective destination. The Israelites contemporary with Jesus might reject Him; an indefinite series of generations may for ages perpetuate this fact of national unbelief. God is under no pressure; time can stretch out as long as He pleases. He will add, if need be, ages to ages, until there come at length the generation disposed to open their eyes and freely welcome their Messiah. God foreknew this *nation* as believing and saved, and sooner or later they cannot fail to be both.

As usual, the form: *or know ye not,* signifies: "Or if ye allege the contrary, do ye forget" . . .—The expression ἐν Ἠλίᾳ, literally, *in Elias,* is a form of quotation frequent in the N. T. (Mark xii. 26; Luke xx. 37) and in the Rabbins to denote: "in the passage of the Scriptures which contains the history of Elias."—The preposition κατά can signify nothing else here than *against. To intercede against* is a

[1] T. R. reads here καί, with D E L, Syr.

strange expression, but fitted to bring out the abnormal state of the people in regard to whom the prophet could only pray thus, that is to say, protesting before God against their conduct. Comp. 1 Kings xix. 10, 14, 18.

Ver. 3. In the Hebrew text the second clause of the verse is put first; it is needless to seek an intention for this inversion.—Mention is made of "*altars* of God," though according to the law there was, properly speaking, only one legitimate altar, that of the sanctuary. But the law itself authorized, besides, the erection of altars in the places where God had visibly revealed Himself (Ex. xx. 24), as at Bethel, for example. Moreover, participation in the legitimate altar being interdicted within the kingdom of the ten tribes, it is probable that in such circumstances the faithful ventured to sacrifice elsewhere than at Jerusalem (1 Kings viii. 29).—Meyer interprets the word *alone* in this sense: "alone of all the prophets." This meaning seems to us incompatible with God's answer. The *seven thousand* are not prophets, but simple worshippers. Elijah, in that state of deep discouragement into which foregoing events had plunged him, no longer saw in Israel any others than idolaters, or believers too cowardly to deserve the name.

Vv. 4, 5. "*But what saith the answer of God unto him? I have reserved to myself seven thousand men, who have not bowed the knee to Baal. Even so then, at this present time also there is a remnant according to the election of grace.*"—Χρηματισμός: the direction of a matter, and hence: a decision of authority; then: a divine declaration, an oracle (Matt. ii. 12).—It is impossible to apply the words: "I have reserved to myself," to the *temporal* preservation of this elect body of pious Israelites, in the midst of the judgments which are soon to burst on Israel. It is in the spiritual sense, as faithful worshippers in the midst of reigning idolatry, that God reserves them to Himself. They are the leaven kept by His faithfulness in the midst of His degenerate people.—It is impossible to understand what leads Hofmann to take κατέλιπον as the third person plural: "*They* (the persecutors) *have left me* seven thousand men." This cannot be the meaning in the Hebrew, where the grammar is opposed to it; and as little the sense meant by Paul, where the words *to myself* and *according to the*

election of grace, ver. 5, prove that he is speaking of the action of God Himself. The pronoun *to myself* does not belong to the Hebrew text; it is added by Paul to bring more into relief the settled purpose of grace in this preservation.—The substantive *Βάαλ*, *Baal*, is preceded by the feminine *τῇ*: "*the* (female) Baal." This form is surprising, for Baal, the god of the sun among the Phœnicians, was a masculine divinity, to whom Astarte, the goddess of the moon, corresponded, as the female divinity. By the LXX. the name Baal is sometimes used as feminine, sometimes as masculine. In our passage this version uses it in the latter way. To explain the female form as used here by Paul, it has been thought that Baal was sometimes regarded as a hermaphrodite divinity. But in 1 Sam. vii. 4, we find Baal put along with Astarte, and both in the feminine form. It seems to us more natural simply to understand the feminine substantive *εἰκόνι*, *the image*, in the sense of: "the statue Baal." Meyer objects that in that case the article *τοῦ* would be required before *Βάαλ*. But the Jews took pleasure in identifying false gods with their images, as if to say that the god was nothing more than his material representation. The Rabbins, in this same contemptuous spirit, had invented the term *Elohoth* to designate idols, a feminine plural of Elohim, and several have been thereby led to suppose that our feminine article might be explained by a feeling of the same kind. This explanation is not impossible; but the previous one seems to me the more simple.

Ver. 5. This verse applies the case of the seven thousand to present circumstances. The *remnant*, of whom the apostle speaks, evidently denotes the small portion of the Jewish people who in Jesus have recognised the Messiah. The term *λεῖμμα*, *remnant*, is related to the preceding verb *κατέλιπον*, *I have reserved to myself, kept*. There is no reference whatever to the members of the Jewish people who shall survive the destruction of Jerusalem, and shall be preserved to go into exile. These form, on the contrary, the rejected portion to whom the words, vv. 7–10, apply.—The three particles which connect this verse with the preceding context: *so, then, also*, refer, the first, to the internal *resemblance* of the two facts, for the same principle is realized in both; the second, to the moral *necessity* with which the one follows from the other in

consequence of this analogy. The third simply indicates the addition of a new example to the former. — The words: *according to the election of grace,* might apply to the *individuals* more or less numerous who are embraced in this remnant, now become the nucleus of the church. The word *election* would in that case be explained, as in the case of the elect in general, viii. 29, 30, by the fact of the foreknowledge which God had of their faith. But the matter in question throughout the whole of this chapter is the lot of the Jewish *people* in general; it is therefore to them in their entirety that the idea of the divine election refers; comp. vv. 2 and 28. One thing indeed follows from the election of grace applied to the whole of Israel; not the salvation of such or such individuals, but the indestructible existence of a believing remnant at all periods of their history, even in the most disastrous crises of unbelief, as at the time of the ministry of Elias, or of the coming of Jesus Christ. The idea contained in the words: "according to the election of grace," is therefore this: In virtue of the election of Israel as the salvation-people, God has not left them in our days without a faithful remnant, any more than He did in the kingdom of the ten tribes at the period when a far grosser heathenism was triumphant.

Ver. 6. "*Now, if it is by grace, then is it no more of works; since grace would be no more grace.*"[1] — The apostle wishes to express the idea, that if Israel possess this privilege of always preserving within their bosom a faithful remnant, it is not because of any particular merit they have acquired before God by their works; it is purely a matter of grace on the part of Him who has chosen them. The instant there was introduced into this dispensation a meritorious cause, whether for little or for much, there would be taken away from grace its character of freeness; it would no longer be what it is. Why add this idea here? Because it is only inasmuch as the maintenance of the faithful remnant is a matter of grace, that the rejection of the mass (of which Paul is about to speak, vv. 7–9) is not an injustice. If there were, on the part of Israel as a people,

[1] T. R. here reads, with B L, the Mnn. and Syr.: εἰ δὲ ἐξ ἔργων, οὐκέτι ἐστὶ χάρις, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἔργον οὐκέτι ἐστὶν ἔργον (*but if it be of works, it is no more grace, since work would be no more work*). These words are omitted in ℵ A C D E F G P, It. Vulg.; besides this, this sentence presents many variants.

the least merit arising from work as the ground of their election, even that partial rejection, of which the apostle speaks, would be impossible.—The word *οὐκέτι, no more,* should be taken here in the logical sense: the principle of grace being once laid down. The verb *γίνεται* (literally, not *is,* but *becomes*) should be explained as Meyer does: Grace ceases to show itself as what it is, ceases to *become* in its realization what it is in its essence.

The second proposition, parallel to the former, which is found in the T. R., is entirely foreign to the context, and for this reason alone it must appear suspicious. But it is decidedly condemned by its omission in the greater number of documents, and in particular by the harmony on this point of the Alex. and Greco-Latin texts, excepting the *Vaticanus.* It is impossible to imagine a reason copyists could have had for rejecting it. Volkmar, in order to remain faithful to the *Vatic.*, alleges this very fact of the want of relation to the context as that which struck copyists, and gave rise to its rejection. This is to do them too much honour. We should have had much graver and more numerous variants in the N. T. if copyists had proceeded so freely. It is much more probable that a reader composed a proposition parallel and antithetic to the former, and wrote it on the margin, whence it passed into the text. Cases of this kind are frequent.

It is obviously wholly unnecessary, in order to explain this verse, to hold, with the Tübingen school, that the apostle means to refute the Judeo-Christian principle of the mixing up of works and grace. Besides, would not the apostle have addressed himself directly in this case as he does to his Gentile-Christian readers in the passage vv. 13 and 14, which Volkmar himself puts parallel to this ?

Let us again remark the correlation between this passage, vv. 1–5, and the preceding, ix. 6–13. The latter referred to the carnal portion of the nation, and proved the right God had to reject them (as much as Ishmael and Esau); the present passage refers to the faithful portion, and establishes the fact that God has not failed to maintain a similar elect number in Israel. These two points of view taken together form the complete truth on the subject.

Reuss finds in this passage two theories placed side by side

with one another, but "which logic deems contradictory." The one, he thinks, is that of unconditional *grace*, by which the holy remnant are kept in their fidelity; the other that of *works*, by which Paul explains the rejection of the nation in general. But there is no contradiction between these two points of view; for if the faithfulness of the elect supposes the initiative of grace, it nevertheless implies faith on their part; and if the mass of the nation are rejected, this rejection only arises from their voluntary and persevering resistance to the solicitations of grace.

The apostle put the question whether the present relation between God and Israel was that of an absolute divorce; and he began by answering: no, in the sense that *a portion* at least of Israel have obtained grace, and form henceforth the nucleus of the church. But, he adds,—for this is the other side of the truth,—it is certainly true that the *greater part* of the people have been smitten with *hardness*. This is what he expounds in vv. 7–10, showing, as his habit is, that this severe measure was in keeping with the antecedents of the theocratic history and the declarations of Scripture.

Vv. 7, 8. "*What then? Israel hath not obtained that which he seeketh for,*[1] *while the election hath obtained it; but the rest were hardened. According*[2] *as it is written, God hath given them a spirit of torpor, eyes that they should not see, and ears that they should not hear, unto this day.*"—By the question: *What then?* Paul means: If Israel are not really rejected, what then? What has happened? As he has elucidated this question in chap. x., he confines himself to summing up in a word all that he has explained above regarding the foolish conduct of Israel. The object of their search, the justification to be obtained from God, having been pursued by them in a chimerical way (by means of human works), they have not attained the end which the elect have reached without trouble by faith. The present ἐπιζητεῖ, *seeketh*, for which there must not be substituted, with the oldest translations (see the critical note), the imperf. *sought*, indicates what Israel has done and is still doing at the very moment when the apostle is writing.—The elect then being once excepted, it is

[1] F G, It. Syr.: ἐπεζήτει (*sought*) instead of ἐπιζητεῖ (*seeketh*).
[2] ℵ B: καθαπερ instead of καθως.

quite true that *all the rest, οἱ λοιποί,* have been rejected, and that in the severest way: a judgment of hardening with which God has visited them. The term *πωροῦν, to harden,* signifies in the strict sense: to deprive an organ of its natural sensibility; morally: to take away from the heart the faculty of being touched by what is good or divine, from the understanding the faculty of discerning between the true and the false, the good and the bad. The sequel will explain how it is possible for such an effect to be ascribed to divine operation.

Ver. 8. Holy Scripture had already either witnessed to an operation of God in this direction in certain cases, or had raised the foreboding of it in regard to the Jews. So when Moses said to the people after their exodus from Egypt, Deut. xxix. 4: "The Lord hath not given you an heart to perceive, and eyes to see, and ears to hear, unto this day." And yet (ver. 2) "they had seen all that the Lord did before their eyes." All the wonders wrought in the wilderness they had seen in a sort without seeing them; they had heard the daily admonitions of Moses without hearing them, because they were under the weight of a spirit of insensibility; and this judgment which had weighed on them during the forty years of their rejection in the wilderness continued still at the time when Moses spoke to them in the plains of Moab, when they were preparing to enter Canaan: *until this day.* In quoting this remarkable saying, Paul modifies it slightly; for the first words: "*God hath not given you* a heart to perceive," he substitutes a somewhat different expression, which he borrows from Isa. xxix. 10: "The Lord hath poured upon you the spirit of deep sleep." The negative form of which Moses had made use ("God hath not given you" . . .) perfectly suited the epoch when this long judgment was about to close: "God hath not yet bestowed on you this gracious gift to this day; but He is about to grant it at length!" While, when the apostle wrote, the affirmative form used by Isaiah to express the same idea was much more appropriate: "God hath poured out on you" . . . The state of Israel indeed resembled in all respects that of the people when in Isaiah's time they ran blindfold into the punishment of captivity. Hence it is that Paul prefers for those first words the form of Isaiah to that of Moses.—There is something paradoxical in the expres-

sion: *a spirit of torpor;* for usually the spirit rouses and awakens, instead of rendering insensible. But God can also put in operation a paralysing force. It is so when He wills for a time to give over a man who perseveres in resisting Him to a blindness such that he punishes himself as it were with his own hand; see the example of Pharaoh (ix. 17) and that of Saul (1 Sam. xviii. 10).—The term κατάνυξις, which is ordinarily translated by *stupefaction,* and which we prefer to render by the word *torpor,* may be explained etymologically in two ways: Either it is derived from νύσσω, the act of *piercing, rending, striking,* whence there would result, when the blow is violent, a state of stupor and momentary insensibility; or it is taken to be from νύω, νύζω, νυστάζω, *to bend the head in order to sleep,* whence: *to fall asleep.* It is perhaps in this second sense that the LXX. have taken it, who use it pretty frequently, as in our passage, to translate the Hebrew term *mardema, deep sleep.* This second derivation is learnedly combated by Fritzsche; but it has again quite recently been defended by Volkmar. If we bring into close connection, as St. Paul does here, the saying of Isaiah with that of Deuteronomy, we must prefer the notion of *torpor* or *stupor* to that of *sleep;* for the subject in question in the context is not a man who is sleeping, but one who, while having his eyes open and seeing, sees not. —The works of God have two aspects, the one external, the material fact; the other internal, the divine thought contained in the fact. And thus it comes about, that when the eye of the soul is paralysed, one may see those works without seeing them; comp. Isa. vi. 10; Matt. xiii. 14, 15; John xii. 40, etc.—The apostle adds in the following verses a second quotation, taken from Ps. lxix. 22 and 23.

Vv. 9, 10. "*And David saith, Let their table be made a snare and a trap and a stumbling-block, and* [*so*] *a recompense unto them! Let their eyes be darkened, that they may not see; and bow down their back alway!*"—Paul ascribes this psalm to David, according to the title and Jewish tradition; he does not trouble with criticism. Is this title erroneous, as is alleged by our modern savants? They allege vv. 33–36, which close the psalm, and in which we have mention made of the liberated captives who shall rebuild and possess the cities of Judah, expressions which naturally apply to the time

of the captivity. But, on the other hand, the author speaks "of that zeal for the house of God which eats him up;" which supposes the existence of the temple. Nay more, the adversaries who oppress him are expressly designated as members of God's people: they are "his brethren, his mother's children" (ver. 8); "they shall be blotted out of the book of life" (ver. 28); their name was therefore inscribed in it; they are not the Chaldeans. Finally, what is stronger: those enemies, his fellow-countrymen, enjoy perfect external well-being; while they give the Psalmist, the object of their hatred, gall to drink, they themselves sit at table and sing as they drink strong drink (vv. 22 and 11, 12); a singular description of the state of the Jews in captivity! It must therefore be held that the last verses of the psalm (vv. 33–36) were, like the last and perfectly similar verses of Ps. li. (vv. 18 and 19), added to the hymn later, when the exiled people applied it to their national sufferings. The original description is that of the *righteous Israelite* suffering for the cause of God; and his adversaries, to whom the curses contained in the two verses quoted by Paul refer, are all the enemies of this just one within the theocracy itself, from Saul persecuting David down to the Jewish enemies of Jesus Christ and His Church.—The *table* is, in the Psalmist's sense, the emblem of the material pleasures in which the ungodly live. Their life of gross enjoyments is to become to them what the snares of all sorts with which men catch them are to the lower animals. It is difficult to avoid thinking that the apostle is here applying this figure in a spiritual sense; for the punishment which he has in view is of a spiritual nature; it is, moral hardening. The cause of such a judgment must therefore be something else than simple worldly enjoyment; it is, as we have seen, the proud confidence of Israel in their ceremonial works. The *table* is therefore, in Paul's sense, the emblem of presumptuous security founded on their fidelity to acts of worship, whether the reference be to the table of show-bread as a symbol of the Levitical worship in general, or to the sacrificial feasts. These works, on which they reckoned to save them, are precisely what is ruining them.—The Psalmist expresses the idea of ruin only by two terms: those of *snare* and *net* (in the LXX. παγίς, *net*, and σκάνδαλον, *stumbling-block*). Paul

adds a third, θήρα, strictly *prey*, and hence: every means of catching prey. This third term is taken from Ps. xxxv. 8 (in the LXX.), where it is used as a parallel to παγίς, *net*, in a passage every way similar to that of Ps. lxix. By this accumulation of almost synonymous terms, Paul means forcibly to express the idea that it will be impossible for them to escape, because no kind of snare will be wanting; first the *net* (παγίς), then the weapons of the chase (θήρα), and finally the trap which causes the prey to fall into the pit (σκάνδαλον).—The Hebrew and the LXX., as we have said, contain only two of these terms, the first and the third. Instead of the second, the LXX. read another regimen: εἰς ἀνταπόδοσιν, *for a recompense*. Whence comes this expression? They have evidently meant thereby to render the word *lischelomim, for those who are in security*, which in the Hebrew text is put between the words *snare* and *stumbling-block*. Only, to render it as they have done, they must have read *leschilloumim* (probably after another reading). This substantive is derived from the verb *schalam, to be complete*, whence in the Piel: *to recompense*. It therefore signifies *recompense;* hence this εἰς ἀνταπόδοσιν, *for a recompense*, in the LXX. Paul borrows from them this expression; but he puts it at the end as a sort of conclusion: "and so in just retribution." In ver. 10 the apostle continues to apply to the present judgment of Israel (hardening) the expressions of the Psalmist. The reference is to *the darkening* of the understanding which follows on the insensibility of the heart (ver. 9), to such a degree that the Gentiles, with their natural good sense, understand the gospel better than those Jews who have been instructed and cultivated by divine revelation. — The last words: *bow down their reins*, are an invocation; they refer to the state of slavish fear in which the Jews shall be held as long as this judgment of hardening which keeps them outside of the gospel shall last. They are slaves to their laws, to their Rabbins, and even to their God (viii. 15). We must beware of thinking, as Meyer does, that this chastisement is their punishment for the rejection of the Messiah. It is, on the contrary, that rejection which is in the apostle's eyes the realization of the doom of hardening previously pronounced upon them. As St. John shows, xii. 37 et seq., the Jews

would not have rejected Jesus if their eyes had not been already blinded and their ears stopped. It could only be under the weight of one of those judgments which visit man with a *spirit of torpor*, that any could fail to discern the raying forth of the glory of God in the person of Jesus Christ, as the apostle declares, 2 Cor. iv. 4. In this passage he ascribes the act of blinding to the *god of this world*, who has cast a veil over the spirit of his subjects. This means, as is seen in the book of Job, that God proves or punishes by leaving Satan to act, and it may be by the *spirit of torpor* mentioned in ver. 8, as with that spirit of lying whom the Lord sent to seduce Ahab in the vision of the prophet Micaiah, 1 Kings xxii. 10 et seq. However this may be, the rejection of Jesus by the Jews was the *effect*, not the *cause* of the hardening. The cause —Paul has clearly enough said, ix. 31–33—was the obstinacy of their self-righteousness.

Vv. 11–32.

God has not then, absolutely speaking, rejected His people; but it is perfectly true that He has hardened and rejected a portion of them. Yet there are two restrictions to be noted here: This chastisement is only *partial;* and, besides, it is only *temporary*. It is this second idea which is developed in the following passage. It is obvious how far Reuss is mistaken when he calls this second passage, in relation to the former, "a *second* explanation." This critic's constant idea is that of contradictory points of view placed in juxtaposition in the apostle's writing. On the contrary, the following passage is the logical complement of the preceding: "And this chastisement, which has fallen on Israel only partially, is itself only for a time."

This passage includes four sections, having each a distinct subject.

The first, vv. 11–15, points out the two *ends*, the *proximate* and the *final*, of the rejection of the Jews. The proximate end was to facilitate the conversion of the Gentiles; the final end is to restore the Jews themselves by means of the converted Gentiles, and that to bring down at length on the latter the fulness of divine blessing.

The second section, vv. 16–24, is intended to put the Gentiles on their guard against the pride with which they might be inspired by the position which is made theirs for the present in the kingdom of God, as well as against contempt of the Jews into which they might be carried.

In the third, vv. 25–29, Paul announces positively, as a matter of revelation, the fact of the final conversion of Israel.

Finally, the fourth, vv. 30–32, contains a general view of the course of divine work in the accomplishment of salvation.

It is impossible, in a subject so difficult, to imagine a simpler and more logical order.

Vv. 11–15.

Vv. 11, 12. "*I say then, Have they stumbled that they should fall? Let it not be! But through their fall salvation is come unto the Gentiles, for to provoke them to jealousy. Now, if the fall of them be the riches of the world, and the diminishing of them the riches of the Gentiles, how much more will be their fulness!*"—The *then* indicates that this new question is occasioned by the preceding development: "A portion have been hardened; is it *then* for ever?" The question with μή anticipates a negative answer. According to many commentators, the two terms *stumble* and *fall* have almost the same meaning, and they make the question signify: "have they fallen solely for the end of falling?" But this meaning would have required the adverb μόνον, *only*, and it is contrary, besides, to the difference of meaning between the two verbs; πταίειν, *to stumble*, expresses the shock against an obstacle; πίπτειν, *to fall*, the fall which follows from it. Consequently the meaning can only be this: "Have they stumbled so as to leave for ever their position as God's people, and to remain, as it were, lying on the ground (plunged in perdition)?" Comp. the figures of *striking against*, ix. 32, and *stumbling*, ver. 9.—"No," answers the apostle, "God has very different views. This dispensation tends to a first proximate aim, namely, to open to the Gentiles the gateway of salvation." According to Reuss, the apostle means to say, God "has for the present hardened the Jews *that* the gospel might be carried to the Gentiles." If by this the author means anew to ascribe

to St. Paul the idea of the unconditional decree, in virtue of which God disposes of men independently of their moral liberty, he completely mistakes the apostle's thought. It is through the fault of Israel that it has been impossible for the preaching of the gospel to the Gentiles to be carried out except by God's breaking with the chosen people. If, indeed, this people had lent themselves with intelligence and love to God's purpose toward the rest of mankind, they would willingly have let fall their theocratic pretensions; and, substituting the righteousness of faith for that of the law, they would themselves have become God's instruments in offering to the Gentiles the grace they enjoyed. But as their national pride did not permit them to enter on this path, and as they wished at any cost to maintain their legal system, God was obliged to blind them, so that they should not in Jesus recognise their Messiah. Otherwise the gospel would have been Judaized; believing Gentiles would have required to become the proselytes of Israel, and this would have been an end of salvation for the world, and of the world for salvation. Moreover, in consequence of the proud contempt of the Jews for the Gentiles, there would have been formed between them and the latter such a relation of enmity, that if Christianity offered itself to the world under cover of this detested Judaism, it would, no doubt, have gained some adherents, but it would have been the object of the antipathy which the Gentile world felt to the Jewish people. In these circumstances, God, who wished the salvation of the world, necessarily required to disentangle the cause of the gospel from that of Judaism, and even to oppose them to one another. And this is what was brought about by the refusal of Israel to recognise Jesus as the Messiah. The preaching of the Christ, delivered by this very separation, was able, free from all hindrance, to take its flight over the world. Once, then, Israel had become by their own fault what they were, God could evidently not act otherwise, if He would save the Gentiles; but nothing forced Israel to become *such*. There is nothing here, therefore, of an unconditional decree; it is ever the same law we meet with: God's plan embracing the vagaries of human liberty, and making them turn to its own fulfilment.

But that is not all. Wonderful result! Israel, having

been unwilling to concur with God in saving the Gentiles, must end by being themselves saved through their salvation. It is undoubtedly a humiliation for them to be the last to enter where they should have introduced all others; but on God's part it is the height of mercy. Here is the more remote end (for which the conversion of the Gentiles becomes a means), which Paul indicates in the words borrowed from the passage of Moses quoted above, x. 19: "*to provoke* them *to jealousy*." Seeing all the blessings of the kingdom, pardon, justification, the Holy Spirit, adoption, shed down abundantly on the Gentile nations through faith in Him whom they have rejected, how can they help saying at length: These blessings are ours? And how can they help opening their eyes and recognising that Jesus is the Messiah, since in Him the works predicted of the Messiah are accomplished? How shall the elder son, seeing his younger brother seated and celebrating the feast at his father's table, fail to ask that he may re-enter the paternal home and come to sit down side by side with his brother, after throwing himself into the arms of their common father? Such is the spectacle of which Paul gives us a glimpse in the words: *to provoke them to jealousy*. The sin of the Jews could modify God's plan, but by no means prevent it.

Ver. 12. The δέ is that of gradation: *well then*. It is a new and more joyous perspective still which the apostle opens up. If the exclusion of the Jews, by allowing the gospel to be presented to the world freed from every legal form, has opened for it a large entrance among the Gentiles, what will be the result of the restoration of this people, if it shall ever be realized? What blessings of higher excellence for the whole world may not be expected from it! Thus the apostle advances from step to step in the explanation of this mysterious decree of rejection. — *Their fall* or *their false step*: this expression, which refers back to the term πταίειν, *to stumble*, ver. 11, denotes Jewish unbelief. — By *the riches of the world*, Paul understands the state of grace into which the Gentiles are introduced by faith in a free salvation. — The two abstract expressions *fall* and *world* are reproduced in a more concrete way in a second proposition parallel to the first; the former in the term ἥττημα, which we translate by *diminishing* (*reduction to a small number*); the latter in the plural word *the*

Gentiles. — The word ἥττημα comes from the verb ἡττᾶσθαι, the fundamental meaning of which is: *to be in a state of inferiority.* This inferiority may be one in relation to an enemy; in this case the verb means: *to be overcome* (2 Pet. ii. 19), and the substantive derived from it signifies *defeat* (*clades*). Or the inferiority may refer to a state fixed on as normal, and below which one falls. The substantive in this case denotes a *deficit*, a fall. Of these two meanings the first is impossible here; for the enemy by whom Israel would be beaten could be no other than God; now in the context this thought is inapplicable. The second and only admissible sense may be applied either qualitatively or numerically. In the former case, the subject in question is a level of spiritual life beneath which Israel has fallen; comp. 1 Cor. vi. 7: "There is utterly an inferiority, ἥττημα (a moral deficit), among you because ye go to law one with another," and 2 Cor. xii. 13. Applied here, this meaning would lead to the following explanation: "The *moral degradation* of Israel has become the cause of the enriching of the Gentiles." But there is something repugnant in this idea, and, besides, we should be obliged by it to take the substantive πλήρωμα, *the fulness*, which corresponds to it, also in the moral sense: the *perfect spiritual state* to which the Jews shall one day be restored. Now this meaning is impossible in view of ver. 25, where this expression evidently denotes *the totality* of the Gentile nations. We are therefore led by this antithesis to the numerical meaning of ἥττημα, *diminishing to a small number* (of believers): "If their diminishing as God's people to a very small number of individuals (those who have received the Messiah) has formed the riches of the world, how much more their restoration to the complete state of a people" . . .! But it is important to observe the shade of difference between this and the often repeated explanation of Chrysostom, which applies the word ἥττημα to the believing Jews themselves, which would lead to an idea foreign to the context, namely this: that if so small a number of believing Jews have already done so much good to the world by becoming the nucleus of the church, the entire nation once converted will do more still. The pronoun αὐτῶν (*their*) excludes this sense; for in the three propositions it can only apply to the same subject, the

Jewish people in general (Meyer). — Instead of "the riches *of the world*," the apostle says the second time "the riches *of the Gentiles*;" because now there presents itself to his mind that indefinite series of Gentile nations who, ever as the preaching of the gospel shall reach them, shall enter successively into the church, and thus fill up the void arising from the reduction of Israel to so small a number of believers. — *Their fulness:* the totality of the then living members of the people of Israel. The term πλήρωμα, used apparently in such different acceptations by the N. T. writers, has but one fundamental signification, of which all the others are only various applications. It always denotes: that with which an empty space is filled (*id quo res impletur*); comp. Philippi simplifying Fritzsche. In the application of this term to the people of Israel, we must regard the abstract notion of a people as the empty frame to be filled, and the totality of the individuals in whom this notion is realized, as that which fills the frame. — From what we have said above, we must set aside meanings of a qualitative nature, such as: "the fulness of the Messianic salvation," or "the restoration of Israel to its normal position," or the state of spiritual perfection to which it is destined (Fritzs., Rück., Hofm.). Neither can the meaning be admitted which Philippi ascribes to the two words ἥττημα and πλήρωμα; he supplies as their understood complement the idea of the kingdom of God, and explains: "the blank produced in the kingdom of God by their rejection," and "the filling up of this blank by their readmission." This is to do violence to the meaning of the genitives αὐτῶν, and to introduce into the text an idea (that of the kingdom of God) which is nowhere indicated.

Vv. 13–15 are a more particular application to St. Paul's ministry of the ideas expounded vv. 11 and 12; for this ministry had a decisive part to play in accomplishing the plan of God sketched in these two last verses; and the feelings with which Paul discharged his apostleship must be in harmony with the course of God's work. This is exactly what he shows in these three verses.

Vv. 13–15. "*For*[1] *I say it to you, you Gentiles, Inas-*

[1] T. R. reads γαρ (*for*), with D E F G L, It., while ℵ A B P, Syr. read δε (*now then*), and C: ουν (*therefore*).

much[1] *as I am the apostle of the Gentiles, I magnify mine office: if by any means I may provoke to emulation them which are my flesh, and might save some of them. For if the casting away of them be the reconciling of the world, what shall the restoring of them be, but a resurrection from the dead?*"—It is somewhat difficult to decide between the two readings γάρ (*for*) and δέ (*now then*). The authorities are balanced; but it is probable that the δέ, *now*, has been substituted for *for*, because the observation which begins ver. 13 was connected with the preceding verse in this sense: "Now I tell you that (the preceding) specially you Gentiles." And as this connection is decidedly mistaken, and the apostle's observation refers manifestly to what follows (vv. 13–15), there is reason to believe that the true connection is that which is expressed by *for*. And in fact the natural transition from vv. 11 and 12 to vv. 13–15 is this: "What I have just told you of the magnificent effects which will one day be produced among you Gentiles by the restoration of the Jews, is so true that it is even in your interest and as your apostle, the apostle to you Gentiles, that I strive to labour for the salvation of the Jews; for I know all that will one day accrue to you from their national conversion, a true spiritual resurrection (ver. 15)." There is a wholly different and widespread way of understanding the meaning of these three verses. It is to take vv. 13 and 14 as a sort of parenthesis or episode, and to regard ver. 15 as a somewhat more emphatic repetition of ver. 12; comp. for example, vv. 9 and 10 of chap. v. In that case, what the apostle would say in this parenthesis (vv. 13 and 14) would be this: "If I labour so ardently in my mission to the Gentiles, it is that I may thereby stimulate my fellow-countrymen, the Jews, to seek conversion." It is the opposite thought from that which we have been expressing. This meaning occurs in almost all the commentaries. But, 1st. It is impossible to understand how Paul could say that *as the apostle of the Gentiles;* he would rather say it *though* their apostle and *as* a Jew by birth. 2d. After an interruption like that of vv. 13 and 14, it would be unnatural to make the *for* of ver. 15 bear on ver. 12. This is what renders the case so

[1] T. R. reads μὲν after ὅσον, with L and Mnn.; ℵ A B C P read μὲν οὖν; D E F G omit every particle.

different from that of chap. v. 9, 10. Let us study our text more closely, and we shall certainly be led to the first meaning which we have stated. The emphasis is not on the fact that in labouring for the conversion of the Gentiles he is labouring in the end for that of the Jews,—which is undoubtedly true, vv. 13 and 14,—but on the fact that in labouring thus for the conversion of the Jews he is in that very way labouring for the good of the Gentiles, who are his proper charge, vv. 13–15.

To you, Gentiles: Baur and his disciples (Volkmar, Holsten), and also Mangold, allege that this style of address embraces only a fraction of the church, the members of Gentile origin, who are only a weak minority. Meyer rightly answers that in that case Paul must have written: *Τοῖς ἔθνεσιν ἐν ὑμῖν λέγω*, "I address *those of you* who are of Gentile origin." Weizsäcker, in the often quoted work (p. 257), likewise observes with reason, that the form employed being the only direct style of address used to the readers in this whole passage, it is natural to apply it to the entire church; that one may consequently conclude from these words with the utmost certainty that members of Gentile origin formed the preponderating element in this church. We shall ask further, if in the opposite case Paul could have called the Jews *my flesh*, as speaking in his own name only, while the great majority of his readers shared with him the characteristic of being Judeo-Christians.—And what does the apostle say to those Gentiles who have become believers? The conjunction *ἐφ' ὅσον* may signify *as long as*, or *inasmuch as*. It is clear that the notion of time has no application here, and that the second sense is the only possible one; comp. Matt. xxv. 40. By this expression Paul distinguishes in his own person two men: one, in whose name he is here speaking; that is, as he says, the *apostle of the Gentiles*. Who is the other? That is understood of itself, and the following expression: *μου τὴν σάρκα*, which should be translated by: *my own flesh* (in consequence of the prominent position of the pronoun *μου*), reveals it clearly enough: it is *the Jew* in him. What does he mean then? That if as a Jew who has become a believer he certainly feels the desire to labour for the salvation of his fellow-countrymen (*his flesh*), he strives all the more to do so as the apostle of the

Gentiles, because the conversion of his people must end in loading the Gentiles with all the riches of the blessings of the gospel. The sequel will explain how (ver. 15). In this connection of ideas there is no doubt that the μέν, which the T. R. reads after ἐφ' ὅσον, and which is rejected by the Greco-Latin reading, belongs really to the text. For this particle is intended to fix and bring out forcibly the character belonging to Paul of apostle to the Gentiles, in opposition to the other which he also possesses. The word is supported, besides, even by the Alexs., which read μὲν οὖν. As to this οὖν, *therefore*, added by the latter, it is evidently, as Meyer himself acknowledges, a gloss, occasioned by the fact that the first proposition was connected with ver. 12, in order to begin afterwards a wholly new sentence.

What does Paul understand by the expression: *I magnify mine office?* These words might be applied to the defences which he was constantly obliged to make of his apostleship, to the narratives in which he proclaimed before the churches the marvellous successes which God granted him (Acts xv. 12, xxi. 19; 1 Cor. xv. 9, 10). But instead of contributing to bring the Jews to faith (ver. 14), such recitals could only embitter them. It is therefore of the zeal and activity displayed by him in the service of his mission that the apostle is thinking. *To magnify* his ministry as the apostle of the Gentiles, is to convert as many heathens as possible. And thereby at what remoter result is he aiming? He tells us in ver. 14.

Ver. 14. He would try *if in any way* (εἴπως; comp. Phil. iii. 11) he may reach the end, by dint of success, of awakening his people, whom he loves as *his own flesh*, from their torpor, should it only be by jealousy! Here, as in ver. 11, he uses the expression which Moses had employed (x. 19). No doubt he does not deceive himself; he does not reckon on a conversion of Israel *en masse* before the last times; but he would like at least, he adds, to save *some of them*, as first-fruits of the harvest. But we are not at the goal. That even is only a means. The *final* aim is declared in ver. 15.

Ver. 15. In truth, it will not be till the national conversion of Israel take place, that the work of God shall reach its

perfection among the Gentiles themselves, and that the fruit of his labour as their apostle will break forth in all its beauty. Such is the explanation of the words of ver. 13: "inasmuch as I am the apostle of the Gentiles." As a Jew, he certainly desires the conversion of the Jews; but he desires it still more, if possible, as the apostle of the Gentiles, because he knows what this event will be for the entire church. It is clear how closely the *for* at the beginning of this verse joins it to vv. 13 and 14, and how needful it is to guard against making these two last a parenthesis, and ver. 15 a repetition of ver. 12. It is also clear how wide of the truth are Baur and his school, when they find in these verses a clever artifice by which Paul seeks to render his mission among the Gentiles acceptable to the so-called Judeo-Christian church of Rome. According to this interpretation, his meaning would be: "You are wrong in taking offence at my mission to the Gentiles; it is entirely to the profit of the Jews, whom it must end by bringing to the gospel;" an adroit way, if one dared say so, of gilding the pill for them! Not only is such a supposition unworthy of the apostle's character, but it is just the opposite of his real thought.—Here it is as it results from the three verses combined: "To take it rightly, it is as your apostle, you Gentiles, that I labour in seeking to provoke the Jews to jealousy by your conversion; for it is not till they shall be restored to grace that you yourselves shall be crowned with fulness of life." This saying is not therefore a *captatio benevolentiæ* indirectly appealing to Judeo-Christian readers; it is a jet of light for the use of Gentile-Christians.

The term ἀποβολή strictly denotes the act of throwing far from oneself (Acts xxviii. 22: ἀποβολὴ ψυχῆς, *the loss of life*). How is the rejection of the Jews the reconciliation of the world? Inasmuch as it brings down that wall of law which kept the Gentiles outside of the divine covenant, and opens wide to them the door of grace by simple faith in the atonement.—Now, if such is the effect of their rejection, what shall be the effect of their *readmission?* The word πρόσληψις (translated by Osterv. *their recall*, by Oltram. *their restoration*, by Segond, *their admission*) strictly signifies the act of welcoming. When cursed, they have contributed to the restoration of the world; what will they not do when blessed?

There seems to be here an allusion to what Christ Himself did for the world by His expiatory death and resurrection. In Christ's people there is always something of Christ Himself, *mutatis mutandis*.—A host of commentators, from Origen and Chrysostom down to Meyer and Hofmann (two men who do not often agree, and who unfortunately concur in this case), apply the expression: *a life from the dead*, to the *resurrection of the dead*, in the strict sense. But—1st. Why use the expression *a life*, instead of saying as usual *ἀνάστασις, the resurrection?* 2d. Why omit the article before the word *life*, and not say as usual *the* life, life eternal, instead of *a* life? And more than all, 3d. What so close relation could there be between the fact of the conversion of the Jews and that of the bodily resurrection? Again, if Paul confined himself to saying that the second event will closely follow the first, this temporal relation would be intelligible, though according to him the signal for the resurrection is the return of the Lord (1 Cor. xv. 23), and not at all the conversion of Israel. But he goes the length of *identifying* the two facts of which he speaks: "What shall their return be but a life?" It is evident, therefore, for all these reasons, that the expression: *a life from the dead*, must be applied to a powerful spiritual revolution which will be wrought in the heart of Gentile Christendom by the fact of the conversion of the Jews. So it has been understood by Theoph., Mel., Calv., Beza, Philip., etc. The light which converted Jews bring to the church, and the power of life which they have sometimes awakened in it, are the pledge of that spiritual renovation which will be produced in Gentile Christendom by their entrance *en masse*. Do we not then feel that in our present condition there is something, and that much, wanting to us that the promises of the gospel may be realized in all their fulness; that there is, as it were, a mysterious hindrance to the efficacy of preaching, a debility inherent in our spiritual life, a lack of joy and force which contrasts strangely with the joyful outbursts of prophets and psalmists; that, in fine, the feast in the father's house is not complete . . . why? because it cannot be so, so long as the family is not entirely reconstituted by the return of the elder son. Then shall come the Pentecost of the last times, the latter rain. We are little affected by the objection of

Meyer, who alleges that, according to St. Paul, the last times will be times of tribulation (those of Antichrist), and not an epoch of spiritual prosperity. We do not know how the apostle conceived the succession of events; it seems to us that, according to the Apocalypse, the conversion of the Jews (chap. xi. 13 and xiv. 1 et seq.) must *precede* the coming of the Antichrist, and consequently also Christ's coming again. Paul does not express himself on this point, because, as always, he only brings out what belongs rigorously to the subject he is treating.

Vv. 16–24.

The apostle proves in this passage the perfect congruity, from the viewpoint of Israelitish antecedents, of the event which he has just announced as the consummation of Israel's history. Their future restoration is in conformity with the holy character impressed on them from the first; it is therefore not only possible, but morally necessary (ver. 16). This thought, he adds, should inspire the Gentiles, on the one hand, with a feeling of profound regard for Israel, even in their lapsed state (vv. 17, 18); on the other, with a feeling of watchful fear over themselves; for if a judgment of rejection overtook such a people, how much more easily may not the same chastisement descend on them (vv. 19–21)! He finishes with a conclusion confirming the principal idea of the passage (vv. 22–24).

Ver. 16. "*But if the first-fruit be holy, the lump is also holy; and if the root be holy, so are the branches.*"—The Jewish people are *consecrated to God* by their very origin,—that is to say, by the call of Abraham, which included theirs (ver. 29). —According to Num. xv. 18–21, every time the Israelites ate of the bread of the land which God had given them, they were first of all to set aside a portion of the dough to make a cake intended for the priests. This cake bore the name of ἀπαρχή, *first-fruits;* it is to this usage the apostle alludes in the first part of our verse. It has sometimes been alleged that he took the figure used here from the custom of offering in the temple, on the 16th Nisan, on the morrow after the Passover, the sacred sheaf gathered in one of the fields of Jerusalem, as

first-fruits and as a consecration of the entire harvest. But the subject in question here is a portion of *dough* (φύραμα), which necessarily leads to the first meaning. This cake offered to God's representative impressed the seal of consecration on the entire mass from which it had been taken. What is it that corresponds to this emblem in the apostle's view? Some answer: *the Jews converted* in the first times of the church; for they are the pledge of the final conversion of the whole people. But exactly the same thing might be said of the first Gentile converts, as being the pledge of the successive conversion of all the Gentiles. Now, by this figure Paul's very object is to express a characteristic peculiar to the Jews. Some Fathers (Or., Theod.) apply this emblem to *Christ*, as assuring the conversion of the people from whom He sprang. But this reasoning would apply equally to Gentile humanity, since Jesus is a man, not only a Jew. We must therefore, with the majority of commentators, take these holy first-fruits as *the patriarchs*, in whose person all their posterity are radically consecrated to the mission of being the salvation-people; comp. ix. 5 and xi. 28.

But this figure, by which the entire nation was compared to a lump of dough consecrated to God, did not furnish the apostle with the means of distinguishing between Jews and Jews, between those who had faithfully preserved this national character and those who had obliterated it by their personal unbelief. Thus he is obliged to add a second figure, that he may be able to make the distinction which he must here lay down between those two so different portions of the nation. There is therefore no need to seek a different meaning for the second figure from that of the first.—Origen, again, applies the emblem of the *root* to *Christ*, inasmuch as by His heavenly origin He is the true author of the Jewish people; but this notion of Christ's pre-existence is foreign to the context.—It follows from these two comparisons, that to obtain salvation the Jewish people had only to remain on the soil where they were naturally rooted, while the salvation of the Gentile demands a complete transplantation. Hence a double warning which Paul feels himself forced to give to the latter. And first the warning against indulging pride.

Vv. 17, 18. "*Now, if some of the branches be broken off, and*

thou, being a wild olive tree, wert grafted in their place, and with them partakest of the root[1] *and fatness of the olive tree, boast not against the branches; and if thou boast, it is not thou that bearest the root, but the root thee.*"—We might give δέ the sense of *but* ("*but* if, notwithstanding their natural consecration, the branches were broken off"); or that of *now*, which is better, as the argument continues down to the inference drawn in ver. 18.—Undoubtedly an event has happened which seems to be in contradiction to this people's character of holiness; a certain number of its members, like branches struck down with an axe, have been rejected. The term *some* indicates any fraction whatever, small or considerable matters not (see on iii. 3).—Σὺ δέ, *and if thou.* Some commentators think that this style of address applies to the Gentile-Christian *church* personified. But in that sense would not the article ὁ have been needed before ἀγριέλαιος, *the wild olive?* Without an article the word is an adjective, and denotes the quality, not the tree itself. Besides, it is not one tree that is engrafted on another. By this style of address, therefore, Paul speaks to *each Christian* of Gentile origin individually, and reminds him that it is in spite of his possessing the *quality* of a wild tree that he has been able to take a place in this blessed and consecrated organism to which he was originally a stranger.—The words ἐν αὐτοῖς, which we have translated: *in their place*, properly signify: *in them*, and may be understood in two ways: either in the sense of *among them*,—that is to say, among the branches which have remained on the trunk, converts of Jewish origin,—or: *in the place* which they occupied, and, as it were, in the stump which has been left by them, which would apply solely to the branches which have been cut down. The prep. ἐν, *in*, which enters into the composition of the verb, might favour this latter meaning, which is, however, somewhat forced.—Once engrafted on this stem, the wild branches have become *co-participants* (συγκοινωνοί) of the root. This expression is explained by the following words: *and of the fatness of the olive*, of which the meaning is this: As there mounts up from the root into the whole tree a fruitful and unctuous sap which pervades all its branches, so the blessing assured to Abraham (ἡ εὐλογία τοῦ Ἀβραάμ, Gal.

[1] ℵ B C omit καὶ after ῥίζης; D F G, It. omit the words τῆς ῥίζης καὶ.

iii. 14) remains inherent in the national life of Israel, and is even communicated by believing Jews to those of the Gentiles who become children of the patriarch by faith; comp. Gal. iii. 5–9. The Alexs. reject the word *καί, and,* after *ῥίζης, root:* "the root *of* the fatness of the olive." It would be necessary in that case to give to the word *root* the meaning of *source,* which is impossible. This reading must therefore be rejected, as well as that of the Greco-Latins, which omit the words: *of the root and of:* "co-participant of the fatness of the olive." The meaning would be admissible; but this reading is only a correction of the text once altered by the Alex. reading.— This passage demonstrates in a remarkable way the complete harmony between St. Paul's view and that of the twelve apostles on the relation of the church to Israel. The Tübingen school persists in contrasting these two conceptions with one another. According to it, the Twelve regarded Christians of Gentile origin as simply members by admission, a sort of *plebs* in the church; while Paul made them members of the new people, perfectly equal to the old. The fact is, that in the view of Paul, as in that of the Twelve, the believers of Israel are the nucleus round which are grouped the converts from among the Gentiles, and God's ancient people, consequently, the flock with which the Gentiles are incorporated. "I have yet other sheep, said Jesus (John x. 16), who are not of this fold; them also I must bring, and there shall be one flock, one Shepherd." Excepting the figure, the thought is identical with our passage.

It has been objected to the figure used here by the apostle, that a gardener never engrafts a wild branch on a stem already brought under cultivation; but, on the contrary, a stem is taken which still possesses all the vigour of the wild state to insert in it the graft of the cultivated tree. There are two ways of answering this objection. It may be said that, according to the reports of some travellers, the course taken in the East is sometimes that supposed by the figure of the apostle. A wild young branch is engrafted in an old exhausted olive, and serves to revive it. But there is another more natural answer, viz. that the apostle uses the figure freely and without concern, to modify it in view of the application. What proves this, is the fact that in ver. 23 he represents the branches broken off

as requiring to be engrafted anew. Now this is an impracticable process, taken in the strict sense.

Ver. 18. If it is so, Christians of Gentile origin have no cause to indulge pride as against the natural branches. The true translation would perhaps be: "*Do not despise the branches.* But if, nevertheless, *thou despisest*" . . . Must we understand by *the branches* those *broken off?* Certainly, for it is on them that the look of disdain might most easily be cast by those who had been called to fill their place. Do we not see Christians at the present day often treating with supreme contempt the members of the Jewish nation who dwell among them? But this contempt might easily extend even to Judeo-Christians; and this, perhaps, is the reason why Paul says simply *the branches*, without adding the epithet: *broken off.* It is all that bears the name of Jew which he wished to put under the protection of this warning. As to the idea Fritzsche had of applying this word *branches* to *Christians* of Jewish origin solely, it does not deserve refutation.

Yet the apostle supposes that the presumption of the Gentile-Christian continues, in spite of this warning. This is why he adds: "But if, notwithstanding, thou despisest" . . . We have not to understand a verb such as: *know that* or *think that.* The idea understood, if there is one, is to this effect: "Be it! despise! But this, nevertheless, remains the fact." And what is the fact that nothing can change, and with which such a feeling conflicts? It is, that the salvation enjoyed by this believer has been prepared by a divine history which is one with that of Israel, and that the Christian of Gentile origin enters into possession of a blessing already existing and inherent in this people. As Hodge says: "It is the Jews who are the channel of blessings to the Gentiles, and not inversely." The Gentiles become God's people by means of the Jews, not the Jews by the instrumentality of the Gentiles. In view of this fact, the contempt of the latter becomes absurd and even perilous.

Not only, indeed, should Gentile believers not *despise* the Jews; but if they understand their position rightly, the sight of this rejected people should lead them to tremble for themselves.

Vv. 19–21. "*Thou wilt say then, Branches*[1] *were broken off,*

[1] T. R. reads οἱ (*the*) before κλάδοι, with D only and several Mnn.

that I might be grafted in. Well! because of unbelief they were broken off, and thou standest by faith; be not high-minded,[1] *but fear! For if God spared not the natural branches,* [*it may be*] *that neither will He spare thee.*"[2]—The objection Paul puts in the mouth of his reader is taken from the very answer which he had just made to him in ver. 18; hence the *then:* "Since branches have been cut off the stem to make place for me, who was foreign to it by nature, the preference of God for me appears thereby still more striking than if God had confined Himself to engrafting me on the same stem with them."—The article *οἱ, the,* before the word *branches,* is to be rejected, according to the majority of the documents. Paul means, in reality: "beings who had the character of branches." The particular emphasis resting on the ἐγώ should be remarked; literally: "that *I* on my part should be grafted in." To make place for *me, even me,* God rejected branches!

Ver. 20. Paul grants the fact; but he denies the inference drawn from it. There is no arbitrary favour in God. If the Jews have been rejected, it is in consequence of their unbelief; and if thou fillest their place for the present, it is a consequence of faith,—that is to say, of divine grace. For there is no merit in faith, since it consists only in opening the hand to receive the gift of God. The term: *thou standest,* alludes to the favoured position of the engrafted branch which now rises on the stem, while those it has replaced lie on the ground.—The reading *ὑψηλοφρόνει* ought certainly to be preferred to the form *ὑψηλὰ φρόνει,* which is substituted for it by the Alexs., probably after xii. 16. In the passage 1 Tim. vi. 17, where this word again occurs, there is the same variant. —But it is not enough to avoid self-exaltation; there should be a positive fear.

Ver. 21. May not what has happened to the natural branches, happen to the engrafted branches? There is even here an *a fortiori:* For the engrafted branches being less homogeneous with the trunk than the natural branches, their rejection may take place more easily still, in case of unbelief. The Alex. reading rejects the conj. *μήπως, from fear that;*

[1] ℵ A B read *ὑψηλα φρονει* instead of *ὑψηλοφρονει,* which is read by all the others.

[2] T. R. reads *μηπως ουδε σου,* with D F G L, Syr.; but ℵ A B C Γ, Or. reject *μηπως.*—T. R. reads *φεισηται,* with some Mnn. only; all the Mjj. read *φεισεται.*

thus the meaning is: "neither will He spare thee." But the T. R., with the Greco-Latins, reads μήπως before οὐδὲ σοῦ, and should be translated by borrowing from the word *fear* in the preceding verse the notion of fear: "[fear] that He will no more spare thee." It is difficult to believe that a copyist would have introduced this form μήπως, *lest*, which softens the threat; it is more probable that this conjunction should have been omitted. Why? The other variant which the last word of this short proposition presents probably explains the reason. The future φείσεται, *will spare*, which is read in all the Mjj., seemed incompatible with the conj. μήπως, which usually governs the subjunctive. Hence two kinds of corrections in opposite ways: the one (the Alex.) have rejected the conjunction, all the more that it was not dependent on any verb; and the others, the Byz. Mnn., have changed the indicative (φείσεται) into the subjunctive (φείσηται).

Vv. 22–24 derive for believers of Gentile origin the practical application of all they have been reminded of in vv. 17–21.

Ver. 22. "*Behold, therefore, the goodness and severity of God: on them which fell, severity;*[1] *but toward thee, goodness,*[2] *if thou continue in this goodness: otherwise thou also shalt be cut off.*" —The readers have just been contemplating two examples, the one of severity, the other of grace; the first, in the person of the Jews; the second, in their own. Hence two lessons to be derived which the apostle entreats them not to neglect. In opposition to χρηστότης, *goodness*, from χρηστός (literally: *that may be handled*), the apostle uses the forcible term ἀποτομία (from ἀποτέμνω, *to cut right off*, to cut short): a rigour which does not bend. We may read in the second clause the two substantives in the nominative with the Alexs., and then we shall have either to understand the verb *is* ("severity is on those who"), which is excessively clumsy, or to make these two words absolute nominatives, as sometimes happens in Greek appositions. But the Received Reading puts these words in the accusative, which is much simpler. It is, besides, sufficiently supported.—In passing to the application of God's

[1] ℵ A B C read αποτομιαν instead of αποτομιαν.

[2] ℵ B C D read χρηστοτητος instead of χρηστοτητα.—The same read θεου after χρηστοτητος.

two modes of acting which he has just characterized, the apostle begins with the second; and he connects it directly with what precedes by this grave restriction: "if thou continue in this goodness." Continuance is effected by the same disposition whereby grace was appropriated at the first, humble faith. Unhappy is the believer for whom grace is no longer grace on the hundredth or the thousandth day, as it was on the first! For the slightest feeling of self-exaltation which may take possession of him on occasion of grace received or of its fruits, destroys in his case grace itself and paralyses it. There is nothing more for him to expect in this condition than to be himself also cut off from the stem. *Καὶ σύ, thou also,* as well as the Jews. The future passive *ἐκκοπήσῃ, thou shalt be cut off,* abruptly closes the sentence, like the stroke of the axe cutting down this proud branch.—It is but too clear to any one who has eyes to see, that our Gentile Christendom has now reached the point here foreseen by St. Paul. In its pride it tramples under foot the very notion of that grace which has made it what it is. It moves on, therefore, to a judgment of rejection like that of Israel, but which shall not have to soften it a promise like that which accompanied the fall of the Jews.—For the rest, I do not think that any conclusion can be drawn from this passage against the doctrine of an unconditional decree relative to individuals; for the matter in question here is Gentile Christendom in general, and not such or such of its members in particular (see Hodge).

In vv. 23 and 24 the idea of *severity* is applied, as that of *goodness* was in the foregoing verse. As the goodness which the Gentiles have enjoyed may through their fault be transformed into severity, so the severity with which the Jews had been treated may be changed for them into compassionate goodness, if they consent to believe as the Gentiles formerly did. With the close of this verse the apostle returns to his principal subject, the future of Israel.

Vv. 23, 24. "*And they also, if they abide not still in unbelief, shall be graffed in; for God is able to graff them in again. For if thou wert cut out of the olive tree which is wild by nature, and wert graffed contrary to nature into a good olive tree, how much more shall these, which be the natural branches, be graffed into their own olive tree!*"—Severity to the Jews was a threat

to the Gentiles; so the goodness displayed to the Gentiles is a pledge, as it were, of mercy to the Jews. Let them only give up persisting in their unbelief (a contrast to the non-persistence of the Gentiles in faith, ver. 22), and on this one condition the power of God will restore them their place in His kingdom. It will engraft them on Christ, who will become to them a vivifying stem, as well as to the Gentiles. And this transplantation will be effected more easily still in their case than in the case of the Gentiles.

Ver. 24. There is, in fact, between the Jewish nation and the kingdom of God an essential affinity, a sort of pre-established harmony, so that when the hour has come, their restoration will be accomplished still more easily than the incorporation of the Gentiles.—The words: *how much more*, seem to us to signify naturally in the context: "How much more easily." It is objected, no doubt, that one thing is no easier to God than another. That is true in the physical world; but in the moral world God encounters a factor which He Himself respects—moral freedom. The Jewish people having been raised up only with a view to the kingdom of God, will not have an organic transformation to undergo in order to return to it; and if it is objected that a Jew is converted with more difficulty than a Gentile, that proves nothing as to the final and collective revolution which will be wrought in the nation at the end of the times. A veil will fall (1 Cor. iii. 14, 15), and all will be done.

Thus far the apostle has shown the moral congruity of the event which he has in view; now he announces the fact positively, and as matter of express revelation.

Vv. 25–32.

Ver. 25 contains the announcement of the fact; vv. 26, 27 quote some prophecies bearing on it; vv. 28, 29 conclude as to Israel; finally, vv. 30–32 sum up the whole divine plan in relation to Israel and to the Gentiles.

Vv. 25, 26*a*. "*For I would not, brethren, that ye should be ignorant of this mystery, lest ye should be wise in your own conceits:*[1] *that hardness in part is happened to Israel, until the*

[1] Instead of παρ' ἑαυτοῖς, A B read ἐν ἑαυτοῖς; F G: ἑαυτοῖς.

fulness of the Gentiles be come in; and so all Israel shall be saved."—The form of expression: "I would not that ye should be ignorant," always announces a communication the importance of which the apostle is concerned to impress. The style of address: *brethren*, leaves no room to doubt that the apostle is here speaking to the church as a whole. Now it is indubitable that in vv. 28 and 30 those readers whom he addresses with the word *ye* are of Gentile origin. This proof of a Gentile majority in the church of Rome seems to us incontrovertible.—Paul uses the word *mystery* to designate the fact he is about to announce. He does not mean by this, as might be thought from the meaning this term has taken in ecclesiastical language, that this fact presents something incomprehensible to reason. In the N. T. the word denotes a truth or fact which can only be known by man through a communication from above, but which, after this revelation has taken place, falls into the domain of the understanding. The two notions *mystery* and *revelation* are correlative; comp. Eph. iii. 3–6. The apostle therefore holds directly from above the knowledge of the event he proceeds to announce; comp. 1 Cor. xv. 51 and 1 Thess. iv. 15.—Before stating the fact, he explains the object of this communication: "that ye be not wise in your own eyes." The reference here is not, as in ver. 19, to proud thoughts arising from the preference which God seems now to have given to the Gentiles. It is the *wisdom of self* whose inspirations Paul here sets aside. The converted Gentiles composing the church of Rome might form strange systems regarding Israel's rejection and future history. Paul is concerned to fix their ideas on this important point, and leave no place in their minds for vain and presumptuous speculations. He borrows his expressions from Prov. iii. 7. Instead of παρ' ἑαυτοῖς, *beside yourselves*, two Alexs. read ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, *within yourselves*. The copyists may possibly have changed the original ἐν (*in*) into παρά, under the influence of the text of the LXX. The meaning is substantially the same.

The contents of the *mystery* are declared in the end of this verse and the first words of the following: "*hardness* is happened." Paul had already pointed out this, ver. 7; but he adds: *in part*, ἀπὸ μέρους. This word is explained, as it

seems to me, by the expression of ver. 7: "the *rest* were hardened," and by the term *some*, ver. 17. Hence it follows that we must here give the word *in part* a *numerical* sense. Judgment has not fallen on the *totality* of Israel, but on *a part* only; such is also the meaning to which we are led by the antithesis of the *all Israel* of ver. 26; comp. 2 Cor. ii. 5. It is a mistake in Calvin to apply this word: *to the degree*, of the hardening which according to him still left room for partial blessings; and in Hofmann, in a more forced way still, to apply it to the *restricted time* during which it is to last.— But even this judgment, which has overtaken one entire portion of the nation, will have an end: to make it cease, God waits till the totality of the Gentile nations shall have made their entry into the kingdom of God. This is the people which should have introduced all the other peoples into it; and for their punishment the opposite is what will take place, as Jesus had declared: "The first shall be last." It is almost incredible how our Reformers could have held out obstinately, as they have done, against a thought so clearly expressed. But they showed themselves in general rather indifferent about points of eschatology, and they dreaded in particular everything that appeared to favour the expectation of the thousand years' reign which had been so much abused in their time. Calvin has attempted to give to the conj. ἄχρις οὗ, *until that*, the impossible meaning of *in order that*; which in sense amounted simply to the idea of vv. 11 and 12. Others gave to this conjunction the meaning of *as long as*, to get this idea: that *while* the Gentiles are entering successively into the church, a part of the Jews undoubtedly remain hardened, but yet a certain number of individuals are converted, from which it will follow that in the end the totality of God's people, Jews and Gentiles (*all Israel*, ver. 26), will be made up. This explanation was only an expedient to get rid of the idea of the final conversion of the Jewish people. It is of course untenable — 1st. From the grammatical point of view the conj. ἄχρις οὗ could only signify *as long as*, if the verb were a present indicative. With the verb in the aor. subjunctive the only possible meaning is: *until*. 2d. Viewed in connection with the context, the word *Israel* has only one possible meaning, its strict meaning: for

throughout the whole chapter the subject in question is the future of the Israelitish *nation*. 3d. How could the apostle announce in a manner so particular, and as a fact of revelation, the perfectly simple idea that at the same time as the preaching of the gospel shall sound in the ears of the Gentiles, some individual Jews will also be converted? Comp. Hodge. — The expression: *the fulness of the Gentiles*, denotes the totality of the Gentile nations passing successively into the church through the preaching of the gospel. This same whole epoch of the conversion of the Gentile world is that which Jesus designates, Luke xxi. 24, by the remarkable expression: καιροὶ ἐθνῶν, *the times of the Gentiles*, which He tacitly contrasts with the theocratic epoch: *the times of the Jews* (xix. 42, 44). Jesus adds, absolutely in the same sense as Paul, "that Jerusalem shall be trodden down *until* those times of the Gentiles be fulfilled;" which evidently signifies that after those times had elapsed, Jerusalem shall be delivered and restored. In this discourse of Jesus, as reported by Matthew (xxiv. 14) and Mark (xiii. 10), it is said: "The gospel of the kingdom shall be preached unto the Gentiles throughout all the earth; and then shall the end come." This *end* includes the final salvation of the Jewish people.— Olshausen and Philippi suppose that the complement of the word πλήρωμα, *fulness*, is: "of the kingdom of God," and that the genitive ἐθνῶν, *of the Gentiles*, is only a complement of apposition: "Until the full number of Gentiles necessary to fill up the void in the kingdom of God, made by the loss of Israel, be complete." This is to torture at will the words of the apostle; their meaning is clear: Till the accomplishment of the conversion of the Gentiles, there will be among the Jews only individual conversions; but this goal reached, their conversion *en masse* will take place.

Ver. 26*a*. Καὶ οὕτως cannot be translated "and then;" the natural meaning is: *and thus;* and it is quite suitable. Thus, that is to say, *by means of* the entrance of the Gentiles into the church, comp. ver. 31. When Israel shall see the promises of the O. T., which ascribe to the Messiah the conversion of the Gentiles to the God of Abraham, fulfilled throughout the whole world by Jesus Christ, and the Gentiles through His mediation loaded with the blessings which they

themselves covet, they will be forced to own that Jesus is the Messiah; for if the latter were to be a different personage, what would this other have to do, Jesus having already done all that is expected of the Messiah? — *Πᾶς Ἰσραήλ, all Israel,* evidently signifies *Israel taken in its entirety.* It seems, it is true, that the Greek expression in this sense is not correct, and that it should be Ἰσραὴλ ὅλος. But the term *πᾶς, all (every),* denotes here, as it often does, every element of which the totality of the object is composed (comp. 2 Chron. xii. 1: *πᾶς Ἰσραὴλ μετ' αὐτοῦ, all Israel was with him*); Acts ii. 36; Eph. ii. 21. We have already said that there can be no question here of applying the term *Israel* to the *spiritual* Israel in the sense of Gal. vi. 16. It is no less impossible to limit its application, with Bengel and Olshausen, to *the elect portion* of Israel, which would lead to a tautology with the verb *shall be saved,* and would suppose, besides, the resurrection of all the Israelites who had died before. And what would there be worthy of the term *mystery* (ver. 25) in the idea of the salvation of all the elect Israelites!—Paul, in expressing himself as he does, does not mean to suppress individual liberty in the Israelites who shall live at that epoch. He speaks of a collective movement which shall take hold of *the nation in general,* and bring them as such to the feet of their Messiah. Individual resistance remains possible. Compare the admirable delineation of this period in the prophet Zechariah (xii. 10–14).—Two prophetic sayings are alleged as containing the revelation of this mystery.

Vv. 26*b*, 27. "*As it is written, There shall come out of Sion*[1] *the Deliverer, and shall turn away ungodliness from Jacob: and this is the covenant I will make with them when I shall take away their sins.*"—Two passages are combined in this quotation, as we have already found so often; these are Isa. lix. 20 and xxvii. 9. As far as the word *when,* all belong to the first passage; with this conjunction the second begins. Both in Isaiah refer to the *last times,* and have consequently a Messianic bearing. Paul follows the LXX. in quoting, with this difference, that instead of *ἐκ Σιών, from Sion,* they read *ἕνεκεν Σιών,* "in favour of Sion." The form

[1] T. R. reads *και* here, with E L, Syr. only.

of the LXX. would have as well suited the object of the apostle as that which he employs himself. Why, then, this change? Perhaps the prep. ἕνεκεν, *in favour of*, was contracted in some MSS. of the LXX. so as to be easily confounded with ἐκ, *from*. Or perhaps the apostle was thinking of some other passage, such as Ps. cx. 2, where the Messiah is represented as setting out *from Sion* to establish His kingdom. But what is singular is, that neither the one nor the other form corresponds exactly to the Hebrew text, which says: "There shall come *to* Sion (*the Zion*), and to them who turn from their sins in Jacob." It is probable that instead of *leschavē* ("them that turn") the LXX. read *leschov* (*to turn away*); and they have rendered this infinitive of aim by the future: *he will turn away*. Hence the form of our quotation. However that may be, the meaning is that He who shall deliver Sion from its long oppression, will do so by taking away iniquity from the *entire people*. Such is, in fact, the bearing of the term Ἰακώβ, *Jacob*, which denotes the whole nation collectively. It is therefore on this second proposition of ver. 26 that the weight of the quotation properly rests. As to the first proposition, it may be regarded as a simple introduction; or we may find in it the idea, that after setting out *from Sion*, the preaching of the gospel, having made the round of the world, will return *to Israel* to purify it, after all the other nations; or, finally, it may be held, with Hofmann, that the words *from Sion* denote the place whence the Lord will make His glory shine forth, when He shall fulfil this last promise on the earth.

Ver. 27. The first proposition of this verse belongs also to the first of the two passages quoted; but, singular to say, it is almost identical with the clause with which Isaiah begins the second saying used here (xxvii. 9): "And this is the blessing which I shall put on them when" . . . This is no doubt what has given rise to the combination of these two passages in our quotation. The meaning is: "Once the sin of Israel (their unbelief in the Messiah) has been pardoned, I shall renew with them my broken covenant." The pronoun αὐτῶν, *their*, refers to the individuals, as the word *Jacob* denoted the totality of the people.

In the two following verses the apostle draws from what

precedes the conclusion relative to Israel. In ver. 28 he expresses it in a striking antithesis, and in ver 29 he justifies the final result (28*b*) by a general principle of the divine government.

Vv. 28, 29. "*As concerning the gospel, they are, it is true, enemies for your sakes; but as touching the election, they are beloved for the fathers' sakes; for the gifts and calling of God are irrevocable.*"—To sum up, Israel are in a twofold relation to God, at once enemies and beloved; but the latter character will carry it in the end over the former. The term ἐχθρός, *hated,* opposed as it is here to ἀγαπητός, *beloved,* can only be taken in the passive sense: an object of the hatred, that is to say, of the just wrath of God; comp. chap. v. 10. It needs not be said that when the feeling of *hatred* is applied to God, we must eliminate from it all admixture of personal resentment, or of the spirit of revenge. God hates the sinner in the same sense in which the sinner ought to hate himself, that is to say, *his own life.* This sentiment is only the hatred of holiness to evil; and then to the wicked man in so far as he is identified with evil.—The words: *as concerning the gospel,* refer to what was said above: that the Jews being once determined not to abandon their law and their monopoly founded on it, needed to be struck with blindness, so that they might not discern in Jesus their Messiah; otherwise a Judaized gospel would have hindered the offer of salvation to the Gentile nations. The apostle might therefore well add to the words: *as concerning the gospel,* the further clause: *for your sakes.*—But in every Jew there is not only an object of the wrath of God, there is an object of His love. If it is asked how these two sentiments can co-exist in the heart of God, we must remark, first, that the same is the case up to a certain point with respect to every man. In every man there co-exist a being whom God hates, the sinner, and a being whom He still loves, the man created in His image, and for whom His Son died. Then it must be considered that this duality of feelings is only transitory, and must issue finally either in absolute hatred or perfect love; for every man must arrive at the goal either absolutely good or absolutely bad of his moral development, and then the divine feeling will be simplified (see on chap. v. 9, 10).—The words: *as touching the election,* must not be

referred, as Meyer will have it, to the *elect remnant*, as if Paul meant that it is in consequence of this indestructible elect that God always loves Israel. The antithesis to the expression: *as concerning the gospel*, leads us rather to see in *election* the divine act by which God chose this people as the salvation-people. This idea is reproduced in the following verse by the expression: ἡ κλῆσις τοῦ Θεοῦ, *the calling of God*.—This notion of election is closely connected with the explanatory regimen: *for the fathers' sake*. It was in the persons of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob that the divine election of Israel was originally realized, and through them that it was transmitted to the whole people. The love with which God loved the fathers continues towards their descendants "even to a thousand generations" (Ex. xx. 6). Only let the hearts of the children return to their fathers, that is to say, let them return to the sentiments of their fathers (Mal. iv. 6; Luke i. 17), and the beneficent cloud which is always spread over their head will again distil its dew on them.

Ver. 29. This verse justifies the assurance of salvation expressed in favour of Israel in the second proposition of ver. 28. The *gifts of God* might denote divine favours in general; but it seems to us more in harmony with the context, which refers throughout to the destination of Israel, to give this term the special meaning which it usually has in St. Paul's Epistles. He there uses the word to denote the moral and intellectual aptitudes with which God endows a man with a view to the task committed to him. And who can fail to see that the people of Israel are really endowed with singular qualities for their mission as the salvation-people? The Greeks, the Romans, the Phenicians had their special gifts in the different domains of science and art, law and politics, industry and commerce. Israel, without being destitute of the powers related to those spheres of mundane activity, have received a higher gift, the organ for the divine and the intuition of holiness.—The *calling of God* is on the one hand the cause, on the other the effect, of those gifts. It is because God called this people in His eternal counsel that He entrusted the gifts to them; and it is because He enriched them with those gifts that in the course of time He called them to fulfil the task of initiating the world in the way of salvation, and

of preparing salvation for the world. Of this august mission they have for the time been deprived; instead of entering first, they will enter last. But their destination is nevertheless irrevocable; and through the overflowing of divine mercy (chap. v. 20) it will be realized in them at the period announced by the apostle, when, saved themselves, they will cause a stream of life from above to flow into the heart of Gentile Christendom (vv. 12, 15, and 25, 26).—This *irrevocable* character of Israel's destination has nothing in it contrary to individual liberty; no constraint will be exercised. God will let unbelieving generations succeed one another as long as shall be necessary, until that generation come which shall at length open its eyes and return freely to Him. And even then the movement in question will only be a national and collective one, from which those shall be able to withdraw who refuse decidedly to take part in it. Only it is impossible that the divine foreknowledge in regard to Israel as a people ("the people whom God foreknew," ver. 2) should terminate otherwise than by being realized in history.

There is nothing in this passage pointing to a *temporal* restoration of the Jewish nation, or to an Israelitish monarchy having its seat in Palestine. The apostle speaks only of a spiritual restoration by means of a general pardon, and the outpouring of the graces which shall flow from it. Will there be a political restoration connected with this general conversion of the people? Or will it not even precede the latter? Will not the principle of the reconstitution of races, which in our day has produced Italian unity, German unity, and which is tending to the unity of the Slavs, also bring about Israelitish unity? These questions do not belong to exegesis, which confines itself to establishing these two things—(1) That, according to apostolical revelation, Israel will be converted in a body; (2) That this event will be the signal of an indescribable spiritual commotion throughout the whole church.

The theme of the chapter is properly exhausted; we are furnished with light from all points of view, that of *right*, that of *cause*, and that of *aim*, on the mysterious dispensation of the rejection of Israel. Nothing remains but to gather up what has been said of the past and future of this elect people into a general view of God's plan as to the religious progress of humanity. This is what the apostle does in vv. 30–32.

Vv. 30, 31. "*For as ye also*[1] *in times past disobeyed God, but have now obtained mercy through their disobedience; even so have these also*[2] *now been disobedient, that through the mercy shown to you they also*[3] *may obtain mercy.*" — The entire course of the religious history of the world is determined by the antagonism created among mankind by the calling of Abraham, between a people specially destined by God to receive His revelations, and the other nations given over to themselves. From that moment (Gen. xii.) there begin to be described those two immense curves which traverse the ages of antiquity in opposite directions, and which, crossing one another at the advent of Christianity, are prolonged from that period in inverse directions, and shall terminate by uniting and losing themselves in one another at the goal of history.— Ver. 30 describes the rebellion of the Gentiles, then their salvation determined by the rebellion of the Jews; and ver. 31, the rebellion of the Jews, then their salvation arising from the salvation of the Gentiles.

Ver. 30. The Gentiles first had their time of disobedience. The expression *in times past* carries the reader back to the contents of chap. i., to those times of idolatry when the Gentiles voluntarily extinguished the light of natural revelation, to abandon themselves more freely to their evil propensities. This epoch of disobedience is what the apostle calls at Athens (Acts xvii. 30) by a less severe name: "the times of ignorance." Perhaps we should read with the T. R. *καί, also,* after *for.* This little word might easily be omitted; it reminds the Gentiles from the first that they *also,* like the Jews, had their time of rebellion.—That time of disobedience has now taken end; the Gentiles have found grace. But at what price? By means of the disobedience of the Jews. We have seen this indeed: God needed to make the temporary sacrifice of His elect people in order to disentangle the gospel from the legal forms in which they wished to keep it imprisoned. Hence it was that Israel required to be given up to unbelief in regard to their Messiah; hence their rejection, which opened the world to the gospel. Now then, wonderful

[1] T. R. reads *καὶ* after *γάρ*, with L, Mnn., Syr.; the others omit it.
[2] D F G read *καὶ αὐτοὶ* instead of *καὶ οὗτοι*.
[3] B D read *νῦν* again before *ἐλεηθῶσιν*.

to tell, an analogous, though in a certain sense opposite, dispensation will take effect in the case of the Jews.

Ver. 31. The word *νῦν, now,* strongly contrasts the present period (since the coming of Christ) with the former, ver. 30. Now it is the Jews who are passing through their time of disobedience, while the Gentiles enjoy the sun of grace. But to what end? That by the grace which is now granted to the latter, grace may also one day be accorded to the Jews. This time, then, it will not be the disobedience of the one which shall produce the conversion of the others. A new discord in the kingdom of God will not be necessary to bring about the final harmony. In this last phase, the good of the one will not result from the evil of the other, but from their very blessedness. Israel went out that the Gentiles might enter. But the Gentiles shall not go out to make place for the Jews; they will open the door to them from within. Thus are explained at once the analogy and the contrast expressed by the conjunctions *ὥσπερ, as,* and *οὕτω, even so,* which begin and form a close connection between vv. 30 and 31. It cannot be doubted that the regimen *τῷ ὑμετέρῳ ἐλέει, through your mercy* (that which has been shown to you), depends on the following verb *ἐλεηθῶσι, may obtain mercy,* and not on the preceding proposition. The apostle places this regimen before the conj. *ἵνα, that,* to set it more in relief; for it expresses the essential idea of the proposition. Comp. the similar inversions, xii. 3; 1 Cor. iii. 5, ix. 15, etc.—For the form *καὶ οὗτοι, these also,* in the first proposition, there is substituted in the second the form *καὶ αὐτοί, they,* or *they themselves also,* to bring out the identity of the subject to which those two so opposite dispensations apply. It is impossible to admit the Greco-Latin reading, which has *καὶ αὐτοί* both times. We must also reject the reading of some Alex. and of some ancient translations, which in the second proposition repeat the *νῦν, now.* These last words refer evidently to the future.

Ver. 32. "*For God hath included them all in disobedience, that He might have mercy upon all.*"—Here we have, as it were, the full period put to all that precedes the last word in explanation of the whole plan of God, the principal phases of which have just been sketched (*for*).—The term *συγκλείειν,*

to shut up together, applies to a plurality of individuals, enclosed in such a way that they have only one exit, through which they are all forced to pass. The prep. *σύν, with*, which enters into the composition of the verb, describes the enclosure as subsisting on all sides at once. Some commentators have thought that there must be given to this verb a simply *declarative* sense, as in Gal. iii. 22, where it is said: "The Scripture hath concluded all under sin," in this sense, that it *declares* all men to be subject to sin and condemnation. But in our passage the action is not ascribed to an impersonal subject like Scripture; the subject is God Himself; it is His dispensations in the course of history which are explained. The verb can therefore only refer to a *real* act, in virtue of which the two portions of mankind just spoken of have each had their period of disobedience. And the act whereby God has brought about this result, as we know from all that precedes, is the judgment denoted in the case of the Gentiles by the term *παρέδωκεν, He gave them up*, thrice repeated, i. 24, 26, and 28, and in the case of the Jews by the word *ἐπωρώθησαν, they were hardened*, xi. 7. Only it must be remarked that this divine action had been provoked in both cases by man's sin; on the part of the Gentiles through their ingratitude toward the revelation of God in nature, and on the part of the Jews by their ignorant obstinacy in maintaining beyond the fixed time their legal particularism. The Danish theologian Nielsen says with good reason, in his short and spiritual exposition of the Epistle to the Romans: "The sinful nature already existed in all; but that the conviction of it might be savingly awakened in individuals, this latent sin required to be manifested historically on a great scale in the lot of nations." To be complete, however, it must be added that this latent sin was already manifested actively and freely on the part both of Gentiles and Jews before taking the form of a passive dispensation and of a judgment from God. Thus the act of *συγκλείειν, shutting up together*, is already justified from the viewpoint of cause; but how much more magnificently still from the viewpoint of end! This end is to make those Jews and Gentiles the objects of universal mercy. The word *τοὺς πάντας, all*, is applied by Olshausen solely to the totality of the *elect* in these two parts of mankind; and by

Meyer, to all the individuals comprehended in these two masses, but solely, according to this author, in respect of their *destination*, in the divine mind. For that this destination may be realized, there is needed the free act of faith. But it should not be forgotten that this saying does not refer to the time of the last judgment and the eternal future, which would necessarily suppose the resurrection of the dead, of which there is no question here. According to the whole context, the apostle has in view an epoch in the history of the kingdom of God *on this earth*, an epoch, consequently, which comprehends only the individuals who shall then be in life. Hence it is that he puts the article τούς, *the*, before πάντας, *all*; for the subject in question is a determined and already known totality, that which comprehends the two portions of mankind which Paul has been contrasting with one another throughout the whole chapter.—The domain of disobedience, within which God has successively shut them all up, leaves both in the end only one issue, that of humbly accepting salvation from the hand of mercy. As Nielsen again says: "Divine impartiality, after having been temporarily veiled by two opposite particularisms, shines forth in the final universalism which embraces in a common salvation all those whom these great judgments have successively humbled and abased." There is therefore no inference to be drawn from this passage in favour of a final universal salvation (de Wette, Farrar, and so many others), or even of a determinist system, in virtue of which human liberty would be nothing more in the eyes of the apostle than a form of divine action. St. Paul teaches only one thing here: that at the close of the history of mankind on this earth there will be an economy of grace in which salvation will be extended to the totality of the nations living here below, and that this magnificent result will be the effect of the humiliating dispensations through which the two halves of mankind shall have successively passed. The apostle had begun this vast exposition of salvation with the fact of universal condemnation; he closes it with that of universal mercy. What could remain to him thereafter but to strike the hymn of adoration and praise? This is what he does in vv. 33–36.

Vv. 33–36.

Ver. 33. "*O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are His judgments, and His ways past finding out!*" — Like a traveller who has reached the summit of an Alpine ascent, the apostle turns and contemplates. Depths are at his feet; but waves of light illumine them, and there spreads all around an immense horizon which his eye commands. The plan of God in the government of mankind spreads out before him, and he expresses the feelings of admiration and gratitude with which the prospect fills his heart.—The word *βάθος, depth,* applies precisely to that abyss which he has just been exploring. The genitive *πλούτου, of riches,* by which the word *depth* is qualified, is regarded by most commentators as a first complement, co-ordinate with the two following: *of wisdom* and *of knowledge.* In this case it must be held that the abstract term *riches* applies to a special divine attribute which can be no other than divine mercy; comp. x. 12; Eph. ii. 4, etc. The two *καί, and . . . and,* which follow, would furnish an instance of a construction like that of Luke v. 17. And one might make these three complements, *riches, wisdom, knowledge,* parallel to the three questions which follow, vv. 34 and 35, as in fact the first refers rather to knowledge, the second to wisdom, and the third to grace. But if this latter relation really existed in the apostle's mind, why should the questions be arranged in an opposite order to that of the three terms corresponding to them in our verse? Then is not the notion of *mercy* too diverse in kind from those of *wisdom* and *knowledge* to allow of the first being thus co-ordinated with the other two? Finally, would not the abstract term *riches* have required to be determined by a complement such as *ἐλέους* or *χάριτος* (mercy, grace)? The apostle is not afraid of such accumulations of genitives (ii. 5 and Eph. i. 19). It rather seems to me, therefore, that the second of these two abstract terms (*depth* and *riches*) ought to be regarded as a complement of the other: *a depth of riches,* for: an infinitely rich depth, that is to say, one which, instead of being an immense void, presents itself as embracing contents of inexhaustible fulness. Calvin has well caught this meaning: "This is why," says he,

"I doubt not that the apostle exalts the *deep riches* of wisdom and knowledge which are in God."—This depth is rich, not in darkness, but in light; it is a depth *both of wisdom and knowledge.*—The two *καί, both . . . and . . .*, have the disjunctive sense; they distinguish the two following substantives very precisely, however closely allied their meaning may be. The second, *γνῶσις, knowledge,* refers especially in the context to divine *foreknowledge,* and in general to the complete view which God has of all the free determinations of men, whether as individuals or as nations. The former, *σοφία, wisdom,* denotes the admirable skill with which God weaves into His plan the free actions of man, and transforms them into so many *means* for the accomplishment of the excellent end which He set originally before Him. We cannot reflect, however little, without seeing that the very marked difference which Paul here establishes between these two divine perfections, is by no means indifferent; it is nothing less than the safeguard of human liberty. If the omniscience of God, especially His foreknowledge, were confounded with His wisdom, everything in the universe would be directly the work of God, and the creatures would be nothing more than blind instruments in His hands.

Paul sees these two attributes of God shine forth in two orders of things which, combined, constitute the whole government of the world: *judgments, κρίματα,* and *ways* or *paths, ὁδοί.* Here the general sense of *decree* is sometimes given to the former of these terms. But the word in every case implies the idea of a *judicial* decree; and what Paul has just been referring to, those severe dispensations whereby God has successively chastised the ingratitude of the Gentiles (chap. i.) and the haughty presumption of the Jews (chap. x.), shows clearly that we are to keep to its strict sense.—*Ways, ὁδοί,* do not really denote different things from *judgments;* but the term presents them in a different and more favourable light, as so many advances toward the final aim. The term *judgments* expresses, if one may so speak, the *because* of the things, as the word *ways* points to their *in order that.* We may thus understand the twofold relation of the events of history to *knowledge* on the one hand, and *wisdom* on the other. From the *knowledge* which God possesses, there follow from the free

decisions of man the *judgments* which He decrees, and these judgments become the *ways* which His *wisdom* employs for the realization of His plan (Isa. xl. 14: κρίματα, ὁδοί).— These two orders of things are characterized by the most extraordinary epithets which the most pliant of languages can furnish: ἀνεξερεύνητος, *what cannot be searched to the bottom;* ἀνεξιχνίαστος, *the traces of which cannot be followed to the end.* The former of these epithets applies to the supreme principle which the mind seeks to approach, but which it does not reach; the latter to an abundance of ramifications and of details in execution which the understanding cannot follow to the end. These epithets are often quoted with the view of demonstrating the incomprehensibility to man of the divine decrees, and in particular of that of predestination (Aug.). But it must not be forgotten that St. Paul's exclamation is called forth, not by the obscurity of God's plans, but, on the contrary, by their dazzling clearness. If they are incomprehensible and unfathomable, it is to man's natural understanding, and until they have been revealed; but, says the apostle, 1 Cor. ii. 10: "God hath revealed them unto us by His Spirit; for the Spirit searcheth (ἐρευνᾷ) all things, even the deep things (τὰ βάθη) of God." It is therefore in view of the *unveiled* mystery that the exclamation is raised, as is done by Paul here: "O the depth of the riches!" A fact which does not prevent the mind which understands them in part from having always to discover in them new laws or applications.

Vv. 34, 35. "*For who hath known the mind of the Lord, or who hath been His counsellor? Or who hath first given to Him, and it shall be recompensed unto him again?*"—Here is the Scripture proof that God's designs are impenetrable until He reveal them Himself to His apostles and prophets, and by them to His people. The first passage quoted is Isa. xl. 13, which Paul uses as if it were his own saying. This question in the mouth of the prophet applies to the wonders of creation. Paul extends it to those of the divine government in general, for the works of God in history are only the continuation of those of nature. — The question: *Who hath known?* is a challenge thrown down to the *natural* understanding. As to those whom God has enlightened on the subject of His designs, Paul himself says, 1 Cor. ii. 16: "But we have the

mind of Christ."—This first question contrasts the always limited knowledge of man with the infinite *knowledge* of God (γνῶσις τοῦ Θεοῦ, ver. 33). The second goes further, it bears on the relation between human and divine *wisdom*. It is no longer merely the *discovery* of the secrets of God by the study of His works which is in question, but some *good counsel* which man might have been called to give to the Creator in the organizing of His plans. The word σύμβουλος denotes one who *deliberates with* another, and can communicate to him something of his wisdom. It is therefore a more exalted position than that supposed by the previous question.

The third question, ver. 35, would imply a still more exalted part. The matter in question is a *service* rendered to God, a present which man is supposed to have made to Him so as to merit a gift in return. Such, indeed, is the position which the Jews were taking, and by which they claimed especially to limit the freedom of God in the government of the world on account of their meritorious works. "There is no difference," said the Jews of Malachi's day pettishly, "between the man who serveth God and him who serveth Him not. What have we gained by keeping His commandments?" This spirit of pride had been growing; it had reached its apogee in Pharisaism. The preposition πρό, *in advance*, which enters into the composition of the first verb, and the preposition ἀντί, *in exchange*, which enters into that of the second, perfectly describe the relation of dependence on man in which God would be placed, if the former could really be the first to do something for God and thereby constitute Him his debtor. With this third question Paul evidently returns to the special subject of this whole dissertation on the divine government: the rejection of the Jews. By the first question he denied to man the power of understanding God and judging Him till God had explained Himself; by the second, the power of co-operating with Him; by the third, he refuses to him the power of imposing on Him any obligation whatever. Thus is fully vindicated the liberty of God, that last principle of the mysterious fact to be explained.

This question of ver. 35 is also a Scripture quotation which Paul weaves into his own text. It is taken from Job xli. 11, which the LXX. translate strangely (xli. 2): "Or who is

he that will resist me and abide?" It is true that in the two MSS. *Sinait.* and *Alex.* there is found at the close of Isa. xl. 14 a saying similar to the apostle's translation. But there it is certainly an interpolation taken from our epistle itself.

Ver. 36. "*For of Him, and through Him, and to Him are all things: To whom be glory for ever! Amen.*"—God's absolute independence, man's total dependence in everything which might be a matter of glory to him: such is the thought of this verse, the termination of this vast survey of the plan of God. The first prep. ἐκ, *of*, refers to God as Creator; it is of Him that man holds everything: "life, breath, and all things," Acts xvii. 25. The second, διά, *through*, refers to the government of mankind. Everything, even the free determinations of the human will, are executed only through Him, and are turned immediately to the accomplishment of His designs. The third, εἰς, *to*, refers to the final goal. The word *to Him* does not refer to God's personal satisfaction, an idea which might undoubtedly be supported; for, as Beck says, "the egoism of God is the life of the world." But it is more natural to apply the term *to Him* to the accomplishment of His will, in which His own glory and the happiness of His sanctified creatures blend together as one and the same thing. It has been sometimes attempted to apply these three prepositional clauses to the three persons of the divine Trinity; modern exegesis (Mey., Gess, Hofm.) has in general departed from this parallel; and rightly. When Paul speaks of *God*, absolutely considered, it is always the *God and Father* he intends, without, of course, excluding His revelation through Christ and His communication by the Holy Spirit. But this distinction is not raised here, and had no place in the context. What the apostle was concerned to say in closing, was that all things proceeding from the creative will of God, advancing through His wisdom and terminating in the manifestation of His holiness, must one day celebrate His glory, and His glory only.—The application of the word *all things* might be restricted to the two portions of mankind spoken of (as in ver. 32). But Paul rises here to the general principle of which ver. 32 was only a particular application, and hence also he substitutes the neuter *all things* for the masculine *all*. What is meant, therefore, is the totality of created things,

visible and invisible.—The glory of God, the reflection of His perfections in all that exists, that glory, now veiled, in so many respects in the universe, must shine forth magnificently and perfectly for ever and ever. For, as Hodge says, "the highest end for which all things can exist and be ordered, is to display the character of God." This goal of history is, as it were, anticipated by the wish and prayer of the apostle: "To Him be glory!"

The first part of the doctrinal treatise had terminated in the parallel between the two heads of mankind, a passage in which there was already heard a more exalted note. The second part closed, at the end of chap. viii., with a sort of lyrical passage, in which the apostle celebrated the blessing of sanctification crowning the grace of justification, and thus assuring the state of glory. The third, that which we are concluding here, terminates in a passage of the same kind, a hymn of adoration in honour of the divine plan realized in spite of, and even by means of, human unfaithfulness. After thus finishing the exposition of salvation in its foundation (justification), in its internal development (sanctification), and in its historical course among mankind (the successive calling of the different nations, and their final union in the kingdom of God), the apostle puts, as it were, a full period, the *Amen* which closes this part of the epistle.

Never was survey more vast taken of the divine plan of the world's history. First, the epoch of primitive unity, in which the human family forms still only one unbroken whole; then the antagonism between the two religious portions of the race, created by the special call of Abraham: the Jews continuing in the father's house, but with a legal and servile spirit, the Gentiles walking in their own ways. At the close of this period, the manifestation of Christ determining the return of the latter to the domestic hearth, but at the same time the departure of the former. Finally, the Jews, yielding to the divine solicitations and to the spectacle of salvation enjoyed by the Gentiles as children of grace; and so the final universalism in which all previous discords are resolved, restoring in an infinitely higher form the original unity, and setting before the view of the universe the family of God fully constituted.

The contrast between the Jews and Gentiles appears therefore as the essential moving spring of history. It is the actions and reactions arising from this primary fact which form its key. This is what no philosophy of history has dreamt of, and what makes these chaps. ix.–xi. the highest theodicy.

If criticism has thought it could deduce from this passage the hypothesis of a Judeo-Christian majority in the church of Rome, if it has sought to explain it, as well as the whole of our epistle, by the desire felt by Paul to reconcile this church to his missionary activity among the Gentiles, it is easy to see from the passage, rightly understood, how remote such criticism is from the real thought which inspired this treatise. The conclusion, from an altogether *general* application, vv. 30–32, in which he addresses the whole church as former Gentiles whom he expressly distinguishes from Jews, can leave no doubt as to the origin of the Christians of Rome. Supposing even that in ver. 13 he had divided his readers into two classes, which we have found to be a mistake, from ver. 25 he would in any case be again addressing all his readers. And as to the intention of the whole passage, it is evidently to show that those who should have been *first*, though now put *last*, are not, however, *excluded*, as the Gentiles might proudly imagine, and that if the πρῶτον, *firstly*, ascribed to the Jews by God's original plan (i. 16) has not been historically realized (through their own fault), the divine programme in regard to mankind will nevertheless, though in another way, have its complete execution. Ver. 32 is the counterpart of i. 16. It is therefore to impair the meaning of this passage to see in it an apology for Paul's mission. The thought is more elevated: it is the defence of the plan of God Himself addressed to the whole church.

SECOND PART OF THE EPISTLE.

THE PRACTICAL TREATISE.

THE LIFE OF THE JUSTIFIED BELIEVER.

XII. 1—XV. 13.

IN the doctrinal part which we have just finished, the apostle has expounded the *way of salvation.* This way is no other than justification by faith, whereby the sinner is reconciled to God (chaps. i.–v.), then sanctified in Christ by the communication of the Spirit (vi.–viii.); and it is precisely the refusal to follow this way which has drawn down on Israel their rejection (chaps. ix.–xi.). What now will be the life of the justified believer—*life in salvation?* The apostle sketches it in a general way in chaps. xii. and xiii.; then he applies the moral principles which he has just established to a particular circumstance peculiar to the church of Rome (xiv. 1–xv. 13). We can therefore distinguish two parts in this course of practical doctrine, the one general, the other special.

GENERAL PART.

CHAPS. XII. AND XIII.

There exists in regard to these two chapters a general prejudice which has completely falsified their interpretation. They have been regarded as giving, according to the expression used even by Schultz, "a series of practical precepts," in other words: a collection of moral exhortations without systematic order, and guided merely by more or less accidental associations of ideas. This view, especially in recent times,

has brought graver consequences in its train than could have been expected. It has been asked whether those details in regard to practical life were in keeping with a whole so systematically arranged as the didactic treatise contained in the first eleven chapters. And Renan and Schultz have been led in this way to the critical hypotheses which we have summarily expounded at the end of the Introduction (I. pp. 111 and 112), and which we must now study more closely.

According to the former of these writers, chaps. xii. xiii. and xiv. formed no part of the Epistle as it was sent to the church of Rome. These chapters were only in the copies despatched to the churches of Ephesus and Thessalonica, and an unknown church, for whose benefit Paul is held to have composed our Epistle. The conclusion, in the copy destined for the church of Rome, was composed solely of chap. xv. Nor did chap. xvi. belong to it. Here we have to do only with chaps. xii. and xiii. The reasons which lead Renan to doubt the original connection of these chapters with the first eleven, in the copy sent to Rome, are the two following:—(1) Paul would be departing here from his habitual principle: "Every one in his own domain;" in fact, he would be giving imperative counsels to a church which he had not founded, he who rebuked so sharply the impertinence of those who sought to build on the foundations laid by others.[1] The first word of chap. xii., the term παρακαλῶ, *I exhort*, is no doubt habitual to him when he is giving a command to his disciples; but it is unsuitable here, where the apostle is addressing believers whom he did not bring to the faith.[2] (2) The first part of chap. xv., which, according to Renan, is really addressed to the church of Rome, forbids the thought that chaps. xii. xiii. and xiv. were composed for the same church; for it would form a duplicate of those three chapters of which it is a simple summary, composed for Judeo-Christian readers, such as those at Rome.

The viewpoint at which Schultz places himself is somewhat different. In his eyes, we possess from chap. xii. a considerable fragment of a wholly different epistle from that which the apostle had composed for the church of Rome. This letter, of which we have not the beginning, was addressed to

[1] *Saint Paul*, p. lxiii. [2] *Ibid.* pp. lxv. and lxix.

the church of Ephesus, and must have been written in the last period of St. Paul's life, that of his Roman captivity. To it belong the three chapters, xii. xiii. and xiv., as well as the first seven verses of chap. xv., then the salutations of chap. xvi. (vv. 3–16), and finally, the warning against Judaizers, xvi. 17–20. The true conclusion of the Epistle to the Romans is to be found, according to him, in chap. xv., from ver. 7 to the end, adding thereto the recommendation of Phœbe, xvi. 1 and 2, and the salutations of Paul's companions, xvi. 21–24. How has the fusion of those two letters in one come about? It is rather difficult to explain, as the one went to the East, the other to the West. Schultz thinks that a copy of this Epistle to the Ephesians, written from Rome, remained without address in the archives of this church, and that the editors of the Epistle to the Romans, finding this short epistle of practical contents, and thinking that it had been written to the Romans, published it with the large one. Only they omitted the beginning, and mixed up the two conclusions.

The following are the reasons which lead Schultz to separate chaps. xii. and xiii. from what precedes:—1. The exhortation to humility, at the beginning of chap. xii., would be somewhat offensive if addressed to a church which the apostle did not know. 2. The exhortation to beneficence toward the saints, and the practice of hospitality, supposes a church in connection with many other churches, which was rather the case with the church of Ephesus than with that of Rome. 3. It is impossible to connect the beginning of chap. xii. (*οὖν, therefore*) naturally with chap. xi.; for *the mercies of God* spoken of chap. xii. 1, are not at all identical with the *mercy* of God spoken of xi. 32. 4. The whole moral side of the gospel having been expounded in chap. vi., it was not necessary to go back on it in chap. xii. 5. There was no reason for reminding the Judeo-Christians of the church of Rome, as Paul does in chap. xiii., of the duty of submission to the Roman authorities; for the Jews were quite happy at Rome about the year 58, during the first years of Nero's reign. Such a recommendation was much more applicable to the Jews of Asia, disposed, as the Apocalypse proves, to regard the imperial power as that of Antichrist.

Are we mistaken in saying that the reasons alleged by these two writers produce rather the impression of being painfully sought after than of having presented themselves naturally to the mind? What! Paul cannot give imperative moral counsels and use the term παρακαλεῖν, *exhort*, when writing to a church which he does not know? But what did he do in chaps. vi. and viii., when he said to his Roman readers: "Yield not your members as instruments unto sin;" "If ye live after the flesh, ye shall die," etc.? And as to the term which seems unsuitable to Renan, does not Paul use it, as Lacheret[1] observes, in chap. xv. 30, which this writer himself supposes addressed to the church of Rome? The objection which Renan draws from the sort of pleonasm which the first part of chap. xv. would form, if it appeared in the same writing as chap. xii., will easily be resolved when we come to the passage. On the contrary, what a difficulty there would be in holding that a doctrinal treatise, composed by the apostle with a view to Gentile-Christian churches, such as Ephesus or Thessalonica, for the purpose of giving them a complete exposition of the faith, could have been addressed just as it was to a Judeo-Christian church like that of Rome (according to Renan) for the purpose of gaining it to the apostle's point of view! This consideration, says Lacheret with reason, suffices to overthrow from the foundation the whole structure of Renan.[2] And what a factitious procedure is that which Renan invites us to witness: "the disciples of Paul occupied for several days copying this manifesto for the different churches," and then later editors collecting at the end of the chief (*princeps*) copy the parts which varied in the different copies, because they scrupled to lose anything of what dropped from the apostle's pen![3]

The reasons of Schultz inspire as little confidence. Paul is careful himself to explain his exhortation to humility in chap. xii., as in chap. i. and in chap. xv. he explains his whole letter, on the ground of his apostleship, and especially his apostleship to the Gentiles, which gives him authority over the church of Rome, though he has not personally founded it: "I say, *through the grace given unto me*, to every man that is among

[1] *Revue théologique*, 1878, p. 85.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 76.
[3] *Saint Paul*, pp. 462 and 481.

you" (xii. 3).—Why would not the exhortation to beneficence and hospitality have been in place at Rome, where the poor and strangers abounded, as well as at Ephesus?—And as to the warning relative to submission to the authorities, had it not its reason in the general position of Christians over against pagan power, without any need of special oppression to give the apostle occasion to address it to this church? Had not the Emperor Claudius not long before expelled the Jews from Rome because of their continual risings? And what church could more suitably than that of the capital receive instruction on the relation between Christians and the State?—Chap. xii. forms by no means a reduplication of chap. vi.; for in the latter the apostle had merely laid down *the principle* of Christian sanctification, showing how it was implied in the very fact of justification, while in chap. xii. he gives the description of all the fruits into which this new life should expand. We shall immediately see what is the relation between chap. xii. and all that precedes, as well as the true meaning of the *therefore* in ver. 1.

We think, therefore, we are entitled to continue the interpretation of our Epistle, taking it as it has been transmitted to us by Christian antiquity. It would need strokes of very different power to sunder the parts of so well-compacted an edifice.

In the theme of the treatise: "The just shall live by faith," there was a word whose whole contents had not yet been entirely developed: *shall live.* This word contained not only the whole matter of chaps. vi.–viii., but also that of chaps. xii. and xiii.; and this matter is not less systematically arranged in these chapters than that of the whole doctrinal part in the preceding eleven. The essentially logical character of Paul's mind would of itself suffice to set aside the idea of an inorganic juxtaposition of moral precepts, placed at haphazard one after the other. We no sooner examine these two chapters more closely, than we discover the idea which governed their arrangement. We are struck first of all with the contrast between the two spheres of activity in which the apostle successively places the believer, the *religious* sphere and the *civil* sphere—the former in chap. xii., the latter in chap. xiii. These are the two domains in which he is called to manifest the life of

holiness which has been put within him; he acts in the world as a member of the church and as a member of the state. But this double walk has one point of departure and one point of aim. The point of departure is *the consecration of his body*, under the direction of the renewed understanding; this is the basis of the believer's entire activity, which Paul lays down in the first two verses of chap. xii. The point of aim is *the Lord's coming again* constantly expected; this advent Paul causes to shine in splendour at the goal of the course in the last four verses of chap. xiii. So: a point of departure, two spheres to be simultaneously traversed, a point of arrival; such, in the view of the apostle, is the system of the believer's practical life. Such are also the four sections of this general part: xii. 1, 2, xii. 3–21, xiii. 1–10, xiii. 11–14.

This moral instruction is therefore the pendant of the doctrinal instruction. It is its necessary complement. The two taken together form the apostle's *complete catechism*. It is because the rational relation between the different sections of this part has not been understood that it has been possible for the connection of this whole second part with the first to be so completely mistaken.

Some one will ask, perhaps, if the apostle, in thus tracing the model of Christian conduct, does not seem to distrust somewhat the sanctifying power of faith so well expounded by him in chaps. vi.–viii. If the state of justification produces holiness with a sort of moral necessity, why seek still to secure this object by all sorts of precepts and exhortations? Should not the tree, once planted, bear its fruits of itself? But let us not forget that moral life is subject to quite different laws from physical life. Liberty is and remains to the end one of its essential factors. It is by a series of acts of freedom that the justified man appropriates the Spirit at every moment, in order to realize with His aid the moral ideal. And who does not know that at every moment also an opposite power weighs on his will? The believer is *dead unto sin*, no doubt; he has broken with that perfidious friend; but sin is not dead in him, and it strives continually to restore the broken relation. By calling the believer to the conflict against it, as well as to the positive practice of Christian duty, the apostle is not relapsing into Jewish legalism. He assumes the inward con-

secration of the believer as an already consummated fact; and it is from this fact, implicitly contained in his faith, that he proceeds to call him to realize his Christian obligation.

TWENTY-FOURTH PASSAGE (XII. 1, 2).

The Basis of Christian Conduct.

Ver. 1. "*I exhort you, therefore, brethren, by the mercies of God, that ye present your bodies a living victim, holy, acceptable unto God,*[1] *which is your reasonable service.*"—How are we to explain the *οὖν, therefore,* which joins this verse to what precedes? We fully concur with Schultz in holding that it is impossible to connect chap. xii. directly with the idea of chap. xi., and to identify the *mercies of God* (ver. 1) with the *mercy* displayed in the course of salvation across the field of history (xi. 32). The true connection with what precedes is much wider; it is nothing less than the relation between the two parts of the Epistle. Religion among the ancients was service (*cultus*); and cultus had for its centre sacrifice. The Jewish service counted four kinds of sacrifice, which might be reduced to two: the first, comprising the sacrifices offered *before* reconciliation and to obtain it (sacrifice *for sin* and *for trespass*); the second, the sacrifices offered *after* the obtaining of reconciliation and serving to celebrate it (the *whole burnt-offering* and the *peace-offering*). The great division of the Epistle to the Romans to which we have come is explained by this contrast. The fundamental idea of the first part, chaps. i.–xi., was that of the sacrifice offered by God for the sin and transgression of mankind; witness the central passage, iii. 25 and 26. These are *the mercies of God* to which Paul appeals here, and the development of which has filled the first eleven chapters. The practical part which we are beginning corresponds to the second kind of sacrifice, which was the symbol of consecration after pardon had been received (the holocaust, in which the victim was entirely burned), and of the communion re-established between Jehovah and the believer (the peace-

[1] T. R., with the majority of documents, puts τῷ θεῷ after εὐάρεστον, while ℵ A P put it before.

offering, followed by a feast in the court of the temple). The sacrifice of expiation offered by God in the person of His Son should now find its response in the believer in the sacrifice of complete consecration and intimate communion.

Such is the force of these first words: "I exhort you, *therefore*, by the mercies of God." This word *therefore* gathers up the whole doctrinal part, and includes the whole practical part. Comp. the entirely similar *therefore*, Eph. iv. 1. So true is it that the relation of ideas just expounded is that which fills the apostle's mind, that to designate the believer's conduct in response to the work of God he employs the expression *victim* and *living* victim, which pointedly alludes to the Jewish sacrifices.

The term παρακαλῶ, *I exhort*, differs from the legal commandment, in that it appeals to a sentiment already existing in the heart, faith in God's mercies. It is by this term, also, that Paul, in the Epistle to the Ephesians, iv. 1, passes from the doctrinal teaching to the practical part. And as this Epistle (notwithstanding its title) is addressed to Christians whom Paul did not know personally (i. 15, iii. 2, iv. 21), we there find a new proof of the mistake of Renan, who thinks that this expression would be out of place addressed to others than the apostle's personal disciples.—The διά, *by*, gives the reader to understand that the divine mercies are the power by means of which this exhortation should take possession of his will. The word παριστάναι, *to present*, is the technical term to denote the presentation of victims and offerings in the Levitical cultus (Luke ii. 22).—The victim to be offered is *the body* of the believer. Many regard *the body* as representing the entire person. But why not in that case say ὑμᾶς αὐτούς, *yourselves*? comp. vi. 13. De Wette thought that Paul meant by the word to remind his readers that the body is the seat of sin. But this intention would suppose that the question about to be discussed was the destruction of this hostile principle, while the apostle speaks rather of the active consecration of the body. Olshausen supposes that, by recommending the sacrifice of the lower part of our being, Paul meant to say: all the more everything that is in you of a more exalted nature. But he could not have passed over all the rest in silence; comp. 1 Thess. v. 23. Meyer distin-

guishes between the consecration *of the body*, ver. 1, and that *of the mind*, which, according to him, is referred to in ver. 2. But this contrast between the two parts of our being does not come out in the least in the sequel; and we shall see, in point of fact, that the relation between the two verses is wholly different. Let us not forget that those whom the apostle here addresses (*ἀδελφοί, brethren*), and whom he exhorts, are believers already inwardly consecrated. Chap. vi. has shown how justification by faith provides the principle of sanctification. It is in the name of this finished work that Paul now invites them to lead the life of consecrated victims. Now, the indispensable instrument for this purpose is *the body*. And hence it is that the apostle, supposing the will already gained, does not require more than the consecration of the body.—The expression *θυσία ζῶσα, living victim*, refers to the animal victims which were offered in the Levitical cultus by putting them to death. The sacrifice required by Paul is the opposite of these. The victim must live to become, at every moment of his existence, the active agent of the divine will. The term *living* has not here, therefore, a spiritual sense, but should be taken in the strict sense. The word *θυσία* is often translated *sacrifice*. It may have this meaning; but the meaning *victim* better agrees with the term *παραστῆσαι, to present*. The epithet *ἁγία, holy*, might express the idea of *real* holiness, in opposition to the merely ritual purity of the Levitical victims. But would not Paul have said, in that sense, *ὄντως* or *ἀληθῶς ἁγία, truly* holy? He means rather to contrast the new employment of the body in the service of God with its previous use under the dominion of sin.—This body, full of life and constantly employed for good, will present a *well-pleasing* spectacle to the eye of God; it will be an "offering of sweet-smelling (well-pleasing) savour" in the N. T. sense. And this is what is expressed by the third epithet. Some have connected the regimen *τῷ Θεῷ, to God*, with the verb *παραστῆσαι, to present*. But this would be a tautology, and too many important words separate the two terms.—The last words of the verse certainly establish a contrast between the external service of the Old Testament and the spiritual service of the New. Hence several commentators have been led to give the word *λογικήν, reasonable*, the sense of *spiritual;* comp.

1 Pet. ii. 2, where, in consequence of the understood antithesis (material milk), there can be no doubt as to the meaning of this word. But why would not Paul have rather used in our passage the ordinary term *πνευματικήν, spiritual?* Calvin takes the epithet *reasonable* as opposed to the superstitious practices of the heathen; and Grotius contrasts it with the ignorance of animal victims. It seems to me that in all these explanations it is forgotten to take account of an important word, the complement *ὑμῶν, of you,*—that is to say, "of such people as you." Is it not this pronoun which explains the choice of the word *λογικήν, reasonable,* of which, undoubtedly, the true meaning is this: "the service which rationally corresponds to the moral premises contained in the faith which you profess"?

It will be asked whether Paul, by requiring simply that service (*cultus*) which consists of a life devoted to good, means to exclude as irrational, *acts of worship* properly so called. Assuredly not, a host of passages prove the contrary; comp. for example, 1 Cor. xi.–xiv. Only the acts of external service have no value in his eyes except as means of nourishing and stimulating the truly rational service of which he speaks here. Every act of service which does not issue in the holy consecration of him who takes part in it, is christianly illogical.—But what use is to be made of this consecrated body? Ver. 2 proceeds to answer this question.

Ver. 2. "*And be not conformed*[1] *to this world, but be ye transformed*[2] *by the renewing of your mind,*[3] *that ye may discern what is that good, acceptable, and perfect will of God.*"—We have already said that we are not to seek in this verse, as Meyer does, the idea of the sanctification of the soul, as completing the consecration of the body. This idea would have been placed first, and the term *soul* or *spirit* would certainly have been used instead of *νοῦς, the mind,* which denotes only one of the faculties of the soul, and that the faculty of simple perception. The relation between the two verses is quite different. Paul has just pointed to the

[1] T. R., with ℵ B L P, It., reads *συσχηματιζεσθε*; A D F G: *συσχηματιζεσθαι.*
[2] T. R., with B L P, It. Syr., reads *μεταμορφουσθε*; ℵ A D F G: *μεταμορφουσθαι.*
[3] A B D F G here omit *υμων*, which T. R. reads with all the rest.

believer's body as a consecrated instrument. What remains to him to indicate, except the *rule* according to which the believer ought to make use of it? The *καί, and,* therefore signifies here: *and in order to that.* The T. R., with several ancient documents and the two oldest versions, reads the two verbs in the imperative: *conform ye, transform ye,* while the Greco-Latin MSS. read them in the infinitive. It is probable that the copyists by this latter reading meant to continue the construction of ver. 1, and to make these two verbs dependent on *παρακαλῶ, I exhort you.* The authorities speak in favour of the imperative. But even if the other reading were adopted, we should have to give to the infinitive the meaning of the imperative, as is so often the case in Greek; comp. in this very chapter, ver. 15. For the relation of dependence on *παρακαλῶ* is in any case forced. — In the use of his consecrated body, the believer has first an everywhere present model to be rejected, then a new type to be discerned and realized. The model to be rejected is that presented to him by *the present world,* or, as we should say, the reigning *fashion,* taking this word in its widest sense. The term *σχῆμα* denotes the manner of holding oneself, attitude, pose; and the verb *σχηματίζεσθαι,* derived from it, the adoption or imitation of this pose or received mode of conduct. The term (this) *present world* is used in the Rabbins to denote the whole state of things which precedes the epoch of the Messiah; in the N. T. it describes the course of life followed by those who have not yet undergone the renewing wrought by Christ in human life. It is this mode of living anterior to regeneration which the believer is not to imitate in the use which he makes of his body. And what is he to do? To seek a new model, a superior type, to be realized by means of a power acting within him. He is to be *transformed,* literally, *metamorphosed.* The term *μορφή, form,* strictly denotes, not an external pose suitable for imitation, like *σχῆμα, attitude,* but an *organic form,* the natural product of a principle of life which manifests itself thus. It is not by looking around him, to the right and left, that the believer is to learn to use his body, but by putting himself under the dominion of a new power which will by an inward necessity transform this use. It is true that Meyer, Hofmann, and others refuse to acknow-

ledge this difference of meaning between the substantives σχῆμα and μορφή, and between the two verbs derived from them, alleging that it is not confirmed by usage. But if Phil. ii. 5 et seq. be adduced, the example proves precisely the contrary. Etymology leads naturally to the distinction indicated, and Paul evidently contrasts the two terms of set purpose.[1]—It should be remarked, also, that the two imperatives are in the *present.* The subject in question is two continuous incessant acts which take place on the basis of our consecration performed once for all (the aorist παραστῆσαι, ver. 1).—And what will be the internal principle of this metamorphosis of the believer in the use of his body? *The renewing of his mind,* answers St. Paul. The νοῦς, *the mind,* is the faculty by which the soul perceives and discerns the good and the true. But in our natural state this faculty is impaired; the reigning love of self darkens the mind, and makes it see things in a purely personal light. The natural mind, thus misled, is what Paul calls νοῦς τῆς σαρκός, the carnal mind (under the dominion of the flesh), Col. ii. 18. This is why the apostle speaks of the *renewing* of the mind as a condition of the organic transformation which he requires. This faculty, freed from the power of the flesh, and replaced under the power of the Spirit, must recover the capacity for discerning the new model to be realized, the most excellent and sublime type, the will of God: *to appreciate* (discern exactly) *the will of God.* The verb δοκιμάζειν does not signify here, as it has often been translated (Osterv., Seg.): *to prove, to make experience of.* For *the experience* of the excellence of the divine will would not be an affair of the mind only; the whole man would take part in it. The meaning of the word here, as usually, is *to appreciate, discern.* By means of his renewed mind the believer studies and recognises in every given position the divine will toward him in the circumstances, the duty of the situation. He lifts his eyes, and, like Christ Himself (John v. 19, 20), "he sees what his Father shows him" to be done. This perception evidently requires a renewed mind. In order to it we require to be raised to the

[1] The difference between these two words may be judged of by the use which we ourselves make of the following terms derived from them: *scheme, schematism; amorphous, morphology.*

viewpoint of God Himself.—It is against the rules of grammar to translate the following words, either in the sense of: "*that* the will of God is good" (Osterv., Seg.), or in the sense: "*how* good it is" (Oltram.). The only possible meaning is: "*what is the* good, acceptable . . . will of God." It is not always easy for the Christian who lives in the world, even with a heart sincerely consecrated, to discern clearly *what is* the will of God concerning him, especially in regard to the externals of life. This delicate appreciation demands a continual perfecting, even of the transformed mind.—And why is the model to be studied and reproduced in the life not the present world's mode of acting, but the will of God? The apostle explains by the three epithets with which he qualifies this will; literally: *the good, the acceptable, the perfect.* Such, then, is the normal type to which, in all circumstances, we must seek to rise with the mind first, then with the conduct. *Good:* in that its directions are free from all connivance with evil, in any form whatever. *Acceptable:* this adjective is not accompanied here with the regimen *to God*, as in ver. 1; it refers, consequently, to the impression produced on men when they contemplate this will realized in the believer's life. They cannot help paying it a tribute of admiration, and finding it beautiful as well as good. Have not devotion, disinterestedness, self-forgetfulness, and self-sacrifice, a charm which subdues every human heart? *Perfect:* this characteristic follows from the combination of the two preceding. For perfection is goodness united to beauty. The meaning would not be very different if, with some commentators, we regarded these three adjectives as three substantives forming an apposition to the term: *the will of God.* "The will of God, to wit, the good, the acceptable, the perfect." But the article τό would require to be repeated before each of the terms if they were used substantively.

The following, then, is the *résumé* of the apostle's thought: To the false model, presented in every age by the mundane kind of life, there is opposed a perfect type, that of the will of God, which is discerned by the renewed mind of the believer, and which he strives to realize by means of his God-consecrated body, at every moment and in all the relations of his life; thus is laid down the principle of life in salvation.

This life he now proceeds to show as manifesting itself simultaneously in two spheres, that of the church, chap. xii., and that of the state, chap. xiii.

TWENTY-FIFTH PASSAGE (XII. 3–21).

The Life of the Believer as a Member of the Church.

The notion of consecration is still the prevailing one in this passage. This consecration is realized in life: 1st, in the form of *humility* (vv. 3–8); 2d, in that of *love* (vv. 9–21).

Vv. 3–8.

The natural tendency of man is to exalt himself. Here is the first point at which the will of God, discerned by the renewed mind of the believer, impresses on his conduct a completely opposite character to that of secular conduct. He recognises the limit which God imposes on him, and modestly confines himself within it.

Ver. 3. "*For I say, through the grace given unto me, to every man that is among you, not to aspire beyond that to which he ought to lay claim; but to aspire to regulate himself, according as God hath dealt to every man the measure of faith.*" —It is with this that he who forms part of the church ought to begin, the sacrifice of himself; instead of seeking to make himself great, as is done in the world, he should aspire to moderate and control himself in conformity with the standard traced for him by the new type which he consults, the will of God. Thus we see how this verse should be joined to the preceding by the word *for*. It is an application which confirms the principle.—The authority with which Paul traces this line of conduct rests on *the grace given unto him*. This grace is that of the apostleship and of the light accompanying it. In virtue of his office, he has not only the gift of teaching the way of salvation, as he has done in the doctrinal part of this Epistle (chaps. i.–ix.). He has also that of marking out the true direction for moral action, as he proceeds to do in this practical part.—The term λέγω, *I say, I declare*, has a

more marked character of authority than the *I exhort* of ver. 1. Religious impulse ought to be regulated by a higher authority. 1 Cor. xii.–xiv. shows the necessity of apostolical direction on that very point which is about to occupy us, that of *spiritual gifts.* It is not without reason that Paul here calls to mind his *office;* comp. i. 1–7. Apostle to the Gentiles, he had the task not only of founding churches among them, but also of guiding them when founded. This charge Paul had, in virtue of his apostleship also, in relation to the church of Rome.—The expression: *παντὶ τῷ ὄντι ἐν ὑμῖν, to every man that is among you,* would be superfluous, if it were merely intended to denote the members of the church *present at Rome.* It is necessary to give the words: *every man that is,* a more special and forcible meaning: "Every man that is *in office,* engaged in ministry in some form or other among you; every one that plays a part in the life of the church." See the enumeration which follows. Perhaps the apostle is led to use this expression by his own absence from Rome. He who with his apostolic gift is absent, addresses all those who, being present, can exercise an influence on the progress of the church, to say to them on what condition this influence shall be a blessed one.—*Ὑπερφρονεῖν*: "*to aspire beyond one's measure.*" The measure of each man is denoted by the words: *ὃ δεῖ φρονεῖν, that which he has a right to claim.* In the believer's case it consists in his wishing only to be that which God, by the gift committed to him, calls him to be. The gift received should be the limit of every man's claim and action, for it is thereby that the will of God regarding him is revealed (ver. 2).—The following expression: *φρονεῖν εἰς τὸ σωφρονεῖν,* contains a sort of play on words: "to turn the *φρονεῖν,* the energy of the mind, into a *σωφρονεῖν,* to recognise its limits and respect them." The man of the world enters into conflict with others, to exceed his measure, to make himself prominent, to rule. The Christian enters into conflict with himself, that he may gain self-rule and self-restraint. He aspires to continue within or return to his measure. Such is a wholly new type of conduct which appears with the gospel.—The rule of this voluntary limitation ought to be *the measure of faith* as it is imparted to each. Paul does not mean to speak of *the quantity* of

faith which we possess; for this measure depends in part on human freedom. The genitive: *of faith*, should be regarded not as a partitive complement, but as denoting quality or cause: "the capacity assigned to each man in the domain of faith; the particular form of activity for which each has been fitted as a believer; the special gift which constitutes his appanage in virtue of his faith." This gift, the measure of the action to which we are called, is a divine limit which the Christian's renewed mind should discern, and by which he should regulate his aspirations in regard to the part he has to play in the church.

Vv. 4, 5. "*For as*[1] *we have many members in one body, and all members have not the same office; so we, being many, are one body in Christ, and every one*[2] *members one of another.*"—The organization of the human body should be an example to the believer to make him perceive the necessity of limiting himself to the function assigned him. Not only, indeed, is there a plurality of members in one body, but these members also possess special functions, varied capacities (ver. 4). So in the church, which is the organ of Christ's life on the earth (*His body*), there is not only a multiplicity of members, but also a *diversity* of functions, every believer having a particular gift whereby he ought to become the auxiliary of all the rest, their member. Hence it follows that every one should remain in his function, on the one hand that he may be able to render to the rest the help which he owes them, on the other that he may not disturb these in the exercise of their gift. See the same figure more completely developed, 1 Cor. xii. —The form κατ' εἷς, instead of κατ' ἕνα, occurs only in the later Greek writers.—Instead of ὁ δέ (in the Byzs.), which is the pronoun in the nominative, the Alexs. and Greco-Latins read τὸ δέ, which may be taken as an adverbial phrase: *relatively to*, or better, as a pronoun, in the sense: "*and that*, as members of one another."

Vv. 6–8. "*Having then gifts differing according to the grace that is given to us [let us exercise them], whether prophecy, according to the proportion of faith; or ministry, in ministering; or he that teacheth, in teaching; or he that exhorteth, in exhorta-*

[1] D E F G read ωσπερ instead of καθαπερ.
[2] T. R. reads, with E L: ὁ δε; all the others: τὸ δε.

tion; he that giveth, with simplicity; he that ruleth, with zeal; he that doeth works of mercy, with cheerfulness."—There is no occasion for making the participle ἔχοντες, *having*, as de Wette and Lachmann do, the continuation of the preceding proposition: "We are one body, *but that while having* different gifts." This idea of the diversity of gifts has been sufficiently explained in the previous verses. And if this participle still belonged to the previous proposition, we should require to take all the subordinate clauses which immediately follow: according to the proportion . . . in ministering . . . in teaching . . . etc., as simple descriptive appendices, which would be tautological and superfluous. The words *having then* are therefore certainly the beginning of a new proposition. Paul takes up the last thought of the previous verse, to make it the point of departure for all the particular precepts which are to follow: "As, then, we have different gifts, let us exercise them every one as I proceed to tell you: confining our activity modestly within the limits of the gift itself." As to the meaning, it is always the σωφρονεῖν, *self-rule*, which remains the fundamental idea. Grammatically, the principal verb should be taken from the participle *having:* "Having then different gifts, let us have (exercise) them by abiding simply in them, by not seeking to go out of them."—The term χάρισμα, *gift*, denotes in the language of Paul a spiritual aptitude communicated to the believer with faith, and by which he can aid in the development of spiritual life in the church. Most frequently it is a natural talent which God's Spirit appropriates, increasing its power and sanctifying its exercise.—The gift which holds the first place in the enumerations of 1 Cor. xii. and Eph. iv. is *apostleship*. Paul does not mention it here; he pointed to it in ver. 3 fulfilling its task.

After the apostle there comes *prophecy* in all these lists. The prophet is, as it were, the eye of the church to receive new revelations. In the passages, Eph. ii. 20 and iii. 5, it is closely connected with the apostolate, which without this gift would be incomplete. But it may also be separate from it; and hence prophets are often spoken of as persons distinct from apostles in the primitive church, for example, Acts xiii. 1 and 1 Cor. xiv. Prophets differed from teachers, in that the latter gathered up into a consecutive body of doctrine the

new truths revealed to the church by the prophets.—Wherein, then, will the voluntary limitation consist which the prophet should impose on himself in the exercise of his gift (his σωφρονεῖν)? He should prophesy *according to the analogy of faith.* The word ἀναλογία is a mathematical term; it signifies *proportion.* The prophet is not absolutely free; he ought to proportion his prophecy to faith. What faith? Many (Hofmann, for example) answer: his own. He should take care in speaking not to exceed the limit of confidence, of real hope communicated to him by the Spirit, not to let himself be carried away by self-love to mingle some human alloy with the holy emotion with which he is filled from above. But, in that case, would not the apostle have required to add the pronoun αὐτοῦ: "*his* faith"? And would not the term *revelation* have been more suitable than that of *faith?* Others think it possible to give the term *faith* the objective meaning which it took later in ecclesiastical language, as when we speak of the evangelical faith or the Christian faith; so Philippi. The prophet in his addresses should respect the foundations of the faith already laid, the Christian facts and the truths which flow from them. But the word faith never in the N. T. denotes doctrine itself; it has always a reference to the subjective feeling of self-surrender, confidence in God, or in Christ as the revealer of God. And may not we here preserve this subjective meaning, while applying it also to the faith of the whole church? The prophet should develope the divine work of faith in the heart of believers, by starting from the point it has already reached, and humbly attaching himself to the work of his predecessors; he should not, by giving scope to his individual speculations, imprudently disturb the course of the work begun within souls already gained. In a word, the revelations which he sets forth should not tend to make himself shine, but solely to edify the church, whose present state is a sort of standard for new instructions. It is obvious how, in the exercise of this gift, it would be easy for one to let himself go beyond the measure of his revelations, and thus add heterogeneous elements to the faith and hope of the church itself. No more in the New Testament than in the Old does it belong to every prophet to recommence the whole work. Hence no doubt

the *judgment* to be pronounced on prophesyings, mentioned 1 Cor. xiv. 29.

Ver. 7. The term διακονία, which we translate by *ministry*, denotes generally in the N. T. a charge, an office confided to some one by the church. Such an office undoubtedly supposes a spiritual aptitude; but the holder is responsible for its discharge, not only in relation to God from whom the gift comes, but also to the church which has confided to him the office. Such is the difference between the functions denoted by this name and the ministry of the prophet, or of him who *speaks with tongues*. These are pure gifts, which man cannot transform into a charge. In our passage this term *ministry*, placed as it is between prophecy and the function of teaching, can only designate an activity of a practical nature, exerted in action, not in word. It is almost in the same sense that in 1 Pet. iv. 11 the term διακονεῖν, *serving*, is opposed to λαλεῖν, *speaking*. We think it probable, therefore, that this term here denotes the two ecclesiastical offices of the *pastorate* (bishop or presbyter) and of the *diaconate* properly so called. *Bishops* or *presbyters* were established in the church of Jerusalem from the first times of the church, Acts xi. 30. Paul instituted this office in the churches which he had just founded, Acts. xiv. 23; comp. Phil. i. 1; 1 Tim. iii. 1 et seq.; Tit. i. 5 et seq. They presided over the assemblies of the church, and directed its course and that of its members in respect of spiritual matters; comp. 1 Thess. v. 12 and 13. Hence their title ποιμένες, *pastors*, Eph. iv. 11.—*Deacons* appear even before elders in the church of Jerusalem (Acts vi. 1 et seq.). They were occupied especially with the care of the poor. This office, which emanates so directly from Christian charity, never ceased in the church; we find it again mentioned Phil. i. 1; 1 Tim. iii. 12.—Each of these functionaries, says the apostle, should keep to his part, confine himself within the administration committed to him. The elder should not desire to mount the tripod of prophet, nor the deacon aspire to play the part of bishop or teacher. It is ever that voluntary limitation which the apostle had recommended, vv. 3–5.

In the passage from the first to the second part of this verse, we observe a slight change of construction. Instead of

mentioning the gift or the office, as in the two preceding terms, Paul addresses himself directly to the man who is invested with it. This is not a real grammatical incorrectness; for, as the preceding accusatives: προφητείαν (*prophecy*), διακονίαν (*ministry*), were placed in apposition to the object χαρίσματα, *gifts* (ver. 6), so the nominatives: ὁ διδάσκων, *he that teacheth*, ὁ παρακαλῶν, *he that exhorteth*, are in apposition to the participle ἔχοντες, *having* (same verse).—As to the following clauses: *in teaching, in exhortation*, they continue to depend on the understood verb ἔχωμεν, *let us have*, exercise, abide in.—*He that teacheth* (the teacher, ὁ διδάσκαλος), like the prophet, exercises his gift by speech; but while the latter receives by revelations granted to him new views which enrich the faith of the church, the teacher confines himself to an orderly and clear exposition of the truths already brought to light, and to bringing out their connection with one another. He it is who, by *the word of knowledge* or *of wisdom* (1 Cor. xii. 8), shows the harmony of all the parts of the divine plan. In the enumeration, Eph. iv. 11, the teacher is at once associated with and distinguished from the *pastor*. In fact, the gift of teaching was not yet essentially connected with the pastorate. But more and more it appeared desirable that the pastor should be endowed with it, 1 Tim. v. 17; Tit. i. 9.

Ver. 8. In 1 Cor. xiv. 3, the function of *exhorting* is ascribed to the prophet, and the surname Barnabas, *son of prophecy*, Acts iv. 36, is translated into Greek by υἱὸς παρακλήσεως, *son of exhortation*. The prophet therefore had certainly the gift of exhorting, stimulating, consoling. But it does not follow from the fact that the prophet exhorts and consoles, that, as some have sought to persuade themselves in our day, any one, man or woman, who has the gift of exhorting or consoling, is a *prophet*, and may claim the advantage of all that is said of the prophets in other apostolical declarations. Our passage proves clearly that the gift of exhorting may be absolutely distinct from that of prophecy. So it is also from that of *teaching*. The teacher acts especially on the understanding; he would be in our modern language the catechist or dogmatic theologian. He that *exhorts* acts on the heart, and thereby on the will; he would rather be the Christian

poet. Also in 1 Cor. xiv. 26, Paul, bringing these two ministries together as he does here, says: "Hath any one a *doctrine*, hath any one a *psalm?*"

The three last functions mentioned in this verse are no longer exercised in the assemblies of the church; they come, to a certain point, under the exercise of private *virtues*. It is wrong, indeed, to regard the μεταδιδούς, *he that distributeth*, as has been done, to indicate the official deacon, and the προϊστάμενος, *he that ruleth*, the elder or bishop. The verb μεταδιδόναι does not signify *to make a distribution* on behalf of the church (this would require διαδιδόναι, Acts iv. 35); but: *to communicate* to others of one's own wealth; comp. Luke iii. 11; Eph. iv. 28. And as to the bishop, the position here assigned to this ministry would not be in keeping with his elevated rank in the church; and the matter in question is especially works of beneficence. The first term: *he that giveth* (communicateth), therefore denotes the believer, who by his fortune and a natural aptitude sanctified by faith, feels himself particularly called to succour the indigent around him. Paul recommends him to do so *with simplicity*. The Greek term might be translated: *with generosity*, with large-heartedness; such is the meaning which the word ἁπλότης (2 Cor. viii. 2, ix. 13) often has. According to its etymological meaning, the word signifies: the disposition not to turn back on oneself; and it is obvious that from this first meaning there may follow either that of *generosity*, when a man gives without letting himself be arrested by any selfish calculation, or that of *simplicity*, when he gives without his left hand knowing what his right does,—that is to say, without any vain going back on himself, and without any air of haughtiness. This second meaning seems to us preferable here, because the prevailing idea throughout the entire passage is that of σωφρονεῖν, *self-limiting*, self-regulating.—The second term: *he that ruleth*, should be explained by the sense which the verb προϊστασθαι frequently has in Greek: *to be at the head of;* hence: *to direct a business*. So, in profane Greek, the term is applied to the physician who directs the treatment of a disease, to the magistrate who watches over the execution of the laws. In the Epistle to Titus, iii. 8, there occurs the expression: προϊστασθαι καλῶν ἔργων, *to be occupied with good works;* whence

the term προστάτις, *patroness*, protectress, benefactress, used in our Epistle, xvi. 2, to express what Phœbe had been to many believers and to Paul himself. Think of the numerous works of private charity which believers then had to found and maintain! Pagan society had neither hospitals nor orphanages, free schools or refuges, like those of our day. The church, impelled by the instinct of Christian charity, had to introduce all these institutions into the world; hence no doubt, in every community, spontaneous gatherings of devout men and women who, like our present Christian committees, took up one or other of these needful objects, and had of course at their head directors charged with the responsibility of the work. Such are the persons certainly whom the apostle has in view in our passage. Thus is explained the position of this term between the preceding: *he that giveth*, and the following: *he that showeth mercy*. The same explanation applies to the following regimen ἐν σπουδῇ, *with zeal*. This recommendation would hardly be suitable for one presiding over an assembly. How many presidents, on the contrary, would require to have the call addressed to them: Only no zeal! But the recommendation is perfectly suitable to one who is directing a Christian work, and who ought to engage in it with a sort of exclusiveness, to personify it after a manner in himself.—The last term: ὁ ἐλεῶν, *he that showeth mercy*, denotes the believer who feels called to devote himself to the visiting of the sick and afflicted. There is a gift of sympathy which particularly fits for this sort of work, and which is, as it were, the key to open the heart of the sufferer. The regimen ἐν ἱλαρότητι, literally, *with hilarity*, denotes the joyful eagerness, the amiable grace, the affability going the length of gaiety, which make the visitor, whether man or woman, a sunbeam penetrating into the sick-chamber and to the heart of the afflicted.

In the preceding enumeration, the recommendation of the apostle had in view especially *humility* in those who have to exercise a gift. But in the last terms we feel that his thought is already bordering on the virtue of *love*. It is the spectacle of this Christian virtue in full activity in the church and in the world which now fills his mind, and which he presents in the following description, vv. 9–21:—First, self-

limiting, self-possessing: this is what he has just been recommending; then self-giving: this is what he proceeds to expound.

Vv. 9–21.

The *χαρίσματα, gifts*, are different, as we have just seen. But there is a gift which is at the root of all the rest, and which ought to be common to all believers, that of all those who have no other, viz. love. The church, gained by faith in divine love, lives by love. All who believe, love. When this love is sincere, it produces in every believer a spontaneous ministry, which is carried out in his whole life by the manifold activity of love. This beneficent activity is exercised, first, toward the *sympathetic* elements the believer finds around him, vv. 9–16; then toward the *hostile* elements which he happens to meet, whether within the church itself or without, vv. 17–21.

Vv. 9–16.

Vv. 9, 10. "*Let love be without dissimulation. Abhor that which is evil, cleave to that which is good. As to brotherly love, being full of tenderness one toward another; as to honour, preferring one another.*"—In these two verses the apostle speaks of three dispositions, and first, ver. 9, of the fundamental feeling, the principle of all the activity about to be described, as well as of the two characteristics which alone guarantee its sincerity: *love*, in the general sense of the word. There follow in ver. 10 two immediate manifestations of love: *brotherly* love and mutual *respect*. — *Without dissimulation*, literally, *without mask*. The heart ought to feel really the whole measure of affection which it testifies. There is also here something of the *σωφρονεῖν, self-ruling*, the controlling idea of the preceding passage, in opposition to the *ὑπερφρονεῖν, self-exalting*.—The two following verbs: *abhor* and *cleave*, are in the participle in Greek: *abhorring, cleaving*. These participles relate grammatically to the subject of the verb *love*, contained in the substantive *love*. It follows from this construction that the two participles: "abhorring, cleaving," are intended to *qualify* the love unfeigned, by reminding us of the

characteristics in virtue of which it deserves the title. This is not here a commonplace recommendation to detest evil and love good. Paul means that love is not *pure* except when it is the declared enemy of evil, even in the person of those whom we love, and that it applies all its energy to labour for their progress in goodness. Destitute of this moral rectitude, which is the spirit of holiness, love is only a form of selfishness.

Ver. 10. The two datives: τῇ φιλαδελφίᾳ, τῇ τιμῇ, which we have translated by: "*as to* brotherly love," "*as to* honour," might be regarded as datives of means: *by*, or *in virtue of*. But it is more natural to take them as a sort of headings in the catalogue of Christian virtues. They are the well-known categories forming the believer's moral catechism. The article τῇ (*the*) precisely characterizes those virtues as supposed present in the heart. The adjective and participle which follow, show how they are to be realized in the life. The word φιλόστοργος, *full of tenderness*, comes from the verb στέργω, which denotes the delicate attentions mutually rendered by those who cherish one another with natural affection, as parents and children, brothers and sisters, etc. The apostle, by using this term, wishes to give to the love of the members of the church to one another the tender character of a family affection.— The term τιμή denotes the feeling of *respect* which every believer feels for his brother, as one redeemed by Christ and a child of God, like himself. — The verb προηγεῖσθαι strictly signifies: "to put oneself at the head in order to guide." Hence may be deduced the meanings: *to give example* (Meyer), or *to anticipate, to be beforehand with kindness* (Vulg., Luth., Osterv., Oltram., Seg.), or *to surpass* (Chrys.). But in all these meanings we should expect from the usage of the language to find the regimen in the genitive or dative rather than the accusative. Erasmus, Hofmann, etc., proceeding on the sense which the simple verb ἡγεῖσθαι often has: *to esteem, regard* (Phil. ii. 3), translate: "each esteeming others better than himself." This meaning is evidently forced; but it may be rendered more natural by taking ἡγεῖσθαι in its primitive signification of *conducting*: "Conducting others before you," that is to say, making them pass in all circumstances before yourselves.

There follows a second group of three dispositions which

are naturally connected with the preceding and with one another.

Ver. 11. "*As to zeal, being not indolent; fervent in spirit; taking advantage of opportunity.*"[1]—With respectful consideration, ver. 10, there is easily connected the disposition to render service, which is here denoted by the word: *not indolent.*—This in its turn, in order to overcome the resistance of selfishness, in cases where to oblige requires self-sacrifice, and must be, not a natural disposition only, but a powerful movement, due to the impulse of the Divine Spirit, and like an inner fire kept up unceasingly by action from above: *fervent in spirit.* The word *spirit* undoubtedly refers here to the spiritual element in man himself, but that as penetrated and quickened by the Divine Spirit. In reading these words, we see the believer hastening, with his heart on fire, wherever there is any good to be done.—The third proposition presents an important variant. The Alex. and Byz. documents read τῷ Κυρίῳ, (*serving*) *the Lord.* The Greco-Lat. text reads τῷ καιρῷ, (*serving*) *the time,* the season, the occasion; adapting yourselves to the opportunity. This expression is somewhat strange, but it is common enough in profane Greek; comp. the καιρῷ λατρεύειν (see Meyer), and in Latin the *tempori servire* (Cicero). The very fact that this phrase is without example in the N. T., may speak in favour of its authenticity. For it is far from probable that any one would have replaced so common an expression as that of *serving the Lord* by that of *serving the time,* while the opposite might easily happen, especially if abbreviations were used in writing. The context must therefore decide, and it seems to me that it decides in favour of the Greco-Latin reading. The precept: *serve the Lord,* is too general to find a place in a series of recommendations so particular. The only means of finding a certain suitableness for it would be to understand it thus: "While employing yourselves for men, do it always *with a view to the Lord* and His cause." But it would be necessary to supply precisely the essential idea. On the contrary, the meaning: "serving the opportunity," or "adapting yourselves to the need of the time," admirably completes the two preceding

[1] T. R. reads τὰ Κυρίου (*the Lord*), with ℵ A B E L P, Mnn. Ital Syr. But D F G read τοῦ καιροῦ (*the fitting time*).

precepts. *Zeal*, according to God, confines itself to espying providential occasions, and suiting our activity to them; it does not impose itself either on men or things.

There follows a third group, the three elements of which form a small well-connected whole.

Ver. 12. "*Rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation, continuing instant in prayer.*"—The fervour of devotion, referred to in ver. 11, has no more powerful auxiliary than *joy;* for joy disposes us to kindness and even to self-sacrifice. But this applies only to Christian joy, to that which is kept up in the heart by the glorious *hopes* of faith.—The passage, chap. v. 3, 4, shows the intimate bond which unites this joy of hope with the *patient endurance* which the believer should display in the midst of trial; comp. 1 Thess. i. 3.—And what are we to do to keep up in the heart the joyful spring of hope, and that firmness of endurance which holds out? *Continue instant in prayer*, says the apostle; such is the fruitful principle of those admirable dispositions. The following is Hofmann's paraphrase of the verse: "In so far as we have cause to hope, let us be joyful; in so far as we have cause of pain, let us hold out; in so far as the door of prayer is open to us, let us continue to use it." The force of the datives which head the three propositions could not be better rendered.

Paul came down from charity and its external manifestations to the depths of the inner life; he now returns to the practical manifestations of this feeling, and points out the blessings of active charity extending to three classes of persons: brethren, strangers, enemies.

Vv. 13, 14. "*Distributing to the necessities*[1] *of saints; given to hospitality. Bless them which persecute you;*[2] *bless and curse not.*"—*The saints* are not only the families of the church of Rome, but also all the churches whose wants come to the knowledge of the Christians of the capital. The Byz. and Alex. documents read χρείαις, *the necessities;* while the Greco-Latins read μνείαις, *the remembrances.* Would this term denote the anniversary days consecrated to the memory of martyrs? This meaning would suffice to prove the later origin of this reading. Or should the expression *remembrances* be applied to the pecuniary help which the churches of the Gentiles sent

[1] T. R. reads χρείαις, with ℵ B E L P, Mnn. It. Syr.; D F G read μνείαις.
[2] B omits ὑμᾶς (*you*).

from time to time to the Christians of Jerusalem (Hofmann)? This meaning of *μνείαις*, in itself far from natural, is not at all justified by Phil. i. 3. The Received reading is the only possible one. The verb *κοινωνεῖν* strictly signifies *to take part;* then, as a consequence, *to assist effectively.*—There is a gradation from saints to *strangers.* The virtue of hospitality is frequently recommended in the N. T. (1 Pet. iv. 9; Heb. xiii. 2; 1 Tim. v. 10; Tit. i. 8).—The term *διώκειν*, literally, "*pursue* (hospitality)," shows that we are not to confine ourselves to according it when it is asked, but that we should even seek opportunities of exercising it.

Ver. 14. A new gradation from strangers to them *that persecute.* The act to be done by love becomes more and more energetic, and this is no doubt the reason why the apostle passes abruptly to the imperative, after this long series of participles. Here we have no longer a manifestation which, supposing love, is in a manner understood as a matter of course. To act as the apostle demands, requires a powerful effort of the will, which the imperative is expressly intended to call forth. This is also the reason why this order is repeated, then completed in a negative form; for the persecuted one ought, as it were, to say no to the natural feeling which rises in his heart. The omission of the pronoun *you* in the *Vatic.* serves well to bring out the odiousness of persecution in itself, whoever the person may be to whom it is applied.—We do not know whether the apostle had before him the Sermon on the Mount, already published in some document; in any case, he must have known it by oral tradition, for he evidently alludes to the saying of Jesus, Matt. v. 44; Luke vi. 28. This discourse of Jesus is the one which has left the most marked traces in the Epistles; comp. Rom. ii. 19; 1 Cor. iv. 12 and 13, vi. 7, vii. 10; Jas. iv. 9, v. 12; 1 Pet. iii. 9 and 14. This recommendation, relating to love toward malevolent persons, is here an anticipation; Paul will return to it immediately.

Now comes a group of four precepts, the moral relation of which is equally manifest.

Vv. 15, 16. "*Rejoice with them that do rejoice,*[1] *weep with*

[1] T. R. reads *καί* between the two propositions, with A E L P, Syr^{sch}; this word is omitted, ℵ B D F G, It.

them that weep: aspiring after the same aim for one another; not minding high things, but condescending to men of low estate. Be not wise in your own eyes." — The connection between vv. 14 and 15 is the idea of self-forgetfulness. As self-forgetting is needed to bless him who hates us, we must also be freed from self to identify ourselves with the joy of others when our heart is full of grief, and with his grief when we ourselves are filled with joy. In Greek the two verbs are in the infinitive. This form is rightly explained by understanding δεῖ, *it is necessary*. But here we may be permitted to mark a shade of distinction; the infinitive is the indication of an accidental fact: to act thus every time that the case presents itself. It is less pressing than the imperative; it is, as it were, a virtue of the time being.—The following precept is commonly applied to good feeling between the members of the church. But in that case there would require to be ἐν ἀλλήλοις, *among you*, and not εἰς ἀλλήλους, *in relation to one another*, and the following precept would have no natural connection with this. The only possible meaning is: "aiming at the same object for one another as for yourselves;" that is to say, having each the same solicitude for the temporal and spiritual wellbeing of his brethren as for his own; comp. Phil. ii. 4. As this common disinterested aspiration naturally connects itself with sympathy, ver. 15, so it is easily associated with the feeling of *equality* recommended in the following verse. There frequently forms in the congregations of believers an aristocratic tendency, every one striving by means of the Christian brotherhood to associate with those who, by their gifts or fortune, occupy a higher position. Hence small coteries, animated by a proud spirit, and having for their result chilling exclusiveness. The apostle knows these littlenesses, and wishes to prevent them; he recommends the members of the church to attach themselves to all alike, and if they will yield to a preference, to show it rather for the humble. The term ὑψηλά therefore denotes distinctions, high relations, ecclesiastical honours. This neuter term does not at all oblige us, as Meyer thinks, to give a neuter sense to the word ταπεινοῖς in the following proposition: "humble *things*;" the inferior functions in the church. The prep. *with*, in the verb συναπαγόμενοι, *letting yourselves be drawn with*, does

not admit of this meaning. The reference is to the most indigent and ignorant, and least influential in the church. It is to them the believer ought to feel most drawn.—The antipathy felt by the apostle to every sort of spiritual aristocracy, to every caste distinction within the church, breaks out again in the last word. Whence come those little coteries, if it is not from the presumptuous feeling each one has of *his own wisdom?* It is this feeling which leads you to seek contact especially with those who flatter you, and whose familiar intercourse does you honour. — This precept is taken from Prov. iii. 7, but it evidently borrows a more special sense from the context.

Already, in ver. 14, the apostle had made, as it were, an incursion into the domain of relations to the hostile elements which the believer encounters around him. He returns to this subject to treat it more thoroughly; here is the culminating point in the manifestations of love. He has in view not merely the enmity of the unbelieving world. He knew only too well from experience, that within the church itself one may meet with ill-will, injustice, jealousy, hatred. In the following verses the apostle describes to us the victory of love over malevolent feelings and practices, from whatever quarter they come, Christians or non-Christians. And first, vv. 17–19, in the passive form of *forbearance;* then, vv. 20, 21, in the active form of generous beneficence.

Vv. 17–19. "*Recompensing to no man evil for evil; being preoccupied with good in the sight of all men. If it be possible, as much as lieth in you, living peaceably with all men. Dearly beloved, avenging not yourselves; but give place unto wrath; for it is written: Vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the Lord.*" —There is a close connection between the abnegation described in the preceding verses and the love which pardons. Hence it is that the apostle continues, in ver. 17, with a simple participle; for vengeance is very often the effect of wounded pride. But why add the second precept, taken from Prov. iii. 4? Probably the apostle means to contrast preoccupation *with good,* as an antidote, with those sombre thoughts and hostile projects which are cherished under the dominion of resentment. The regimen: *before all men,* depends of course on the participle προνοούμενοι, *preoccupying yourselves,* not on

the object καλά, *good things*, as Hofmann thinks. Paul would have the believer's inward preoccupation with good to be so manifest in his conduct, even toward his adversaries or enemies, that no one shall be able to suspect in him any working of the mind inspired by a contrary disposition. The meaning of the Hebrew is rather different from that of the Alex. version, which the apostle here follows. The original ought probably to be translated thus: "Thou shalt find favour and success before men." The LXX. have translated: "Thou shalt find favour; and do thou consider good before all men."

Ver. 18. This spirit of goodwill is necessarily *pacific;* not only does it not do nor mediate anything which can trouble, but it strives to remove what disunites. The first restriction: *if it be possible*, refers to our neighbour's conduct; for we are not master of his feelings. The second: *as much as lieth in you*, refers to our own; for we can exercise discipline over ourselves. If it does not depend on us to bring our neighbour to pacific dispositions toward us, it depends on us to be always disposed to make peace.

Ver. 19. But this notwithstanding, there is in the heart of man an ineffaceable feeling of justice which the apostle respects. He only desires to give this sentiment its true direction. Evil ought to be punished, that is certain. Only, if thou wouldest not thyself become unjust, think not thou shouldest make thyself the instrument of justice, and peacefully resign this care to God, the just Judge. The apostle knows that he is here requiring a difficult sacrifice. Hence the style of address: *dearly beloved*, by which he reminds his readers of the tender love which dictates this recommendation, a love which is only an emanation of that which God Himself bears to them. *To give place unto wrath*, is to refrain from avenging oneself, in order to give free course to the justice which God Himself will exercise when and how He thinks good. To seek to anticipate His judgment is to bar the way against it. Comp. what is said of Jesus Himself, 1 Pet. ii. 23. It is needless to refute explanations such as the following: "Let your wrath have time to calm down," or: "Let the wrath of the enemy pass." The passage quoted is Deut. xxxii. 35, but modified in conformity with the version of the LXX. The Hebrew text says: "To me belong vengeance

and retribution." The LXX. translate: "In the day of punishment I will repay." Either they read *aschallem, I will repay,* instead of *schillem, retribution;* or they freely paraphrased the meaning of the substantive. Paul appropriates the verb: *I will repay,* as they introduced it; and it is remarkable that the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews does exactly the same. The same form is also found in the paraphrase of *Onkelos* (*vaani aschallem*), which seems to prove that this way of quoting the verse was common. It is impossible, therefore, to conclude anything from this analogy as concerning the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews.—But forbearance alone would only be a half victory. It is not enough to refrain from meeting evil with evil; the ambition of love must go the length of wishing to transform evil into good.

Vv. 20, 21. "*Therefore, if*[1] *thine enemy hunger, feed him; if he thirst, give him drink; for in so doing thou shalt heap coals of fire on his head. Be not overcome of evil, but overcome evil with good.*"—The connection: *But if,* in the Alex., would signify: "But, far from avenging thyself, if the opportunity of doing good to thine enemy present itself, seize it." The connection: *Therefore if,* in the Byzs., is somewhat more difficult to apprehend; but it is precisely this fact which speaks in its favour: "Thou oughtest not to avenge thyself; *consequently,* if the occasion present itself of doing good to thine enemy, seize it; for to neglect it would in itself be an act of revenge." The Greco-Latin reading: *if* (simply), merely adds doing good to forbearance; it is the least probable.—The precept is taken, like so many others in this chapter, from the Book of Proverbs; comp. xxv. 21, 22. It is impossible to suppose that in this book the precept is an encouragement to heap benefits on the head of the evil-doer in order to aggravate the punishment with which God shall visit him (Chrys., Grot., Hengst., etc.). For we read in the same book, xxiv. 17: "Rejoice not when thine enemy falleth; and let not thine heart be glad when he stumbleth." Not to be guilty of a self-contradiction, the author would therefore have required to add in our passage: "if thine enemy repent not." In any case, Paul could not quote this saying in such a sense. For

[1] T. R., with E L, reads ἐὰν οὖν (*therefore if*); ℵ A B P, Mnn. read ἐὰν δέ (*but if*); D F G: εἰ (*if*) simply.

how would acting thus be "to overcome evil with good" (ver. 21)? There is here, therefore, rather a fine irony at the expense of him who would cherish in his heart a desire of vengeance: "Thou wouldst avenge thyself? Be it; and here is the way in which God permits thee to do so: Heap benefits on thine enemy; for thereby thou shalt cause him the salutary pain of shame and regret for all the evil he has done thee; and thou shalt light up in his heart the fire of gratitude instead of that of hatred." The figure *coals of fire* is common among the Arabs and Hebrews to denote a vehement pain; but, as Meyer observes, it contains no allusion whatever to the idea of melting or softening the object.

Ver. 21. To render evil for evil, is to let evil have the victory; to confine oneself to not rendering evil is, if it may be so said, neither to be conqueror nor conquered, though in reality this also is to be conquered. The true victory over evil consists in transforming a hostile relation into one of love by the magnanimity of the benefits bestowed. Thereby it is that good has the last word, that evil itself serves it as an instrument: such is the masterpiece of love.

TWENTY-SIXTH PASSAGE (XIII. 1–10).

The Life of the Believer as a Member of the State.

Meyer and many others find no connection whatever between the subject treated in this chapter and that of the foregoing. "A new subject," says this author, "placed here without relation to what precedes." It must be confessed that the connections proposed by commentators are not very satisfactory, and afford some ground for this judgment of Meyer. Tholuck says: The apostle passes here from *private* offences to official persecutions proceeding from the heathen state. But in what follows the state is not regarded as a persecutor; it is represented, on the contrary, as the guardian of justice. Hofmann sees in the legally-ordered social life one of the aspects of that *good* by which evil ought to be overcome (ver. 21). Schott finds the link between the two passages in the idea of the *vengeance* which God will one day take by the

judgment (xii. 19), and which He is taking now by the power of the state (xiii. 4). Better give up every connection than suppose such as these.

As for us, the difficulty is wholly resolved. We have seen that Paul, after pointing to the Christian consecrating his body to God's service, places him successively in the two domains in which he is to realize the sacrifice of himself: that of *spiritual* life properly so called, and that of *civil* life. And what proves that we are really in the track of his thought, is that we discover in the development of this new subject an order exactly parallel to that of the preceding exposition. Paul had pointed to the Christian, first, *limiting* himself by humility, then *giving* himself by love. He follows the same plan in the subsequent passage. In vv. 1–7, he inculcates the duty of *submission* by which the believer controls and limits himself in relation to the state; then, in vv. 8–10, he enters into the domain of private relations, and points to the Christian giving himself to all in the exercise of *righteousness*. We therefore find here the counterpart of the two passages xiii. 3–8 and 9–21, the former of which presented the believer in his relations to the church as such; the latter, in his conduct in the midst of society in general.

If such is the nexus between the subjects treated in these two chapters, there is no necessity for seeking in the local circumstances of the church of Rome for a particular reason to explain this passage. Baur, proceeding on the idea of a Judeo-Christian majority in this church, has alleged that the apostle meant here to combat the Jewish prejudice which held heathen authorities to be only delegates of Satan, as the prince of this world. But Hofmann justly remarks, that if such were the polemic of the apostle, he would have confined himself to proving that it is *allowable* for the Christian to submit himself to a heathen power, without going the length of making this submission a duty, and a duty not of expediency only, but one of conscience. Weizsäcker also replies to Baur, that if the matter in question were a Jewish prejudice to be combated, the apostle would require especially to remind his readers that the Christian faith does not at all imply, as the Jewish Messianic viewpoint did, the expectation of an earthly kingdom; whence it follows that nothing is opposed from this side

to the submission of believers to the power of the state. It is in this line he argues, in the *First Epistle to the Corinthians*, vii. 21 et seq., when he shows that there is no incompatibility between the position of slave and Christian.[1] Besides, we have seen the error of Baur's hypothesis regarding the Judeo-Christian composition of the church of Rome too clearly to make it necessary for us to spend more time in refuting this explanation. If it were thought absolutely needful to find in the state of this church a particular reason for the following precepts, we should certainly have to prefer Ewald's hypothesis. This critic thinks that the spirit of insubordination which broke out soon after in the Jewish nation in the revolt against the Romans, was already agitating this people, and making itself felt even at Rome. The apostle's intention was therefore, he thinks, to protect the church of the capital from this contagion emanating from the synagogue. This supposition can no more be proved than it can be refuted by positive facts. All that we can say is, that it is not needed to explain the following passage. Expounding the gospel didactically, and the life which flows from it, the apostle must naturally, especially when writing to the church resident in the heart of the empire, develope a duty which was soon to become one of the most important and difficult in the conflicts for which it was necessary to prepare with the heathen power, that of submission to the state on the ground of conscience and independently of the character of those who wield the power for the time. Weizsäcker thinks that all Paul says here to Christians supposes no persecution to have yet taken place. We think on this point he is mistaken, and that in any state of the case Paul would have spoken as he does. For, as we shall see, he treats the question from the viewpoint of moral principle, which remains always the standard for the Christian. And what is a clear proof of it is, that the course traced by him has been ratified by the conscience of Christians in all epochs,

[1] *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, 1876, pp. 18 and 19. This author, in another article published in the same journal, the same year, p. 262 et seq., points out how the remarkable prayer for the authorities of the state, which is found in the manuscript of the *First Epistle of Clement of Rome*, recently published by Archbishop Bryennius, chap. 61, furnishes the most striking proof of the *purely Christian* need which is met by the exhortation of St. Paul in our Epistle.

even in times of persecution. It was followed, in particular, by the whole primitive church, and by the Christians of the Reformed Church of France; and if there was a time when the latter, driven to extremity by extraordinary sufferings, deviated from this line of conduct, their action certainly did not turn out a blessing to them. Moreover, comp. the sayings analogous to those of Paul in Matt. xxvi. 52, Rev. xiii. 10, and the whole of the First Epistle of Peter, especially chap. ii. —We cannot help quoting here, as a specimen of Renan's manner, the observation with which he accompanies the precept of the apostle: "Paul had too much tact to be a mover of sedition. He wished the name of Christian to be of good standing" (p. 477).

In vv. 1–7, the apostle points out the Christian's duty in regard to the state (1*a*), and explains the ground of it (1*b*). He points out its penal sanction (ver. 2), and justifies it (vv. 3 and 4). Ver. 5 draws the general consequence from these principles; finally, vv. 6 and 7 apply this consequence to the details of social life.

Ver. 1. "*Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers; for there is no power but of God,*[1] *and the powers*[2] *that be are ordained of God.*"—Why does the apostle say: *every soul*, instead of every man, or rather every believer? Is he alluding to the fact that submission ought to proceed from the inmost sanctuary of the human being (the conscience, ver. 5)? The word *every* does not correspond well with this explanation; it leads rather to the thought that the apostle means to express that a duty is involved which is naturally incumbent on every human being. This is not an obligation on the believer arising from his spiritual life, like the precepts of chap. xii.; it is an obligation of the *psychical* life which is the common domain of mankind. Every free and reasonable being should recognise its suitableness. — The present imperative, *ὑποτασσέσθω, let it submit itself*, indicates a reflex action, exercised by the man on himself, and that permanently. This expression is, indeed, the counterpart of the term *σωφρονεῖν, to control oneself*, in chap. xii.—The term *higher powers* does not denote merely the highest class of authorities in the state.

[1] T. R., with D E F G: *ἀπὸ θεοῦ*; ℵ A B L P, Mnn. read *ὑπὸ θεοῦ*.
[2] ℵ A B D F G omit *ἐξουσίαι*.

It is all those powers in general and of all degrees; they are thus designated as being raised above the simple citizen; comp. ver. 7.

The second part of this verse justifies the duty of submission, and that for two reasons: the first is the divine origin of the state as an institution; the second, the will of God which controls the raising of individuals to office at any given time. The first proposition has the character of a general principle. This appears — (1) from the singular ἐξουσία, *power;* comp. the same word in the plural before and after, in this same verse, which proves that Paul means to speak of power *in itself,* and not of its historical and particular realizations; (2) from the negative form of the proposition: "there is not but of" . . .; this form corresponds also to the enunciation of an abstract principle; (3) from the choice of the preposition ἀπό, *of,* or *on the part of,* which indicates the origin and essence of the fact. It is true the Alexs. and Byzs. read ὑπό, *by,* in this proposition as well as in the following. But this is one of the cases in which the Greco-Latin text has certainly preserved the true reading. It is clear, whatever Tischendorf may think, that the copyists have changed the first preposition according to that of the following clause. Meyer himself acknowledges this. We shall see that as thoroughly as ἀπό corresponds to the idea of the first proposition, so thoroughly does ὑπό apply to that of the second. Paul means, therefore, first, that the institution of the state is according to the plan of God who created man as a social being; so that we are called to recognise in the existence of a power (authority) the realization of a divine thought. In the second proposition he goes further (δέ, *and, moreover*). He declares that at each time the very persons who are established in office occupy this exalted position only in virtue of a divine dispensation. This gradation from the first idea to the second appears—(1) from the particle δέ; (2) from the participle οὖσαι, *those who are,* that is to say, who are there; this term added here would be superfluous if it did not denote the historical fact in opposition to the idea; (3) from the return to the plural (*the powers*), which proves that Paul means again to designate here, as in the first part of the verse, the manifold realizations of social power;

(4) from the affirmative form of the proposition, which applies to the real fact; (5) from the preposition *ὑπό, by,* which more naturally describes the historical fact than would be done by the preposition *ἀπό, on the part of.*—The word *ἐξουσίαι* in the T. R. is probably only a copyist's addition.

But for the very reason of this precept it is asked: If it is not merely the state in itself which is a thought of God, but if the very individuals who possess the power at a given time are set up by His will, what are we to do in a period of revolution, when a new power is violently substituted for another? This question, which the apostle does not raise, may, according to the principles he lays down, be resolved thus: The Christian will submit to the new power as soon as the resistance of the old shall have ceased. In the actual state of matters he will recognise the manifestation of God's will, and will take no part whatever in any reactionary plot. But should the Christian support the power of the state even in its unjust measures? No, there is nothing to show that the submission required by Paul includes active co-operation; it may even show itself in the form of passive resistance, and it does not at all exclude protestation in word and even resistance in deed, provided that to this latter there be joined the calm acceptance of the punishment inflicted; comp. the conduct of the apostles and Peter's answer, Acts v. 29, 40–42. This submissive but at the same time firm conduct is also a homage to the inviolability of authority; and experience proves that it is in this way all tyrannies have been morally broken, and all true progress in the history of humanity effected.

Ver. 2. "*Whosoever, therefore, riseth against the power, resisteth the ordinance of God; now, they that resist shall receive to themselves judgment.*"—This verse exhibits the guilt, and, as a consequence, the inevitable punishment of revolt. The term *ἀντιτασσόμενος* is the counterpart of *ὑποτάσσεσθαι*, ver. 1. The perfect *ἀνθέστηκεν*, as well as the participle which follows, has the meaning of the present.—The term *διαταγή, ordinance,* includes the two ideas expressed in 1*b*: an institution, and a fact of which God Himself is the ordainer. This term etymologically and logically recalls the three preceding: *ὑποτασσέσθω, ἀντιτασσόμενος*, and *τεταγ-*

μέναι. — The application of the principle laid down here remains always the same, whatever may be the form of government, Monarchical or Republican. Every revolt has for its effect to shake for a longer or shorter time the feeling of respect due to a divine institution; and hence the judgment of God cannot fail to overtake him who becomes guilty.— Undoubtedly the term κρῖμα, *judgment*, without article, does not refer to eternal perdition; but neither should we apply it, with many critics, solely to the punishment which will be inflicted by the authority attacked. Most certainly, in the mind of the apostle, it is God who will put forth His hand to avenge *His institution* which has been compromised, whether He do so directly or by some human instrumentality. Paul here reproduces in a certain sense, but in another form, the saying of Jesus, Matt. xxvi. 52: "All they that take the sword shall perish by the sword." Volkmar has thought good, in connection with this precept, to advance a supposition which resembles a wicked piece of pleasantry. He alleges that when the author of the Apocalypse represents the false prophet seeking to induce men to submit to the beast (the Antichrist), he meant to designate Paul himself, who, in our passage, teaches the Christians of Rome to submit to the emperor. But the author of this ingenious hypothesis will yet acknowledge that *to submit* is not the equivalent of *to worship* (Rev. xiii. 12). And to give this application any probability whatever, the Apocalypse must have avoided reproducing exactly the saying of Jesus which we have just quoted, and the precept of Paul himself, by cautioning Christians against revolt, and saying to them, xiii. 10: "He that killeth with the sword must be killed with the sword; here is the patience and the faith of the saints." It is obvious that Jesus, Paul, and John have only one and the same watchword to give to the believer in regard to his relations to the state: submission, and, when necessary, patience.

Vv. 3, 4. "*For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil.*[1] *Now wilt thou not be afraid of the power? do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same; for he*

[1] T. R. reads, with E L, Mnn. Syr.: των αγαθων εργων . . . των κακων; but ℵ A B D F G P, It. read τω αγαθω εργω . . . τω κακω.

is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain, for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil."—If revolt is a crime, and a crime which cannot fail to receive punishment, it is because the power whose authority it attacks is a *divine delegation* in the midst of human society, and is charged with a moral mission of the highest importance; hence the *for*.—The *good work* is not submission, and the *evil work* is not revolt. Paul means by the one the practice of justice, and by the other that of injustice, in general, in the whole social life. The state is called to encourage the doing of good, and to repress the doing of evil in the domain which is confided to it. This domain is not that of the inward feelings, it is that of external deeds, of *work* or *works*, as the apostle says. It matters little which of the two readings (the dative singular or the genitive plural) is preferred; the first is better supported.—After this general declaration, the apostle takes up again each of the two alternatives. And first that of *well-doing*, vv. 3*b* and 4*a*. The verses have been badly divided here. The first proposition of ver. 4 belongs still to the idea of ver. 3, that of well-doing. —No doubt it may happen, contrary to what the apostle says, that the virtuous man falls under the vengeance of the laws, or becomes a butt for the unjust dealings of the magistracy. But it remains true that in this case good is not punished *as good*. An unjust law or a tyrannical power make it appear falsely as evil; and the result of this suffering unjustly endured will certainly be the reform of the law and the fall of the power. Never has any power whatever laid down as a principle the punishment of good and the reward of evil, for thereby it would be its own destroyer.—The *praise* of which the apostle speaks consists, no doubt, in the consideration which the man of probity generally enjoys in the eyes of the magistracy, as well as in the honourable functions which he is called by it to fill.

Ver. 4*a*. If it is so, it is because magistracy is a divine ministry, instituted for the good of every citizen (σοί, *to thee*), and because, though it may err in the application, it cannot in principle deny its charge to assert justice.

Ver. 4*b*. The other alternative: *evil-doing*. The power of

the state is not to be feared except by him who acts unjustly. — The verb φορεῖν, a frequentative from φέρειν, *to carry*, denotes official and habitual bearing. — The term μάχαιρα, *sword*, denotes (in opposition to ξίφος, the poniard or straight-edged sword) a large knife with bent blade, like that carried by the chiefs in the *Iliad*, and with which they cut the neck of the victims, similar to our *sabre*. Paul by this expression does not here denote the weapon which the emperor and his pretorian prefect carried as a sign of their power of life and death,—the application would be too restricted,—but that which was worn at their side, in the provinces, by the superior magistrates, to whom belonged the right of capital punishment, and which they caused to be borne solemnly before them in public processions. It has been said that this expression was not intended by the apostle to convey the notion of the punishment of death. The sword, it is said, was simply the emblem of the right to punish in general, without involving anything as to the punishment of death in particular. Is not Philippi right in answering to this: that it is impossible to exclude from the right of punishing the very kind of punishment from which the emblem representing this right is taken? It is improper to bring in here the idea of the grace of the gospel. For at the very time when the state is carrying out on the criminal the work of justice to which it is called, the church may, without the least contradiction, carry out toward the same man the work of mercy which is divinely confided to it. Thus Paul devotes to the *destruction of the flesh* (1 Cor. v. 4, 5) the same man whose salvation he labours to procure against the day of Christ. And Peter tells us of men who perished when *judged according to the flesh*, but to whom the gospel is preached that they may live *in spirit* according to God. Experience even proves that the last punishment of the law is very often the means of opening up in the heart of the malefactor a way for divine grace. The penalty of death was the first duty imposed on the state at the time of its divine founding, Gen. ix. 6: "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, *by man* shall his blood be shed; for God made man after His image." It is profound respect for human life which in certain cases enjoins the sacrifice of human life. The question involved is not that of simple social expediency, but

that of keeping up the human conscience to the level of the value which God Himself attaches to the human person.—The last proposition is exactly parallel to that with which the apostle had concluded the first alternative, that of good (ver. 4*a*). When the magistracy punishes, no less than when it rewards, it does so as God's agent and vicegerent on the earth (διάκονος, *servant*).—In the expression ἔκδικος εἰς ὀργήν, *an avenger for wrath*, there is not, as might be thought, an unmeaning pleonasm. The meaning is: *an avenger by office* to satisfy the demands of *wrath*, that of God, the only wrath perfectly holy. The expression ἔκδικος might be used here in a favourable sense: to render justice to him who is trampled on; comp. Luke xviii. 3, 5, 7, and 8.

Ver. 5. "*Wherefore ye must needs be subject*,[1] *not only for wrath, but also for conscience' sake.*"—If the state were only armed with means of punishing, it would be enough to regard it with fear; but it is the representative of God to assert justice among men; and hence it is from a principle of *conscience* that submission must be given to it. It is obvious that the apostle has a much nobler idea of the state than those who make this institution rest on utilitarian grounds. As its foundation he lays down a divine principle, and sees in it an essentially moral institution. This teaching was the more necessary as the Christians were daily witnesses of the corruption which reigned in heathen administration, and might be led to involve in one common reprobation both the institution and its abuses. But it must not be forgotten that, in assigning conscience as a ground for obedience, the apostle is in the very act indirectly tracing the limit of this obedience. For the very reason that the state governs in God's name, when it comes to order something contrary to God's law, there is nothing else to be done than to make it feel the contradiction between its conduct and its commission (see above, the example of the apostles), and that while still rendering homage to the divine principle of the state by the respect with which the protest in the case is expressed and the calmness with which the punishment inflicted is borne.

In the two following verses the apostle confirms by a particular fact of public life the notion of the state which

[1] D E F G reject αναγκη and read υποτασσεσθε.

he has just been expounding (ver. 6), and passes from the principle to its practical applications (ver. 7).

Vv. 6, 7. "*For, for this cause also ye pay tribute; for they are God's ministers for this very thing, waiting thereon continually. Render*[1] *to all their dues: tribute to whom tribute; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honour to whom honour.*"—There is a usage universally practised, and whose propriety no one disputes: that is, the payment of tribute for the support of the state. How are we to explain the origin of such a usage, except by the general conviction of the indispensable necessity of the state? The: *for this cause,* does not refer specially to the idea of ver. 5, but to the whole preceding development from ver. 1. The *for* makes the practical consequence (the payment of tribute) the proof of the principle, and the *also* refers to the agreement between the general idea and the particular fact. It is unnecessary, therefore, with Hofmann, to make the verb τελεῖτε, *ye pay,* an imperative: *Pay.* It is a simple fact which Paul states. — The apostle, to designate the divine character of the state, here uses a still graver term than that of *servant,* ver. 4. He calls him λειτουργός, *minister.* This term, compounded of the words λαός, *people,* and ἔργον, *work,* denotes one who labours for the people, who fills a *public office,* and with the complement Θεοῦ, *of God,* a public office in the religious sphere, like the priests and Levites in the theocracy. Among the Jews these divine functionaries were supported by means of the tithe; the same principle, in the view of the apostle, explains the tribute paid by citizens to the state: for the state performs a function for God.—Some have translated: "For ministers are *of God.*" The meaning is impossible grammatically; it would require the article before λειτουργοί. — The regimen which follows: *for this very thing,* might depend on the participle προσκαρτεροῦντες, *applying themselves to.* But it is more natural to make it depend on the expression λειτουργοί: "ministers for this very thing,"—that is to say, to make justice reign by checking evil and upholding good. Olshausen and Philippi apply the words: *for this very thing,* to the payment of tribute, which would signify that the state is God's minister to levy tribute, or that it may watch continually on this levy-

[1] T. R. reads here οὖν, *therefore;* this word is omitted by ℵ A B D.

ing. Neither the one nor the other of these two ideas rises to the height of the notion of the state as it has just been expounded. This appendix: προσκαρτεροῦντες, *waiting thereon continually*, seems at the first glance superfluous; but it is intended to account for the payment of tribute because the magistrates, devoting *their whole time* to the maintenance of public order and the wellbeing of the citizens, cannot themselves provide for their support, and ought consequently to be maintained at the expense of the nation.

Ver. 7. After thus confirming the notion of the state which he has enunciated, the apostle deduces from it some practical applications. Four MSS. reject the *therefore*, which is read in all the others. We may indeed be content to understand this particle. The imperative *render* thus becomes somewhat livelier.—Foremost is placed the general obligation which is afterwards specified. The verb ἀπόδοτε, *render*, belongs to the four principal propositions which follow. The verb of the four dependent propositions is understood; it is ὀφείλετε, *ye owe*, to be taken from the substantive ὀφειλάς: "him to whom ye [*owe*] tribute, [*render*] tribute." — Πᾶσι, *to all*, denotes all persons in office. — The term φόρος, *tribute*, refers to a personal impost, the annual capitation (the *tributum*); the word is connected with συμφέρειν, to contribute regularly to a common expenditure; the word τέλος, *custom*, denotes the custom duty on goods (*vectigal*); it comes from the verb τελεῖν, *to pay* (occasionally); φόβος, *fear*, expresses the feeling due to the highest authorities, to supreme magistrates before whom the lictor walks, and who are invested with the power of life and death; τιμή, *honour*, applies generally to all men in office.

The church did not neglect the faithful discharge of all these obligations. The author of the Epistle to Diognetus, describing in the second century the conduct of Christians during a time of persecution, characterizes it by these two words: "They are outraged, and honour (ὑβρίζονται καὶ τιμῶσι)." The passage, 1 Pet. ii. 13–17, presents, especially in ver. 14, a striking resemblance to ours. The Apostle Paul is too original to allow us to suppose that he imitated Peter. Could the latter, on the other hand, know the Epistle to the Romans? Yes, if he wrote from Rome; hardly, if he wrote

from Babylon. But it is probable that the two apostles, when they lived together at Jerusalem or Antioch, conversed on a subject so important for the guidance of the church, and so the thoughts, and even the most striking expressions of the Apostle Paul, might have been impressed on the mind of Peter.

From the duty of submission to the state, Paul passes to that of justice in private relations.

Ver. 8. "*Owe no man anything, but to love one another; for he that loveth another hath fulfilled the law.*"—The expression *anything* and *no man* clearly indicate a transition to the private sphere. Most commentators think that Paul here returns to the duty of love; Meyer, for example, says at the beginning of vv. 8–14: "Exhortation to *love* and to Christian conduct in general." As if the apostle were in the habit of thus resuming without cause a subject already treated, and as if, wishing to describe the task of love, he could have contented himself with saying, as he does in ver. 10: "Love *worketh no ill* to his neighbour!" No, the apostle does not wander from his subject: the duty of *justice*. Only he is not ignorant that there is no perfectly sure pledge for the exercise of this duty except love. This is what leads him to speak again of love, and what explains at the same time the purely negative form he uses: "not to do wrong," an expression which is the formula of justice, much more than that of love. Love is therefore not mentioned here except as the solid support of justice.—The believer should keep no other debt in his life than that which a man can never discharge, the debt which is renewed and even grows in proportion as it is discharged: that of loving. In fact, the task of love is infinite. The more active love is, the more it sees its task enlarge; for, inventive as it is, it is ever discovering new objects for its activity. This debt the believer therefore carries with him throughout all his life (chap. xii.). But he can bear no other debt against him; and loving thus, he finds that in the very act he has fulfilled all the obligations belonging to the domain of justice, and which the law could have imposed. — How could it have occurred to the mind of Hofmann to refer the words τὸν ἕτερον, *the other*, to νόμον, *the law*: "He that loveth hath fulfilled *the other* law,"—that

is to say, the rest of the law, what the law contains other than the commandment of love? Love is not in the law a commandment *side by side* with all the rest; it is itself the essence of the law.—The perfect πεπλήρωκεν, *hath fulfilled*, denotes that in the one act of loving there is virtually contained the fulfilment of all the duties prescribed by the law. For a man does not offend, or kill, or calumniate, or rob those whom he loves. Such is the idea developed in the two following verses.

Vv. 9, 10. "*For this: thou shalt not commit adultery, thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not steal,*[1] *thou shalt not covet; and if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in this saying, namely,*[2] *Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. Love worketh no ill to his neighbour; therefore*[3] *love is the fulfilling of the law.*"—It has been asked why the apostle only mentioned here the commandments of the second table. Simply because he does not make ethics at will, and because he keeps strictly to his subject. Duties to God do not belong to *justice;* the obligations which constitute the latter are therefore found solely in the second table of the law, which was, so to speak, the civil code of the Jewish people. It is this also which explains the *negative* form of the commandments. Justice does not require the positive doing of good, but only the abstaining from doing *wrong* to others. Paul begins like Jesus, Mark x. 19, Luke xviii. 20, and Jas. ii. 11, with the commandment forbidding adultery; Philo does the same. Hofmann thinks this order arises from the fact that the relation between man and wife is anterior to the relation which a man holds to all his neighbours. This solution is not so inadmissible as Meyer thinks. The latter believes that the apostle simply follows the order which he finds in his manuscript of the LXX.; for such inversions are observed in the MSS. of this version.—According to the most of the documents belonging to the three families, the words: "Thou shalt not bear false witness," are unauthentic. This is possible; for Paul closes the enumeration with the general expression: "and if there be any other commandment." The

[1] T. R. here reads ου ψευδομαρτυρησεις, but with ℵ P only.
[2] B F G, It. omit the words εν τω.
[3] D F G, It. read δε instead of ουν.

commandment which forbids *covetousness* is mentioned here, because it puts the finger on the secret principle of the violation of all the rest. It is really in the struggle with this internal source of all injustices that love appears as the indispensable auxiliary of justice; what other feeling than love could extinguish covetousness? — The word ἕτερον, *different*, is not, strictly speaking, used for ἄλλον, *other*; it reminds us that every article of the code protects our neighbour on a different side from the preceding. — The apposition ἐν τῷ, *in the* (namely), though wanting in some MSS., is certainly authentic; it might easily be forgotten after the preceding substantive (ἐν τῷ λόγῳ). Like the τὸ γάρ, *for this*, at the beginning of the verse, it points to the saying quoted as something familiar to all readers. — The quotation is taken from Lev. xix. 18; as true as it is that one does not wrong himself, so true is it that it contains all the duties of justice to our neighbour. Ἀνακεφαλαιοῦν: to gather up a plurality in a unity; Eph. i. 10.—The Alexs. have thought right to correct the ἑαυτόν, *himself*, by σεαυτόν, *thyself*. It was not in the least necessary; comp. John xviii. 34.

Ver. 10. The *asyndeton* between these two verses arises from the vividness with which the author perceives their logical relation: "No, *certainly!* love cannot do wrong" . . . It has been asked why the apostle speaks here only of the evil which love does not do, and not of the good which it does. "The good to be done," answers Hofmann, "was understood as a matter of course." But the evil not to be done was still more so. The explanation of the fact arises from what precedes. Love is spoken of here only as the means and pledge of the fulfilment of justice. Now, the functions of justice have a negative character (not to do wrong).—The second proposition of this verse serves only to express as a conclusion (*therefore*, true reading) the maxim laid down as a thesis in ver. 8, and regarded as demonstrated.—Πλήρωμα, *the fulfilment*; strictly: what fills a void; the void here is the commandment to be fulfilled.

Paul has thus closed his exposition of the Christian's duties as a member of civil society. It only remains for him to direct the minds of his readers to the solemn expectation

which can sustain their zeal and perseverance in the discharge of all those religious and social obligations.

The nature of the state, according to Rom. xiii.—The apostle's doctrine on this important subject occupies the mean between two opposite errors, both equally dangerous: that which *opposes* the state to the church, and that which *confounds* them. The first view is that which is expressed in the famous maxim: "The state is godless" (Odillon Barrot). Bordering on this saying, as it seems, was Vinet's thought when he wrote the words: "The state is the flesh," thus contrasting it with the church, which would be the incarnation of the Spirit. This opinion appears to us false, because the state represents the natural man, and the natural man is neither "godless," nor "the flesh" pure and simple. There is in him a moral element, the law written in the heart (chap. ii. 14 and 15), and even a religious element, God's natural revelation to the human soul (i. 19–21). And these two elements superior to the flesh ought to enter also into the society of natural men organized as a state. This is what St. Paul has thoroughly marked, and what, according to him, gives a moral and even religious character to the institution of the state, as we have just seen in explaining this passage. But, on the other hand, we must beware of confounding this religious character of the state with the Christian character. It is impossible to distinguish the Christian sphere from the civil more exactly than Paul does in these two chapters, xii. and xiii. The one belongs to the psychical order; hence the πᾶσα ψυχή, *every human soul*, xiii. 1; the other is spiritual or pneumatic, and supposes faith (xii. 1–6). The one has justice as its principle of obligation, the other love. To the one belong means of constraint, for we have the right to demand of every man that he discharge the duties of justice; the other is the reign of liberty, because love is essentially spontaneous, and cannot be exacted from any one. There is therefore a profound *distinction* between the state and the church, according to Paul's teaching, but not *opposition*, any more than between law and grace, or between justice and love. As the law paves the way for grace, and as the conscientious practice of justice prepares the soul for the exercise of love, so the state, by repressing crime, preserves public order, and thereby the condition in which the church can tranquilly pursue her work, that of transforming the citizens of the earth into citizens of the kingdom of heaven. There is thus a reciprocal service which the two institutions render to one another. But we must beware of going further; the church has nothing more to ask of the state than her freedom of action,

that is to say, the common right. So Paul himself declares, 1 Tim. ii. 1 and 2. And on its side the state has not to espouse the interests of the church, nor consequently to impose on this society, which it has not contributed to form, any belief or procedure whatever. The essence and origin of the two societies being different, their administration ought to remain distinct.—Such is the result of the exposition which we have just studied in chaps. xii. and xiii. In tracing these outlines of the philosophy of right and of the theory of the state, by how many centuries was St. Paul ahead of his own age, and perhaps of ours? We have palpable proof of the truth of the saying with which he introduces this whole moral doctrine (xii. 3): "I declare unto you by the grace given unto me."

TWENTY-SEVENTH PASSAGE (XIII. 11–14).

The Expectation of Christ's coming again a Motive to Christian Sanctification.

This passage is the counterpart of that with which the apostle had begun his moral teaching, xii. 1 and 2. There he had laid down the principle: a living consecration of the body to God under the guidance of a mind renewed by faith in the mercies of God. This was, as it were, the impelling force which should sustain the believer in his twofold spiritual and civil walk. But that this course may be firm and persevering, there must be joined to the impelling force a power of attraction exercised on the believer's heart by an aim, a hope constantly presented to him by faith. This glorious expectation is what the apostle reminds us of in the following passage. The passage, xii. 1, 2, was the foundation; this, xiii. 11–14, is the corner-stone of the edifice of Christian sanctification.

Vv. 11, 12. "*And that knowing the time, that now it is high time for you*[1] *to awake out of sleep; for now is our salvation nearer than when we believed. The night is far spent, the day is at hand; let us therefore cast off the works of darkness, and*[2] *let us put on the instruments of light.*"—The somewhat

[1] T. R. reads ἡμᾶς, with D E F G L, It. Syr$^{sch.}$; the reading is ὑμᾶς in ℵ A B C P.

[2] A B C D E P read δὲ instead of καί.

abrupt transition from ver. 10 to ver. 11 has been differently understood. What is the principal verb on which the participle εἰδότες, *knowing*, rests? Meyer thinks that we must go back on ὀφείλετε (ver. 8), "Owe no man anything." But there is no *special* relation to be observed between the duty of justice, ver. 8, and the following passage. Lange has recourse to a strong ellipsis; he derives from the participle *knowing* the understood verb *we know* (comp. xii. 6), which leads to this meaning: "and knowing this (that love is the fulfilling of the law), we know also the importance of the present moment (the nearness of final salvation)." The logical connection between these two ideas would thus be this: When once love is present, perfect salvation cannot be far off. This meaning is ingenious, but very far-fetched, and this construction is not sufficiently justified by xii. 6. Hofmann, feeling the impossibility of these explanations, has recourse to the following expedient: he gives τοῦτο, *that*, an adverbial meaning: *in that way*, or *in that respect*. The clause would therefore signify: "Knowing the time *thus far*, that the hour is come for you to awake,"—that is to say, the true meaning of the present moment is the obligation to awake. This strange construction is its own condemnation.— After the exposition which we have given of the plan of this whole moral part, we are not embarrassed by this transition. In the words: *And that*, Paul sums up all the foregoing precepts, all the duties of love and justice, enumerated chaps. xii. and xiii., with the view of passing to the fourth and last section of this part: "And all that [we fulfil], knowing" . . . The idea of fulfilling did not need to be specially expressed, because the foregoing precepts along with the idea of duties included that of their execution. — Faithfulness in the realization of such a life rests on the knowledge which Christians have of the present situation of the world and of its significance: "The hour is solemn; time is short; we shall soon be no longer able to labour on the work of our sanctification; there is not an instant to lose." In the following proposition: "It is high time for you to awake out of sleep," the apostle compares the Christian's position to that of a man who has begun to awake from the sleep in which he was plunged, and who, by an energetic act, requires to overcome the last

remnant of sleepiness. *Sleep* is the state of forgetfulness of God and of estrangement from Him, and the carnal security of the man of the world in this state. *Awaking* is the act by which man reaches the lively conviction of his responsibility, gives himself to the impulse of prayer drawing him to God, and enters into communication with Him to obtain through Christ the pardon of his sins and divine help. As to awakening, his readers had already experienced it; but the most awakened in the church has still need of awakening; and hence the apostle reminds his readers that the meaning of the present situation is the duty of awakening thoroughly. The word ἤδη, *already* (*now*), is well explained by Philippi: *at length*, "high time."—The reading ὑμᾶς, *you*, is to be preferred to the reading ἡμᾶς, *us*. The latter evidently arises from the following verb, which is in the first person plural.

The need of a complete awakening arises from the rapidity with which *the day* is approaching to which we are moving on. Paul understands by this day the decisive moment of *Christ's coming again*, which he proceeds to compare (ver. 12) to the rising of the sun in nature. He here calls it *salvation*, because this will be the hour of complete redemption for believers; comp. v. 10, viii. 23–25, x. 10.—The march of events to this goal, or of this goal to us, is so rapid, says the apostle, that the interval which separates us from it has already sensibly diminished since he and his readers were brought to the faith. To understand this saying, which is somewhat surprising when we think of the eighteen centuries which have followed the time when it was written, it must be remembered, 1st. That the Lord had promised His return at the time when all the nations of the earth had heard His Gospel; and 2d. That the apostle, looking back on his own career, and seeing in a sense the whole known world evangelized by his efforts (Col. i. 6), might well say without exaggeration that the history of the kingdom of God had made a step in advance during the course of his ministry. Of course this saying supposes that the apostle had no idea of the ages which should yet elapse before the advent of Christ. The revelation of the Lord had taught him *that* He would return, but not *when* He would return. And when it was sought to fix this time, the apostle himself opposed the

attempt (1 Thess. v. 1, 2; 2 Thess. ii. 1 et seq.). He expresses himself sometimes as a possible witness of it (1 Thess. iv. 17; 1 Cor. xv. 52); sometimes as if he were not to have part in it; 1 Cor. vi. 14 (ἡμᾶς, *us*, the undoubted reading); 2 Tim. iv. 18. And is it not thus we ought to live constantly, waiting without ceasing? Is not this attitude the most favourable to progress in sanctification? Did not Jesus claim this of His own when He said, Luke xii. 36: "Be ye like unto men that wait for their lord when he will return from the wedding, that when he cometh and knocketh, they may open unto him immediately"? And if it is not He who comes to us in the Parousia, is it not we who shall go to Him in death? Is not death for the individual what the Parousia is for the church as a whole, meeting with the Lord?—The interval between the time when the readers had come to the faith and that of this solemn meeting, individual or collective, was therefore sensibly shortened since the day of their conversion.

Ver. 12. On the one hand the night deepened, on the other the day drew near. The former of these figures signifies that the time granted to the present world to continue its life without God had moved on, was shortened; the latter, that the appearing of the kingdom of Christ had approached. Hence a double inference: As the night is dissipated, there should be an end of the works of the night; and as the day begins to shine, awaking should be completed, and there should be effected what may be called the toilet worthy of full day.—The *works of darkness:* all that dare not be done by day, and which is reserved for night (ver. 13). The term ὅπλα may be translated in two ways: the *instruments* or *arms* of light. The parallel, 1 Thess. v. 4–11, speaks in favour of the second sense. In that case the reference would be to the breastplate, the helmet, the sandals of the Roman soldiery, *arms* which may be regarded as garments fitted on in the morning to replace the dress of night. But the delineation as a whole does not seem to apply to a day of battle; rather it appears that the day in question is one of peaceful labour. And for this reason we think it more natural to apply the expression ὅπλα here to the *garments* of the laborious workman who, from early morning, holds himself in readiness for

the hour when his master waits to give him his task. These figures are applied in vv. 13 and 14: the *works of night*, in ver. 13; the *instruments of light*, in ver. 14.

Vv. 13, 14. "*Let us walk decently, as in the day, not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and wantonness, not in strife and party heats; but put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ, and be not preoccupied with the flesh to excite its lusts.*"[1] —The words ὡς ἐν ἡμέρᾳ signify: "as is done in full day;" but not without allusion to the fact that the light which shines in the believer's soul is the very light which shall break on the world in the *day* of salvation, in the hour of the Parousia; comp. 1 Thess. v. 5 and 8.—Christian holiness is represented here as the highest decency (εὐσχημόνως, *decently*), to be compared with that full attitude of dignity which the rising of the sun enjoins on the man who respects himself. Worldly conduct resembles, on the contrary, those indecencies to which men dare not give themselves up except by burying them in the shades of night. Such a mode of acting is therefore incompatible with the situation of a man who is already enlightened by the first rays of the great day.—The *works of night* are enumerated in pairs: first, sensuality in the forms of eating and drinking; then impurity, those of brutal libertinism and wanton lightness; finally, the passions which break out either in personal disputes or party quarrels. This last term seems to me to express the meaning of the word ζῆλος, in this passage, better than the translations *jealousy* or *envy*. Comp. 1 Cor. iii. 3; 2 Cor. xii. 20; Gal. v. 20.

Ver. 14. To lay aside what belongs to the night of worldly life, is only the first part of the preparation to which we are called by the rising of the great day. Our concern must be, besides, to put on the dispositions which are in keeping with so holy and brilliant a light. What is this new equipment which we must haste to substitute for the old? Paul indicates it in the expression: *to put on Jesus Christ*. He certainly speaks of Christ here not as our *righteousness*, but as our *sanctification*, 1 Cor. i. 30. The toilet of the believer, if one may venture so to speak, in view of the approaching salvation, consists solely in putting on Christ, in appropriating by habitual communion with Him all His sentiments and all

[1] A C read τῆς ἐπιθυμίαν; F G It.: ἐν ἐπιθυμίαις; all the others: τὰς ἐπιθυμίας.

His manner of acting. He thus becomes for His redeemed ones Himself the robe for the marriage-feast. The Christian will be unable to stand before Him except in so far as he is "found *in Him*" (Phil. iii. 9).

It seemed as if this forcible recommendation: "But put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ," should close the passage. But the apostle adds a last word, which is certainly intended to form the transition to the following passage.

This pure garment of the believer (Christ's holiness which he appropriates) should be kept free from every stain. But the apostle here perceives a very common infirmity, which is not made greatly matter of self-reproach, and against which he feels the need of putting his readers particularly on their guard. It is a sensuality which has not the gross character of the works of night, and which may even assume a lawful form. The body being an indispensable servant, is it not just to take care of it? The apostle does not deny this. But to take care of the body and *to be preoccupied with* its satisfaction are two different things. The expression *πρόνοιαν ποιεῖσθαι, to give oneself up to preoccupation,* clearly indicates a thought directed with a certain intensity towards sensual enjoyment. I do not think the notion of sin is contained in the word *flesh,* which simply denotes here our sensitive nature; it is rather to be found in the term: *to preoccupy oneself with.* Paul does not forbid the believer to accept a pleasure which comes of itself; comp. the touching expression, Acts xxvii. 3, where it is said of Julius the centurion that he allowed Paul to repair to his friends *to enjoy their attentions* (*ἐπιμελείας τυχεῖν*). But to accept with pleasure the satisfaction which God gives, is quite another thing from going in quest of pleasure. In this second case there is a weakness, or, to speak more properly, a defilement which spoils the marriage garments of many Christians.—The last words: *εἰς ἐπιθυμίας,* literally, *for lusts,* may be regarded either as expressing the aim of the preoccupation: "Do not preoccupy yourselves *with a view to* satisfying lusts," or, as a reflection of Paul himself, intended to justify the previous warning: "Do not preoccupy yourselves with the satisfaction of the flesh *so as to* (or: which would not fail to) give rise to lusts." Both constructions are possible. But the second meaning seems to us

simpler. The regimen εἰς ἐπιθυμίας thus understood well justifies the warning: "Be not preoccupied with" . . .— These verses, 13 and 14, have acquired a sort of historical celebrity; for, as related by St. Augustine in the eighth book of the *Confessions*, they were the occasion of his conversion, already prepared for by his relations with St. Ambrose. If ver. 13 had been the inscription of his past life, ver. 14 became that of his new life.

We may now be convinced that the practical treatise, which serves as a complement to the doctrinal, is not less systematically arranged than the latter was. The four parts of which it is composed: faith in the mercies of God as the basis of Christian life (xii. 1, 2); the realization of this life in the two spheres, religious and civil, under the supreme law of love (xii. 3–21 and xiii. 1–10); finally, the eye of hope constantly fixed on the coming of Christ as the spring of progress in sanctification (xiii. 11–14);—these four parts, we say, which may be reduced to three, bring us without straining to Paul's ordinary *triad:* faith, love, and hope (1 Thess. i. 3; 1 Cor. xiii. 13, etc.). It might be asked, no doubt, how it comes that in this summary of Christian morals he omits family duties, so well set forth in the Epistles to the Colossians and Ephesians. But perhaps the subject of domestic life appeared to him too particular to find a place in so general an exposition.

TWENTY-EIGHTH PASSAGE (XIV. 1–XV. 13).

Exhortation relative to a particular Difference of View in the Church of Rome.

The following passage is a practical application of the law of love expounded, chaps. xii. and xiii. It is an immediate illustration of the self-sacrifice which Paul has just been requiring. This passage, from its connection with a local circumstance, is at the same time the first step of return from the *treatise* to the *letter* form; it is, consequently, the transition to the epistolary conclusion of the entire writing. Thus it is that everything is organically bound together in the compositions of the apostle.

What was the subject of the difference of view to which the instruction following refers? Ver. 2 proves that a certain number of Christians at Rome thought they should abstain from the use of meats and of wine; and it is probable, from vv. 5 and 6, that the same men joined to this abstinence the scrupulous observance of certain days which seemed to them more holy than others. This party does not appear to have been considerable or influential; and Paul, far from treating it as he treated those who corrupted the pure gospel in Galatia, at Corinth, or at Colosse, seems rather inclined to take it under his protection as against the rest of the church. The subject is one on which somewhat divergent views have been expressed. It is difficult to explain the principle which led these people to act thus.

Eichhorn regarded the *weak* as former Gentiles, who had belonged previously to a school of philosophy with an ascetic tendency, the Neo-Pythagoreans, for example. They imported into the gospel, according to him, certain principles pertaining to their former philosophy.—This opinion is now generally rejected. 1st. There are manifest indications of the Jewish origin of this party. Thus vv. 5 and 6 appear to prove that these same men observed the Jewish feast days, like the heretics of Colosse (see the exegesis). Besides, if the passage, xv. 1–13, still forms part of this section, as appears to us unquestionable, it follows that we have to do with a Judeo-Christian party. For this whole passage closes with the celebration of the union of Christians *of both origins* in one and the same salvation. 2d. Such men would not have taken the modest and timid attitude at Rome which seems to have been that of the *weak*. On the ground of their pretended superiority, either in holiness or in culture, they would much rather have affected haughty airs in relation to the rest of the church.

Origen and Chrysostom regarded these people as Christians of Jewish origin, and ascribe their kind of life to their attachment to the Mosaic law. But the law did not forbid the eating of flesh, except that of certain (unclean) animals, nor the use of wine, except to certain persons and in certain particular cases. It would therefore be difficult to explain how they could have come by the way of the Levitical ordinances to the principle of entire abstinence.

This reflection and comparison with the passage. 1 Cor. viii.–x., have led many commentators (Clem. of Alex., Flatt, Neand., Philip., etc.) to explain the abstinence of the *weak* by the fear they felt of unwillingly eating flesh and drinking wines which had been *offered to idols.* Rather than run such a risk, they preferred to dispense with them altogether. But it should have been easy to find means of avoiding this danger, at least in private meals; and it would be hard to understand how, if the ideas of these people had been the same as those of their scrupulous brethren in the church of Corinth, Paul should not give them any of those explanations which he had given to the latter, and should content himself with striving to preserve peace within the church of Rome. It appears to us very doubtful, besides, whether the *weak* at Corinth were of Jewish origin. The more we have examined the question, the more have we been led to regard them rather as formerly Gentiles. Finally, the text of ver. 14 is incompatible with this opinion. Paul says: "I am persuaded in the Lord that there is nothing unclean *of itself.*" These words: *of itself,* prove that the pollution appeared to the weak as attaching to the very nature of the meats, and not merely contracted by accident.

Baur, in his *Apostel Paulus* (I. p. 361 et seq.), has attempted to connect the party of the *weak* with the *Ebionites,* who, according to the description given by Epiphanius, abstained from all animal food, or even from food prepared with animal matter. He also cites the *Clementine Homilies* (dating from Rome in the last third of the second century), in which the Apostle Peter thus describes his mode of life: "I use only bread and oil and a little pulse," and where it is taught that the use of flesh is contrary to nature, and of diabolical origin. He cites also the saying of Hegesippus regarding James the brother of our Lord: "He ate nothing ἔμψυχον (*animated*)." As to wine, this critic refers to the fact that, according to Epiphanius, the most austere of the Ebionites celebrated the Eucharist only with unleavened bread and water; which seems to prove that they abstained wholly from wine.

Ritschl (*Enst. der altkath. Kirche,* 2d ed. p. 184 et seq.) has given out a somewhat different hypothesis, which has been adopted by many moderns (Mey., Mang., etc.). Our

party of the *weak* at Rome was composed, it is said, of former *Essenes*. According to this critic, the fundamental idea of the Essene order was to realize a permanent priestly life. Now, it is known that the priests were forbidden (Lev. x. 9) to drink wine while they were officiating; the Essene must therefore have abstained from it entirely. Moreover, the priests, being required to eat only food consecrated to God, and Essenism rejecting at the same time the practice of bloody sacrifices, it followed that they could eat no flesh. If, therefore, such men had been sold as prisoners, and carried to Rome as the result of previous wars, then set free and converted to the gospel, they might have carried with them into the church their former mode of life as superior in holiness to that of ordinary Christians. An analogous origin ought probably to be assigned to the sect which some years later troubled the church of Colosse. In general, it is clear that a certain ascetic dualism was in the air at this period. And this was the common source of all the different tendencies which we have mentioned. — Only the question arises — (1) Whether, supposing *the weak* had belonged to one of these parties, Paul could have attached so little importance to the question considered in itself (comp. his polemic in the Epistle to the Colossians); and (2) whether the attitude of such Christians would have been so modest as the following passage supposes?

Perhaps there is a simpler way of explaining the origin of such ideas. We must go back even beyond the law. According to the narrative of Genesis, animal food was not originally allowed to man (Gen. i. 29). It was not till after the deluge that it was expressly authorized (ix. 3). The invention of wine dates also from this latter epoch, and the abuse of this drink was immediately connected with its discovery. It is easy to understand how such Biblical precedents might have taken hold of serious readers of the O. T., and led them to the abstinence of which our text speaks. In this conduct no Christian principle was seriously compromised. It was simply an attempt to return to the primitive regimen, which easily presented itself to the mind as the most normal. And thus is explained why the apostle does not even touch the root of the question, and treats it solely on the side on

which it concerns the maintenance of harmony between the members of the church.—To finish at once the exposition of our view, we shall add that, as appears to us, it was in the love-feasts that the difference broke out and gave rise to certain painful manifestations to which the apostle desired to put an end. We think we can give the proof of this as we study chap. xiv.

It has been sometimes thought that in the first part of this chapter, vv. 1–12, the apostle was addressing the *weak*, with the view of checking their unjust judgments upon the strong; and in the second, vv. 13–23, the *strong*, to call them to the exercise of charity toward the weak. This view does not seem to me exact, at least as to the first part. Rather Paul begins by addressing both in this part, in order to point out to them the duty of *mutual toleration;* then he turns specially to the strong in the second part, to remind them of the *considerate bearing* which love claims of them toward the weak.

Vv. 1–12.

The first three verses are a sort of heading, in which the apostle expounds the ground of difference, and gives the solution of it provisionally.

Vv. 1, 2. "*Him that is weak in the faith receive ye not to discussions of opinions. One believeth that he may eat all things; but another, who is weak, eateth herbs.*" — The participle *ἀσθενῶν, being weak,* is not altogether synonymous with the adjective *ἀσθενής, weak;* it denotes one whose faith falters (becomes weak) at a given moment and in a special case. This expression better spares the sensibilities of those here spoken of. The imperative *προσλαμβάνεσθε, receive,* addressed to the whole church, evidently assumes that those who are recommended to this favourable reception form only a very weak minority at Rome. The Greek expression signifies *to take to oneself with tenderness;* comp. xv. 7 and John xiv. 3, where it is applied to Christ's conduct in relation to believers. — The last words of the verse have been explained in a multitude of ways. Luther, Olsh.: "but not so as to excite doubts (*διακρίσεις*) in your neighbour's inward thoughts (*διαλογισμῶν*)." There are two reasons opposed to this

meaning; διάκρισις does not signify *doubt*, and διαλογισμός cannot mean simply *thought*. The word always denotes in the N. T. the activity of the understanding in the service of evil; comp. Luke ii. 35, v. 22; 1 Cor. iii. 20; and in our Epistle, i. 21. — Beza, Vulgate: "but not to dispute with them (διακρίσεις) regarding the ideas which they form of things (διαλογισμῶν)." But διαλογισμός does not denote an *idea*; it is a *reasoning*. — Rückert: "but not to reach a still profounder separation of opinions." But how could it be thought that this would be the result of the reception recommended; and how should the idea: *still profounder*, have been omitted by the apostle? — Meyer: "but not so as to criticize the thoughts (of your weak brethren)." This meaning would require the singular διάκρισις, *criticism*, and it does not harmonize with the term διαλογισμός, which applies rather to the reasonings of a proud wisdom than to pious scruples. — The following is the meaning which alone seems to me natural: "but not to get by this very reception into debates (διακρίσεις), which would terminate in the end only in vain reasonings (διαλογισμοί)." This meaning suits the two substantives used, as well as the plural form of both. After this general recommendation the apostle formulates the point of the question.

Ver. 2. The meaning of πιστεύειν, *to believe*, is determined by its opposition to ἀσθενῶν, *being weak*: "who *has a faith* firm enough to be able to eat anything without scruple." — *Eateth herbs*, that is to say, nothing else.

Ver. 3. "*Let not him that eateth, despise him that eateth not; and*[1] *let not him which eateth not, judge him that eateth; for God hath received him.*" — This verse contains the theme which is about to be developed down to ver. 12. The two propositions are connected in the T. R. by *and*, and in the Alex. by *but*. The second reading more strongly, perhaps too strongly, contrasts the two views. The term *despise* applies well to one who feels himself strong, and regards with a disdainful eye the timid attitude of the weak; the term *judge* suits the latter, who, not understanding the liberty used by the strong, is disposed to confound it with licence. — The last words: *God hath received him*, may refer to both, or to the latter only (the

[1] T. R., with E L P, Syr., reads καὶ ὁ μή; ℵ A B read ὁ δὲ μή.

strong). The following verses being addressed more particularly to the weak, it may possibly be the divine reception of the strong only to which Paul wishes here to refer. A being whom God has taken to Him, whom He has made one of His own, ought not to be judged lightly by his brother, as if he were without master. This is what is developed in the following verse.

Ver. 4. "*Who art thou that judgest another man's servant? To his own master he standeth or falleth. Yea, he shall stand; for God*[1] *is powerful*[2] *to hold him up.*"—The idea is: It is to the advantage or disadvantage of his master, not of his fellow-servants, that a servant fulfils or neglects his task. The terms *standing* and *falling* refer, not to the servant's absolution or condemnation at the judgment, but to his daily faithfulness or unfaithfulness, and to the strengthening or weakening of his inward relation to Christ. What proves this, is the ground for confidence indicated in the words: "Yea, he shall stand; for God is powerful to hold him up." There is no more need of being *held up*, or at least of being so by the *power* of God, in the judgment day. Of course the servant's sincerity, in the line of conduct which he has adopted, is assumed, even if he were in error on a particular point. Paul affirms that the Lord will be able to hold him in communion with Himself.—Here *the Lord* is probably, as generally in the N. T., Christ. It is He, indeed, who is Master of the house, and for whom the servants labour (Luke xii. 41–48).—There is a slight touch of irony in this reason: "Yea, he shall be held up." It is as if Paul said to the weak: "Thou mayest assure thyself about him; for, even if he is mistaken, his Master is powerful enough to avert the bad effects of a piece of flesh." This argument applies, of course, only to things which arise exclusively on the domain of the individual conscience.—In the last proposition, the Greco-Lat. reading ὁ Θεός, *God*, it seems to me, ought to be preferred to that of the other documents: ὁ κύριος, *the Lord*; for the act in question is that of strengthening, which is naturally ascribed to God. The reading ὁ κύριος has probably arisen from the τῷ κυρίῳ which precedes.—How

[1] T. R., with D E F G L, It., reads ὁ θεος; ℵ A B C P: ὁ κυριος.

[2] T. R., with L P and Mnn., reads δυνατος γαρ εστιν; ℵ A B C D F G: δυνατει γαρ.

easily do these verses find their explanation, if we imagine the church assembled for the love-feast! The majority gives an affectionate welcome to the minority. They sit down all together for the feast; then immediately the difference breaks out between neighbours. It is the moment for watching: "Well!" says the apostle, "no perverse debates on this occasion; but let each beware of the danger which threatens him at this instant, the one of despising, the other of judging."

Vv. 5, 6. "*One man*[1] *distinguisheth one day from another, the other esteemeth every day alike: let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind. He that regardeth the day, regardeth it unto the Lord; and he that regardeth not the day, to the Lord*[2] *he does not regard it. He that eateth, eateth to the Lord, for he giveth God thanks; and he that eateth not, to the Lord he eateth not, and giveth God thanks.*"—Paul here adduces an example taken from the same domain of external practices, and in which the two opposite lines of conduct may be also followed with equal fidelity. The *days* are those of the Jewish feasts, which Judeo-Christians continued for the most part to observe: Sabbaths, new moons, etc. (Col. ii. 15). Did this example really exist at Rome, or did the apostle choose it from the life of the church in general, to have the opportunity of better explaining his thought? The first is the more natural supposition. For there must have been in the church of Rome a certain number of Judeo-Christians, though they did not form the majority.—The *for*, which is read in some MSS., is probably owing to a copyist's habit. The word κρίνειν, *to judge*, frequently takes the sense of *distinguishing*. *To judge one day among others*, may therefore signify: to distinguish it favourably from the others; to set it apart as more worthy to be sanctified. There is a little irony in the second alternative: to discern *every* day. For it is evident that there is no longer any distinction when all are distinguished. To set apart every day as holy, is no longer to sanctify any one specially. Between the two modes of acting thus expressed, the apostle does not decide. All he asks of any one is, that his practice should obey a personal and deliberate conviction. The expres-

[1] ℵ A C P read γαρ after ος μεν.

[2] The whole proposition ο μη φρον. την ημ. κυρ. ου φρονει, which T. R. reads, with L P Syr., is omitted by ℵ A B C D E F G, It.

sion ἐν τῷ νοΐ, *in his mind*, contains the idea of a serious examination; and the term πληροφορεῖσθαι, strictly: *to be filled to the brim*, denotes a state of conviction which leaves no more room for the least hesitation.

Ver. 6. The apostle states the reason why the two lines of conduct are equally admissible. It is because, opposed as they are, they are inspired by one and the same desire, that of *serving the Lord*. The second proposition: "He that regardeth not the day" . . ., is omitted in the Alex. and Greco-Lat. texts. Notwithstanding all the efforts of commentators, and of Hofmann in particular, to justify the absence of this parallel proposition, this reading appears to me untenable. It is necessary strangely to force the meaning of the first alternative: "He that regardeth . . . regardeth unto the Lord," to bring it into logical relation to the two ways of acting explained in ver. 5. And it is impossible to refer it only to one of them. The confounding of the two φρονεῖ by a careless copyist must have caused the omission, as in so many other similar cases.—The apostle means that the man who, in his religious practice, keeps the Jewish feast-days, does so for the purpose of doing homage to the Lord by resting in Him, as the man who does not observe them does so for the purpose of labouring actively for Him.

It has been concluded from these sayings of Paul, that the obligation to observe *Sunday* as a day divinely instituted, was not compatible with Christian spirituality, as this was understood by St. Paul. The context does not allow us to draw such a conclusion. The believer who observes Sunday does not in the least do so under the thought of ascribing to this day a *superior holiness* to that of other days. To him all days are, as the apostle thinks, equal in holy consecration. As rest is not holier than work, no more is Sunday holier than other days. It is another form of consecration, the periodical return of which, like the alternations of sleep and waking, arises from the conditions of our physico-psychical existence. The Christian does not cease to be a man by becoming a spiritual man. And as one day of rest in seven was divinely instituted at the creation in behalf of natural humanity, one does not see why the believer should not require this periodical rest as well as the unregenerate man. "The Sabbath was made *for man;*" so long as the Christian preserves his earthly nature, this saying applies to him, and should turn not to the detriment, but to the profit of his

spiritual life. The keeping of Sunday thus understood has nothing in common with the Sabbatical observance which divides life into two parts, the one holy, the other profane. It is this legal distinction which Paul excludes in our ver. 5 and Col. ii.

In the second part of ver. 6, Paul returns to the principal case. He does so simply by the copula *καί, and,* and not by a *ὡσαύτως, likewise;* which seems to prove that the example taken from the keeping of days was not a simple comparison chosen at pleasure from the general life of the church, but a case which was really found at Rome itself. As a proof that he who eats (of everything), eats to the Lord, the apostle adduces (*for*) the fact that he gives thanks *for those meats.* The object of this giving of thanks is God, as the author of nature.—In speaking of him who does not eat (of everything), Paul does not say, as in the previous case: "*for* he giveth thanks," but: "*and* he giveth thanks." It was unnecessary, indeed, *to prove* that by abstaining he did so for the Lord; that was understood of itself. The real meaning of this proposition is therefore: "And he does not the less give thanks, he too, for this frugal repast."—As to these two thanksgivings, which mark the two different ways of acting with a seal of equal holiness, how much more of a dramatic character do they take when we imagine them as offered by these two classes of believers at the same moment and at the same table!

This so remarkable saying of the apostle furnishes us with the true means of deciding all those questions of casuistry which so often arise in Christian life, and cause the believer so much embarrassment: May I allow myself this or that pleasure? Yes, if I can enjoy it to the Lord, and while giving Him thanks for it; no, if I cannot receive it as a gift from His hand, and bless Him for it. This mode of solution respects at once the rights of the Lord and those of individual liberty.

The contrast between these two ways of acting, partaking and abstaining, which we must beware of converting into a contrast of faithfulness and unfaithfulness, was only the special application of a more general contrast which pervades the whole of human life: that between living and dying. Paul, always

under the necessity of embracing questions in all their width, extends in the following verses that which he has just been treating to the entire domain of life and death.

Vv. 7, 8. "*For none of us liveth to himself, and no man dieth to himself. For, whether we live, we live unto the Lord; whether we die,*[1] *we die*[2] *unto the Lord. Whether we live, therefore, or die,*[3] *we are the Lord's.*"—In everything that concerns the active use of life (such as the enjoyment of a kind of food), as well as in everything connected with the wasting of it, of which death is the termination (such as abstinence), the Christian depends not on his own will, but on the Lord's. Paul does not mean to say thereby how we *ought* to act. For in that case the following verse would require to be connected with this one by *therefore*, and not by *for*. It is a *fact* which he expresses; he supposes it realized in the life of his readers. The truth of this supposition follows from the meaning of the word ἡμῶν, *us*, us believers. Faith, if it is real, implies this consequence. Once we are believers, the current of life with all it embraces, and the current of death with all that accelerates it, tend no longer self-wards, as in our natural existence. Consequently we cannot be called by men to give account of our conduct, though it may differ from theirs.

Ver. 8. The proof of ver. 7 is given in ver. 8 (*for*). Our life and death being through the fact of faith at the Lord's service, the contrast between living and dying is thus completely dependent on the higher direction impressed on our being. Comp. 2 Cor. v. 15 and Rom. xii. 1. For the believer to live, is to serve Christ; to die, is to be united to Him more perfectly (Phil. i. 21–24; 2 Cor. v. 6–9). Hence it follows (οὖν, *therefore*) that he remains in every state of the case the Lord's *property*. As the dative τῷ κυρίῳ, *to the Lord*, in the first part of the verse, expressed consecration; so the genitive τοῦ κυρίου, literally, *of the Lord*, in the last proposition, expresses possession. We remain *His* in both cases. The bond which unites us to Him can only be strengthened by the so varied circumstances summed up in the two words: life

[1] T. R., with ℵ B, reads ἀποθνησκωμεν; A D E F G P: ἀποθνησκομεν.

[2] ℵ C L read ἀποθνησκομεν instead of ἀποθνησκωμεν, which T. R. has, with all the rest.

[3] T. R. reads, with ℵ B C L: ἀποθνησκωμεν; A D E F G P: ἀποθνησκομεν.

and death.—The first and third time we should probably read the subjunctive *ἀποθνήσκωμεν*; for *ἐάν, if, whether*, is construed in the N. T. only with the subjunctive. But the second time the indicative *ἀποθνήσκομεν* must certainly be read; for it is a fact which Paul is stating. Those who have read the subjunctive, have mistaken it for an exhortation.

The solidity of the bond of possession which unites the believer to the Lord, rests on his side on the subjective fact of faith, but on the Lord's side on an objective fact which nothing can shake: the sovereignty of the glorified Christ, in virtue of which He evermore controls the contrast between life and death (ver. 9).

Ver. 9. "*For to this end Christ*[1] *died and revived*;[2] *that He might be Lord both of the dead and living.*"—With the view of securing the possession of His own, whether as living or dead, Jesus began by resolving in His own person the contrast between life and death. He did so by dying and reviving.—For what is one raised again except *a dead man living?* Thus it is that He reigns simultaneously over the two domains of being through which His own are called to pass, and that He can fulfil His promise to them, John x. 28: "None shall pluck them out of my hand." Comp. also John xi. 25, 26. Of the three principal readings presented by the documents, the simplest and most agreeable to the context is certainly the Alexandrine reading: "He died and revived." These two terms correspond to *the living* and *the dead.* This very simple relation has been changed in the other readings. The word *rose again,* in the Byz. reading, has evidently been introduced to form the transition between these: *died* and *revived.* The reading of two Greco-Lats. and of Irenæus: "lived, died, and rose again," has certainly arisen from the desire to call up here the earthly life of Jesus; which was not necessary, since the domain of the living belongs now to Jesus, not in virtue of His earthly

[1] T. R., with L Syr., reads *και* before *απεθανεν.*

[2] Three principal readings with variants:—

1. T. R., with Syr[sch.] and the Mnn.: *απεθανεν και ανεστη και ανεζησεν, died and rose again and revived* (L P: *και εζησεν, and revived*).

2. ℵ A B C: *απεθανεν και εζησεν, died and revived* (F G: *απεθανεν και ανεστη, died and rose again*).

3. D E, It.: *εζησεν και απεθανεν και ανεστη. lived and died and rose again.*

existence, but in consequence of His present life as the glorified One. To understand this saying rightly, Eph. iv. 10 should be compared, where the apostle, after pointing to Christ "descended into the lowest parts (the abode of the dead)," then "ascended to the highest heavens," adds: "that He might fill all things." Which signifies that by traversing all the domains of existence Himself, He has so won them, that in passing through them in our turn as believers, we never cease to be His, and to have Him as our Lord. Hence the inference expressed ver. 10.

Ver. 10. "*But thou, why dost thou judge thy brother? and thou also, why dost thou set at nought thy brother? For we shall all stand at the judgment-seat of Christ.*"[1]—The δέ, *but*, contrasts the incompetent judgment of a *brother*, with the judgment of this one *Lord*.—The first question is addressed to the weak; comp. ver. 3. The second, connected by: *or thou also*, to the strong. The *also* is explained by the fact that contempt is likewise a mode of judging. No one ought to be withdrawn from his rightful judge, who is the Lord alone.—The *all* is prefixed to remind us that no one will escape from that judge. It is well said, no doubt, John v. 24, that the believer "shall not come into judgment;" but that does not mean that he shall not appear before the tribunal (2 Cor. v. 10). Only he will appear there to be owned as one who has already voluntarily judged himself by the light of Christ's word and under the discipline of His Spirit; comp. John xii. 48 and 1 Cor. xi. 31.—The Alexs. and Greco-Lats. read τοῦ Θεοῦ: "the judgment-seat *of God*." This expression must then be explained in the sense: *the divine tribunal*, where Christ will sit as God's representative. For never is God Himself represented as seated on the judgment throne. But is it not the two following verses which have given rise to this reading?

Vv. 11, 12. "*For it is written, As I live, saith the Lord, every knee shall bow to me, and every tongue shall confess to God. So then,*[2] *every one of us shall give account of himself to God.*"[3] —In ver. 11, Paul quotes Isa. xlv. 23, where the universal

[1] T. R., with L P, Syr., reads του Χριστου (*of the Christ*); all the rest: του θεου (*of God*).

[2] B D F G P, Syr$^{sch.}$ omit αρα, *then*.

[3] B F G omit τω θεω, *to God*.

homage is described, which all creatures will render to God at the end of the world. This homage supposes and implies the judgment, by which they shall all have been brought to His feet. If we read *of Christ*, and not *of God*, at the end of ver. 10, it must be held that the apostle sees this last royal manifestation of Jehovah, proclaimed by Isaiah, finding its realization *in Christ;* comp., indeed, Phil. ii. 10, 11, where the words of Isaiah in our verse are applied to Jesus glorified.—The form of affirmation in the original text is: *I have sworn by myself.* Paul substitutes, unintentionally no doubt, a somewhat different form of oath, but one which is also frequent in the O. T.: "I am living that" . . . the meaning of which is: "As truly as I am the eternally living One, so truly shall this come to pass." The words: *saith the Lord*, are here added by the apostle. Then he substitutes for the expression: *shall swear by me* (as the one true God), the term "shall do me homage" (ἐξομολογεῖσθαι). This word, which strictly signifies *to confess*, might allude to the judgment which will lay every man low in the conviction of his guilt, and draw forth from the heart of all an acknowledgment of God's holiness and righteousness. But all that this term expresses may simply be the homage of adoration, which proclaims God as the one being worthy to be glorified; comp. Luke ii. 38; Phil. ii. 11.—The words *to God* are the paraphrase of the *to me*, in Isaiah.

In ver. 12, Paul applies to every individual in particular what has just been said of all in general. The preceding context signified: "Judge not thy brother, for God will judge *him;*" this verse signifies: "Judge thyself, for God will judge *thee.*"—Paul here repeats the expression τῷ Θεῷ, *to God*, rather than say τῷ Χριστῷ, *to Christ*, because he wishes to contrast in a general way divine, the alone truly just judgment, with human judgments.

Vv. 13–23.

After having addressed the strong and the weak simultaneously, the apostle further addresses a warning to the former, to induce them not to use their liberty except in conformity with the law of love. As is observed by Hofmann,

he had nothing similar to recommend to the weak; for he who is inwardly bound cannot change his conduct, while the strong man who feels himself free may at pleasure make use of his right or waive it in practice. To induce the strong believer to make sacrifice of his liberty, the apostle brings to bear on him the two following motives:—1st. Vv. 13–19*a*, the duty of not wounding the heart of the weak or producing inward irritation; 2d. Vv. 19*b*–23, the fear of destroying God's work within him by leading him to do something against his conscience.

Ver. 13. "*Let us not, therefore, judge one another any more, but judge this rather: that no man put a stumbling-block or an occasion to fall in his brother's way.*"—The first proposition sums up the whole of the first part of the chapter; for it is still addressed to both parties; it forms at the same time the transition to the second. The object of the verb: *one another*, proves that the term *judge* here includes the contempt of the strong for the weak, as well as the condemnation which these take the liberty of pronouncing on the former.—From the second proposition of the verse onwards, the apostle turns to the strong exclusively. He makes a sort of play on the meaning of the word κρίνειν, *to judge*: "Do not judge one another; but, if you will judge absolutely, judge as follows." *Judge* the second time has the meaning of *decide*; comp. Tit. iii. 12.—The wise decision to take is, according to Paul, to avoid anything that might cause a *shock* (πρόσκομμα), or even a *fall* (σκάνδαλον), to your neighbour. There must be, whatever Meyer may say, a difference of meaning between the two substantives; not only because Paul does not use pleonasms, but also on account of the particle ἤ, *or*, which undoubtedly expresses a gradation: *or even*. One *strikes against* (προσκόπτειν), the result is a *wound*; but one stumbles against an obstacle (σκανδαλίζεσθαι), the result is a *fall*. The second case is evidently graver than the first. It is easy even to recognise in these two terms the theme of the two following developments: the first relates to the *wounded feeling* of the weak, with all its vexing consequences; the second to the *sin* which one is in danger of making him commit by leading him into an act contrary to his conscience. The first of these evils, as we have said, is referred to in vv. 14–19*a*.

Vv. 14, 15. "*I know, and am persuaded in the Lord Jesus, that nothing is unclean of itself:*[1] *except that to him that esteemeth anything to be unclean, it is unclean. Now*[2] *if thy brother be grieved with a meat, thou walkest no more charitably. Destroy not him with thy meat, for whom Christ died.*"—Paul does not wish to discuss the matter; but yet he cannot conceal his conviction; and he expresses it in passing, in ver. 14, as a concession he must make on the side of the strong. At bottom, it is they who are right. *Οἶδα, I know,* indicates a rational, theoretic, conviction, such as even a Jew, trained by the O. T. to a true spirituality, might reach. The second verb *πέπεισμαι, I am persuaded,* goes further; it indicates that this conviction has penetrated to his very conscience, and set it practically free from all perplexity. The words: *in the Lord Jesus,* remind us that it is He who has put an end to the obligations imposed by the ceremonial law. The emancipation which faith finds in Him arises not only from His doctrine (Matt. xv. 11, for example), but above all from the redemption wrought by Him. This regimen: *in the Lord Jesus,* bears on the second verb; there is nothing except the possession of salvation which can practically give full liberty to the soul. —Several ancient commentators have referred the words *δι' αὐτοῦ,* to Jesus Christ: "Through Him there is no longer anything unclean." But the negative form of the proposition is not favourable to this sense. Paul would rather have said: "everything is clean through Him." It is more natural to understand this *δι' αὐτοῦ* in the sense of: *of itself* (as would obviously be the case with the reading *δι' ἑαυτοῦ*): "Nothing is unclean in its own nature (in the matter of food);" comp. 1 Cor. x. 26; 1 Tim. iv. 4, 5; Tit. i. 15.—The restriction *εἰ μή, except,* applies to the idea of uncleanness in general, without taking account of the limitation *of itself.* This slightly incorrect use of *εἰ μή* has given rise, though erroneously, to the belief that this particle might signify *but;* comp. Matt. xii. 4; Luke iv. 26, 27; John v. 19; Gal. i. 19, ii. 16, etc. etc.—This restriction, whereby Paul reminds us that what is regarded as unclean becomes

[1] T. R., with ℵ B C, reads *δι' ἑαυτου* instead of *δι' αυτου,* which is read in all the others.

[2] T. R., with L, Mnn. Syr$^{sch.}$, reads *δε* instead of *γαρ,* which all the others read.

really so to him who uses it under this idea, paves the way for indicating the voluntary limits which the strong should be able to impose on himself in the exercise of his liberty.

Ver. 15. If this verse be connected with the preceding by *for*, with the majority of the Mjj., it is very difficult to understand their logical relation. Meyer paraphrases thus: "It is not without reason that I remind you of that (the preceding restriction); *for* love is bound to take account of such a scruple." Hofmann rightly judges this explanation of the *for* impossible; but is his own less so? He takes the phrase following in the interrogative sense: "*For*, if thy brother is grieved thereby, wouldest thou for this error on his part henceforth cease to walk toward him in love?" It is difficult to imagine anything more forced. We must therefore, though the T. R. δέ, *now then* or *but*, has only a single Mj. (L) in its favour, prefer this reading (Reiche, Rück., de W., Philip.). This δέ may be taken in the sense of *now then*, or in that of *but*. The adversative sense seems to me preferable. The *but* refers to the first part of ver. 14: "I know that nothing is unclean . . ., but if, nevertheless" . . . The meaning is excellent, and the construction the more admissible because the second part of ver. 14 was a simple parenthesis. — Λυπεῖται, *is grieved, hurt;* this word expresses the painful and bitter feeling produced in the heart of the weak by the spectacle of the free and bold eating of the strong. — With the words: "Thou walkest *no more* (οὐκέτι) charitably," we must evidently understand the idea: when thou actest thus. The threat, added by the apostle, of compromising thereby our neighbour's salvation, is so grave, that it is not explicable at the first glance, and one is tempted to refer it to the sin which the weak believer would commit by imitating the strong; comp. ver. 20. But it is not till afterwards that Paul comes to this side of the question, and it is far from probable that the weak man, at the very time when he is *wounded* by the conduct of the strong, could be tempted to imitate him. These words therefore refer to the profound irritation, the hurtful judgments, the breach of brotherly ties, which must result from such wounding. The *asyndeton* is striking: it shows Paul's emotion when writing these last words . . .: "By thy meat make him perish whom Christ saved by His death!"

The whole scene supposed by this verse is infinitely better understood if it is placed in the full love-feast, than if the strong and the weak are supposed taking their meal at their own houses. The following verses (16–19*a*) complete by some secondary considerations the principal motive which has been expressed at the end of ver. 15.

Ver. 16. "*Let not, then, the good you*[1] *enjoy be evil spoken of.*" —The expression *your good* has been applied to the kingdom of God (Meyer), or to faith (de Wette), or to the gospel (Philip.), or to the superiority of the Christian to the non-Christian (Hofmann). But all these meanings want appropriateness. The context itself shows that the subject in question is *Christian liberty* (Orig., Calv., Thol., etc.). The *you* applies not to all believers, but to the strong only. Paul recommends them not to use their liberty so as to provoke the indignation and blame of their weaker brethren. The blessing they enjoy ought not to be changed by their lack of charity into a source of cursing. Carefully comp. 1 Cor. viii. 9–11, and x. 29, 30.

Ver. 17. "*For the kingdom of God is not meat or drink, but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Spirit.*"—Nothing could be simpler than the connection of this verse with the preceding. The force from above, which is the essence of the kingdom of God, does not consist in being able to eat or drink more or less freely and regardlessly toward our neighbour, but in realizing in life the three dispositions mentioned, by triumphing over our own tastes and vanity. The three terms: *righteousness, peace, joy,* ought, according to the context, to be taken in the social sense, which is only an application of their religious sense. *Righteousness:* moral rectitude whereby we render to our neighbour what is his due,—here particularly respect for his convictions. *Peace:* good harmony between all the members of the church. *Joy:* that individual and collective exultation which prevails among believers when brotherly communion makes its sweetness felt, and no one is saddened. By such dispositions the soul finds itself raised to a sphere where all sacrifices become easy, and charity reigns without obstacle. Such is the reality of the kingdom of God on the earth. Would it not then be folly to seek it in the inconsiderate use of some meat or drink, at the expense of

[1] D E F G, It. Syr$^{sch.}$ read ἡμῶν instead of ὑμῶν.

those the only true blessings?—By the words: *in the Holy Spirit*, Paul indicates the source of these virtues: it is this divine guest who, by His presence, produces them in the church; the instant He retires grieved, He carries them with Him.—It is incomprehensible how this passage has not succeeded in moving Meyer from the interpretation of the term *kingdom of God*, which he has adopted once for all in his commentary, applying it invariably to the *future* Messianic kingdom.

Ver. 18. "*For he that in these things*[1] *serveth Christ, is acceptable to God and approved of men.*"—So true is it that it is in these dispositions the kingdom of God consists, that the goodwill of God and men rests only on him who cultivates them. If we read ἐν τούτῳ, we may refer the pronoun (*him* or *that*) either to the *principle* expressed in ver. 17 ("thus"), or to the *Holy Spirit*. The first meaning is forced; it would have required κατὰ τοῦτο, *according to* (this principle). Nor is the second less so; for it would be the merest commonplace to say that he who serves Christ in the Holy Spirit is acceptable to God. We must therefore read, with the T. R. and the Byzs., ἐν τούτοις, *in these dispositions*. Such a man is acceptable to *God*, who reads the heart, and he enjoys merited consideration even in the judgment of *men*. Every one, Christian or non-Christian, recognises him to be a man really animated with power from above, the opposite of a fool or a boaster; δόκιμος: an approved Christian, who has stood the test of trial.

Vv. 19, 20. "*Let us therefore follow after*[2] *the things which make for peace, and things wherewith one may edify another.*[3] *For meat destroy not the work of God; all things indeed are pure, but a thing becomes evil for that man who eateth with offence.*"—Ver. 19 forms the transition from the first to the second reason; 19*a* repeats the first: the obligation to preserve harmony in the church; 19*b* introduces the second: the obligation to do nothing which might be injurious to our neighbour's edification. The call, therefore, is no longer merely

[1] T. R., with E L, Mnn. Syr., reads ἐν τούτοις (*in these things*); all the rest read ἐν τούτῳ (*in this*).

[2] T. R. reads, with C D E, Mnn. It., διωκωμεν; all the rest: διωκομεν.

[3] D E F G. It. read after ἀλλήλους, φυλαξωμεν (*let us keep*).

to avoid what may wound and vex our neighbour, but also to respect and not compromise the *work of God* already wrought in his heart. It is obvious, as Meyer acknowledges, that we must read διώκωμεν, *let us seek*, and not διώκομεν, *we seek*. The Greco-Latin reading, according to which we should require to read φυλάξωμεν, *let us keep*, as the verb of the last proposition of the verse: "Let us keep the things which are for edification," may very probably be authentic. The omission of this verb would be explained by the fact that the copyists did not understand that the apostle was passing to a new reason.

Ver. 20. The *asyndeton* between vv. 19 and 20 proves how acutely the apostle is alive to the responsibility of the strong: destroy the work of God! In ver. 14, where it was personal pain, wounding, which was referred to, the apostle spoke of making *the brother* himself perish. Here, where the occasioning of a *scandal* is the matter in question, he does not speak any more of the person, but of the *work* of God in the person.—It matters not that food is free from uncleanness in itself; it is no longer so as soon as man uses it against his conscience. Rückert has taken the word κακόν, *evil*, as the attribute of a verb understood: "*Eating* becomes *evil* for the man who does it against his conscience." Meyer prefers to take from the preceding proposition the understood subject τὸ καθαρόν, what is clean in itself: "Even *the food which is clean of itself* becomes evil when it is eaten thus." But it seems to me simpler to make κακόν the subject: "*There is evil* (sin) for him who eateth in such circumstances."—Διὰ προσκόμματος, *in a state of scandal*. On this use of the διά, comp. ii. 27. Is the reference to the strong man, who eats while *occasioning* scandal, or to the weak brother, who lets himself be drawn into eating by *succumbing* to the scandal? Evidently the second. Paul is not speaking here of the evil which the strong believer does to himself, but of that which he does to his brother carried away into sin.—We may be astonished to find the apostle regarding the salvation of the weak as compromised by this one trespass. But is not one voluntary sin interposing between Christ and the believer enough to disunite them, and if this sin is not blotted out, and the state is prolonged, to plunge him again in death?

Ver. 21 is the summing up of the whole warning addressed to the strong from ver. 13.

Ver. 21. "*It is good not to eat flesh and not to drink wine, and* [*to do nothing*] *whereby thy brother stumbleth, or is offended, or even is made weak.*"[1]—The word καλόν, *it is good, honourable,* is tacitly opposed to the notion of humiliation, which in the eyes of the strong attached to abstinence. There is nothing except what is honourable, Paul means, in abstaining when we sacrifice our liberty to charity. — Before the pronoun ἐν ᾧ, *wherein,* we must understand the verb ποιεῖν τι, *to do anything.* —Of the three verbs which the T. R. reads, the first refers to the *wounding* of the heart caused to our neighbour by conduct which he disapproves; the second, to the *sin* which he would be led to commit by being drawn away to do what his conscience condemns; the third, to the want of regard for the scruples with which he is affected through weakness of faith. So: to make him judge ill of you; to make him do what he condemns, or to do in his presence something which raises a scruple in him. The ἤ, *or,* which connects the two last verbs, should be translated by: *or even only.*—The reading λυπεῖται, *is grieved,* instead of προσκόπτει, *is offended,* in the *Sinaït.*, is certainly mistaken. As to the omission of the last two verbs in the Alex. text, it is probably the effect of an oversight; for the verb προσκόπτειν, *to be offended,* would not completely sum up the warning given to the strong (see at ver. 13).

The last two verses are the conclusion and summary of the entire chapter. Ver. 22 applies to the strong; ver. 23 to the weak.

Vv. 22, 23. "*As to thee, thou hast faith;*[2] *have it to thyself before God. Happy is he that judgeth not himself in that thing which he alloweth! But he that doubteth is condemned if he eat, because he eateth not of faith. Whatsoever is not of faith is sin.*"[3]—The proposition: *thou hast faith,* might be taken in the interrogative sense; but there is more force in the simple affirmation. The Alexs. read ἣν, *which,* after πίστιν, *faith.*

[1] ℵ P read λυπεῖται instead of προσκόπτει, and ℵ A C, Syr^sch. reject the words ἢ σκανδαλίζεται ἢ ἀσθενεῖ.

[2] ℵ A B C read ἣν before ἔχεις.

[3] L, 200, Mnn. and the *Lectionaria* here add the three verses which in other documents form the conclusion of the Epistle, xvi. 25–27; G g here have a blank space; A P have these three verses here and at the end of chap. xvi.

The meaning in that case is: "The faith which thou hast, keep." The ancient versions do not favour this reading, and neither is it in keeping with the context, which requires that the two cases treated should be put expressly face to face with one another, with a view to the definitive counsel to be stated for each. The words *keep*, etc., allude to the sacrifice which Paul had asked the strong to make in his external conduct. Paul reminds him that he does not in the least ask the abandonment of his internal conviction, and invites him to preserve it intact in his heart under the eye of God.—By the last words: *Happy . . .*, he gives him to understand that it is a feeling of gratitude and not of pride, with which he ought to be inspired by the degree of faith, and of liberty in faith, to which he has attained. Here, as elsewhere, the word κρίνειν must be translated by *judge*, and not by *condemn*. "To condemn oneself in what he adopts as good," would be a contradictory idea. The subject in question is a simple *inquiry* as to the course which has been adopted once for all. Happy the man who no longer feels any scruple, nor puts any question of conscience to himself regarding the resolution he has taken. Δοκιμάζειν, *to find good after examination.*

Ver. 23 applies to the opposite case: that of doubt in regard to the line to be followed. Conscience has not reached oneness with itself; hence the term διακρίνεσθαι, *to be divided* into two men, the one of whom says yes, the other no.—Many give to the word πίστις, *faith*, the abstract sense of *conviction*. But there is nothing to authorize us to take from the word so common in Paul its religious signification. It refers, as always, to the acceptance of the salvation won by Christ. What a man cannot do as His redeemed one and in the joy of His salvation, must not be done at all. Otherwise this act, of which faith is not the soul, becomes sin, and may lead to the result indicated ver. 20: the total destruction of God's work in us.

Of the position of the doxology, xvi. 25–27, *at the end of chap.* xiv.—A considerable number of documents place here, after ver. 23, the three doxological verses which, in the generally Received text, close the Epistle (xvi. 25–27). These are the Mj. L, nearly 220 Mnn., the *Lectionaria*, the Philoxenian Syriac version, some ancient MSS. mentioned by Origen, finally, the

Fathers of the Greek Church (Chrysostom, Cyril, Theodoret, etc.). There may be added the MS. G and the Latin translation which accompanies it (g), which leave a blank here, as well as the Mjj. A and P and three Mnn., which read these three verses in *both* places. We shall complete these indications when we come to xvi. 25. Should it be held that these verses have their original place here, and were afterwards transposed from it to the end of the Epistle? Or did they, on the contrary, form originally the conclusion of the letter, and have certain copyists transferred them to this place for some reason or other? Or, finally, should we regard this passage as a later interpolation, which was placed sometimes at the end of chap. xiv., sometimes at the end of chap. xvi.? There might be a fourth supposition, viz., that the apostle himself *repeated* at the end of his letter this passage, placed originally at the end of our chapter. But such a repetition would be without example or object. As to the apostolic origin of the passage, we shall examine it at xvi. 27.

The question has more importance than appears at the first glance; for it has a somewhat close connection with that of the authenticity of chaps. xv. xvi. If the apostle closed chap. xiv. with this formula of adoration, it is probable that he meant thereby to terminate his Epistle; consequently all that follows would be open to the suspicion of being unauthentic. True, Reuss says, that even though the last three verses were placed at the end of chap. xiv., "there would arise therefrom no prejudice unfavourable to the authenticity of chap. xv.;" the apostle might have intended "to lay down the pen and close his discourse with a short prayer; then he bethought himself to add a few pages." We doubt, however, whether a real example of such procedure can be quoted, and we think that if the true position of these three verses was indeed at the end of chap. xiv., the fact would prove indirectly either that chaps. xv. and xvi. are the work of an interpolator, or that, if they proceeded from the apostle's pen, they belonged originally to some other writing, whence they were transferred to this.

Let us examine the different hypotheses made on this subject:—

1st. Hofmann has attempted to bring these three verses into the apostolic text by making them the transition from chap. xiv. to chap. xv. According to him, the expression: "To Him that is of power to stablish you" (xvi. 25), is in close connection with the discussion of chap. xiv. relative to the strong and the weak; and the dative τῷ δυναμένῳ, *to Him that is of power* . . . is dependent on the verb ὀφείλομεν, *we owe* (xv. 1): "We owe to Him that is of power to stablish us to concur in His work by bearing the burdens of the weak." The relation is ingeniously

discovered; but this explanation is nevertheless inadmissible. Not only would this dative: *to Him that is of power*, be separated from the verb on which it depends by a doxological amplification out of all proportion, but especially the δέ, *now then*, which accompanies the verb *we owe*, indicates clearly the beginning of a new sentence.

2d. Baur, Volkmar, Lucht, place the doxology here, but as a later interpolation, and infer from this fact the total or almost total unauthenticity of chaps. xv. and xvi. According to Lucht, the true conclusion of the Epistle, which immediately followed xiv. 23, was suppressed by the elders of the church of Rome as too severe for the weak of chap. xiv. But it was discovered again afterwards in the archives of this church, and amplified in two different ways, in the form of the doxology xvi. 25–27, and in the more extended form of the passage xv. 1–xvi. 24; these two conclusions, at first distinct, were afterwards fused into one, which produced the now generally received form. Volkmar enters still more into detail. The true apostolic conclusion may, according to him, be found with certainty and in a complete form in chaps. xv. and xvi. It consists of the two passages xv. 33–xvi. 2, and xvi. 21–24. The rest of these two chapters embraces additions intended to co-operate in the pacification of the church. They proceed principally from two authors, the one in the east, who added the doxology about 145; the other in the west, who composed nearly all the rest about 120.—We are struck at once with the arbitrariness there is in the hypothesis of Lucht. What! elders take the liberty of suppressing the end of the apostolic writing! Then they preserve it in the archives of the church, and it becomes in the hands of some writer or other, along with some fragments of an Epistle to the Ephesians, the theme of our last two chapters! This is a romance which in any case could only gain some historical probability if we were to discover in chaps. xv. and xvi. very positive proofs of their unauthenticity. Volkmar holds that the authentic conclusion has been wholly preserved, though mixed with a conglomerate of diverse interpolations. But would this close be sufficient? The apostle had introduced his didactic treatise with a long preamble in the letter form (i. 1–15). Was it possible that in closing the writing he should not return, at least for a few moments, to the epistolary form with which he had begun? Now it is evident that the few words which Volkmar preserves as authentic by no means correspond to a preamble at once so grave and affectionate as the beginning of the Epistle. And it is impossible to understand how Paul could pass suddenly from the end of the practical treatise: "Whatsoever is not of faith is sin" (xiv. 23),

to the words which, according to Volkmar, immediately followed: "The God of peace be with you all! Amen. I commend unto you Phœbe" . . . No, it was not thus the apostle composed.

3d. Since, then, it is impossible to find a place for this doxology in the didactic tissue of chaps. xiv. and xv.; and since, on the other hand, it cannot be held that it indicates the conclusion of the Epistle (at the end of chap. xiv.),—it only remains to have recourse to a third solution. The weight of critical authorities makes the balance incline in favour of the position of these three verses at the end of chap. xvi. What circumstance could have led to their migration, in a certain number of documents, to the end of chap. xiv.? If we keep account of the fact demonstrated by the study of the text of the whole N. T., that most of the errors of the Byz. documents arise from the tendency to adapt the text to the necessities of public reading, we shall be led to the supposition that in very ancient times the reading of our Epistle in the assemblies of the church stopped at the end of chap. xiv., because from that point the didactic part, properly so called, terminated. But the reading could not end so abruptly. There was written therefore on the margin, for the use of the reader, the doxology which closed the entire Epistle; and, as has so often happened, it passed from the margin into the text at this place. So it has come about that it is found here in the documents of Byz. origin, and particularly in the *Lectionaria*, or collections of passages intended for public reading. It is objected, no doubt, that chaps. xv. and xvi. appear in all our ancient lectionaries. But the period at which the omission of these two chapters would have taken place is long anterior to the date of the collections of pericopes which have been preserved to us. This way of explaining the transposition of the doxology seems to us preferable to the reasons stated by Meyer. If it is so, we understand how this doxology is found in both places at once in some documents, and how it is wholly wanting in some others. Certain copyists, doubtful about the position to be given to it, put it in both places; certain others, made suspicious by this double position, rejected it altogether. It is singular, we acknowledge, that it was not rather placed after ver. 13 of chap. xv., so as to embrace also in the public reading the passage we are now going to study (xv. 1–13). It is impossible at this date to discover the circumstance which has led to the choice rather of the end of chap. xiv.

XV. 1–13.

Here, according to M. Renan, we return to the text of the copy addressed to the church of Rome; for, according to him,

chap. xv. formed the conclusion of the Epistle destined for this church. If this view were well grounded, the first verse of chap. xv. must have immediately followed the last of chap. xi.; for chaps. xii. xiii. and xiv. only belonged to the copies intended for other churches. Is this hypothesis probable? What connection is there between the end of chap. xi., celebrating the wisdom of God in the course of history, and this distinction between the strong and the weak with which chap. xv. begins? This contrast fits in, on the contrary, in the closest possible way to the subject of chap. xiv. Schultz feels this so much, that though sharing Renan's opinion in regard to the three preceding chapters, up to a certain point, he still makes the first six verses of chap. xv. the continuation and conclusion of the passage chap. xiv., and not till ver. 7 does he find the resumption of the true Epistle to the Romans, which closed, according to him, with our ver. 13. Thus in the apostolic copy it was ver. 7: "Wherefore receive ye one another as Christ also received you," which immediately followed the close of chap. xi. But this sudden transition to a hortatory application, after so vast a development as that of chap. xi., is somewhat too abrupt to be probable; and especially when we recognise, as this author does, the close connection between the first six verses of chap. xv. and the whole development of chap. xiv., it must also be seen that the exhortation: "Wherefore receive ye one another" (ver. 7), is only the resumption of that which began chap. xiv. in these terms: "Receive ye him that is weak in faith." Not only is it in both cases the same verb that is used: *προσλαμβάνεσθαι, to take to oneself.* But, moreover, the following words of ver. 7: "as Christ took you to Himself," reproduce exactly the end of xiv. 3: "For God hath taken him to Himself" (thy brother, weak or strong). Our ver. 7 is therefore the close of the cycle of teaching opened xiv. 1–3; and Paul sums up in ver. 7 the general exhortation to connect with it the invitation to union between the two parts of the church which forms the subject of vv. 8–13. Thus is closed the practical part begun in chap. xii. Everything is so strongly compacted, and forms so fine a whole, that it is hard to understand how it should have entered the mind of intelligent commentators to break such an organism.

We have already said that with chap. xv. there begins, according to Baur, the unauthentic part of our Epistle. We shall examine step by step the objections to which the composition of these two chapters by the Apostle Paul seems to him to be exposed. We shall have to study likewise the reasons which have led a great number of critics, such as Semler, Griesbach, Eichhorn, Reuss, Schultz, Ewald, and others to dispute, not the apostolic origin of the whole or part of the last two chapters, but their original connection with the Epistle to the Romans. As we have stated these very diverse opinions in the Introduction, vol. I. pp. 109–113, we think it unnecessary to reproduce them here.

From the particular question which has just occupied the apostle, he now passes to a more general subject, that of the perfect union which, notwithstanding the difference between the two elements of which it is composed, ought to unite the whole church in a common song of praise to the God of salvation. The goodwill with which all, Jews and Gentiles, have been received by God, ought to make them, as it were, one heart and one mouth to magnify the Lord, while awaiting patiently the consummation of the work He has begun. Such are the contents of this passage, which admirably crowns the practical part. It is really impossible to understand Baur's affirmation: "This piece contains nothing which had not been much better said before," or that of M. Renan, who, adhering to this judgment, thus expresses himself: "These verses repeat and weakly sum up what precedes." The particular question treated in chap. xiv. broadens; the point of view rises, and the tone is gradually heightened even to the elevation of a hymn, as at the end of all the great parts preceding (chap. v. 12 et seq., viii. 31 et seq., xi. 33 et seq.). —Paul first exhorts, by the example of Christ, to mutual condescension, vv. 1–3; he points out, vv. 4–7, as an end to be reached the common adoration to which such conduct will bring the church; finally, vv. 8–13, he indicates the special part given to Jews and to Gentiles in this song of the whole redeemed race. He has not before expressed anything like this.

Ver. 1. "*We then that are strong ought to bear the infirmities of the weak, and not to please ourselves.*" — The δέ, *then*, is

progressive. The domain enlarges; it is no longer simply the question of meats, but in general of the relation between Judeo-Christianity more or less legal, of which the party of the weak, chap. xiv., was a branch, and that pure spirituality, which is the proper character of Paul's gospel. This tendency to enlarge the subject had already appeared in the preceding chapter, in vv. 5 and 6, where the example taken from the observance of feast *days* was evidently borrowed from a more general domain. The apostle now expresses his entire thought regarding the relation between a Christianity still allied to the legal spirit, and that which is wholly exempt from it. Since the two elements co-existed in the church of Rome, Paul must once at least before closing utter his thought as to their normal relation, and he does so here quite naturally by applying that law of love in which he has just pointed out that the soul of the Christian life is to be found. It is this gradation in the subject treated which is indicated by the δέ progressive (*then*) of ver. 1. It is no doubt for the same reason he changes the expression which he had used to designate *the weak* in chap. xiv. He now employs the terms δυνατός and ἀδύνατος, *able, unable,* whereas he had made use of the term ἀσθενής. It would be improper, however, completely to identify the contrast expressed by these two terms, employed ver. 1, with that between Judeo-Christians and believers of Gentile origin. For by saying ἡμεῖς, *we,* the apostle shows clearly that he puts himself among *the strong,* and not only himself, but all those also of his Jewish fellow-countrymen who, like Aquilas and Priscilla, for example, have risen to the height of Christian spirituality. Among the weak, on the other hand, might be found a goodly number of former proselytes who had brought with them into the gospel their attachment to the law. We acknowledge then, with Mangold, that the contrast between the strong and the weak in chap. xv. does not coincide absolutely with that of chap. xiv. There, the matter in question was only a special feature of Judeo-Christian formalism; here, the apostle speaks of the conduct to be observed toward the formalist spirit in itself. But, on the other hand, it is impossible to adopt the opinion of the same author, when he represents the strong and the weak here as two small minorities, two *ultra* parties of the right

and left, the one of extreme Gentile-Christians, the other of particularly narrow Judeo-Christians, whom Paul contrasted with the in general moderate Judeo-Christian mass of the church of Rome. How could Paul himself, by saying: *we, the strong*, take his place in one of these extreme parties, which, according to Mangold, wished even (see at ver. 7) to excommunicate the weak! This construction, whereby it is sought in the face of this whole passage to save the hypothesis of a Judeo-Christian majority in the church of Rome, is an expedient which all critics have hitherto judged untenable.—*Ἀσθενήματα, the infirmities* or *weaknesses*; these are, as Hodge says, "the prejudices, errors, and faults which arise from weakness of faith." The strong ought to show his strength, not by humiliating the weak and triumphing in the feeling of his superiority, but by bearing the burden of his weakness with love and tenderness. To serve is always in the gospel the true sign of strength (Gal. vi. 2).—But to be able to act thus, there is an enemy that must be swept out of our own heart: self-complacency. The man who boasts of his superiority in understanding and in Christian liberty, is not fitted to assist the weak; rather he estranges and revolts them.

Vv. 2, 3. "*Let every one*[1] *of us*[2] *please his neighbour for his good to edification. For also Christ pleased not Himself; but, as it is written, The reproaches of them that reproached thee fell on me.*"—The *γάρ, for*, in the T. R., is certainly unauthentic: the *asyndeton* implies a more emphatic reproduction of the thought of ver. 1. The word *every one* seems to us to extend the exhortation to all the members of the church, weak or strong; it is as if it ran: "Yes, let every one of us in general" . . .—There are two ways of seeking to *please our neighbour*. In the one we are self-seeking; we seek to satisfy our interest or self-love. In the other, we seek the good of our neighbour himself. It is this latter way only which the apostle recommends: such is the force of the first regimen: *in good;* for good, not from egoism. Then this abstract notion is positively determined by the second regimen: *to edification.* The life of Paul was all through the realization of this precept; comp. 1 Cor. x. 33, 34.

[1] T. R. reads *γαρ* after *εκαστος*, with some Mnn. only.
[2] F G P, It$^{alliq.}$ read *υμων* instead of *ημων*.

Ver. 3. The example of Christ is to the believer the new law to be realized (Gal. vi. 2); hence the *for also*. If, as man, Christ had pleased Himself in the use of His liberty, or in the enjoyment of the rights and privileges which His own righteousness had acquired, what would have come of our salvation? But He had only one thought: to struggle for the destruction of sin, without concerning Himself about His own well-being, or sparing Himself even for an instant. In this bold and persevering struggle against our enemy, evil, He drew on Him the hatred of all God's adversaries here below, so that the lamentation of the Psalmist, lxix. 9, became as it were the motto of His life. In labouring thus for the glory of God and the salvation of men, He gave back, as Isaiah had prophesied, "neither before shame nor spitting." This certainly is the antipodes of *pleasing ourselves*. Ps. lxix. applies only indirectly to the Messiah (ver. 5: "*My sins* are not hid"); it describes the righteous Israelite suffering for the cause of God. But this is precisely the type of which Jesus was the supreme realization.—We need not say, with Meyer, that Paul adopts the saying of the Psalmist directly into his own text. It is more natural, seeing the total change of construction, like Grotius, to supply this idea: "*but he did* as is written;" comp. John xiii. 18.—Paul, vv. 1 and 2, had said *us;* it is difficult, indeed, to believe, that in writing these last sayings he could avoid thinking of his own apostolic life.

But divine succour is needed to enable us to follow this line of conduct unflinchingly; and this succour the believer finds only in the constant use of the Scriptures, and in the help of God which accompanies it (vv. 4–6).

Vv. 4–6. "*For whatsoever things were written aforetime*[1] *were written*[2] *for our learning, that we, through patience and through*[3] *comfort of the Scriptures, might have hope. Now the God of hope and consolation grant you to be like-minded one toward another according to Christ Jesus.*[4] *That ye may with one mind and one mouth glorify the God and Father of our*

[1] B, It. read εγραφη instead of προεγραφη.
[2] T. R., with A L P, reads προεγραφη instead of εγραφη.
[3] D E F G P omit the second δια.
[4] T. R., with B D E G L, It. reads Χριστου Ιησουν; ℵ A C F P, Syr.: Ιησουν Χριστον.

Lord Jesus Christ."—The transition from ver. 3 to ver. 4 is this: "If I thus apply this saying of the Psalmist to Christ and ourselves, it is because, in general, all Scripture was written to instruct and strengthen us." It is certain that for the first verb we should read προεγράφη, *was written aforetime;* and probably we should read for the second the simple ἐγράφη, *was written* (comp. the critical note). The new light which Scripture revelation throws on all things, and particularly on the events of human life, diffuses in the heart the strength which makes us *hold out* (ὑπομονή, *patience*), and even hold out joyously (παράκλησις, *comfort*). Whether we read or reject the second διά, *through*, the genitive τῶν γραφῶν, *of the Scriptures*, equally depends on both the preceding substantives: the patience and comfort of which the Scriptures are the source.—And it is by these dispositions that we are kept at the height of Christian *hope* which anticipates the joy of perfect salvation. We need not give the verb ἔχωμεν the exceptional meaning of *holding fast* (κατέχειν); the simple sense of *possessing* is enough.—Baur has found in this verse an evidence of the unauthenticity of the whole piece. How could the apostle, on occasion of the passage quoted (ver. 3), set himself to speak all at once of the entire O. T.? But he forgets that this whole piece is a practical exhortation, and that in such circumstances the particular recommendation of the use of the Scriptures is quite in place. The inspiration thereto was probably given by the apostle's own daily experience.—But he knows well himself that Scripture is ineffectual without the direct help of the God of the Scriptures. It is therefore to Him that he lifts his eyes, ver. 5.

Ver. 5. By the double description of God as the *God of patience* and *of consolation*, He is characterized as the true source of these two graces which are communicated to us through the channel of the Scriptures. To get them, we must therefore go not only to the Scriptures, but to Himself.—There is a close relation in a church between the consolation and the union of its members. When all are inwardly consoled from above, the way is paved for communion of hearts, all together aspiring vehemently after the same supreme good. It is this *common impulse* which is expressed by Paul's term (φρονεῖν ἐν ἀλλ.). He thus returns to the principal idea of

the passage, which he had left for an instant to speak of the Scriptures.—On the difference between *Christ Jesus* and *Jesus Christ*, see at i. 1.

Ver. 6. When one common aspiration reigns in the church, secondary diversities no longer separate hearts; and from the internal communion there results common adoration, like pure harmony from a concert of well-tuned instruments. All hearts being melted in one, all mouths become only one. And how so? Because one being only appears henceforth to all as worthy of being glorified.—It seems obvious to us, since the two words *God* and *Father* are joined in Greek by one and the same article, that the complement: *of our Lord Jesus Christ*, must depend on both. Comp. Eph. i. 17 ("the God of Jesus Christ"); Matt. xxvii. 46 ("my God, my God"); John xx. 17 ("my Father and your Father, my God and your God"). The expression: *God of Jesus Christ*, denotes the relation of complete dependence; and the expression: *Father of Jesus Christ*, the relation of perfect intimacy. The ideal here described by the apostle, and which is the supreme object of the prayer which he has just formed, ver. 5, is therefore that of the union of the entire church, composed of Jews and Gentiles, in the adoration of the God and Father who has redeemed and sanctified it by Jesus Christ. This union was in a sense his personal work, and the prize of his apostolic labours. How his heart must have leapt, hearing already, by the anticipation of faith, the hymn of saved humanity! It is the part of every believer, therefore, to make all the advances and all the sacrifices which love demands in order to work for so magnificent a result. So there is added, as the conclusion of all that precedes (from xiv. 1), ver. 7.

Ver. 7. "*Wherefore receive ye one another, as Christ also received us,*[1] *to the glory of God.*"—The compassionate welcome which Christ has given to all the members of the church individually, ought to be perpetually reproduced in the welcome of goodwill and tenderness which they give one another in all the relations of life. And if there is some concession to make, some antipathy to surmount, some difference of opinion to allow, some injury to forgive, one thing ought to lift us above all these annoyances,—the thought that we are thereby labour-

[1] T. R. reads, with B D P: ημας; all the rest: υμας.

ing for the glory of God, who received us in grace through Jesus Christ. Mutual love ought to reign supremely in a church wholly composed of the Lord's well-beloved. We should probably read ἡμᾶς, *us, us believers* in general, rather than ὑμᾶς, *you* (the Christians of Rome). This latter reading has no doubt arisen from the verb in the second person plural: *receive ye.* The words: *to the glory of God,* depend rather on the first than on the second verb; for they are intended to explain the recommendation.—Mangold finds himself led by his peculiar point of view, according to which the strong in this chapter are merely the small number of extreme Paulinists, to give to the word *receive* a wholly different sense from that which it had xiv. 1, where the same recommendation was addressed to the entire (according to him, Judeo-Christian) church. The party of the strong mentioned here had, according to this critic, pushed opposition to the weak the length of regarding them as a burden to the life of the church, and of demanding their excommunication. And this is what Paul would prevent. It is very obvious how arbitrary is this difference laid down in the notion of *receiving.* Not only can the προσλαμβάνεσθαι (*receive*) signify nothing else than in xiv. 1, but, moreover, the apostle would never have consented to rank himself, as he would do by the word *us* (vv. 1 and 2), in a party so violent.

The apostle would seem, by this conclusion, to have reached the end of the whole development begun xiv. 1. But he has still an explanation to add: If Christ has received us with equal goodness, there has yet been a difference in the mode of this receiving. Unity in the works of God is never uniformity. Rather harmony implies variety. This common adoration, in which all presently existing contrasts in the church are to be fused, does not prevent each group in the new people of God from bringing with it its own experiences, and playing its particular part in the final concert.

Vv. 8, 9*a*. "*Now*[1] *I say that Christ*[2] *was*[3] *a minister of the circumcision for the truth of God, to confirm the promises made*

[1] T. R., with L, Syr., reads δέ (*now*); all the rest: γάρ (*for*).
[2] T. R., with D E F G, It. Syr., reads Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν; L P: Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν; ℵ A B C: Χριστόν.
[3] T. R., with ℵ A E L P: γεγενῆσθαι; B C D E F G: γενέσθαι.

unto the fathers, but that the Gentiles glorify God for His mercy."—The gracious acceptance which Jesus Christ has given to men has taken place in two principal ways. In His relation to the Jews, God has above all displayed *His truth*, His fidelity to His ancient promises; in His relation to the Gentiles, He has more particularly manifested *His mercy;* for, without having promised them anything directly, He has given everything to them as well as to the Jews. And hence it is, that with the voice which rises from the people of Israel to celebrate God's faithfulness, there should henceforth be joined that of the Gentile world magnifying His grace. Such is the meaning of this admirable passage, which extends to ver. 13. —The reading γάρ, *for*, would introduce the demonstration of the προσελάβετο, *He received us.* But what follows is rather an explanation than a proof; the latter would have been superfluous. We must therefore read λέγω δέ: "*Now*, here is my whole thought regarding this receiving on the part of Christ, and the duty of union arising from it."—What attracts the Jew to Christ is not exactly the same as that which gains for Him the heart of the Gentile. The Jew is struck with the fulfilment of the prophecies in His person (comp. the Gospel of St. Matthew); the heart of the Gentile is taken by the view of His mercy (comp. the Gospel of Luke).—Baur has thought that the expression: *minister of the circumcision*, could not be ascribed to the apostle, and that it betrayed a writer disposed to carry concessions to Judaism much further than St. Paul could have done. But what is there in this expression which goes beyond the contents of Gal. iv. 4 and 5: "Born of a woman, born under the law, to redeem them that are under the law"? All the Gospels prove that Jesus submitted to the strictest observance of the law, and that from His circumcision to His death He enveloped Himself as it were in the national form of Israelitish life. It is a gratuitous error of commentators to think that He ever violated the Sabbath, even in His works of healing. He simply freed it from the Pharisaical prescriptions which had greatly exaggerated Sabbatical strictness. And when Paul says, Phil. ii. 8: "He became obedient, even to the death of the cross," he exactly expresses the idea contained in the term with which Baur finds fault. Hilgenfeld himself acknowledges the error

of the master of his school on this point: "This passage," says he, "contains nothing more than was already contained in chap. xi. of our Epistle."—Several MSS. substitute the aorist *γένεσθαι* for the perfect *γεγενῆσθαι*; erroneously, without doubt, for the fact in question is one which remains for ever in its results, as is proved in the sequel.—*To establish* a promise is to confirm by fulfilling it. Comp. 2 Cor. i. 19, 20, a passage which is, as it were, the exegesis of ours.

Ver. 9*a*. The Gentiles, indeed, occupied a place in the prophecies committed to Israel; but God had never promised them anything directly. This circumstance gave to the salvation which was granted to them as well as to the Jews a more marked character of freeness.—The verb *δοξάσαι, to glorify,* is not an optative, as Hofmann thinks; the change of construction would be too abrupt. It is the aorist infinitive; and this infinitive is not to be regarded as parallel to *βεβαιῶσαι,* to establish, and consequently as dependent on *εἰς, in order to:* "in order to confirm the promises . . ., and in order that the Gentiles might glorify" . . ., as Meyer thinks. For the work of God for the Gentiles would thus be made dependent on the act by which Jesus became a minister of the law in behalf of the Jews, which, in this passage at least, would have no meaning. The simple construction is to make this infinitive, as well as the preceding *γεγενῆσθαι,* the object of *λέγω, I say:* "Now, I say that Jesus became a minister . . . for the truth of God . . .; and that the Gentiles glorify [have in Him a cause for glorifying] God for His mercy." Thus is formed the sublime duet in which there is uttered henceforth the thanksgiving of the entire race.—In support of this idea Paul now quotes a series of O. T. passages which announced the future participation of the Gentiles in the eternal hallelujah.

Vv. 9*b*, 10. *"As it is written, For this cause I will confess to Thee among the Gentiles, and sing unto Thy name. And again he saith, Rejoice, ye Gentiles, with His people."*—The first passage quoted is Ps. xviii. 49: David, victorious over all his enemies, declares that he will make his hymn of thanksgiving resound even in the heathen countries subject to his sceptre, in order to associate these nations in celebrating the work of Jehovah. In the application, Paul starts from the idea that what was

accomplished in David's person must be more magnificently realized in that of his antitype, the Messiah.

The second passage (ver. 10) is found in Deut. xxxii. 43. Moses, in his final hymn, describes Israel's future deliverance and the judgment of their adversaries; then he invites the Gentiles who have escaped punishment to join their song of rejoicing with that of Israel glorified. The apostle follows the version of the LXX. The latter translates from a form of the text which is not that of our Masoretic text, but which has been proved by Kennicott as a variant. According to this reading, the preposition *eth* (*with*) stands before *ammo* (*His people*), which leads to the meaning of the LXX. and of the apostle: "Rejoice, ye Gentiles, *with* His people." If this *eth* be rejected, as in the ordinary text, we may translate: "Rejoice, ye nations, His people," either, with de Wette, applying the term nations (*gojim*) to the twelve tribes of Israel, or holding, with Aquilas, Theodotion, Ostervald, Hofmann, that it is the Gentiles themselves who are here designated as the people of God. In the sense of de Wette, the application Paul makes of this saying would have no connection with the thought which it really expressed. But this meaning is not admissible, for Moses could not designate the people of Israel as *gojim, Gentiles,* especially in a song which turns throughout on the antagonism between Israel and the heathen. The second explanation would be possible; it would be in harmony with the object of the apostolic quotation. Only it must be confessed that the idea of the *transformation* of the Gentiles into God's people has not been so much as hinted by the rest of the song.—Again, it may be translated, as by the Vulgate and Segond: "Nations, praise His people," or, "Sing the praises of His people." But is it natural to direct praise to Israel rather than to Jehovah? Besides, Meyer rightly observes that the Hiphil *hirenin, to sing,* either has no regimen (Ps. xxxii. 11), or it is construed with the dative (Ps. lxxxi. 1).—Lange and others hold yet a different translation: "Gentiles, *make* His people *sing with joy* (by turning to the Lord)." *Hirenin* has really this causative sense, Ps. lxv. 8. But there is no question here of making Israel rejoice, but of celebrating the glory of Jehovah. If the meaning defended by Hofmann (see above) is inadmissible, it

only remains to follow the reading adopted by the LXX., and which has passed into the text of the apostle. The idea of these two quotations, as well as of the two following, is the announcement of the great fact: that a day will come when the Gentiles shall celebrate Jehovah in concert with Israel.

Vv. 11, 12. "*And again,*[1] *Praise the Lord, all ye Gentiles; and let all the peoples laud Him!*[2] *And again, Esaias saith, There shall be a root of Jesse, and He that shall rise to reign over the Gentiles; in Him shall the Gentiles hope.*"—The third passage is taken from Ps. cxvii. 1. This hymn in honour of Jehovah, ascribed to the Gentiles, naturally supposes their conversion and their entrance into the kingdom of God. We prefer the reading ἐπαινεσάτωσαν, *let them laud*, to the T. R. ἐπαινέσατε, *laud ye*. The second person is probably a correction after the preceding proposition. The MSS. of the LXX. present the same variant.

Ver. 12. Quotation from Isa. xi. 10.—The literal meaning of the Hebrew is: "And in that day there shall be a shoot of Jesse, which shall be set up as a banner for the peoples." . . . For the figure of an erected *banner*, the LXX. have substituted the idea of a person rising up to reign; Paul quotes after them. In meaning it comes to the same thing.—With what emotion does St. Paul refer to all these passages, each of which was the motto, as it were, of his own work among the Gentiles! One understands, in reading such quotations, what he said in ver. 4, undoubtedly from his own experience, of the patience and consolation which are kept up in the believer by the daily use of the Scriptures, as well as of the ever new hope which they inspire. This idea of *hope* is that which is expressed in the prayer uttered ver. 13. For this adoration of the Gentiles, to which the four preceding quotations refer, is the fruit not only of the enjoyment of present blessings, but also, and above all, of the hope of future blessings.

Ver. 13. "*Now the God of hope fill you with all joy and peace in believing, that ye may abound in hope through the power of the Holy Spirit!*"—God is described here as the *God of hope*, evidently in relation to the last words of the preceding

[1] B D E F, It. Syr. read λέγει after πάλιν.

[2] T. R., with F G L P, reads αἰνεῖσατε (*laud ye*) instead of αἰνεσάτωσαν (*let them laud*), which all the others read.

quotation: "In Him shall the Gentiles hope." The apostle could not more clearly designate his readers as former Gentiles, than he does by this connection.—The richer the possession of present blessings (*peace and joy*) which the believer derives by the ever-renewed act of faith (ἐν τῷ πιστεύειν, literally, *by believing*), the more does his soul rise to the lively view of future blessings, and according to the expression of the apostle, superabounds or overflows with hope.—The last words: *the power of the Holy Spirit*, point out to the reader once more, as in xiv. 17, the true power which they ought to seek, in opposition to the factitious power by which one exalts himself so easily above others. The former unites, for it strives to serve (xv. 1), whereas the second disunites.

From the very marked connection of this whole last passage with the apostle's ministry, it forms at once the conclusion of the didactic part of the Epistle to the Romans and the transition to the epistolary conclusion in which Paul proceeds to treat of the present situation of his apostolic work.

The reasons alleged by Baur against the authenticity of the first part of this chapter have appeared to us without force. The spirit of conciliation in regard to Judaism, which Baur judges incompatible with Paul's character, never ceased to be that which inspired his work. It was because he felt the need of keeping up union with the Twelve, that after each of his missions he returned to Jerusalem, "lest," as he says himself, Gal. ii. 2, "he had run in vain." The collections which he made in the churches of the Gentile world in behalf of the Judeo-Christians of Palestine had the same object. This was also the object of the personal concessions of which he speaks 1 Cor. ix. 21, 22, and by which he became "to the weak as weak," exactly as he recommends to the strong in this passage. Hilgenfeld rightly says: "What is looked upon as not possibly Paul's, to my conviction only proves one thing: that since the days of Marcion there has been formed an inexact idea of the apostle to which it is still sought at the present day to conform the real Paul" (*Einleit.* p. 323). It will be seen that this observation applies equally to the criticism of Baur and Lucht in regard to the second part of this chapter.

According to Schultz, it is from ver. 7 that the real Epistle to the Romans recommences, to which the whole moral treatise, xii. 1–xv. 6, was originally foreign. It would follow

therefrom that the *wherefore* of ver. 7 was immediately connected with the end of chap. xi. There is something seductive at first glance in this combination. The mercy shown both to the Gentiles and to the Jews (xi. 32) is well adapted to justify the invitation to the mutual receiving spoken of in our ver. 7. But it is nevertheless true that this relation is factitious—1st. Because the object of chap. xi. was to justify God's dispensations towards the people of Israel, and not to endeavour the union of Jews and Gentiles in the church; 2d. Because ver. 7 is in evident, and we might say literal correlation, not with any saying whatever of chap. xi., but with the first three verses of chap. xiv.

Finally, we have an inference to draw from this whole piece, xiv. 1–xv. 13, as to the composition of the church of Rome. We appropriate the observation of Hilgenfeld, who declares that in this passage, as nowhere else, there is revealed the true composition of this church; but we apply it in a very different sense from his. While confessing, indeed, that Paul is addressing the Roman Christians in a body as *strong* (xiv. 1 and xv. 1), this critic refuses to conclude therefrom that the majority of the church were Pauline by conviction and Gentile-Christian by origin. How does he escape from this consequence, which is yet so evident? By supposing that Paul expresses himself thus: "as conceiving good hopes of them,"—that is to say, describing them here not as they are, but as he hopes they will become. This critical subterfuge will deceive no one.

M. Reuss experiences no less embarrassment in view of our passage. In his *Histoire des écrits du N. T.* he expressed himself thus: "This passage is cleverly turned, so as to make believe that the freer opinion was dominant at Rome, while the contrary was assuredly the case." Reuss thus ascribed tactics to the apostle unworthy of his character, rather than abandon his preconceived opinion of a Judeo-Christian majority in this church. In his *Commentaire sur les épîtres pauliniennes* he expresses himself somewhat differently: "It is thus evident," he says, "that the author considers the Christian community of Rome as not being exclusively composed of Jews." That is certainly very evident, and no one ever denied that there were at Rome other Christians than those of Jewish origin. But this confession is altogether insufficient. Instead of *not exclusively*, he should have said *not essentially*, to deal fairly with the text before us. The violent expedient attempted by Mangold, in his desire to evade this conclusion, demonstrates it better than anything else. And when Schultz, acknowledging that the strong are Paulinists, and at the same time that they form the majority in the church, concludes therefrom that the whole

passage, xiv. 1–xv. 6, cannot have been addressed to the church of Rome, *seeing that it was Judeo-Christian in its majority*, he will allow us to regard this simply as a naive confession of the falsity of the latter opinion, and to conclude by saying, to the contrary effect: As this passage cannot have been written to a Judeo-Christian church, and as it is addressed to the church of Rome, this church in its majority was not Judeo-Christian.

EPISTOLARY CONCLUSION.

XV. 14–XVI. 27.

We have said that the Epistle to the Romans is a didactic treatise, doctrinal and practical, contained in a letter. The treatise is now closed, and the letter begins again. It is easy to show, indeed, that the part about to follow is closely correlated to the epistolary preface which preceded the treatise (i. 1–15). The apostle apologizes for the liberty with which he writes to the Christians of Rome, by reminding them of his mission to the Gentiles (xv. 14–16). This passage corresponds to i. 14 and 15, where he declares himself a *debtor* for the gospel to all Gentiles, the Romans included. He explains (xv. 17–24) what has kept him hitherto in the east. Thus he completes what he had said, i. 11–13, of the impossibility he had before found in the way of visiting Rome. The personal salutations which we find in the first part of chap. xvi. correspond to the address, i. 7: "To all that are at Rome, beloved of God." Finally, the doxology which closes at once chap. xvi. and the whole Epistle (vv. 25–27) brings us back to the idea with which the letter had opened (i. 1, 2): that of the fulfilment of the divine plan by the gospel promised beforehand in the O. T. Thus the circle is completed; on every other view (whether the end of the Epistle be put at chap. xi. or at chap. xiv.) it is broken.

This conclusion contains the following passages:—

(1) xv. 14–33, where the apostle gives explanations of a personal nature regarding his letter, his work in general, his approaching visit to Rome, and the journey which he must first make to Jerusalem.

(2) xvi. 1–16: Recommendations and salutations of the apostle.

(3) Vv. 17–20: A warning in regard to the probable arrival of Judaizers in the church of Rome.

(4) Vv. 21–24: The salutations of his fellow-workers.

(5) Vv. 25–27: The doxology which closes the Epistle.

TWENTY-NINTH PASSAGE (XV. 14–33).

Personal Explanations.

This passage is intended to convey to the minds of his readers full light as to the apostle's conduct toward them. These explanations relate first to this letter itself.

Vv. 14–16.

Vv. 14, 15. "*Now I myself also am persuaded of you, my brethren, that ye also*[1] *are full of goodness, filled with all knowledge, able also to admonish one another.*[2] *Nevertheless, brethren,*[3] *I have written the more boldly*[4] *unto you, as in some measure to put you in mind, because of the grace that is given to me of God.*"[5]—The form of address: *my brethren,* is occasioned by the return to the epistolary style.—By saying: *myself also,* the apostle hints that the very full instruction which he has given them in this Epistle is not caused by a want of confidence in their Christian attainments; *myself:* "though my letter might make you suppose the contrary." This meaning seems to me more natural than that of many commentators who suppose that Paul means: "I, as well as others," or: "without needing any one to remind me of what you are."—The καὶ αὐτοί, *ye also,* is certainly authentic, notwithstanding the omission of the words by the Greco-Latins; the meaning is: "you, to whom I am thus writing."

[1] The words καὶ αὐτοὶ are omitted by D E F G, It.
[2] L Syr. read ἀλλους instead of ἀλλήλους.
[3] ℵ A B C omit ἀδελφοί.
[4] A B: τολμηροτέρως instead of τολμηροτέρον.
[5] T. R. reads, with 7 Mjj., ὅτε instead of ἀπό, which is the reading of ℵ B F.

The qualities on which the apostle rests this favourable judgment are at once of a moral and intellectual nature. They are full of *goodness*, ἀγαθωσύνη; this word denotes practical solidity, the full maturity of spiritual life; then they possess in abundance every kind of Christian *knowledge*, πᾶσα γνῶσις. We may remark the difference between this testimony and the eulogium passed on the Corinthians (1st Ep. i. 5), where Paul brings out only this second sort of gifts (*knowledge and speech*).—From these two kinds of qualities it followed that there was among them the capacity for providing in a certain measure for their own edification and their mutual instruction. The true reading is ἀλλήλους, *one another*, and not as it is in one Mj. and the Syriac version, ἄλλους, *others*. The καί, *also* or *even*, which accompanies this pronoun, means: even among yourselves, without the help of any master from without. There is nothing in the expressions of this verse which goes beyond what the apostle could say with all sincerity, nor anything to support the judgment of Baur: that these sayings are the work of a later writer, who, seeing the bad effect produced by this letter on the Judeo-Christians of Rome, sought to soothe them by adding these chaps. xv. and xvi. The apostle might well think the church of Rome very advanced in all respects, without its following that a letter like this was a work of supererogation. He himself (i. 8) gave thanks for the faith of his readers, "which is spoken of throughout the whole world;" and if the terms which he uses in our verse could not be applied fully to all the individuals composing the church, they were nevertheless strictly true when applied to the church as a whole; for, as chap. xvi. will show, it possessed a very great abundance of teachers and evangelists who could carry out within it the functions of instruction and admonition.

Ver. 15. The δέ is adversative: *but;* nevertheless; and the comparative τολμηρότερον, *more boldly*, is explained precisely by this contrast with ver. 1: "More freely than it seemed I should do in the case of such a church." The repetition of the form of address: *brethren*, is perfectly natural in these conditions; it expresses anew the feeling of equality with which the apostle loves to approach them.—In the explana-

tion of what follows, everything depends on the grammatical meaning and construction of ἀπὸ μέρους, which we have translated by: *in some measure,* and which literally signifies: *in part.* Some refer this restriction to the verb: *I wrote you* (Meyer, for example), and apply it solely to some particularly forcible passages of the letter, such as xi. 17–25, xii. 2, xiv. 1 et seq. But what is there in these passages so different from the rest of the Epistle, and which should have called forth a special apology? Hofmann refers this "in part" to what is fragmentary in the teaching of the Epistle to the Romans. But in no letter does Paul give a statement of evangelic doctrine which less deserves to be called fragmentary. It is impossible to get an appropriate meaning for ἀπὸ μέρους, *in part,* except by referring this restriction to ἐπαναμιμνήσκων, *putting you in remembrance,* and applying it, not to the extent and contents of the teaching, as if the readers had had certain parts of the truth present to their mind, and not others, but to the *mode* of giving instruction. The apostle has written to them, not with the view of teaching them things that were *new* to them, but to bring back to their memory, in a way not to be forgotten, things which he knew to be already known to them *to a certain degree.* Thus is explained the ὡς, *as;* it is much more as *reminding* than as instructing them that he has written. He wished to treat them not as catechumens, but as Christians and brethren.—And if he has taken the liberty of acting thus toward them, it is not arbitrarily and at his own hand, it is in virtue of the mission which he has received and of the gift which has been bestowed on him in order to its fulfilment. Such is the meaning of the διὰ τὴν χάριν, *on account of the grace,* an expression which we must beware of rendering "*through* the grace," which is forbidden by the regimen in the accusative. The thing referred to, as is shown by the following verse, is his commission as apostle of the Gentiles, which he has only been obeying by writing thus to the church of Rome. Thus he apologizes for his letter:—(1) By declaring that he wished merely to remind his readers of what they already knew; and (2) by tracing his right of acting thus to the apostleship which he has received. There is room for hesitating between the two readings, ὑπό, "*by* God," and ἀπό, "*on the part of*

God." The former is perhaps preferable in the context, as denoting a more direct divine interposition.

The right understanding of these two verses suffices to set aside Baur's view regarding the entire Epistle to the Romans. According to this critic, the apostle aimed at nothing less than to bring over the church from the Judeo-Christian legal standpoint to his own evangelical conception. Now, to say that all he did was only *to bring back to the memory* of his readers what they already knew, would, if such had been his aim, be an act of gross hypocrisy; to make one change his opinion is not to remind him of what he knows. It is true that Baur has sought to give a quite different meaning to the expression: "as putting you in mind." He applies it, not to the contents of the Epistle, but solely to the communications which are about to follow regarding the work which Paul has accomplished in the world. But such is not the natural meaning of the word ἔγραψα, *I have written unto you;* and the restriction: ἀπὸ μέρους, *in part,* no longer in that case admits of explanation. It is with good reason that Mangold himself declares that it is impossible to found a hypothesis on exegetical processes of such violence.

Ver. 16. "*That I should be the minister of Jesus Christ to the Gentiles, ministering the gospel of God, that the offering up of the Gentiles might be acceptable, being sanctified by the Holy Spirit.*"—The grace of apostleship had been given to Paul for the accomplishment of a sublime task. The word λειτουργός denotes a public functionary. In this case the function involved is nothing less than presenting to God the Gentile world as an offering which may be acceptable to Him. This world-wide service to which Jesus Christ Himself had called St. Paul was not only that of a preacher, it had a priestly character. This is certainly what is expressed by the term ἱερουργεῖν (see Meyer): "to offer sacerdotally;" not that the preacher of the gospel is in any sense a mediator who comes between God and the believer; but his function does not consist in simple teaching; each time it is an act of consecration whereby the messenger of salvation offers to God his own person as well as the persons of all his hearers. We know how Paul prayed constantly for the churches which he had already founded (comp. i. 8–10, and the beginning of all the

Epistles), and we can thus imagine what the work of their founding was. Thus was his whole apostolate a priestly function. In the expression: "to fulfil sacerdotally (minister) the gospel of God," we must understand, here as elsewhere (see on i. 8), by "the gospel," not the contents, but the *act* of preaching. — The end of this priestly office confided to the apostle is to transform the world of the Gentiles into an *offering well-pleasing to God.* Comp. Phil. ii. 17.—*Τῶν ἐθνῶν, of the Gentiles,* is a genitive of apposition: the offering which consists of the persons of the Gentiles. The verb *γένηται, might be* (*become*), indicates progress; this progress does not consist only in the growing extension of the work; but also, and especially, as is shown by the following words, in the transformation of those who are its subjects: *being sanctified by the Holy Spirit.* The word of salvation received with faith must be sealed in the heart by power from on high, that the soul may be truly gained, and that it may belong to God; comp. Eph. i. 13. The apostle probably alludes to the Levitical ordinance, according to which the sprinkling of salt over the meat-offering was the condition of its acceptance on the part of God.

If it is true, according to the natural meaning of these verses 14–16, that the apostle justifies his Epistle to the Romans by his commission to be the apostle of the Gentiles, it clearly follows that the majority of the Christians of Rome were of Gentile origin. The defenders of the Judeo-Christian composition of this church have had to seek to parry this decisive blow. They have tried to do so in two ways. Mangold explains these verses in this sense: "I have required, as apostle of the Gentiles, to express myself more than once in this letter more forcibly than seemed fitting in addressing Judeo-Christians like you; but I had to uphold the rights of those of whom God made me the apostle."[1] But what is there to give us the right to restrict the application of the word *τολμηρότερον, more boldly,* to a few passages of the Epistle relative to the calling of the Gentiles? This expression bears on the character of the entire writing as a doctrinal composition; this is shown by the connection of ver. 15 with ver. 14. Filled with knowledge, as the Romans were, they seemed to have no need of this complete instruction. Then the description of Paul's apostolate, from ver. 16 to ver. 20, proves that we have

[1] *Der Römerbrief,* etc., pp. 70 and 71.

here the positive indication of the motive which led him to write this Epistle, and not only the justification of some passages of his letter. Weizsäcker correctly observes that the apostle explains his letter by the duty which his task of providing for the edification of the Gentiles imposed on him, and not by the right which he has to uphold their cause before Judeo-Christians.—Volkmar, who pursues the same object as Mangold, has attempted another explanation:[1] "I do not forget, Paul would say, that I am only the apostle of the Gentiles, and I have no thought, in writing you as I do, to intrude on a church which does not belong to me, since it is of Judeo-Christian origin; and that is the very reason which has prevented me hitherto from visiting you, for my intention is not to build on a foundation laid by another; but now that I have no more place in the countries of the east, I am about to proceed to Spain, and I shall see you in passing" (vv. 17–24). This construction is ingenious, but impossible. The διὰ τὴν χάριν, "*because of* the grace given unto me," depending on ἔγραψα, *I have written unto you*, is absolutely opposed to *it*; and in what follows the apostle does not for a moment say that he has not yet visited Rome because of the Judeo-Christian character of the church, but that he has not done so because he was still detained in the east by nearer duties. Whether the founders of the church of Rome were or were not Judeo-Christians, whether the believers gathered in by them were or were not of this character, the apostle makes no allusion to this side of the question; a proof that it was not this which concerned his inference.—Lucht has attempted to find a proof of unauthenticity in the absence of the title *apostle*, ver. 16. The forger sought, he holds, by avoiding this title, to spare the susceptibilities of the Judeo-Christians of Rome. But, answers Hilgenfeld, "if the word is not there, the thing is." And, in fact, ver. 16 is nothing else than the paraphrase of the term: *apostle of the Gentiles*. And if Paul has here preferred the paraphrase to the title itself, it is because it was much more suitable than the latter to explain the course which he had followed in writing such a letter to this church which he had not founded, and which he did not even yet know.

As to this mission to the Gentile world with which he has been invested, God has crowned it with such successes that it is now finished in the east, and that it only remains to the apostle to continue it in the west, which will lead him next to Rome. Such are the contents of the following verses,

[1] *Paulus Römerbrief*, pp. 60 and 61.

17–24, the somewhat free connection of which with what precedes is not hard to understand.

Vv. 17–24.

Vv. 17–19. "*I have therefore whereof I may glory*[1] *through Jesus Christ in the service of God. For I will not dare to speak*[2] *of any of those things which Christ hath not wrought by me, to make the Gentiles obedient, by word and deed, in the power*[3] *of signs and wonders, in the power of the Spirit of God;*[4] *so that from Jerusalem, and the countries round about, unto Illyria, I have fully preached the gospel of Christ.*"—*Therefore:* in virtue of that weighty commission by which I have felt myself authorized to write you as I have done. If we read the article τήν before καύχησιν, "*the* glorying," the meaning is: "I have therefore *this* cause of glorying (that of being Christ's minister to the Gentiles)." But the last words: *in the service of God,* are thus made superfluous. The article must therefore be rejected; the meaning is this: "I have truly occasion to glory in what concerns the service of God." The expression τὰ πρὸς Θεόν, literally, "what concerns God," is a sort of technical phrase in the Jewish liturgical language to denote the functions of worship (Heb. ii. 17, v. 1, etc.). This term therefore belongs to the same order of ideas as all those of the preceding verse (ἱερουργεῖν, λειτουργός, προσφορά, ἡγιασμένη). — The words: *through Jesus Christ,* soften the too startling force which the term *glorying* might have. This verse, while recalling the work already done by Paul in God's service, completes the justification of what Paul had called the τολμηρότερον, the somewhat bold character of his conduct. Nothing assuredly could have a more authentic character than such a passage.

This ver. 17 is at the same time the transition to what follows. As a confirmation of his apostolic mission to the Gentiles, Paul expounds the extraordinary results which he

[1] B C D E F G read την (before καυχησιν), which is rejected by ℵ A L P and the Mnn.

[2] D E F G read ειπειν instead of λαλειν.

[3] D E F G read αυτου after δυναμει.

[4] T. R., with ℵ L P, Syr^{sch}., reads πνευματος θεου; A C D E F G, It. read πνευματος αγιου; B: πνευματος alone.

has obtained—(1) from the view-point of the nature of the work, vv. 18, 19*a*; (2) from the view-point of the extension of the work accomplished, ver. 19*b*.

Ver. 18. The words: "I will not dare to speak of any of those things," signify, according to Meyer and others, that to exalt himself he will not take the liberty of inventing facts which Christ had not really wrought by him. But did this odious supposition need to be denied? Such a defence of his veracity might be in place in the Epistles to the Corinthians, but not in that to the Romans. Besides, the expression τι ὧν, *any of the things which*, naturally refers only to real facts. To designate fictitious facts, he must have used, not τι ὧν, but τι ὅ, *anything which*. Finally, all the following qualifications: "*for the obedience . . ., by word* and *deed*" . . ., can only be applied to real facts. Hofmann thinks Paul means that he will not take advantage here of any other grounds of glorying than those which enter into the service of Christ; that he will omit, for example, all those he enumerates (Phil. iii. 4 et seq.). But in that case the subject Χριστός, *Christ*, should be at the head of the proposition. And what motive could the apostle have to allude in this passage to the advantages which he might have possessed before being a Christian? The only possible meaning of these words: *I will not dare*, is this: "It would imply some hardihood on my part to indicate a single mark of apostleship whereby God has not deigned to set His seal on my ministry to the Gentiles." It is a very delicate form of saying, that it would be easier to convict him of falsehood in the signs of apostolic power which he might omit in speaking of his work, than in those which he enumerates here. This: *I will not dare*, is, as it were, the acme of the καύχησις, of that *glorying* of which he spoke in ver. 17. It would be vain for him to seek a divine manifestation which Christ has not wrought by him; he would not discover it. This mode of speaking does not come of boastfulness; it is the expression of a holy jealousy in behalf of the Gentiles, that domain which God has assigned him, and which He has privileged by the apostleship of Paul, no less than the Jewish world has been by the apostleship of the Twelve; comp. 2 Cor. xii. 11, 12.—In the expression: *by word*, are embraced all his

teachings, public and private; and in the expression: *by deed*, his labours, journeys, collections, sufferings, sacrifices of all kinds, and even miracles, though these are mentioned afterwards as a category by themselves. — The expression: *the power of signs*, is explained by Meyer in this sense: "the power (my power over men) arising from signs." It seems to me more natural to understand: "the (divine) power breaking forth in signs." Miraculous facts are called *signs* in relation to the meaning which God attaches to them and which men ought to see in them, and *wonders* (τέρας) in relation to nature and its laws, on the regular basis of which the miracle is an inroad.—*The power of the Spirit* may designate the creative virtue inherent in this divine breath; but here the complement seems to me to be the person of Paul: "the power with which the Spirit fills me."—It is better to read, with the T. R., the Spirit *of God* than the *Holy* Spirit (with 6 Mjj.), for it is force that is in question rather than holiness.

In the second part of the verse Paul passes from the nature of his activity to the extent of the results obtained. The latter is the effect of the former; hence the ὥστε, *so that*. For the previous subject, *Christ*, there is substituted the personal pronoun *I*, because in the act of preaching it is the human agent who is in view. There has been found (by Hofmann and others) in the word κύκλῳ, *in a circle*, an indication of the course followed by the apostle in his work of evangelizing, to the effect that Paul did not proceed from Jerusalem to Illyria by a straight line, but by describing a vast ellipse. This idea is far from natural, and would have a shade of boastfulness. It is much simpler to understand the word *in a circle* (or *with its surroundings*) as intended to widen the point of departure indicated by the word *Jerusalem*: "Jerusalem, with the surrounding countries." In fact, it was strictly at Damascus, then in Arabia, that Paul had begun to evangelize. But Jerusalem being the point best known to western Christians, he names only this capital. —If we refuse, with Meyer, to give to the word εὐαγγέλιον the meaning of *preaching of the gospel*, it is impossible to find a natural meaning here for the word πληροῦν, *to fill*. To translate, with Luther: "to fill every place *with* the gospel," is

contrary to grammar. Meyer understands: to give the gospel its full development (by spreading it everywhere). But one feels how forced this manner of expression would be in this sense. We have only to represent to ourselves the *act of preaching* the gospel in the east as a task to be fulfilled or an ideal to be reached, and the meaning of πληροῦν becomes clear. It is in this same sense that we have seen πλήρωμα νόμου signify *the fulfilment of the law*, xiii. 10. Baur has here found manifest exaggeration, and therein a sign of unauthenticity. But it is clear that Paul was not claiming to have finished the work of preaching in relation to the small towns and country districts of the lands he had evangelized. He regarded his apostolic task as entirely fulfilled when he had lighted the torch in the great centres, such as Thessalonica, Corinth, and Ephesus. That done, he reckoned on the churches founded in those capitals continuing the evangelization of the provinces. The same critic has pronounced the fact here mentioned of the apostle's preaching *in Illyria* to be inadmissible. None of the apostle's journeys known to us had led him into this "rude and inhospitable country." The rudeness of a country did not arrest St. Paul. From the fact that this mission is not mentioned in the Book of Acts, must it be concluded that it is a fable? But this book does not speak of the *three years* passed by Paul in Arabia, according to Gal. i. 17; must it therefore be concluded that the statement is false, and that the Epistle to the Galatians is unauthentic? A forger would have taken good care, on the contrary, not to implicate himself in other facts of the apostle's life than those which were generally known. Besides, what is there improbable in the statement that during the time which elapsed from his leaving Ephesus (Pentecost 57 or 58) till his arrival at Corinth (December 58) the apostle, who spent that time in Macedonia, should have made an excursion to the shores of the Adriatic? For that only a few days were needed. The Book of Acts is not at all intended to relate in detail the life of Peter or of Paul.

Vv. 20, 21. "*And that while reckoning it my honour*[1] *to preach the gospel, not where Christ was already named, lest I*

[1] T. R. reads, with ℵ A C E L, the Mnn., Syr., φιλοτιμούμενον; B D F G P: φιλοτιμούμαι.

should build upon another man's foundation: but as it is written, To whom He was not spoken of, they shall see Him; and they that have not heard shall know Him."—To confirm the reality of his apostleship to the Gentiles, Paul has referred to the successes with which his activity thus far has been crowned in the east; and now, to pass to the idea of his future work in the west and of his visit to Rome, he recalls the principle by which he has always been guided in the direction of his labours. The participle φιλοτιμούμενον has something of the force of a gerund: *while making it my ambition.* The reading φιλοτιμοῦμαι, *I esteem it a matter of honour,* must be unhesitatingly rejected; for the apostle does not mean here to express a new idea, but merely to define the manner of his procedure in the work to the goal of which he is now approaching. The term φιλοτιμεῖσθαι should not be generalized in the sense of: *to strive* or *bind myself to;* it must be kept in its strict sense: *to esteem it a matter of honour.* Not that Paul sought his personal honour in the method followed by him; what he was concerned about was his apostolic dignity. An apostle is not a simple pastor or evangelist; his mission is, as Paul himself says, 1 Cor. iii. 10, to "*lay* the foundation" on which others after him may build, consequently to preach where others have not yet come. Paul might have said: "to preach the gospel where Christ has not yet been named," but he prefers to give his expression a still more negative turn, and to say more precisely: "to preach the gospel, not where He has been named." He wishes to preach the gospel, but not where any one has done so before him.

Ver. 21. This conduct rested, as we have just said, on the exalted feeling which he had of the apostolic mission; and, moreover, he found, as it were, the programme for it in a prophetical saying, Isa. lii. 15. The prophet speaks here of the Gentile kings and peoples to whom the declaration of the Messiah's work shall come for the first time.—The expression: "as it is written," depends, as in ver. 3, on a verb understood: "*but doing* as it is written." Volkmar here finds proof of the Judeo-Christian character of the church of Rome, since this church is to Paul like a foreign domain on which he has denied himself the satisfaction of entering. Weiz-

säcker shows indeed that Paul's words contain nothing of the kind; for what he says refers in general to every church not founded by him, whether of Jewish or Gentile origin. But it may be questioned if Paul is even alluding to the reason which has kept him hitherto from visiting Rome. Does not Paul by this digression, vv. 20 and 21, simply mean to say that so long as there still remained unevangelized countries in the east, it was his duty to remain in that part of the world? In vv. 22–24, he calls to mind that now circumstances are changed, and that the application of the same principle which had hitherto detained him in the east, henceforth impels him to the west, which will bring him at the same time to Rome. —Baur has asked, if to write a letter of so considerable compass as this to a Judeo-Christian church not founded by him, was not to build on the foundation laid by another? We first remove from the objection the word Judeo-Christian; then we call to mind that the founders of the church of Rome were chiefly disciples of St. Paul, who came from churches founded by him in the east; and finally, we cannot put on the same footing a letter written by Paul, and his personal intervention as a preacher. He wrote to the Colossians and the Laodiceans, though he had not personally founded and known those churches (Col. ii. 1). It is precisely for this reason that in beginning his Epistle (i. 1–7), and then again in closing it (xv. 16), he has referred to his mission to the Gentiles which imposes on him duties to all churches of Gentile origin.

Vv. 22–24. "*From which cause also I have been hindered*[1] *often*[2] *from coming to you; but now, having no more place in these parts, and having a great desire these many*[3] *years to come unto you, when*[4] *I take my journey into Spain,*[5] *I trust*[6] *to see you in my journey, and to be brought on my way thitherward by you,*[7] *if first I have somewhat satisfied the need I have of seeing*

[1] D E F G: ενεκοπην instead of ενεκοπτομην.

[2] B D E F G: πολλακις instead of τα πολλα.

[3] B G: ικανων instead of πολλων.

[4] T. R., with L, Mnn., reads ως εαν; all the others: ως αν.

[5] T. R., with L, Mnn., reads (after Σπανιαν) ελευσομαι προς υμας, *I will come to you.* These words are omitted by ℵ A B C D E F G P, It. Syr^{sch}.

[6] T. R., with ℵ A B C D E L P, reads γαρ after ελπιζω; this γαρ is omitted by F G, It. Syr.

[7] Instead of υφ' υμων, B D E F G read αφ' υμων.

you."—The "for which cause also" might be connected with vv. 20 and 21 in this sense: because I still found parts in the east where Christ had not been preached. But vv. 20 and 21 may also be regarded as a digression, and the "for which cause" connected with the idea of ver. 19. The immense labour to which Paul had to give himself to preach the gospel from Jerusalem to Illyria has not allowed him to carry out his often formed project of going to preach it at Rome (i. 13).—The imperfect ἐνεκοπτόμην is the true reading. It is an imperfect of duration: "Ever and again I was hindered."—*Τὰ πολλά* might signify: *by many things;* but it is more natural to understand it in the sense: *many times,* like πολλάκις, which is read by the *Vatic.* and the Greco-Lats.

Vv. 23, 24. Yet, agreeably to the principle expounded vv. 20 and 21, his journey to Rome will not, strictly speaking, be a mission, but rather a visit as it were in passing, for the church already exists in this capital. When, Acts xix. 21, Paul at Ephesus was forming his plans for the future, it indeed was *to Rome* that he wished to proceed; but afterwards he had no doubt heard of the foundation of a church in that city, and therefore he now no longer says: *to Rome,* but: *to Spain, by way of Rome.* The unevangelized country, Spain, is the goal (the εἰς); Rome is now only the way (the διά). Yet it would be easy to go directly by sea from Asia to Spain. But this is what he will take good care not to do, for he hungers and thirsts to enter into personal communication with the Christians of Rome, and he will make a detour to visit them in passing. Such is the perfectly obvious meaning of these two verses.

The text of ver. 24 comes to us in three forms. The T. R. and the Byzs. read after the words: "into Spain," a principal clause: "*I will come to you;*" which leads them to add a *for* with the following verb: "*for* I trust." The clause is simple, the sense clear; only these words: *I will come to you,* are wanting in the documents of the two other texts.—The Alex. is much less intelligible. It begins at ver. 23 with two participles: "having no more place . . . but having the desire" . . .; then it continues with a subordinate proposition: "when I shall go into Spain;" and instead of the principal verb expected, it closes by saying: "for I hope to

see you in passing" . . .; and in ver. 25: "now then I go to Jerusalem." There would be but one way of justifying this text, to make a long parenthesis from: *for I trust*, to the end of the verse, and to find the principal verb on which the two participles of ver. 23 depend, in ver. 25: "now I go to Jerusalem." But this would require us to reject the δέ, *but* or *now*, at the beginning of ver. 25, contrary to the authority of *all* the documents; then, there is no logical relation between the idea of these two participles: *having no more place, having the desire to come to you*, and the verb: *I go to Jerusalem*. To render this reading admissible, it is absolutely necessary to reject the γάρ, *for*, after ἐλπίζω, *I trust*, and thus to make this the principal verb.—This is precisely what is done by the Greco-Lat. reading, which is supported by the ancient Syriac version. This is not the only time that the Greco-Latin text has the superiority over the other two. We have already met with some similar cases in the Epistle to the Romans (xiii. 1, for example), and we beg the reader specially to compare 1 Cor. ix. 10, which is not intelligible except in the form preserved by the Greco-Latin documents. The meaning which we get by means of this text is faultless: "Having no more place . . ., but having the desire to see you . . ., when I go into Spain, I hope to see you in passing." —The διά in διαπορευόμενος alludes to the idea that Rome will only be a place of rest and passage; the reason of this has been explained. The church is already founded there.—The verb προπεμφθῆναι, *to be conducted farther*, contains these two ideas: to be accompanied by some of theirs, and to be provided with everything necessary for the journey; comp. Tit. iii. 13 and 3 John 6.—The reading ὑφ' ὑμῶν, *by you*, which contains the idea of the solicitude of the Romans about Paul, is much to be preferred to the reading ἀφ' ὑμῶν, *from among you*, which makes the church only a point of departure.—Ἐκεῖ, the adverb of rest, is used, as it often is, instead of ἐκεῖσε, the adverb of motion; the goal is considered as reached: "to go *thither* and be *there*." Comp. John xi. 8. —Ἐμπλησθῆναι, literally, *to saturate himself with them*, a very lively expression of the need he feels to make their personal acquaintance, and of the pleasure which this relation will bring him; comp. i. 12. The word *somewhat* is not a

poor compliment which he pays to the Romans, as if he meant to say that his stay among them will only half satisfy him; Paul means, on the contrary, that he will never see them enough to satisfy *completely* the want he feels of spiritual communion with them.—Baur suspects this whole passage, for the reason that this journey to Spain is a pure fiction; a notion, the realization of which is wholly without attestation. But the Fragment of Muratori says expressly: "the departure of Paul, setting out from Rome to Spain." For the very reason, answers Hilgenfeld, that this journey never took place, a forger would not have mentioned it. And without examining the question of fact, how is it possible to prove that Paul could not have formed such a project, which corresponded so well with his noble ambition, even though he had not been able to realize it?

But before setting out for the west, the apostle has yet a task to fulfil; he proposes to seal by a solemn act the union between the two portions of the church in that part of the world which he is about to leave. Such is the object of a last visit which he yet reckons on making to Jerusalem. He must transmit to the mother church of Jerusalem, on behalf of the churches of Greece, the fruits of a collection which they have made spontaneously for it. The apostle is concerned to inform the Christians of Rome on this point, not only because this journey will detain him some time yet in the east, but especially because it may involve him in dangers, and because he has a request to address to them in this relation. Such are the perfectly natural contents of the end of the chapter.

Vv. 25–33.

Vv. 25–27. "*But now I go unto Jerusalem to minister*[1] *unto the saints. For it hath pleased them of Macedonia and Achaia to make a certain contribution for the poor saints which are at Jerusalem. For it hath pleased them, and verily their debtors they are; for if the Gentiles have been made partakers of their spiritual things, their duty is also to minister unto them in carnal things.*"—The νυνὶ δέ, *but now*, does not con-

[1] ℵ reads διακονησων; D E F G: διακονησαι; all the rest: διακονων.

trast, as that of ver. 22 did, his approaching journey to Rome with certain anterior obstacles; the matter in question now is a near hindrance which still retards his visit to Rome. The word διακονῶν, *putting myself at the service of* (ministering), shows that the apostle is referring to a task which is sacred in his eyes. The participle present διακονῶν is preferable to the participle future or to the infinitive aorist: "in order to serve," which is read by some documents. For the service is not only the object of the journey; it consists of the journey itself.

Ver. 26. The expression: *the saints*, characterizes the church of Jerusalem as the most venerable of Christendom; comp. 1 Cor. xvi. 1. But it is not to all the church, it is to the most indigent of its members, that this service is destined. The idea has often been advanced, that the cause of the poverty of so large a number of believers at Jerusalem was the community of goods which is thought to have prevailed at the origin of this church. This is to exaggerate and mistake the import of the facts related in the narrative of the Acts on this subject. The state of things is quite naturally explained in the following way. From the beginning, the preaching of Christ found but little access except to the poorer classes; "Blessed are *the poor*," said Jesus (Luke vi. 20). The indigence of those first believers must have been increased day by day by the violent hatred of the Jewish authorities and of the upper classes; comp. Jas. ii. 4–6. What easier for rich and powerful families than to deprive poor artisans, who had become the objects of their reprobation, of their means of subsistence! This is an event which is reproduced everywhere when there is a transition from one religious form to another; so in Catholic countries where Protestantism is preached; among the Jews, among the heathen of India or China, etc., when one of their own becomes a Christian. Thus are naturally explained the meals in common (the service of tables) to which the whole church was invited in the first times, the collection made at Antioch (Acts xi. 29) in behalf of the church of Jerusalem, and the request which the apostles addressed to Paul and Barnabas, Gal. ii. 10.—Κοινωνία, strictly *communion*, and hence material communication so far as it arises from communion of hearts;

comp. Heb. xiii. 16. The word τινά, "*some communication*," brings out with delicacy the free and at the same time accidental character of this collection, both as to the thing in itself and as to its amount. It is the churches which have spontaneously taxed themselves for this purpose. It is surprising that Paul speaks only of the churches of Greece, for Acts xx. 4 and 1 Cor. xvi. 1 put beyond doubt the participation of the churches of Asia and Galatia.

Ver. 27. The repetition of the: "it seemed good to them," emphasizes still more forcibly the free-will of the churches in this course. They felt themselves impelled to pay this homage to the church from which the gift of salvation had come to them; they even judged that it was a small matter to act thus in a lower domain in behalf of those to whom they owed blessings of an infinitely more precious nature. Paul evidently enlarges thus on this subject, not only to praise the churches of Greece, or with the view of leading the church of Rome immediately to carry out a similar work, but with the intention of awaking in the hearts of his hearers the feeling of a duty which they shall also have the opportunity of fulfilling some time or other. After this episode Paul returns to his principal subject.

Vv. 28, 29. "*When, therefore, I have performed this and have sealed to them this fruit, I will come by you into Spain. Now I am sure that when I come unto you, I shall come in the fulness*[1] *of the blessing of Christ.*"[2]—The term σφραγίζεσθαι, *to seal*, has been understood here in many ways. Erasmus explained it thus: "when I have delivered to them this money well enclosed and sealed." This meaning is grammatically impossible, and the idea is rather vulgar. Theodoret thought Paul was alluding to the duly signed and sealed receipt which should be given him by the receivers to be transmitted to the donors. But the αὐτοῖς, *to them*, can only apply to the former, while in this sense it would require to refer to the latter. Hofmann applies the idea of the *seal* to the signed and sealed deed by which the churches of Greece charged Paul to take to Jerusalem the deputies who were

[1] D F G: πληροφορια instead of πληρωματι.

[2] T. R., with L, Mnn. Syr., reads του ευαγγελιου του Χριστου (*of the gospel of Christ*); all the rest: Χριστου (*of Christ*) only.

bearers of the collection. But how could all that be included in the simple expression: to seal? The term σφραγίζεσθαι is frequently taken in a metaphorical sense: *to keep closed, to keep secret, attest, confirm, consent.* It is in this wide sense that it must be explained here. The word denotes the delivery officially and in due form of the sum collected. We can see, Acts xxi. 18, how Paul, arrived at Jerusalem, repaired to the assembly of the elders called together in the house of James as to a solemn reception. It was then no doubt that the letter of commission from the churches was communicated, with the sums accompanying it, and that a receipt, duly signed was given by the elders.—Paul declares that this formality once accomplished, he will haste to take up his project of a journey to the west (ver. 29); and if things can be so brought about, he is perfectly sure of the happiness he will enjoy among his brethren of the church of Rome. Would a forger, writing in the apostle's name in the second century, have made him pen a plan of the future so different from the way in which things really fell out?—The Greco-Latin reading πληροφορίᾳ, instead of πληρώματι (*fulness*), is evidently erroneous; for this word signifies only "fulness *of conviction*," a meaning which does not suit the context. The words τοῦ εὐαγγελίου τοῦ, *of the gospel of* (Christ), in the Byz. documents, must be regarded as an interpolation, unless we choose to explain their omission in the other Mjj. by the four terminations in ου which follow one another consecutively.

The more assured the mind of the apostle is when it is turned to Rome, the more does disquiet take possession of his heart when he thinks of Jerusalem.

Vv. 30–32. "*Now I exhort you, brethren,*[1] *by our Lord Jesus Christ, and by the love of the Spirit, that ye strive together with me before God for me in your prayers, that I may be delivered from the disobedient in Judea, and that this aid*[2] *which I have for*[3] *Jerusalem may be accepted of the saints; that coming*[4]

[1] B omits ἀδελφοι.

[2] B D F G read διαφοριαν instead of διακονια.

[3] B D F G read εν instead of εις.

[4] T. R., with D E F G L P, reads ελθω with και before συναναπαυσωμαι; ℵ A C read ελθων, and reject the και.

with joy among you by the will of God,[1] *I may with you be refreshed.*"—The δέ might be adversative (*but*); it would thus express the contrasted impressions which we have just indicated. But it is better to take it simply as progressive: *now.* The form of address: *brethren,* which the *Vatic.* wrongly rejects, makes a pressing appeal to the sympathy of the readers. This appeal is addressed in the name of Christ Himself, whom Paul serves, then of the affection by which he feels himself bound to the Romans by the operation of the Holy Spirit. *The love of the Spirit* is opposed to that which exists between persons who know one another personally; "who have seen my face in the flesh," as Paul himself says, Col. ii. 1 (in opposition to i. 8).—The request so solemnly prefaced is one for a common *struggle;* for there are hostile powers to be combated (ver. 31). The two regimens: *for me* (in my behalf) and *before God,* are often joined to the substantive προσευχαῖς: "your prayers for me before God." But would not the regimen *before God* connected with the word *prayers* be superfluous, and would not the expression *your prayers for me* imply a thing which Paul has no right to assume: viz. that they make prayer for him continually? The two regimens, therefore, depend rather on the verb *strive.* To strive *before God,* whose arm can alone cover the apostle in this journey with an impenetrable buckler; and *by your prayers,* since they are the efficacious means of moving this almighty arm.—The regimen: *with me,* reminds the Romans how he is himself striving for the same end.

Ver. 31. The enemies to be removed are, above all, the unbelieving Jews. It is to them the first *that* refers; the second intimates that there are other adversaries within the church itself; they are "those thousands of Jews who have believed," Acts xxi. 20 and 21, and who have been filled with prejudices against Paul's person and work. All those hearts must be prepared by God Himself to receive well the offering which is about to be brought them. The reading δωροφορία (*offering of a present*) instead of διακονία (*service*), in the *Vatic.* and the Greco-Lats., seems to me probable enough, considering the rareness of the expression.—The kind

[1] T. R., with A C L P, Mnn. Syr., reads θεου; ℵ: Ιησου Χριστου; B: κυριου Ιησου: D E F G, It.: Χριστου Ιησου.

of anxiety which breathes throughout this whole passage is in keeping with the painful presentiments felt by all the churches about this journey to Jerusalem, and which found utterance shortly afterwards by the mouth of the prophets wherever Paul stopped (Acts xx. 22, 23, xxi. 4 et seq., 11 et seq.).

Ver. 32. If with ℵ A C we read: "*that coming* (ἐλθών) . . . *I may be refreshed* (συναναπαύσωμαι)," the two clauses: *with joy* and *by the will of God*, might refer to this principal verb: "that I may be refreshed." But it seems to me that this relation is unnatural, for the idea of *joy* is already contained in that of *being refreshed*, and the *will of God* more naturally determines the matter of *arriving* than that of resting. It is therefore preferable to apply these two clauses to the idea of *coming*. Of the two readings ἐλθών or ἔλθω . . . καί, the former is more in keeping with the simplicity of the apostle's style; the latter, more elegant, seems to be an Alexandrine correction. — We think we see the apostle, after happily finishing his mission in Palestine, embarking full of joy and guided by the will of God, then arriving at Rome there to rest his weary heart among his brethren in the joy of the common salvation, and to recover new strength for a new work.—The reading "by the will *of God*" is preferable to all the others: Paul ordinarily rises to God whenever the subject involved is providential dispensations.

Ver. 33. "*The God of peace*[1] *be with you all! Amen.*"[2]— The apostle's heart seems constrained, in proportion as he approaches the end, to transform every particular subject he touches into a prayer or request. The special prayer contained in this verse is suggested to him by his conviction of the hostilities and dangers lying before himself, and by the need of soon being in full peace in the midst of his readers.— The authenticity of the word ἀμήν, *amen*, is doubtful. It is found, no doubt, in most of the Mjj., but it is wanting in three of them, and it is easier to explain its addition by copyists than its omission.

The authenticity of vv. 30–33 is acknowledged by Lucht. Volkmar admits only that of ver. 33, adding the first two verses of chap. xvi. We have seen how little weight belongs

[1] D E F G, It. Syr$^{sch.}$ read ημων after ειρηνης.
[2] A F G omit the word αμην.

to the objections raised by Baur and those critics to the authenticity of chap. xv. in general; we have not therefore to return to them. As to the opinions formerly given out by Semler and Paulus, according to which this whole chapter is only a particular leaf intended by the apostle either for the persons saluted in chap. xvi., or for the most enlightened members of the church of Rome, they are now abandoned. The apostle was no friend of religious aristocracies, as we have seen in chap. xii.; and he would have done nothing to favour such a tendency. Besides, what is there in this chapter which could not be read with advantage by the whole church? We have proved the intimate connection between the first part of the chapter and the subject treated in chap. xiv., as well as the connection between the second part and the Epistle as a whole, more particularly the preface, i. 1–15. The style and ideas are in all points in keeping with what one would expect from the pen of Paul. As Hilgenfeld says: "It is impossible in this offhand way to reject chaps. xv. and xvi.; the Epistle to the Romans cannot have closed with xiv. 23, unless it remained without a conclusion." M. Reuss expresses himself to the same effect, and we have pleasure in quoting the following lines from him in closing this subject: "The lessons contained in the first half of the text (chap. xv.) are absolutely harmonious with those of the previous chapter, and of the parallel passages of other Epistles, and the statement of the apostle's plans is the most natural expression of his mind and antecedents, as well as the reflection of the situation of the moment. There is not the slightest trace of the aim of a forged composition, nor certainly of the possibility that the Epistle closed with chap. xiv."

THIRTIETH PASSAGE (XVI. 1-16).

Recommendations, Salutations, Warning.

It is the apostle's custom, when closing his letters, to treat a number of particular subjects of a more or less personal nature, such as special salutations, commissions, or warnings; comp. 1 Cor. xvi. 10–22 (particularly ver. 22); 2 Cor. xiii. 11–13; Col. iv. 7–18; Phil. iv. 10–23; 1 Thess. v. 25–28. He does so in our Epistle.

And first, vv. 1 and 2, the recommendation of the deaconess Phœbe.

Vv. 1, 2. "*Now*[1] *I commend unto you Phœbe, our sister, which is a deaconess of the church of Cenchrea, that ye receive her in the Lord as becometh saints, and that ye assist her in whatsoever business she hath need of you; for also she hath been a succourer of many and of myself.*"—Here, according to some, begins a private note entrusted by the apostle to the bearers (Semler), or to the female bearer (Eichhorn), of this Epistle, to indicate the principal persons to be saluted in the churches which were to be visited by the way. Some moderns, D. Schulz, Reuss, Ewald, Laurent, Renan, etc., even think they can, either from the starting-point (Cenchrea), or from certain names in the salutations which follow, positively determine the church for which this note was composed. It was, they hold, the church of Ephesus. We shall examine step by step as we proceed the reasons alleged in favour of this supposition. We only remark here, that many of those who reject the salutations, vv. 3–16, from the Epistle to the Romans, yet regard vv. 1 and 2 as having belonged to it (Scholten, Volkmar, Schultz). We note besides, as to the rest of this chapter, the following observation of Schultz: "As long as the destination to the church of Rome of all the parts of chap. xvi. *can be maintained,* this view ought to be preferred to every other." And, indeed, it will always be difficult to understand how a leaf of salutations intended for the church of Ephesus, or any other, should have strayed into the copy of our Epistle deposited in the archives of the church of Rome (see the remarks at the end of this chapter).

It has generally been admitted that Phœbe was the bearer of our Epistle, and no doubt with reason. For otherwise how are we to explain this so special personal recommendation? Comp. Col. iv. 7; Eph. vi. 21. Paul mentions two titles which point her out for the interest of the Christians of Rome; she is *a sister,* and, moreover, *a servant of the Lord,* invested consequently with an ecclesiastical office. It has been denied that at so remote a period the office of deaconess could already be in existence. But why, if there were *deacons* (xii. 7; Acts vi. 1 et seq.; Phil. i. 1), should there not have been also from primitive times a similar office discharged by women, members of the church? With what

[1] D F G omit the δέ.

right can we allege that the office mentioned xii. 8 belonged only to men? It seems to us impossible to think that *the widows* spoken of, 1 Tim. v. 3 et seq., were not persons invested with an ecclesiastical office. And in any case, the ministrations of beneficence of a private nature, mentioned in our Epistle (xii. 7), must have been carried out in good measure by *sisters*. And why should not a rich and devoted woman, who had for a time occupied herself with such work, have borne, even without ecclesiastical consecration, the title of deaconess? If our passage had a later origin than the first century, there would certainly have been introduced here, instead of the word διάκονος (*deacon*), which is the masculine term originally applied to both sexes, the feminine title διακόνισσα (*deaconess*), already in use in the second century. Comp. the letter in which Pliny relates that he has been obliged to torture two of those *servants* who are called *ministræ* (evidently a translation of διακόνισσαι). There were so many services to be rendered to the poor, to orphans, to strangers, to the sick, which women only could discharge! As is observed by Schaff, the profound separation between the sexes in the East must also have contributed to render a female diaconate altogether indispensable. — The participle οὖσαν, *who is*, expressly denotes that Phœbe is still, at the time of Paul's writing, invested with this office.—Cenchrea was the port of Corinth toward the east, on the Egean Sea; and hence it has been inferred that Phœbe was going rather to Ephesus than to Rome. The proof is far from convincing. "The person in question," says Schultz himself, "is not a Corinthian who is passing through Cenchrea, but, on the contrary, a woman of Cenchrea who is passing through Corinth, and who is consequently on her way to the west." A good answer as an argument *ad hominem*. But, speaking freely, what a puerility is criticism thus handled!

Ver. 2. *In the Lord:* in the profound feeling of the communion with Him, which binds into one body all the members of the church.—The expression: *as becometh saints*, may signify, becoming saints who are received, like Phœbe, or saints who are called to receive, like the Romans. Is it absolutely necessary to choose between the two meanings?— There is a correlation between the two terms παριστάναι, *to*

stand beside in order to hold up, and προστάτις (*protectress, patroness*), one who stands before in order to guide or protect. Hence it appears that Phœbe had bestowed care on Paul himself, perhaps during his stay at Cenchrea, mentioned Acts xviii. 18, and on occasion of an illness. M. Renan informs us that "this poor woman started on a wild winter journey across the Archipelago without any other resource than Paul's recommendation." Then he adds: "It is more natural to suppose that Paul recommended Phœbe to the Ephesians, whom he knew, than to the Romans, whom he did not know." As if the titles given to Phœbe, cited vv. 1 and 2, were not enough to interest any church whatever in her!

Vv. 3–16.

To the recommendation of Phœbe, the apostle joins a list of *salutations*, which might indeed still be called recommendations; for the imperative ἀσπάσασθε, *greet*, fifteen times repeated, is addressed to the whole church. It is, in fact, the church itself which he charges to transmit this mark of affection to its different objects. How was this commission carried out? Probably, at the time when the letter was read in full assembly of the church, the president expressed to the person designated, in some way or other, the mark of distinction which the apostle had bestowed on him. Most critics of the present day hold that this list of salutations cannot have been written by Paul with a view to the church of Rome, which he had not yet visited. How then could he have known so many persons in it? The persons in question, therefore, were friends of the apostle in a church which he had himself founded, and, to all appearance, in the church of Ephesus. Accident has willed that this list should be joined afterwards to the Epistle to the Romans (see especially Reuss, *Epîtres Pauliniennes*, pp. 19, 20). Baur, Lucht, etc., go still further: they think that this list was composed later by a forger, who thought good to make Paul pen the names of several notable persons of the church of Rome, in order to produce an advantageous impression on this church, which was always somewhat unfavourably disposed toward the

apostle. "A very improbable procedure," observes Schultz. "And how," asks this writer with reason, "would the forger in this case have forgotten Clement," who should surely have figured at the head? For the rest, let us study the list itself.

Vv. 3–5*a*. "*Greet Prisca*[1] *and Aquilas, my helpers in Christ Jesus. Who have for my life laid down their own necks,—unto whom not only I give thanks, but also all the churches of the Gentiles. And the church that is in their house.*" —Aquilas and his wife Prisca (or Priscilla) were Jews, natives of Pontus, in Asia Minor. They were established at Rome as tent-makers, when the edict of Claudius, which expelled Israelites from the capital, obliged them to emigrate. They had been settled for a short time at Corinth, when Paul arrived there for the first time in the year 53. Their common occupation drew them together, and Paul soon brought them to the knowledge of Christ (Acts xviii. 2). For it is absolutely arbitrary to represent them as already Christians when they left Rome. This opinion arises only from the tendency to derive the propagation of the gospel at Rome from the Jewish synagogue. But it is excluded by the expression of the Acts: *τινὰ Ἰουδαῖον, a certain Jew.* Luke would have added the epithet *μαθητήν, disciple;* comp. Acts xvi. 1. When, two years later, the apostle left Corinth with the intention of going to found a mission at Ephesus, Aquilas and his wife repaired to the latter city, while Paul proceeded first to visit Jerusalem and Antioch. Their intention certainly was to prepare the way for him in the capital of the province of Asia, then to support his ministry there, as they had done at Corinth; comp. Acts xviii. 18–21.—It is this salutation more than anything else which has given rise to the supposition that our entire list was addressed to Ephesus. But could not this husband and wife, who had emigrated from Pontus to Rome, then from Rome to Corinth, and lastly, from Corinth to Ephesus, have returned to Rome, their former domicile, after the imperial edict had fallen into desuetude? This is the more admissible as the object of this return is easily understood. We know from Acts xix. 21, that even at Ephesus Paul had already formed the plan of proceeding to Rome as soon as he had finished his work in Asia and Greece.

[1] T. R. reads Πρισκίλλαν, with several Mnn. Syr.

Aquilas and Priscilla, who had been so useful to him at Corinth, who had even gone to Ephesus with him with a view to his approaching mission, might a second time, by proceeding from Ephesus to Rome, do for him what they had done by leaving Corinth for Ephesus. The passage, Jas. iv. 13, shows with what ease rich Jewish traders travelled from one large city to another. "To-day or to-morrow we will go into such a city, and buy and sell and get gain." Objection is taken from the short time which had elapsed since the end of Paul's sojourn at Ephesus: ten months only, it is said, from the spring of the year 57, when at Ephesus he wrote the First Epistle to the Corinthians (chap. xvi. 8), and when he conveys greetings from Aquilas and Priscilla (xvi. 19), to the beginning of 58, when it is alleged he wrote the Epistle to the Romans from Corinth. But we think there is a mistake in putting only ten months' interval between the First Epistle to the Corinthians and the Epistle to the Romans. A profound study of the Second Epistle to the Corinthians, as well as of the Acts, leads to a wholly different result. From the spring of the year 57, when Paul left Ephesus, to the time when he made the stay at Corinth, during which he composed our Epistle, there elapsed, we think, nearly two years, from Easter 57 to February 59. Such an interval fully suffices to explain the new change of Aquilas and Priscilla, and their return to Rome. In the fact that many years later, about the year 66, and perhaps on occasion of the persecution of Nero (in 64), they are again settled at Ephesus, where Paul sends them a salutation, 2 Tim. iv. 19, there is nothing to surprise us.—The form *Prisca* is certainly authentic in the Epistle to the Romans; the diminutive *Priscilla*, which is read in the T. R., is found only in some Mnn. In the Acts (xviii. 2, 18, 26, and 1 Cor. xvi. 19), the latter form is found in all the documents. In 2 Tim. iv. 19, the two readings exist, but the majority are in favour of Prisca, as in Romans. There is also variation in the reciprocal position of the two names. The wife is placed here first, as in Acts xviii. 18 and 2 Tim. iv. 19. Probably she was superior to her husband, either in ability or Christian activity.

Ver. 4. The qualitative pronoun *οἵτινες* signifies: *as people who* . . . The expression: *to put the neck under* (*the axe*), is

no doubt figurative; but in any case it implies the act of exposing one's life. We do not know where or when this event took place. Was it at Corinth, on occasion of the scene described Acts xviii. 12 et seq.? or was it not rather at Ephesus, in one or other of the cases to which allusion is made in the words, 1 Cor. xv. 32 and 2 Cor. i. 8? The apostle reminds the Romans that they had thereby rendered service to all the churches of the Gentile world, and consequently to them also. This passage proves two things—1st. That these words, intended to recommend Aquilas and Priscilla, were not addressed to the church of Ephesus, where the event referred to probably took place; for Paul undoubtedly means to give his readers information. 2d. That the church to which he addressed them was itself one of those churches of the Gentile world whose gratitude these two persons had deserved; a new proof of the Gentile origin of the Christians of Rome.

Ver. 5*a*. The expression: *the church that is in their house*, may have three meanings. Either it denotes the entire assembly of the servants and work-people residing and working with them; or it applies to that *portion* of the church which had its usual place of meeting in their house; or finally, the words apply to the whole church of the capital, which held its plenary meetings at their house; comp. 1 Cor. xiv. 23. This last sense is incompatible with the preposition *κατά*, the meaning of which is distributive, and supposes other places of worship (vv. 14 and 15). The first is improbable, for the term *ἐκκλησία, church*, would not suit a purely private gathering. The second is therefore the only possible one; comp. 1 Cor. xvi. 19. Schultz thinks we may conclude from these words that Aquilas was invested with the office of elder in the church of Ephesus where he lived, and that, consequently, he could not so easily change his domicile. One must surely be at a loss for good reasons to imagine such a one as this.—What is certain is, that these two persons are saluted here, not only as particular friends of St. Paul, but because of the important part they played in the work of his apostleship. The passage, Acts xviii. 24–28, presents an example of their activity, and of the powerful influence they exercised; and it is most probable that what they had been at Ephesus, they

had also been at Rome, from the day when they returned to it. In a word, they were evangelists of the first order. This is what recommends them to the respectful attention of the church, and assigns them the first rank in this list of apostolic salutations. This circumstance throws light on the character of the whole list.

Vv. 5*b*, 6. "*Greet my well-beloved Epenetus, who was the first-fruits of Asia*[1] *unto Christ.*[2] *Greet Mary,*[3] *who bestowed much labour on us.*"[4]—Epenetus is to us an unknown personage. According to the Received reading, he would be the first convert of *Achaia*, consequently a native of Corinth, which could hardly be reconciled with 1 Cor. xvi. 15. This reading probably arises from the copyists thinking that Paul meant to speak of the country from which he was writing. The true reading is certainly *of Asia*. Meyer concludes, from the fact that Epenetus was the first convert in this province, that he must have been a Jew, because Paul preached first of all in the synagogue; as if Aquilas and Priscilla, who had preceded Paul at Ephesus, might not have met with and converted a Gentile in that city before Paul arrived, and proclaimed the gospel in full synagogue! The Greek name of Epenetus would rather lead us to think him a Gentile; he was *the first-fruits of the Gentiles* converted at Ephesus. Here again the critics find an undeniable proof of the destination of this list to the church of Ephesus. But if, as is probable, Epenetus was the fruit of the labours of Aquilas, anterior even to those of Paul, he might very naturally have accompanied the evangelist-pair from Ephesus to Rome, to take part in their work in that great city. Hence the intimate relation which the apostle here establishes between these three persons; hence also the honourable title which he gives to this last before all the church.—The regimen εἰς Χριστόν, *unto Christ*, makes Christ the person to whom the first-fruits are offered.

Ver. 6. We know nothing of this *Mary* saluted in ver. 6; her name indicates her Jewish origin, even if, with some Mjj.,

[1] T. R. reads, with L P, Syr., Αχαιας (*of Achaia*) instead of Ασιας (*of Asia*).
[2] D E F G read εν Χριστω (*in Christ*) instead of εις Χριστον (*unto Christ*).
[3] A B C D: Μαριαν instead of Μαριαμ.
[4] T. R., with L, Mnn., reads εις ημας (*on us*); all the rest: εις υμας (*on you*).

we read *Μαρίαν*.—If, with almost all the Mjj., we read *εἰς ὑμᾶς, on you*, Mary would be one who had rendered herself particularly useful in the church of Rome, perhaps by her devotion during some epidemic which had raged in the church. But would Paul thus remind the church of a thing which, in that case, it knew much better than himself? Besides, all the persons saluted here are so because of some connection or other with the apostle; this is what makes us prefer the reading *εἰς ἡμᾶς, on us*. Like Phœbe, like Aquilas and Priscilla, she had actively taken part in the work of Paul, and occupied herself by ministering to those who surrounded him; and now from the east she had gone to Rome, like so many others.

Vv. 7, 8. "*Salute Andronicus and Junias, my countrymen and my fellow-prisoners, who are of note among the apostles, and who also were in Christ before me.*[1] *Greet Ampliatus,*[2] *my beloved in the Lord.*"—The word *Junian* might be taken as the accusative of a female name, *Junia*, to denote the sister or wife of Andronicus. But the end of the verse leads us rather to think of a man of the name of *Junias*.—The expression *συγγενεῖς μου* may signify: *my kinsmen*, or *my fellow-countrymen* (ix. 3). The first meaning seems, in itself, the more natural; but in vv. 11 and 21 this term is applied to other persons, two of whom (Jason and Sosipater) appear to be Macedonians (Acts xvii. 5 and xx. 4). The wider meaning, that of *fellow-countrymen*, thus becomes the more probable. Even Schultz finds a proof in these words that Paul wrote these lines to a church of Gentile origin ("*my* countrymen"). Hence it has been concluded that these salutations could not be addressed to the church of Rome. From the same circumstance we, for our part, on the contrary, conclude that the church of Rome was not Judeo-Christian. It has been asked when these two Christians of Jewish origin could have been imprisoned with St. Paul? Neither the Acts nor the previous Epistles furnish an answer to this question. But the descriptions in 2 Cor. vi. 5 et seq., and xi. 23 et seq., allude to so many unknown circumstances in the apostle's life, that this ignorance ought not to excite our surprise. In chap.

[1] D E F G, It. read τοις προ εμου instead of οι και προ εμου γεγονασι.
[2] D E L P, Syr.: Αμπλιαν instead of Αμπλιατον.

xv. of his Epistle to the Corinthians, Clement of Rome enumerates seven captivities of the apostle, and we know of only four (Philippi, Jerusalem, Cæsarea, Rome). Probably the event in question belongs to a period anterior to his missionary journeys (comp. the end of the verse).—Most critics of the present day agree in explaining the following words in this sense: "well known by the apostles" (the Twelve). But what a strange title of honour: the apostles know them! And can the ἐν, *in*, have such a meaning: "illustrious *with*, that is to say, in the opinion of the apostles." Meyer quotes the phrase of Euripides: ἐπίσημος ἐν βροτοῖς, illustrious with mortals, or in their eyes. But why not translate quite simply: illustrious *in the number of* or *among* mortals? And similarly, and with still more reason, here: illustrious among those numerous evangelists who, by their missionary labours in the countries of the East, have merited the name of *apostles*. This title, indeed, could in certain cases have a wider sense than it has in our Gospels; thus, Acts xiv. 4 and 14, it is applied to Barnabas, as it is indirectly, 1 Cor. ix. 5. So we call the missionary Brainerd, the apostle of the Indians. Such another, the apostle of China or of the Indies.—A last title of honour: these two men preceded Paul himself in the faith. They belong, therefore, to that primitive church of Jerusalem whose members, as years elapse, take ever a more venerable character in the eyes of all the churches. The Greco-Latin reading: "the apostles *who were before me*," is an evident corruption of the text.

Ver. 8. The Alexs.: *Ampliaton;* the others, following an abridged form: *Amplian*. Paul, having no special distinction to mention as belonging to this person, contents himself with pointing him out to the respect of the church by the expression of his affection; and that is enough, for it is an affection *in the Lord*, which consequently implies in Amplias devotion to His service.

Vv. 9, 10. "*Salute Urbanus, our helper in Christ, and Stachys my beloved. Salute Apelles* [*the brother*] *approved in Christ. Salute them which are of Aristobulus' household.*"—Urbanus, a Latin name signifying *citizen;* Stachys, a Greek name signifying *an ear of corn*. In speaking of the former as his fellow-worker, Paul says: *our* (comp. the *on us*, ver. 6),

because it is the apostolic *work* which is in question with all the workers who engage in it along with him; speaking of his personal friendship, he says: *my*.

Ver. 10. *Apelles:* a frequent name for freedmen at Rome, especially among Jews. Every one knows the *Credat judæus Apella* of Horace.—*Δόκιμος*: the Christian who has passed his trials, who has shown himself stedfast in his course.—The last words may denote the Christians who are of the number of Aristobulus' *children*, or those who belong to his house as *servants*. The expression used agrees better with the second meaning. It was a large house, Jewish perhaps, to which the gospel had found access.

Vv. 11, 12. "*Salute Herodion my countryman. Greet them that be of the household of Narcissus, which are in the Lord. Salute Tryphena and Tryphosa, who labour in the Lord. Salute the beloved Persis, which laboured much in the Lord.*"—Here, again, *συγγενής* may signify either *countryman* or *kinsman* (see ver. 7). The Roman writers Suetonius, Pliny, Tacitus, speak of a freedman of Claudius, of the name of Narcissus. Is it the house of this imperial favourite which is here referred to? He himself had been executed four years before the composition of our Epistle; but his house might still exist at Rome.

Ver. 12. Paul speaks here of three women, the two former of whom were distinguished at this time, and the third had been distinguished previously in the service of the Lord and of the church, like Priscilla and Mary. The two former were probably sisters; their almost identical names come from the verb *τρυφᾶν, to live voluptuously*. Paul wishes evidently to contrast this meaning of their name with that of the epithet *κοπιώσας, who work laboriously*. They are in Christ the opposite of what their name expresses.—Persis, a woman of Persia. Foreigners were often designated by the name of their native country (Lydia, a Lydian). Meyer points out the delicacy with which Paul here omits the pronoun *μου* (*my*). Probably she was an aged woman; Paul says: *laboured*.

Ver. 13. "*Salute Rufus, chosen in the Lord, and his mother and mine.*"—The term *chosen* cannot be taken here in the sense in which it applies to all Christians: it must denote something special. Hofmann, judging from what follows,

understands: "The man whom I have specially chosen as my brother in the Lord." But in this sense the pronoun μου (*my*) could not be wanting. As what is the better is willingly chosen, the word ἐκλεκτός, *chosen*, takes the sense of *distinguished, excellent*. This is certainly the meaning of the epithet here, as in 2 John 1 and 13. The following words: "his mother and mine," prove that Paul was united to this family by the closest ties—that he had even lived in it. And if we remember that Mark, writing his Gospel at Rome, was pleased to designate Simon of Cyrene, who carried the cross of Jesus, as "the father of Alexander and *Rufus*," we shall be naturally led to hold that this family had removed from Jerusalem to Rome, where Rufus occupied a distinguished place in the church. It was therefore during the years of his youth, when he was studying at Jerusalem, that Paul had lived in the bosom of this family, and had enjoyed the motherly care of Simon's wife.

Vv. 14, 15. "*Salute Asyncritus, Phlegon, Hermes, Patrobas, Hermas, and the brethren which are with them. Salute Philologus, and Julia,*[1] *Nereus, and his sister, and Olympas, and all the saints which are with them.*"—The personages whose names follow are not designated by any epithet of distinction; but it was honour enough to be marked out, were it only by name, to the respectful attention of the whole church of Rome.—The last words of both of the verses 14 and 15: *and the brethren who are with them*, prove that the persons just named are so, not simply as believers, but as directors of a whole assembly which is accustomed to meet around them. They lived, no doubt, in different quarters, and formed, besides the group which met in the house of Aquilas, two distinct assemblies.—Hermas was regarded by Origen as the author of the work famous in the primitive church, entitled the *Pastor* of Hermas. But it seems now established by the Fragment of Muratori that this writing dates only from the second half of the second century, and that Hermas is a wholly different person from the man who is here saluted by the apostle.—*Olympas* (perhaps an abbreviation of Olympiodorus) is certainly here a *man's* name.

Ver. 15. *Julia* (for such is the true reading) is undoubtedly the wife of Philologus.

[1] C F G read Ιουνιαν instead of Ιουλιαν.

Ver. 16. "*Salute one another with an holy kiss. All*[1] *the churches of Christ salute you.*"[2]—The apostle has just saluted in his own name the influential members of the different flocks of the church of Rome; but he naturally feels the need of also testifying his affection to the whole church; and he charges all its members to do so for him toward another. For this purpose they are to use the customary form of the *brotherly kiss.* If we did not know positively from the Fathers, particularly Tertullian (*osculum pacis*) in the *De Oratione,* c. 14 (comp. 1 Pet. v. 14), that the reference here is to an external rite, we should be tempted to hold the opinion of Calvin and Philippi, according to which we must give the term *holy kiss* a purely spiritual meaning: the salutation of brotherly love. But we learn from the *Apostolic Constitutions* that at a later time rules were laid down to remove from this custom all that might be offensive in it, so that it is more probable the term ought to be taken literally. We may be assured that in the apostolic churches all was done with order and dignity. This is what is expressed by the epithet ἅγιον, *holy,* which recurs 1 Cor. xvi. 20, 2 Cor. xiii. 12, and 1 Thess. v. 26. Probably the president of the assembly gave the kiss to the brother who sat next him, and he to his neighbour, while the same thing took place on the part of the women.

While the apostle in thought sees the Christians of Rome saluting one another by this sign of brotherhood, a greater spectacle is presented to his mind, that of all the churches already composing Christendom, and which are likewise united by the bond of communion in Christ. He has just himself traversed the churches of Greece and Asia; he has spoken to them of his already formed plan of proceeding to Rome (Acts xix. 21, xx. 25), and they have all charged him with their salutations to their sister in the capital of the world. Now is the time for him to discharge this commission. Through his instrumentality, the members of Christ's body scattered over the earth salute one another with a holy kiss, just like the members of the church which he is addressing. The T. R. has rejected the word *all,* no doubt because it was not under-

[1] T. R., with several Mnn. only, omits πασαι (*all*).

[2] D E F G, It. omit all the second part of ver. 16 (see on ver. 21).

stood how Paul could send greetings from other churches than those among which he was at the time.—The Greco-Latin text has transferred this second half of the verse to the end of ver. 21, with the evident intention of connecting it with the salutations of Paul's companions. But these have too private and personal a character to allow of the apostle appending to them so solemn a message as that of all the churches of the East to the church of Rome. This message must form an integral part of the letter; it is quite otherwise with these salutations (see below).

We are now in a position to judge of the question whether this passage belongs to our Epistle. In it twenty-six persons are individually designated—twenty-four by their names. Of these names it may be said that one or two are Hebrew, five or six Latin, fifteen to sixteen Greek; three Christian communities assembling in different localities are mentioned (vv. 5, 14, 15); besides two groups having more of a private character (vv. 10 and 11). It appears evident to us that the apostle feels the need of paying homage to all the faithful servants and all the devoted handmaids of the Lord who had aided in the foundation and development of this church, and before his arrival completed the task of the apostolate in this great city. Not only is the apostle concerned to testify to them his personal feelings; but he expresses himself in such a way as to force the church, so to speak, to take part as a whole in this public testimony of gratitude toward those to whom it owes its existence and prosperity. If such is the meaning of this truly unique passage in St. Paul's letters, does it not apply infinitely better to a church which, like that of Rome, had not yet seen an apostle within it, than to those of Ephesus or Corinth, where the entire activity of laying the foundation was, as it were, personified in a single individual? Hence those different expressions used by the apostle · "fellow-worker in the Lord," "who laboured" or "who labour," "all those who are with them," and even once the use of the title *apostle*. We seem, as we read these numerous salutations, to have before us the spectacle of a beehive swarming on all sides with activity and labour in the midst of the vast field of the capital of the world, and we understand better the whole passage of chap. xii. relative to the varied gifts and numerous

ministries, as well as the remarkable expression: *πάντι τῷ ὄντι ἐν ὑμῖν, every man that is* [as a worker] *among you* (ver. 3). "Here is," says Gaussen,[1] "a picture to the life of a primitive church; we can see to what height the most ignorant and weak of its members can rise. . . . We wonder at the progress already made by the word of God, solely through the labours of travellers, artisans, merchants, women, slaves, and freedmen, who resided in Rome." Not only did the apostle know a large number of these workers, because he had been connected with them in the East (Andronicus and Junias, Rufus and his mother, for example), or because he had converted them himself (Aquilas and Priscilla); but he also received news from Rome, as is proved by the intimate details into which he entered in chap. xiv.; and he might thus know of the labours of many of those saluted, whom he did not know personally. Such is probably the case with the last persons designated, and to whose names he adds no description. The Greek origin of the most of these names constitutes no objection to the *Roman* domicile of those who bear them. What matters it to us that, as M. Renan says, after Father Garucci, the names in *Jewish* inscriptions at Rome are mostly of Latin origin? If there is any room for surprise, five or six Latin names would perhaps be more astonishing at Ephesus than fifteen or sixteen Greek names at Rome. Have we not proved over and over that this church was recruited much more largely from Gentiles than from Jews, and that especially it was founded by missionaries who had come from Syria, Asia, and Greece? M. Reuss no doubt asks what became of all those friends of Paul, when, some years later, he wrote from Rome his Epistles to the Colossians and Philippians; and later still, the Second to Timothy. But, in writing from Rome to the churches of Colosse and Philippi, he could only send salutations from individuals who knew them. And a little before the Second to Timothy, there occurred the persecution of Nero, which had for the time dispersed and almost annihilated the church of Rome. Our conclusion, therefore, is not only that this passage of salutations may have been written to the church of Rome, but that it could not have been addressed to any other more suitably. As at the present day, Paris or even Rome is a sort

[1] *Théopneustie*, pp. 468 and 474.

of rendezvous for numerous foreign Christians of both sexes, who go thither to found evangelistic works; so the great pagan Rome attracted at that time the religious attention and zeal of all the Christians of the East.

Let us remark, in closing, the exquisite delicacy and courtesy which guide the apostle in those distinguishing epithets with which he accompanies the names of the servants or handmaids of Christ whom he mentions.[1] Each of those descriptive titles is as it were the rough draft of the *new name* which those persons shall bear in glory. Thus understood, this enumeration is no longer a dry nomenclature; it resembles a bouquet of newly-blown flowers, which diffuse refreshing odours.

Vv. 17–20.

In the First Epistle to the Corinthians, the apostle, after a passage of salutations, xvi. 19–21, stops all at once to address to the church, as in the form of a postscript, a solemn warning (ver. 22). It is as if the salutation which he had just written awoke in him once more before closing the feeling of the danger which lies in the way of his readers. It is the same here, with this difference, that at Corinth the danger was present and pressing, as is shown by the whole Epistle, whereas at Rome it is still remote, though inevitable. The tone also of the warning is distinctly different in the two cases; for Corinth a threatening, for Rome a simple putting on their guard in the most affectionate and fatherly tone.—Renan, Weizsäcker, Schultz, agree in thinking that this passage can only have been addressed by Paul to a church which he had himself founded—that of Ephesus, for example. We shall examine their reasons as we study this passage. In the eyes of Baur, Lucht, Volkmar, it is not even St. Paul's; it falls under the judgment of condemnation which, according to these critics, is due to the two chaps. xv. and xvi. mostly or totally.

Vv. 17, 18. "*Now I exhort you, brethren, to mark them which cause* [*the*] *divisions and offences contrary to the doctrine*

[1] See on this subject the whole beautiful passage in M. Gaussen's work just quoted, pp. 468–471.

which ye have learned; and avoid them. For they that are such serve not Christ our Lord, but their own belly; and by fair speeches and benedictions[1] *deceive the hearts of the simple.*"— As observed by Hofmann, the apostle had regulated (chaps. xiv. and xv.) all that related to the internal differences which might exist in the church of Rome. But now the unity of all Christendom has just presented itself vividly to his mind; and remembering the divisions which trouble it in other churches, he thinks that they might penetrate from without into the bosom of this one. He has evidently in view those Judaizers who from Jerusalem had come down to trouble the church of Antioch, who from Syria had followed Paul step by step to Galatia, and even to Corinth, and who would be sure, as soon as they heard of a church founded at Rome, to arrive on the spot, seeking to monopolize it for themselves. Facts proved that the anticipation of Paul was well founded. The beginning of the Epistle to the Philippians, written from Rome four or five years after ours, proves the pernicious activity of those fanatical partisans of the law in the church of Rome. Probably the party of the *weak*, chap. xiv., had opened it to their entrance.

The description which follows contains details which are too minute to allow us, with Hofmann, to apply this warning to all false teachers in general, Gentile or Jew.—The article before the words *divisions* and *offences*, shows that the apostle has in view facts already known. But it does not follow that they had transpired in the church to which he was writing, as is alleged by those who maintain that this passage cannot have been addressed to the church of Rome. It was enough that these disorders were facts of notoriety in other churches, to warrant St. Paul in speaking as he does. And how could those who had laboured with him in the churches of the East, and whom he has just been saluting in such numbers, Aquilas and Priscilla, for example, who had shared with him at Ephesus all the agonies of the great Corinthian conflict, have failed to know intimately the burning enmity with which the apostle was regarded by a certain number of Judeo-Christians? The term *divisions* refers to ecclesiastical divisions; the term *offences*, to the moral disorders which had

[1] D E F G, It. omit the words και ευλογιας.

so often accompanied them, particularly at Corinth; comp. 2 Cor. x.–xiii. — It is entirely false to conclude from the words: "contrary to the doctrine which ye have learned," that Paul himself was the founder of the church to which this passage was addressed. He would have said more clearly in that case: "which ye learned *of me;*" comp. Phil. iv. 9. This passage says nothing more than vi. 17, where Paul gives thanks "because the Romans have obeyed from the heart the form of doctrine according to which they were taught." The reference, here as there, is to Paul's gospel which had been taught to the Romans, not by himself, but by those of his fellow-labourers whom he has just saluted. The teaching opposed to this gospel is the legal system, which, according to this passage, as well as i. 8, 11, 12, vi. 17, and the whole Epistle in general, had not yet got a footing at Rome.—These words are obviously sufficient, if they were really addressed to this church, to overthrow Baur's opinion as to its composition and tendency. As the expression: *to mark, have the eyes open to* (σκοπεῖν), refers to an enemy expected rather than present, we must apply the last words of the verse: *avoid them,* to the time when they shall be present, and shall seek to do their work. Then there will be no need even to enter into communication with them; all that is necessary will be simply to turn the back to them; and why? The following verse answers this question.

Ver. 18. The parties referred to are men at once sensual and hypocritical; it is therefore under the influence of a deep moral aversion that the Christians of Rome are called to avoid them. They serve their sensual appetites, and not Christ. This feature reminds us of Phil. iii. 19, words which apply to the same individuals: "whose god is their belly, and who mind earthly things;" comp. also 2 Cor. xi. 20 and 21: "If a man bring you into bondage, devour you, take of you, ye suffer it." It is this sensual and insolent conduct which Paul characterizes, Phil. iii. 2, in the severe terms: "Beware of dogs; beware of evil workers." The gospel ministry was to these people a means of gain, and gain the means of satisfying their gross passions. They were the Tartuffes of the period. Another point of resemblance identifies them more completely still with the type drawn by Molière: they present themselves

with a benignant style of speech (χρηστολογία), and with fatherly benedictions (εὐλογίαι); and *the simple* (ἄκακοι, literally, *the innocent*), who suspect no evil, allow themselves to be caught with these devout airs and paternal tone. Was it necessary, as Schultz holds, that these men should be already present to account for Paul speaking thus in regard to them? Had he not learned to know them in this light in Galatia and at Corinth, and could he not portray them to the church of Rome, that they might be recognised immediately on their appearing?

Ver. 19. "*For your obedience is come abroad unto all; I am glad therefore on your behalf.*[1] *But yet I would have you wise*[2] *unto that which is good, and simple concerning evil.*"— This verse has been connected with the preceding in different ways. Thol., Mey., Philip. find in it a reason for peace: "You will be able to resist them; for every one knows your obedience to the pure gospel." But the *for* in this sense cannot be explained except in a forced way (see Meyer), and Paul would have required to say in any case: "For *I* know" . . ., and not: "For *all* know" . . . Origen explains: "I warn you thus; for ye are yourselves of the number of those simple (ἄκακοι), whose obedient docility is well known." But how are we to reconcile such a statement with the eulogies bestowed on the knowledge and experience of the readers, xv. 14 and 15? It is to no purpose to answer that this very saying proves that the passage is not addressed to the Romans. For the Ephesians, who had for three years enjoyed Paul's presence and his teaching in public and private, and who had been witnesses of his most strenuous conflicts with the Judaizers, might far less be designated ἄκακοι, *innocent*, than the Christians of Rome, who had never seen an apostle. Calvin and others understand thus: "I warn you in this way, because I desire that to your obedience, universally known, you would add both the wisdom and simplicity which shall secure you from seduction." This meaning is good; but it does not account for the idea placed at the head of the verse: "Your obedience has come abroad unto all." It is on these words that Rückert has with good

[1] T. R., with E, Mnn., reads χαιρω ουν το εφ' υμιν; D F G likewise, while rejecting the το; ℵ A B C L P read εφ' υμιν ουν χαιρω.

[2] T. R., with ℵ A C P, reads μεν after σοφους; the rest omit this particle.

reason rested his explanation; for they are the key to the following sentences. He explains: "If I warn you as I have just done (vv. 17, 18), it is because the report of your obedience to the gospel having already spread everywhere, those men will not fail to hear your church spoken of, and to break in on you to make gain of your faith, as they have done elsewhere." Taken in this sense, the saying is a repetition of i. 8: "Your faith is spoken of throughout the whole world."—The apostle adds how rejoiced he is because of their evangelical convictions, but how indispensable it is that in order to preserve them, they should join to the wise discernment of what it is good to do, the simple and hearty horror of what is evil.—The reading of the T. R.: τὸ ἐφ' ὑμῖν, *in that which concerns you*, must be set aside. It is too slenderly supported, and there is no reason for here contrasting the Romans with other churches. Of the two other readings, the Greco-Lat., which places the verb χαίρω, *I rejoice*, first, ought to give place to that of the Alexs., which begins with the words: ἐφ' ὑμῖν οὖν, *on your behalf therefore*. This regimen connects this sentence closely with the preceding. Their attachment to evangelical truth rejoices the apostle (comp. the: *Thanks be to God*, vi. 17). Only they must persevere, and for that end the apostle desires that to their obedience to the truth they should add two things: discernment and simplicity.—A moralist writing on this subject would probably have said: "wisdom *as concerning evil*, and simplicity *as concerning good*." St. Paul does the opposite. And here again we can show that he is speaking "by the grace given unto him." In regard to what is evil, there are no two questions. The sentence once pronounced in the conscience: it is evil! everything is said. Woe to him who thereafter still disputes and reasons! An abler than he (comp. ver. 20) will not fail to take him in the snare. There is but one thing to be done: *to turn from it* (ver. 17). Hence, as concerns evil, the one thing needed is simplicity. It is not so in regard to good. When a thing is recognised as good, all has not yet been said. Here, on the contrary, it is that there is need of prudence not to spoil a good thing by the unwise or unskilful way in which it is gone about. Different questions present themselves: Is it the time for doing it? How should one

address himself to it to succeed? Who should put his hand to the work? etc. etc. All, questions which demand a certain measure of wisdom, of discernment, of practical ability, of *σοφία*. In the case of evil, woe to the able! Ability makes dupes. In the case of good, woe to the simple! Simplicity is the parent of mistakes. — The T. R. places *μέν, without doubt,* after the word *σοφούς, wise;* which would lead to the sense: "I would, that *while ye are* wise in good, ye should be simple as regards evil." This form makes all the weight of the recommendation fall on the second proposition. But the word *wise, σοφούς,* too evidently forms a contrast to the word *ἄκακοι, innocent,* to allow us to give it so secondary a position. The first proposition should, in Paul's recommendation, be on the same line as the second. As much clear-sightedness is needed to discern the corruption of adversaries under their fair exteriors, as of simplicity to avoid them after having discerned them.—It is to be remarked, that to denote *simplicity,* Paul in this verse uses quite a different term from that in the preceding. There he had in view men ignorant of evil, who are easily duped; hence the use of the term *ἄκακος, innocent.* Here Paul wishes to speak of the moral rectitude which, the instant it knows evil, breaks with it. Hence the term *ἀκέραιος,* literally, *not mixed,* exempt from impure alloy. This saying of the apostle may serve to explain the precept of Jesus, Matt. x. 16: "simple as doves, wise as serpents." Comp. also 1 Cor. xiv. 20 and 2 Cor. xi. 3.—We should like to know what forger would have hit on such a word?

Ver. 20. "*Now, the God of peace shall bruise Satan under your feet shortly. The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ*[1] *be with you.*"[2]—From the visible enemy who threatens, the apostle's eye turns to the invisible world, where he discovers on the one side the more formidable enemy of whom his earthly adversaries are the instruments, and on the other, the all-powerful ally on whose succour the church can reckon in this struggle. The connection between vv. 19 and 20 may find its explanation in vv. 13–15 of 2 Cor. xi., where the apostle thus expresses himself in regard to Judaizing disturbers:

[1] ℵ B read Ιησου simply.

[2] D E F G, It. omit the second proposition of the verse.—T. R. with some Mnn. adds αμην.

"Such are false apostles, deceitful workers, transforming themselves into apostles of Christ; and no marvel, for Satan himself is transformed into an angel of light. Therefore it is no great thing if his ministers also be transformed as the ministers of righteousness. Their end shall be according to their works." — The expression: *God of peace,* is designedly chosen to describe God as one who, if the church fulfils its task well in these circumstances, will take care to overthrow the designs of its adversaries, and preserve harmony among the faithful.— The term *συντρίψει, shall bruise,* is evidently an allusion to the ancient promise, Gen. iii. 15, which—strange to say—is referred to nowhere else in the N. T.—The words *ἐν τάχει* are ordinarily translated by *soon,* which would signify: "at a time near this when I write you." It is because of this translation that Schultz and many others find here the idea of Christ's near return. But the word *ταχύς* and its derivatives do not denote the imminence, the nearness of the event. They denote the celerity with which it is accomplished. The *ταχέες πόδες,* in Homer, are feet which move *quickly* and not *soon;* a *tachygraph* is a man who writes quickly and not near one. The Greek has the word *εὐθύς* (*straight,* who goes right to his end) and its derivatives to express imminence.[1] Paul means, therefore, not that the victory will be near, but that it will be *speedily* gained, once the conflict is begun. When the believer fights with the armour of God (Eph. vi.), the conflict is never long. — Victory will result from two factors, the one divine (*God shall bruise*), the other human (*under your feet*). God communicates strength; but it passes through the man who accepts and uses it.

To this warning there is attached in the T. R. and in the Alexs. a prayer of benediction, with this difference, that in the former this prayer is repeated word for word in ver. 24. The Greco-Lats. place it only in ver. 24. Of these three forms, that of the Alex. is the most probable; for it easily explains the other two. The Greco-Lats. have transposed this prayer, putting it after the salutations, vv. 21–23, to conform to the ordinary usage of the apostle; the Byz. text has combined

[1] We think also that it is wrong to translate Rev. xxii. 20: "I come *soon* (my arrival is near);" the meaning is rather: "I come quickly," that is to say, I move *rapidly* (even though my arrival may yet be long delayed).

the two forms. What confirms this supposition is, that the Greco-Lats. in general omit the doxology at the end of our chapter; now, they could not close the Epistle to the Romans with the words: "and Quartus our brother." They were therefore obliged to transfer thither the prayer of ver. 20. Regarded here as authentic, this prayer is the counterpart of that which we find 1 Cor. xvi. 23. It forms the general conclusion of the Epistle; for it has nothing sufficiently special to be applied only to the preceding warning. But why the salutations which still follow, vv. 21–23, and the final doxology, vv. 25–27? This is what we shall have to explain.

Critical conclusion regarding the passage, vv. 17–20.—The objections of Baur and Lucht to the composition of this passage by the Apostle Paul are of no weight. The only serious question is, whether the warning forms part of the Epistle to the Romans, or whether it was addressed, as is thought by so large a number of our modern critics, to the church of Ephesus. First of all, we have a right to ask how it could have happened that a warning addressed to Ephesus, and which had no force except in relation to those whom it personally concerned, made the journey from Ephesus to Rome, and was incorporated into the Epistle to the Romans? For ourselves, we know no probable explanation of such a phenomenon, nor any example of such a migration. But it is still more the intrinsic reasons which prevent us from holding this supposition. This passage applies more naturally to a church which was not instructed by the apostle personally, than to a church founded by him. He rejoices in its docile attitude to the gospel, as in a thing which he has learned, and the news of which will spread to many other ears than his (ver. 19). This is not how one writes to his own disciples. Besides, is it conceivable that he would address to the church of Ephesus, that church within which he had recently passed three whole years, and where he had composed the Epistle to the Galatians and the First to the Corinthians, a passage in which the readers are reckoned as still strangers to the manœuvres of the Judaizing adversaries, and ignorant of their character? What! Paul pass all this time in this church, between Galatia on the one side and Corinth on the other, and speak to them of those parties as persons against whom they still require to be put on their guard! No, such a warning can only concern a church situated at a distance from the theatre of conflict. This church is therefore quite naturally that of Rome.—If it is so, Weizsäcker's opinion as to the state of this church and the object of our letter is at once set aside. This

critic thinks that the Epistle to the Romans was called forth by the necessity of combating a Judaizing movement which at that very time showed itself in the church. But our passage evidently points to the danger as yet to come. The letter may not have been written without the intention of forearming the church; but it cannot have had the intention of combating the enemy as already present.

Vv. 21–23. "*Timothy my fellow-worker, and Lucius, and Jason, and Sosipater, my countrymen,*[1] *salute you. I Tertius, who wrote this Epistle, salute you in the Lord. Gaius mine host, and of the whole church, saluteth you. Erastus the chamberlain of the city saluteth you, and the brother Quartus.*"[2] —After the farewell prayer, ver. 20, this passage of salutations excites surprise; for usually the salutations of Paul's fellow-labourers are placed before the final prayer. But there is a circumstance fitted to throw light on this exceptional fact; the mention of Timothy, ver. 21. Ordinarily, when Paul has this faithful fellow-labourer beside him, he mentions him in the *address* of the letter, as if to associate him in the very composition of the writing; comp. 1 and 2 Thess., 2 Cor., Col., Philip., Phil. If he does not do so in 1 Cor., it is because, according to the letter itself, Timothy was absent. In the Epistle to the Galatians, Timothy is embraced no doubt pre-eminently in the general expression: "And all the brethren who are with me" (ver. 2). There remain, therefore, only Ephesians and Romans. This conjunction serves exactly to explain the particular fact which we are pointing out. For these two letters have this in common: that Paul wrote them in his capacity of *apostle to the Gentiles*, a dignity which he shared with no one; for it followed from a personal and special call (i. 1). And hence it is, that though Timothy was with him at the time he composed them (as appears in the case of the Romans from ver. 21, and in the case of the Ephesians from the addresses to the Colossians and Philemon written at the same time), he could not associate his disciple with him in an act so solemn, and which had a sort of official

[1] F G read here και ολαι αι εκκλησιαι (transposed from ver. 16).

[2] T. R. reads here, with D E F G L, Mnn. It., η χαρις του Κυριου ημων Ι.Χ. μετα παντων υμων αμην (transposed from ver. 20). These words are omitted by ℵ A B C, Or.

character. Now this is also the reason why those salutations from his fellow-labourers have been in this case placed outside of the letter properly so called. The official Epistle must first be closed before a place could be granted to a communication of an entirely private character. — We know that *Timothy* was at that moment at Corinth with the apostle, ready to join him in the journey to Jerusalem; this appears from Acts xx. 4. This same passage explains to us the presence in this city, and at the same time, of another of the three fellow-labourers afterwards named, *Sosipater* of Berea, in Macedonia. This name, which is probably identical with that of Sopater, Acts xx. 4, belonged to one of the deputies delegated by the churches of Macedonia to represent them in the mission which Paul was about to carry out for them at Jerusalem (2 Cor. viii. 18 et seq.).—*Jason* was also of that province; for he is probably identical with Paul's host at Thessalonica, of whom mention is made, Acts xviii. 1–7. He had accompanied the deputies of Thessalonica and Berea whom Paul had appointed to meet together at Corinth, because he reckoned on embarking there for Palestine (Acts xx. 3). The third person, *Lucius*, cannot be, as Origen thought, the evangelist Luke; for the Greek name of the latter (*Lucas*) is an abbreviation of Lucanus, while Lucius certainly comes from the word *lux*. But it is not improbable that we have here again the Lucius of Cyrene, who had played an important part as prophet or teacher in the church of Antioch soon after its foundation. He was now fulfilling the same ministry in other churches, and so had come to Corinth. Paul designates these three last as his countrymen; for the meaning *kinsmen*, which some give to συγγενεῖς, cannot, as we have already seen, apply to so large a number of persons (comp. vv. 7 and 11).—Very probably these four fellow-labourers of the apostle had come into contact in the East with many of the persons whom Paul had just saluted at Rome in his own name,—for example, Aquilas, Epenetus, and the first of those who follow. Delicacy accordingly required Paul to add to his own, the salutations of these brethren who surrounded him.

Ver. 22. But Paul had beside him at this very time a fellow-labourer of a different kind, to whom he must also give a place. This was the friend who had lent him the help of

his pen in this long work, the *Tertius* of this verse. Only, could he dictate to him his own salutation as he had dictated the preceding? No, that would have been to treat him as a simple machine. The apostle had too exquisite a sense of propriety to follow such a course. He ceases to dictate, and leaves Tertius himself to salute in his own name: "I Tertius." This detail, insignificant in appearance, is not without its value. It lets us see what St. Paul was better than many graver actions. Here we have what may be called the politeness of the heart. Would a forger have thought of this?

Ver. 23. Yet another fellow-labourer, but of a wholly different kind: he is Paul's host, under whose roof he is composing this work. This *Gaius* can neither be the Gaius of Derbe in Asia Minor, Acts xx. 4, nor the Gaius of a church in the neighbourhood of Ephesus, 3 John 1. He is evidently the person of whom Paul speaks 1 Cor. i. 14, one of the first believers of Corinth whom he had baptized with his own hand before the arrival of Silas and Timothy. Paul calls him at once *his* host and that of *the whole* church. These last words might signify that when the church of Corinth held a full meeting (1 Cor. xiv. 23), it was at the house of Gaius that these assemblies took place. But there attaches to the term ξένος, *host*, rather the idea of welcome given to strangers. Paul means, therefore, no doubt that the house of Gaius is the place of hospitality by way of eminence, that which at Corinth is ever open to receive Christian strangers. From Gaius, the first member of the church of Corinth named here, the apostle naturally passes to two other distinguished Christians of the same church, and who had personal relations to some of the Christians of Rome. *Erastus*, occupying an exalted post in the administration of the city (probably as treasurer), cannot be the evangelist of this name mentioned Acts xix. 22; he is more likely the person of whom Paul speaks 2 Tim. iv. 20. We know nothing of *Quartus*.—One sees, then, that all these persons are placed with the order, tact, and discernment which never failed the apostle, even in the minutest details of his letters.

Ver. 24 in the T. R. is certainly unauthentic. Meyer quotes, to defend it, the repetition of the apostolic prayer, 2 Thess. iii. 5 and 18; but there no MS. omits it, while here

it is not found in any of the four oldest MSS. It is easy to see that certain copyists have transposed it hither from ver. 20, to place it, as is customary, at the close of the salutations.

Critical conclusion regarding the passage, vv. 21–24. — This short passage is acknowledged to be authentic, and to belong to the Epistle to the Romans, by Volkmar and Schultz. The latter has brought out forcibly the proof in its favour arising from the enumeration of the deputies of Macedonia, Acts xx. 4. He also rebuts the objection taken from the Latin origin of several of these names, by recalling the fact that Macedonia was peopled throughout with Roman colonists, which explains the propagation of Latin names in this province.—M. Renan infers from the salutations addressed in the name of several Macedonians, that we have here the conclusion of the copy intended for the church of Thessalonica. In arguing thus, he does not take account of the assembling in the city of Corinth of all the deputies of Greece and Asia who were to accompany Paul to Jerusalem.—We cannot discover in this passage the least word calculated to inspire doubts either as to its being composed by the apostle, or as to its original connection with the Epistle to the Romans.

THIRTY-FIRST PASSAGE (XVI. 25–27).

The Look Upwards.

Could the apostle have closed such an Epistle with the words: "and the brother Quartus"? After the final benediction, he had added the salutations of some eminent brethren who surrounded him, and who were connected with certain members of the church of Rome. But could he, having reached the close of such a writing, fail once more to lift his eye upwards and invoke on this work, the gravity of which he knew, and on the church for which it was intended, the blessing of Him who alone truly builds up and strengthens? He had done so several times, in the course of his writing, when concluding some important development. How could he avoid doing it with stronger reason at the close of the entire Epistle? In the somewhat exceptional presence of a doxology at the end of this letter, there is therefore nothing which of itself can inspire the least suspicion. Our one task is to

examine whether this passage comes up to the elevation of the apostle's mind, and agrees with his mode of writing; and then, if as a whole and in its details it possesses satisfactory appropriateness.

Vv. 25–27.[1] "*Now to Him that is of power to stablish you according to my gospel, and the preaching of Jesus Christ, according to the revelation of the mystery, which was kept secret during the eternal ages, but now is made manifest, and*[2] *by prophetical writings, according to the commandment of the everlasting God, made known to all the nations for the obedience of faith: to God only wise . . ., by Jesus Christ, whose*[3] *is the glory for ever and ever.*[4] *Amen.*"—Paul had in the preface of the Epistle expressed his desire to visit the Christians of Rome, that they might receive by his means an increase of *strength*, "εἰς τὸ στηριχθῆναι ὑμᾶς." This desire he has partly gratified by addressing to them this letter of instruction. But what are man's words when the obtaining of a true spiritual result is in question? A sounding brass. Hence the need of lifting his soul to Him who *can do* what man is incapable of producing: τῷ δυναμένῳ, *to Him that is of power.* The particle δέ, *now*, serves here to form the transition from the weak man who has just been writing, to the Almighty God, who can act. It is exactly the same connection as in the discourse of Paul at Miletus, Acts xx. 31 and 32.—We shall afterwards inquire after the verb, expressed or understood, on which this dative depends: *to Him that is of power.*—The verb στηρίζειν, *to stablish*, is absolute. There is no special reference to stablishing in faith or love. Paul means to speak of the firmness of the inner life in general, of that spiritual consistency against which all attacks from within and from without are defeated. He would have them all to become of the number of those *strong*, δυνατοί, of whom he has spoken, xv. 1. This strength embraces both inward emancipation of conscience in relation

[1] ℵ B C D E, some Mnn. It. Syr$^{sch.}$ read here, and here only, the doxology, vv. 25–27.—A P read it here and after xiv. 23.—L, more than 200 Mnn., and the Lectionaries read it only after xiv. 23.—F G omit it altogether. This was also done by Marcion, according to the testimony of Origen: "Caput hoc Marcion . . . de hac epistolâ penitus abstulit."

[2] The τε is wanting in D E, Syr.

[3] B Syr$^{sch.}$ omit ὦ.

[4] T. R., with B C, omit των αιωνων (*of the ages*).

to legal forms, and new life by the power of the Holy Spirit. —The increasing communication of this spiritual strength is connected by the apostle with a definite standard: *my gospel.* —He means thus to indicate the type of Christian doctrine which had been personally revealed to him (Gal. i. 11–16), and the two characteristic features of which were, as we have seen throughout this Epistle, the perfect *freeness,* and, as a consequence, the absolute *universality* of salvation. Salvation without any condition of previous *working,* salvation offered without distinction *to all:* such is, in two words, what Paul called *his gospel;* an expression which is found only in our Epistle (ii. 16) and 2 Tim. ii. 8. The power of God can act only in agreement with the thought of God. Now, Paul's gospel being the supreme thought of God, it follows that God's power can only be put forth in the heart of man in so far as this gospel is by it received and understood. Such is the meaning of the preposition κατά, *according to,* which must not be confounded either with ἐν, *in* (stablish *in the faith of* . . .), or with διά, *through* (stablish *by means of* . . .).—The following words: *and according to the preaching of Jesus Christ,* have been understood in this sense: "the preaching of which Jesus Christ is the author;" some, like Meyer, understanding thereby the preaching which Christ causes to sound through the world by the mouth of Paul; others, like Hofmann: the word as Christ preached it while He was on the earth. This last meaning is inadmissible; for Paul never alludes to the earthly preaching of Jesus Christ, which had been circumscribed within limits traced by His pedagogical condescension toward Israel. But neither does Meyer's meaning commend itself. Paul has no motive for here raising the particular idea that it is Christ Himself who preaches by his mouth. If we consider that the words: "the preaching of Jesus Christ," depend equally with the preceding term: "my gospel," on the preposition κατά, *according to,* we shall easily see that this complement: *of Jesus Christ,* can only designate here the *subject* of the preaching. The apostle wishes to efface what seemed too strongly personal in the standard: "according to *my gospel.*" Hence it is that he takes care to add: "and (in general) according to the preaching of which Christ is the subject." Indeed, the Christ proclaimed by the Twelve is the

same whom Paul preaches; comp. 1 Cor. xv. 11. It is Christ crucified and risen for us. And if the peculiar revelation which Paul received had for its effect to unveil new and unexpected consequences of the work of this Christ, it is nevertheless true that the Christ preached by him is the same as the Christ of apostolic preaching in general. We are not diverted from this so natural sense by the objection which Lucht draws from it: that this expression reveals a conciliatory tendency in regard to the Twelve which is incompatible with St. Paul's character. For we have found that this spirit of union was that of the apostle's whole ministry. Paul and Peter felt themselves radically at one, whatever even M. Renan may say, for each acknowledged the other's ministry as proceeding *from the same* God, who had confided to each what was peculiarly his own (Gal. ii. 7, 8).

We again find a regimen dependent on the preposition *κατά, according to: according to the revelation of the mystery* . . . And the question is, whether this regimen is parallel to those which precede, or whether, on the contrary, it depends on them. In the former case, it might be made to depend on the verb *stablish* (Meyer), or on the whole phrase: *to Him that is of power to stablish you* (Philippi). But in either construction it is impossible to escape from a sort of tautology with the preceding regimen. And it cannot be allowed that Paul would have thus co-ordinated two *κατά, according to,* without joining them by a copula. I think, therefore, that the second regimen must be regarded as dependent on the first. There is in the words *εὐαγγέλιον* and *κήρυγμα* (*gospel* and *preaching*) an active verbal notion: "*the act* of evangelizing, preaching," which allows this grammatical relation. The act of preaching is subject to a standard. The man does not discharge it in an independent and arbitrary manner. So Paul is careful to conform his evangelic preaching to the revelation he has received of the divine mind for the salvation of mankind. The regimen: *according to the revelation,* depends therefore on the two previous substantives.—God from eternity has conceived a plan on our behalf (1 Cor. ii. 7). This plan was *kept secret* for ages; and so long as man was not initiated into it, it remained a *mystery,* a thing inaccessible to man left to himself; comp. xi. 25. But now this eternal plan has been

unveiled. Realized through the appearing and work of Jesus Christ, it has been revealed by the Holy Spirit (1 Cor. ii. 7–12) to those who are called to make it known to the world, and specially to Paul, so far as concerns the Gentiles (Eph. iii. 2 and 3).—The contents of this *mystery* are, generally speaking, salvation in Christ, but more particularly in our passage, that salvation as it is to be preached to the Gentiles (Gal. i. 16),—to wit, that through faith they become *one body* in Christ with Jewish believers (Eph. iii. 4–6).—*The eternal ages* are the numerous ages which have elapsed between the creation of man and the appearing of Christ; comp. Tit. i. 2.

Ver. 26. With these times of silence there is contrasted that of divine speaking. The word *νῦν, now,* strongly expresses this contrast. The participle *φανερωθέντος, manifested,* refers to the inward revelation of the divine mystery by the Holy Spirit, which the apostles have received; comp. the perfectly similar expressions, Eph. iii. 5.—This act of revelation must necessarily be completed by another, as is indicated by the following participle: *γνωρισθέντος, published, divulged.* What the apostles received by revelation, they are not to keep to themselves; they are called to proclaim it throughout the whole world. These two participles are joined by the particle *τέ, and.* This mode of connection applies in Greek only to things of a homogeneous nature, and the one of which serves to complete the other. This peculiarity of the *τέ* suffices to set aside Hofmann's explanation, who translates: "manifested *now and by* the prophetical writings." For the two notions of the time and mode of revelation are too heterogeneous to be thus connected. And, moreover, it would follow from this explanation that the second participle (*γνωρισθέντος, published*) would be unconnected with the first by any conjunction, which is impossible. The Greco-Lats. and some versions omit the particle *τέ.* But it is a copyist's error well explained by Meyer. The words: *by prophetical Scriptures,* were connected with the preceding participle (*φανερωθέντος, manifested*), as nearer than the following one, and from this false connection arose the suppression of the *τέ.*—The second participle, *γνωρισθέντος, made known,* is determined by four regimens. The first refers to the *cause:* the divine command; the second to the *means:* prophetical Scriptures; the third to the *end:*

the obedience of the faith; the fourth to the *object*: all the Gentiles.

The *command of God* sounded forth by the mouth of Jesus when He said: "Go ye and teach all nations." This command was not the expression of a transient or secondary thought; it was the immutable and eternal thought, to which all the rest were subordinated, even the decree of creation. This is what the epithet *eternal*, given to God, is intended to remind us of. He remains exalted above all the phases through which the execution of His designs passes.

By the *prophetical Scriptures*, which are the *means* of the making known, all critics understand the prophetical books of the O. T. But how could Paul say: The gospel is proclaimed *by* these books? He has just declared, on the contrary, that the mystery had been kept secret up to the present time. It is answered, that the apostle is alluding to the use made of the writings of the prophets in apostolic preaching. But though these writings were a means of demonstration, they were not a means of making known; and yet this is what is expressed by the participle γνωρισθέντος. And, besides, why in this case reject the article which was necessary to designate these prophetical books as *well-known* writings; why say: "by *writings*"... and not: "by *the* writings of the prophets"? It might be answered, that Paul expresses himself in the same way in the passage i. 2; but there, the term *prophets* which precedes, and the epithet *holy* which accompanies, the word *Scriptures*, sufficiently determine the idea. It is not so here, where these writings are represented as the means of propagating a new revelation, and should consequently designate new prophetical writings. I think that the only explanation of this term in harmony with the apostle's thought is got from the passage which we have already quoted, Eph. iii. 3–6: "For God by revelation made known unto me the mystery, *as I wrote afore* in few words, whereby when ye read ye may understand my knowledge in the mystery of Christ, which in other ages was not made known unto the sons of men, as it is now revealed unto His holy apostles *and prophets* by the Spirit, that the Gentiles are fellow-heirs, and of the same body, and partakers of His promise in Christ by the gospel." The apostles are here

called *prophets*, inasmuch as they are bearers of a new revelation. What then are their writings, if not *prophetical writings?* Paul himself feels that the letter which he has just written has this character, and that it ranks among the means which God is using to carry out the publication of the new revelation. It is therefore of this very letter, as well as of the other letters which had proceeded from his pen, or from that of his colleagues, that he is speaking in our passage. And from this point of view the absence of the article is easily explained. Paul really means: "by prophetical writings." It is as it were a new series of inspired writings coming to complete the collection of the ancient and well-known books, even as the new revelation is the completion of the old.—The *end* is denoted by the words: *for the obedience of faith;* an expression which reproduces that of i. 5, and the meaning of which is, as we have proved there, the obedience to God *which consists of* faith itself.—Finally, *the object* of the publication: *to all the Gentiles* (nations); an expression similar to that of i. 5: *among all the Gentiles.* Paul thus ends where he had begun: with his apostleship to the Gentiles, which follows from the appearance of a new and final revelation, and of the full realization of God's eternal plan. The return to the ideas of i. 1–5 is evident.

Ver. 27. The dative τῷ δυναμένῳ, *to Him that is of power*, in ver. 25, has not yet found the verb on which it depends. It is evidently this same dative which, after the long developments contained in vv. 25 and 26, reappears in the words: *to God only wise.* The idea of God's power in ver. 25 was naturally connected with that of *stablishing;* and so the idea of the divine *wisdom* is joined here with the notion of the divine plan and its accomplishment, expounded in vv. 25 and 26. But on what does this dative of ver. 27, as well as that of ver. 25 which it takes up again, depend? Some answer: on the proposition following: "To Him is (or be) the glory!" But why in this case introduce the relative pronoun ᾧ, *to whom?* Why not say simply αὐτῷ, *to Him?* (Eph. iv. 20, 21). To make this construction admissible, all that would be necessary would be to reject this pronoun, as is done by the *Vatic.* and some Mnn. But these authorities are insufficient. And the reason of the omission is so easy to understand!

Must it then be held, as Meyer and many others do, that we have here, exactly in the last sentence of the Epistle, an inaccuracy? It is supposed that Paul, carried away by the great thoughts expressed in vv. 25 and 26, forgot the dative with which he had begun the sentence in ver. 25, and continues as if the preceding proposition were finished. But this remote dative, which Paul is thought to have forgotten, is evidently reproduced in this one: *to God only wise!* He has it therefore still present to his mind. Tholuck, Philippi, and others refer the relative pronoun ᾧ, *to whom*, not to *God*, but to *Jesus Christ;* they hold that, according to the apostle's intention, the doxology was originally meant to apply to God, the author of the plan of salvation, but that Paul, on reaching the close of the period, applied it to Christ, who executes the plan: "To God powerful . . . and wise [be glory], by Jesus Christ, to whom be glory for ever." This explanation would certainly be more tolerable than Meyer's. But we doubt whether the apostle's real meaning is thereby obtained. In fact, when he began his period with the words: *To Him that is of power to stablish you*, his intention was certainly not to terminate with this idea: To Him be glory! We glorify Him who *has done* the work; but as concerning Him who *is able* to do it, we look to Him to do it; we ask His succour; we express our confidence in Him and in His strength. Such was the inward direction of the apostle's heart when he began ver. 25 by saying: "To Him that is of power" . . ., exactly as when he closed his discourse to the elders of Ephesus, Acts xx. 32, by saying: "And now *I commend you to God* and to the word of His grace, *to Him that is of power* (τῷ δυναμένῳ) to build you up and give you the inheritance" . . . The idea understood, on which the dative of ver. 25 depends, is therefore that of commendation and confidence: "My eye, in closing, turns to Him who *is able*, and from whom I expect everything." This impulse Godwards, in which he desires his readers to join him, is so lively within his soul that he does not even feel the need of expressing it; he includes it in this reduplicated dative (τῷ δυναμένῳ and μόνῳ σοφῷ Θεῷ). And hence the proposition may be regarded as complete, and as terminating without any real inaccuracy in the doxological formula which closes the period and the whole

Epistle: "whose is the glory" . . . The full form would be: "I look with you all to Him who can stablish you . . . to God only wise, through Jesus Christ whose is [or be] the glory!"

The regimen: *through Jesus Christ*, is connected by Meyer with the word *wise*: "to God whose wisdom is manifested in Jesus Christ, in His person and work." But the expression: *only wise through Christ*, would not signify: who *has shown Himself* wise through Christ, but: who *is* really wise through Christ. And that is an idea which Paul could not enunciate. The words: *through Jesus Christ*, must therefore be referred to the understood thought which forms the basis of the whole preceding sentence: "I look to God, I wait on Him, for all that concerns you, through Jesus Christ." It is through Jesus Christ that the apostle sends up his supplication, as it is through Jesus Christ that there will come down on the Romans the help of God only strong and only wise.—If it is so, the relative pronoun *to whom* refers rather to Jesus Christ than to God. But it must be added that in his view the author and executor of the plan of salvation are so closely united, that it is difficult in this final homage to separate God to whom He looks, from Jesus Christ in whose name he looks. In the passage i. 7, the two substantives: *God* and *Jesus Christ*, are placed under the government of one and the same preposition; they may therefore be embraced here in one and the same pronoun.—The verb to be understood in the last proposition would certainly be ἔστω, *let it be*, if Paul had used the word δόξα, *glory*, without article. But with the article ("*the* glory") the verb ἐστί, *is*, must be preferred: "whose *is the* glory." It belongs to Him wholly throughout all eternity. For He has done everything in that work of salvation just expounded in the writing now closed.

Critical conclusion regarding the doxology, vv. 25–27, *and regarding* chaps. xv. *and* xvi.—The *authenticity* of vv. 25–27 has been combated in a thoroughgoing way by Reiche, Lucht, and Holtzmann.[1] Hilgenfeld, who against these critics defends the authenticity of chaps. xv. and xvi. in general, agrees with them on this point. M. Renan, on the contrary, ascribes the

[1] Reiche in his critical Commentary.—Lucht, *Ueber die beiden letzten Kap. des Römerbr.* 1871.—Holtzmann, *Epheser und Colosser Brief*, pp. 307–310.

composition of this passage to the apostle; but he regards it as the final particular of the copy addressed to a church unknown. In this copy these verses joined on immediately, according to him, to the end of chap. xiv. M. Reuss also supports their authenticity, and regards them as the conclusion of our Epistle, with which, according to him, they are intimately connected.

The following are the principal reasons alleged against the authenticity of the passage:—(1) The entire omission of these verses in Marcion and in two Mjj., and their transposal to the end of chap. xiv. in three Mjj. and in most of the Mnn. (2) The absence of similar sayings at the end of St. Paul's other Epistles. (3) The emphasis of the style and the heaping up of expressions which contrast with the ordinary sobriety of the Pauline language. (4) Certain echoes of expressions in use in the Gnostic systems of the second century. (5) The want of appropriateness and of all definite object.

1. As to Marcion, it is not surprising that he suppressed this passage, as well as so many others, in the letters of the one apostle whose authority he recognised. For this passage, by mentioning the *prophetical writings*, appeared to Marcion to connect the new revelation closely with that of the O. T., which absolutely contradicted his system.—We think we have explained at the end of chap. xiv. the transference of these verses to that place in some documents, as well as their omission or repetition in a very few documents. The position of the doxology at the end of the Epistle certainly rests on the concurrence of the most numerous and weighty authorities. 2. It is not surprising that in a letter so exceptionally important as this the apostle should not be satisfied with concluding, as usual, with a simple benediction, but that he should feel the need of raising his soul heavenwards in a solemn invocation on behalf of his readers. This writing embraced the first full exposition of the plan of salvation. If, on closing the different parts of the statement of this plan, his heart had been carried away by an impulse of adoration, this feeling must break forth in him still more powerfully at the moment when he is laying down his pen. 3. It is true the heaping up of clauses is great; but it arises from the strength of this inward impulse, and has nothing which exceeds the natural measure of Paul's style. The participle *γνωρισθέντος*, *made known*, ver. 26, is accompanied by four regimens; but in that there is nothing suspicious. The participle *ὁρισθέντος*, *established* (i. 4), has three, and an attribute besides; and the verb *ἐλάβομεν*, *we received* (i. 5), has three also, and, moreover, two objects. The passage, chap. v. 15–17, has given us a specimen of the way in

which Paul's nimble and fertile mind succeeded in cramming into a single sentence a wonderful mass of expressions and ideas. The one question, therefore, is whether there is a superfluous accumulation of identical expressions; now this is what cannot be proved. We have established the deliberate intention and precise import of every term in these verses, 25–27, as well as throughout the rest of the Epistle. 4. The analogies which Lucht thinks he has discovered with certain Gnostic terms are purely imaginary. The reader will judge of this from the examples quoted by Meyer. The expression *eternal ages*, Lucht would have it, refers to the æons of the Valentinian system. The term σεσιγημένου, *kept secret*, is related to the divine principle designated by the name σιγή, *silence*, in this same system. In speaking of *prophetical writings*, the author is alluding to the allegorical exegesis in use among the Gnostics.—Such criticism belongs to the domain of fancy, not of science. 5. The absence of definite aim cannot be charged against this passage, except in so far as the critic fails to understand the act of having recourse to God, which forms its essence, and which is intended to bring the whole church to the footstool of the throne from which strength comes down.

According to Reiche, the author of this doxology was an anagnost (public reader), who composed it with the help of the end of Jude's Epistle (vv. 24, 25), and of the last words of Heb. xiii. 21. But when from the parallel in Jude there is removed the word σοφῷ, *wise*, which is unauthentic, and the τῷ δυναμένῳ, which proves nothing (Acts xx. 32; Eph. iv. 20), what remains to justify the supposition of its being borrowed? The liturgical formula, Heb. xiii. 21, is so common that it can prove nothing. Would a compiler so servile as the one supposed by Reiche have composed a piece of such originality as this, in which there are found united as in a final harmony, corresponding to the opening one (i. 1–7), all the principal ideas of the preceding composition?—Holtzmann, in his treatise on the letters to the Ephesians and to the Colossians, supposes this passage to be the work of the unknown author, who, about the end of the first century, took to collecting St. Paul's Epistles. He began by giving in the Epistle to the Ephesians an amplification of a very short Epistle addressed by Paul to the Colossians; then he revised this latter by means of his previous work; finally, he set himself also to complete the Epistle to the Romans by this doxology by means of some passages of Ephesians and Colossians, where the same hymnological tone and the same tendency to amplification are to be remarked. The parallels which we have quoted in the course of exegesis

undoubtedly prove a certain analogy of thought and expression between our passage and these letters. But if Paul himself composed the latter three years after our Epistle, there is nothing wonderful in this coincidence. If, on the contrary, their author is a forger of the end of the first century, he must have had some point of departure in Paul's authentic writings for a composition of this kind, and the authenticity of our doxology is thus rendered probable by this very forgery. In any case, a forger would hardly have committed the apparent inaccuracy which is remarked in ver. 27. For it supposes an exaltation of feeling and thought which is at variance with a composition in cold blood. — Finally, to refute M. Renan's supposition, to which we have referred above, it is enough to read again the last verse of chap. xiv.: "What is not of faith is sin," and to attempt to follow it up with our ver. 25: "To Him that is of power to stablish you," etc., to measure the diametrical distance of ideas which separates these two verses, the one of which on this theory would be the sequel of the other!

There is but little more for us to add on chaps. xv. and xvi. taken as a whole. We have stated the numerous and contradictory hypotheses in which critics have indulged for more than a century in regard to these chapters. We have examined them passage by passage; they have appeared to us of little weight in detail; is it possible they have more force when applied to the whole? That Marcion rejected all, or perhaps only some parts of these chapters,[1] is of no importance; for the dogmatic nature of the motives which guided him is evident. As to the fact that the Tübingen school feel themselves obliged to follow this example, by rejecting the whole or nearly the whole, the reason of this critical procedure is not less clear; for these chapters, accepted as authentic, overturn Baur's hypothesis regarding the composition of the church of Rome, the aim of our Epistle, and in general the position taken up by Paul in relation to Judaism.—If Irenæus and Tertullian do not yet quote any passage from these last two chapters, it may only be an accident, like the absence of any quotation from the Epistle to Philemon

[1] There is room, indeed, for hesitation as to the meaning of the word *dissecuit* (*he mutilated*) in the passage in which Origen explains the course taken by Marcion (*ad Rom.* xvi. 25), a passage which we have only in Latin. Must this term be regarded as synonymous with *desecuit* (*he rejected*), a meaning which *dissecare* sometimes has in the vulgar Latin of that period? It is possible, but yet doubtful. What makes me think that the thing intended was a simple *mutilation*, is the to me evident contrast to the preceding expression relative to the doxology, vv. 25–27: *penitus abstulit* (*he wholly rejected*). Marcion, then, suppressed the doxology, and made simple rejections here and there in the rest of the two chapters; comp. Introd. I. p. 109.

in Irenæus or in Clement of Alexandria.—The apparent multiplicity of conclusions is the thing which seems to have told most forcibly on the mind of modern critics. Some have even been led by this circumstance to regard the whole closing part of our Epistle as an accidental collection of detached leaves, unrelated to one another. We think this impression superficial; it is dissipated by a profounder study. We have found that the conclusion, xv. 13, is intended to close the exhortation to union begun in chap. xiv., and that the prayer, xv. 33, is occasioned by the details which Paul has just given about his personal situation, and by the anxious fears he has expressed in regard to the journey which still lies between him and his arrival at Rome. The salutation of the churches, xv. 16, naturally attaches itself to those of the apostle. The prayer, xvi. 20*a*, is closely connected with the warning, in the form of a postscript, by which he has just put the church on its guard against the disturbers whose coming cannot be distant. Finally, the prayer which closes this verse is that which in all the other letters concludes the Epistle. As to the passage, vv. 23, 24, it is an appendix containing salutations of a private nature, of a very secondary character, and which lie, strictly speaking, beyond the Epistle itself. The prayer, ver. 24, is certainly unauthentic. Finally, the doxology is a last word fitted to sum up the whole work, by raising the eyes of the readers, with those of St. Paul himself, to the heavenly source of all grace and strength. This forms a natural whole; if we examine the details closely, there is nothing in them betraying a conglomerate. Besides, when indulging in such suppositions as those before us, sufficient account is not taken of the respect with which the churches cherished the apostolic writings which they might possess. They preserved them as precious treasures in their archives, and it would not have been so easy for an individual to introduce into them unobserved changes. The Epistle of Clement of Rome[1] was regularly read at Corinth in the second century. It was therefore always in hand. As much certainly was done for the apostolic writings. We know from declarations of the Fathers that these writings were kept at the house of one of the presbyters,[2] and that they were copied and reproduced for other churches, which asked to have them, only under strict control, and with the sort of attestation

[1] "This Sunday we have read your letter (that of Soter, Bishop of Rome), and by reading it regularly again hereafter, as well as that formerly written to us by Clement, we shall not fail to be well exhorted."

[2] Irenæus (*Hær.* iv. 26. 2) says: "Every question shall be decided for him as soon as he reads with care the Scriptures in the keeping of those who are presbyters in the church."

formally given: *correctly copied.*[1] We are therefore entitled to say, that so long as peremptory reasons do not force us to suspect the *general* tenor of the transmitted text, it has on its side the right of the first occupant.

[1] Tertullian (*Cont. Marc.* iv. 4) thus describes the mode in which the Gospels were communicated from one church to another: "the Gospels which we possess *per illas* (through the apostolic churches) *et secundum illas* (according to the copy which they caused to be made and collated for us)."

CONCLUSIONS.

I ANNOUNCED a chapter of conclusions, in which the results of the exegesis should be summed up. These conclusions will bear on three points,—

1. The critical questions stated and left open in the Introduction.
2. The importance of the writing.
3. Its true character.

I.—Critical Results.

The *integrity of the commonly transmitted text* has been verified as a whole. We have found, in particular, how little weight there is in the numerous and contradictory suppositions by which modern criticism seeks to dismember the last part of the Epistle from chap. xii. But we have pointed out in detail a considerable number of variants; about 270 in all, and among them a certain number on which it has been impossible for us to pronounce with certainty. We have remarked with tolerable distinctness three principal varieties of text: that which bears the name of Alexandrine; that which represents the form received in the countries of the West; and the third, which reproduces the text adopted in the Byzantine Church. The comparison of these three forms of the text has not made it possible for us to give in a general way the preference to any one over the two others. In every particular case in which they diverge we have been obliged to try them by the context, without being unduly influenced either by antiquity or number; and that all the more because we have frequently found the representatives of each of the three groups at variance with one another, and allying themselves capriciously with some members of the

two other families to support one and the same variant. In the few cases in which the three texts are well distinguished, and the witnesses of each precisely grouped, if our exegetical appreciation has not deceived us, the preference must be given to the Alexandrine text. In fourteen cases in which some documents of the three texts are at one, the true reading has, in every case, been preserved by their means. The Alexandrines are found in twenty-one cases in harmony with the Greco-Latin against the Byzantine, which in these cases has been judged thrice only superior to the two others. The Greco-Latins and the Byzantines are agreed eighteen times in opposition to the Alexandrine, which has proved in six cases superior to its two rivals. The Alexandrines and Byzantines harmonize thirty-five times against the Greco-Latin, which in four cases appears to us to have preserved the better reading. — In many cases experience has proved that a weakly supported and apparently more recent reading may be that which exegetical tact forces us to prefer.—In no case has a variant appeared to us of a nature to modify the apostolic conception of the gospel.[1]

Relatively to the founding, composition, and religious tendency of the *church of Rome*, we have found in the way of exegesis the confirmation of the results to which we were led in the Introduction by the historical data.

Though we knew absolutely nothing of the history of the church of Rome during the first two centuries, we should be forced by our Epistle itself, impartially consulted, to recognise in its founding the work of Paul's disciples and friends, in the majority of its members Gentiles by birth, and in its religious conception the type of the apostle to the Gentiles. For the first point we refer especially to xvi. 3 et seq.—For the second, to i. 5 and 6, 13–15, vii. 1, xi. 1, 13, 14, 28, 30, 31, xv. 12, 13, 15, 16, xvi. 26.—For the third, to i. 8, 11, 12, vi. 17, xiv. 1, xv. 1, 14, 15, xvi. 25.[2]—The manner

[1] We subjoin some special observations. The Received text in eleven cases agrees with the Mnn. only, and always erroneously.—It rests eight times on the Mj. L, and the Mnn. only, and five times, if we are not mistaken, with good reason. The MS. P, the form of which is somewhat indecisive, agrees sixteen times with the Byzantines, five times with the Greco-Latins, and four times with the Alexandrines; it is therefore rather Byzantine.

[2] I am glad to find these general results accepted and confirmed in the

in which Paul expresses himself in these passages forces us to choose between two alternatives: to accept the results which we have just expressed, or to ascribe tactics to the apostle according to which he would deliberately represent the state of things in such a way as to make it appear different from what it really was. Who would not judge such procedure unworthy of the character of such a man?

A third critical result is consequently this: The aim of our Epistle cannot have been to transform the convictions and tendency of the majority of the church of Rome, but solely, as St. Paul himself declares, both in beginning and concluding (i. 11 and xvi. 25), to *strengthen* them. He wished to confirm the believers of Rome by making the church rest on the foundation of solid and thorough instruction.—Neither does the Epistle present the least trace of a struggle already existing within the church. For this name cannot be given to the secondary ground of difference to which chap. xiv. applies; and the only passage which is directed against the Judaizing adversaries is found quite at the end of the Epistle (xvi. 17–20), and speaks of them as of enemies still at a distance. But it follows from this same passage that St. Paul foresaw their arrival as a thing certain, which naturally explains the need he felt of putting the church in a condition to resist such an attack. He had just seen his most flourishing

interesting article of Professor Chapuis (*Revue de théologie et de philosophie*, "L'Eglise de Rome au 1er siècle," Janvier 1880). The only point of any importance which divides us is the following: M. Chapuis thinks that the gospel, brought to Rome by Christians of the churches of the East, was first preached there, as well as at Antioch (see the καί, Acts xi. 20), in the synagogue. The agitations which led to the decree of Claudius were, he thinks, the effect of this preaching; and as to the chief of the synagogue (Acts xxviii.), who pretend not to know what this new doctrine is, we must regard their words as only "a prudent reserve on their part" in regard to Paul, who was to them a stranger. It would also follow that the founding of the church of Rome took place earlier than I think.—I do not believe that the conduct of the Jews of Rome can be explained thus. Neither do I think that the καί, *also*, Acts xi. 20, necessarily implies a public preaching in the *synagogue* of Antioch. And the passage, Rom. i. 8, which so strikingly recalls the saying, 1 Thess. i. 7, 8, seems rather to allude to a somewhat recent founding, which is not at all contradicted by other statements such as i. 13 and xv. 23.—But however that may be, I eagerly embrace the present occasion to thank Professor Chapuis for the kind and courteous tone which characterizes his whole article.

creations in Galatia and Achaia threatened with destruction by these relentless disturbers; and yet he had lived among those churches; he had himself founded and instructed them; what, then, was there not to be dreaded for the church of the capital of the world, founded merely by apostolic fellow-workers, when once it was put to the proof? It is also quite natural that before setting out for Jerusalem he should calmly propound his dogmatical and practical catechism, as he teaches it in all the churches which he is called to found, the gospel of salvation by faith which was revealed to him personally by the Lord, and that while taking account of the experiences made in the hot conflict which he has just been maintaining. The Epistle to the Romans is thus found to be at once the most perfect expression of his preaching and of his inner life, the triumphal arch raised on the battle-field after his recent victory, the normal conclusion of that period of his apostleship now brought to an end, and, if one may so speak, the *Ebenezer* of the apostle of the Gentiles.

II.—Importance of the Epistle.

From the theological point of view, the Epistle to the Romans appears to us as the first powerful effort of human thought to embrace in one survey the divine salvation realized in Jesus Christ, and to sum it up in a few fundamental points connected with one another by the closest possible rational and moral bond. It is not only the first *Dogmatic* which has continued to be the basis of all others, but also the first Christian *Ethic*. For, as we have seen, the practical part is not less systematically arranged than the doctrinal part. The plan of both is perfectly logical. Salvation in its objectivity *in Christ*, and as it is freely apprehended by faith; salvation realized in the *individual* by sanctification, the work of the Holy Spirit; salvation wrought out in the whole of *humanity* through the great passages of history, the plan of which God's finger has traced;—such is the doctrinal part. The life of the saved believer, explained first in its inward principle: *consecration to God* by the sacrifice of the body; this life manifesting itself in the two spheres, the *religious* and *civil*, there by humility and love, here by submission and righteous-

ness; this life finally moving on to its glorious *goal:* the return of Him who is to impress on it the seal of perfection; —such is the practical part. We doubt whether the precision of this primordial conception of Christ's work has ever been surpassed.

Apologetic also finds in this Epistle the most precious materials. Twenty-nine years after our Lord's death, Christianity had traversed continents and seas, and created a new society at Rome. What power of expansion and renovation!—A quarter of a century after the earthly existence of Jesus, His life was regarded as that of the second Adam, as the appearance of a new personal centre of the human species, as the principle of a universal restoration. The contemporaries of Jesus were still living, and His death was, in the eyes of the church, the expiatory sacrifice offered for all mankind, the supreme manifestation at once of God's righteousness and mercy. The fact of His resurrection was not only accepted and believed without question, but regarded as the revelation of a justification virtually pronounced in favour of every sinful man. Jesus had scarcely disappeared when already the eye of faith followed Him to the invisible world, and contemplated Him there as the Sovereign who, from the midst of His glory, filled all things, from heaven to the very place of the dead (chap. xiv.); the expectation of His return was the soul of the collective and individual life of all believers. The facts of His human life were still present to all minds, and already from Jerusalem to Rome the church recognised Him as a being whose *name* was to be *invoked* like that of God Himself (Rom. x. 12), and to whom the title of God could be applied without blasphemy (ix. 5). What an impression, then, must have been produced by that public activity of two or three years! And what must He have been, who in so short a time had graven so profound a mark in the consciousness of humanity?

It is not theology only, but human thought in general, which, by coming to this writing of Paul, drinks from new fountains. In the first two chapters, the *Philosophy of religion* can learn these two decisive truths: primitive revelation and human responsibility in the origin of polytheism. In chap. v. *Anthropology* can gather the fruitful propositions of the unity

of the human species and of the successive concentration of our race in two manifestations of a character at once generic and individual, the one issuing in ruin, the other in salvation. In pondering chap. vi., *Psychology* finds itself face to face with the terrible law in consequence of which man is every moment alienating something of his liberty of choice, by spontaneously subjecting himself to the good or bad principle to which he surrenders himself, and which will not fail henceforth to control him ever more completely. Chap. vii. furnishes the same science with an incomparable analysis of the natural state of the human soul created for good, and yet the slave of evil. Chap. viii. hands over to the *Philosophy of nature* the great idea of a future renovation of the universe, proceeding from the physical and moral regeneration of humanity. In chap. xi. there are traced the great lines of the *Philosophy of history*, and chap. xiii. is a no less sure guide for the *Philosophy of law* in investigating its fundamental notion, that of the state. On all these points, in regard to which human thought labours in all directions, the thought of Paul goes straight to the mark. The entire domain of truth seems to lie unveiled before him, while that of error seems on all sides to be closed to him.

But the essential matter, when it is sought to estimate the importance of such writing, is the full light which it casts on the *way of salvation* opened to sinful man. The apostle knows the unrest which troubles the depths of the human heart, and which keeps it separate from God and imprisoned in evil. And he understands that it is within those depths of the conscience, where the echo of divine condemnation resounds, that a saving transformation must first of all be wrought. Hence the first gift of grace which the gospel offers to man is, according to him, the gift of his justification, without any other condition than that which every one may fulfil at once—faith. This first act done, man is free from his guilt in relation to his God; no cloud any longer troubles his relation to Him; peace takes the place of the inward unrest; and in this state of inward tranquillity there may be sown *the fruit of righteousness*, sanctification. The reconciled man becomes open to the communication of the Divine Spirit. As naturally as this guest must withdraw from a condemned

heart, so necessarily does He come to dwell in the man whom nothing any longer separates from God; and he realizes within him Christ's life and death in the measure in which this life and death have been apprehended by his faith. Finally, to him who walks in this way there opens up in the distance a new gift, the renewing of his body and the inheritance of glory, through his complete transformation into the likeness of the glorified Christ. What clearer, what simpler, what at once more really divine and human, than this *order of salvation* traced by the apostle; and what a seal has not the experience of ages impressed on this exposition contained in the first eight chapters of our Epistle! Let not him who desires to see such a work accomplished within himself, or who proposes to carry it out in others, emancipation from guilt and victory over sin, take to the task in any other way, if he would not fail miserably!

III.—The True Nature of this Apostolic Writing.

There remains to us a last question to be examined: Is the conception of the way of salvation, which St. Paul has expounded in the Epistle to the Romans, a creation of his powerful understanding, or a revelation of God's mind on the subject? This dilemma may be thought imperfect; it may be said that a certain divine illumination does not exclude the exercise of the understanding, and that inward meditation is a means of bringing help from above. Of this there is no doubt, and yet in the case before us the question must be pressed more closely. Does Paul give us here a view to which he has raised himself by the exercise of his mind, or, on the contrary, the thought of God which was communicated to him by a direct operation of the Spirit for the purpose of initiating him, and through him the world, into the eternal plan of divine salvation? In the latter case we have a *witness* speaking, in the former a genius speculating. In this case we find here a sublime thought, but a thought which may some day be surpassed by one more elevated still; in the former case, it is the thought of God re-thought and expounded by man at a given time, not to be perfected in the future, but to be appropriated as it is by every soul desirous

of salvation. In the first case, the Epistle of Paul deserves our admiration; in the second, our faith. It is clear that the difference is great, and that the question cannot be declared idle.

We know of no peremptory answer to this question except that which Paul's own consciousness gives to it. With the first words of his Epistle, he places the contents of this writing under the warrant of the Christ who called him to it, that Christ who, born a son of David, has by His resurrection recovered His essential dignity as the Son of God, by means of which He embraces in His salvation not only the Jews, but the whole Gentile world. His apostleship is the work of this universal Lord, and his writing the fruit of this apostleship. To this first word of the Epistle must be added the last, xvi. 25: "according to my gospel and the preaching of Jesus Christ, *according to the revelation* of the mystery which was kept secret during eternal ages, and now is made manifest." The evangelical conception which the apostle developes is therefore, according to him, God's eternal thought, which He had kept secret from the creation, and which, after the coming of Jesus Christ, was revealed to him—to him, Paul—with the mission to make it known to the Gentiles whom it more directly concerned; and hence it is that he can justly call it *his gospel.* Such is the apostle's inward conviction. It is likewise expressed, Gal. i. 11 and 12: "I certify you that the gospel which was preached of me is not after man; for I neither received it of man, neither was I taught it, but by the revelation of Jesus Christ." And hence he writes to the Thessalonians (First Epistle, iv. 8): "He that despiseth us, despiseth not man, but God;" and to the Ephesians (iii. 2–4): "It was by revelation God made known unto me the mystery, as I wrote afore in few words;" and this is what constitutes the allotment of evangelical grace and light which God has specially imparted to him for the accomplishment of his task within the apostleship common to him and to the Twelve (ver. 2). By appearing to him on the way to Damascus, Christ made Saul an apostle; and by the revelation which followed, He bestowed on him the endowment necessary for the fulfilling of his apostleship.

In all this, could Paul have been the victim of an illusion?

Could this divine calling, this supernatural revelation, be only a fruit of his pious imagination? We have examined this question in the Introduction of this commentary, and from the historical viewpoint at least we have not to return to it. But there are two points which we feel bound to bring out here, which seem to us in a peculiarly striking way to characterize the Epistle to the Romans. The first is the penetrating logic, the sure sweep of vision which the apostle shows in the discussion of the different subjects which he takes up. Not an exaggeration, not a digression. The hot conflict which he had been maintaining in the previous years with the partisans of the legal system, might have predisposed him to go beyond the limit of truth on some points in estimating Judaism. The incline was slippery; of this we may easily convince ourselves, by seeing into what errors it carried the authors of the so-called Epistle of Barnabas and of the letter to Diognetus, and finally Marcion. And yet these men had guides before them, Paul's writings and the Epistle to the Hebrews, which might have helped them to weigh their judgments. Paul had none but himself; he was under the influence of the strong reaction against the law into which his sudden change had thrown him, and of the violent resentment which must have been produced in him by the injustice and hatred of his Judaizing adversaries. And yet he moves, without wavering for an instant, on the straight line of truth, exhibiting the divinity of the ancient dispensation, and at the same time its profound contrast to the new, so that the result of his exposition is a complete view both of the difference and of the harmony between the two economies of salvation. And the same is the case, as we have seen, in all the questions which he touches. In matters where we still detect our modern writers, even the most sagacious and Christian, flagrantly guilty of exaggeration to the right or to the left, we discover in the apostle's view a fulness of truth which constantly excludes error.—The second feature which strikes us in his writing is the perfect calmness with which he seems to handle truth. He does not seek it, he has it. Compare the Epistle to the Romans with Pascal's *Thoughts*, and the distance will be seen between the apostle and the thinker of genius. It is also evident that the apostle himself draws his life from

the faith which he preaches; he has faith in his faith as one cannot have in his thought, for the very simple reason that this faith is not his discovery, but the gift of God. Besides, St. Paul was not unaware of the illusions which a man may form in regard to false inspirations. If we bear in mind how he has put the Corinthians on their guard against the abuse of the gifts of the Spirit (First Epistle, xiv.), it will suffice to show us that in such a domain he could not easily be the dupe of his imagination.

And let us not forget that the experience of ages has spoken. It has put its seal to the conviction which the apostle bore within him, that in *his Gospel* he was giving to the world, not his own thought, but that of God. For history shows that a truly powerful and healthy Christianity has never developed except on the way of salvation traced by St. Paul. Where can we find a sinner who has found full relief for his conscience in relation to God, otherwise than by the gift of free justification? A sinner who has been put in possession of a sanctification decisively cutting short the dominion of sin over the heart and body, otherwise than through the spirit of life bestowed in Jesus Christ on the sinner justified by Him?

The New Testament contains two writings which admirably complete one another, the Epistle to the Romans and the fourth Gospel. The one presents for our contemplation the object of faith in its grander and perfect beauty: the union of man with God realized in One, in order to be at length realized through Him, in all; the other initiates us into the means of apprehending the salvation thus realized in one for all, and of appropriating it: the act of faith. There, the ideal realized, shining as on a celestial summit; here, the arduous pathway by which sinful man may succeed in reaching it. Let the church constantly possess herself of the Christ of John by means of the faith of Paul,—and she will be preserved, not from persecution, but from a more terrible enemy, death.

MORRISON AND GIBB, EDINBURGH,
PRINTERS TO HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

00111692

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 18 July, 2018